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Introduction 
“It is important to remember that foreign assistance is not charity or a favor we do for other 
nations. It is a strategic imperative for America. It lifts others up, and then reinforces their 
willingness to link arms with us in common endeavors.”1   
         - U.S. Secretary of State, John Kerry, 2013 
 
Since the end of World War II, the successive United States administrations have provided 
billions of American taxpayers’ dollars to numerous countries, international organizations, 
and non-Government Organizations (NGOs) throughout the world. For the better part of the 
last half-century, the U.S. has stood unchallenged atop the donor pyramid as the biggest 
donor in terms of amount of money donated.2 American foreign assistance has built schools 
and hospitals in the far reaches of Africa and Latin America, and has contributed to economic 
development in every corner of the globe, with varying degrees of success. Bags of flour 
stamped with the American flag and the words “a Gift from the American People,” can be 
seen in every part of the world that is suffering from a natural disaster, or from political crises 
and their usual consequences of economic and social hardships. This vast empire of 
assistance serves and protects the interests of the United States in no lesser way than 
America’s military might and diplomatic corps. Foreign assistance has become an 
indispensable tool of American statecraft.  
There are numerous benefits and considerable advantages to using this tool. Besides 
the obvious fact that foreign assistance costs less money, and fewer lives than wars, it also 
has numerous economic benefits such as providing American farmers and manufacturers with 
markets for their products, and helping them get rid of surplus goods. It improves the 
standing of the U.S. in the world by demonstrating to the world that America is indeed a 
“City upon a Hill,” the world leader who aids the needy and supports the disadvantaged, a 
shining example to other nations.3 Foreign assistance serves the interests of the U.S., as 
Secretary of State John Kerry argued in the quote above, by binding other countries to the 
U.S., not just diplomatically and politically, but also economically. Furthermore, foreign aid 
can prove to be a useful tool in influencing other countries to adopt policies and stances that 
further American foreign policy goals and objectives, whether these objectives are political, 																																																								
1 Secretary of State, John Kerry, U.S. Department of State, Executive Budget Summary: Function 150 & Other 
International Programs: Fiscal Year 2014 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 2014), 2. 
2 Mark Anderson, "Foreign Aid Close to Record Peak After Donors Spend $135 bn in 2014," The Guardian, 
April 8, 2015.  
3 The origin of the phrase dates back to John Winthrop’s “A Model of Christian Charity,” 1630 sermon. It has 
since been used within the context of “American Exceptionalism” by various presidents, including John F. 
Kennedy, and Ronald Reagan. See Hilde Restad, American Exceptionalism: an Idea That Made a Nation and 
Remade the World, Routledge Studies in US Foreign Policy (New York: Routledge, 2014), 41-42. 
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economic, or ideological. Few may have put it more bluntly and succinctly than former 
Congressman Howard Berman (D-California) when he said, 
“Aid is not a gift… the United States provides foreign 
assistance because it serves our interests… There is no 
escaping our obligations, not only because we are morally 
bound to meet them, but because our economic and 
political interests demand that we address widespread 
poverty and chaos in the world. Our health, our security, 
and our prosperity are advanced by a world in which basic 
human needs are met, fundamental freedoms are 
respected, conflicts are resolved peacefully and the 
world’s resources are used wisely.”4  
 
There are numerous benefits for the recipients as well. Leaders in recipient countries 
need the various forms of assistance in order to bring about economic development, political 
stability, and socioeconomic prosperity, and thereby improve their chance of being re-
elected, or staying in office where such practices as elections are rare. In most cases, the 
recipients have to meet certain conditions in order to receive this assistance. Aid conditions 
are imposed in different forms, they could take the shape of economic reforms; opening 
markets to foreign investment, allowing more freedom for private sector businesses, reducing 
taxes on imports, etc. There are also conditions that require political reforms that may include 
providing more individual freedoms, lifting restrictions on speech and the press, holding free 
and fair elections, changing stance at the UN, and making specific policy adjustments on 
certain issues. 
 Such adjustments, which are more in line with the view of the U.S. administration, 
may prove costly domestically, but the recipient still carries them out because the benefits of 
receiving aid outweigh the cost. Or to put it differently, if the recipient does not meet these 
conditions, the cost of missing out on American aid can prove detrimental to their ability to 
conduct their politics and run their economy, or worse, the recipient could face economic 
sanctions. In theory, the process may suggest a result of win-win situation, in reality 
however, the process does not always yield such results. Worse still, in some cases there are 
unintended consequences, and even perverse consequences that make aid a cause for crisis 
rather than a tool of advancing peace and socioeconomic prosperity. These unintended and 
perverse consequences of aid are the subject of this research.  
																																																								
4 U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs- Democrats, "Congressman Howard Berman 
Releases Discussion Draft of Foreign Assistance Reform Plan," news release, September 8, 2011. 
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The case of the Palestinian National Authority (PA) serves as a prime example of 
these consequences. The PA was born as a result of the peace process between Israel and the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). The PA is made up mostly of individuals 
affiliated with the Palestinian National Liberation Movement (Fatah), which until 2006 was 
the largest and most influential political party within the PLO and the Palestinian Territories. 
The PA has been the governing body of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip since 1994, as 
agreed upon by the PLO and Israel in the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-
Government Agreements, better known as the Oslo Accords and the subsequent peace 
agreements. The goal was to establish a “Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority […] 
for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not 
exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council 
Resolutions 242 and 338.”5  
This self-government authority relies heavily on foreign assistance, making the 
Palestinian population the highest recipients of foreign aid per capita in the world.6 Foreign 
aid amounts to approximately 30 percent of the PA’s $4 billion annual budget, and 20-30 
percent of this aid is provided by the U.S. federal government, making it the single largest 
bilateral state donor.7 Another 60 percent of the budget is tax revenues collected by Israel and 
is often withheld by the Israeli government depending on the relations between the two, 
making foreign assistance all the more important for the PA, and American assistance most 
paramount of all.8 While the majority of aid to the PA comes from the European Union, 
European aid has generally been more consistent in terms of delivery, and less political than 
its American counterpart.9 Member states of the Arab League have also paid substantial 
amounts in aid to the Palestinian Authority.10 Other major bilateral donors include Norway, 																																																								
5 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (IMFA), Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Declaration of Principles on 
Interim Self-Government Arrangements, September 13, 1993, Vol. Article I (online: Israel Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. 
6 Jeremy M. Sharp and Christopher M Blanchard, Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress: 
U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians (Online: Federation of American Scientists, 2006), Summary, 1. 
7  Based on author calculations from Orhan Niksic, Nur Nasser Eddin, and Dana Almubaied, "Economic 
Monitoring Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee," (Online: The World Bank,  2015). And Palestinian 
Ministry of Finance, "General Budget Law: Fiscal Year 2015," (Online: Palestinian Ministry of Finance,  2015). 
And data from Global Humanitarian Assistance, "West Bank and Gaza Strip: Profile," ed. UK based NGO: 
Global Humanitarian Assistance (2015). 
8  Mohsen Moh'd Saleh, "The Economic Situation in the West Bank and Gaza- The PA's General Budget 
(Ramallah)," in The Palestinian Strategic Report 2010/2011, ed. Mohsen Moh'd Saleh (Online: Al Zaytouna 
Center for Studies and Cosultations, 2012); "Abbas Threatens to Turn to ICC over Withheld Tax Funds," The 
Times of Israel, April 6, 2015.  
9 Development Researchers' Network et al, "Evaluation of the European Union's Cooperation with the Occupied 
Palestinian Terriroty and Support to the Palestinian People- Evaluation Carried out on Behalf of the European 
Commission," (Online: The European Commission,  2014). 
10 Assistance, "West Bank and Gaza Strip: Profile." 
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Japan, and Canada, as well as the United Nations.11 The fact that U.S. aid has been the largest 
in terms of quantity, and the most political in terms of its conditionality and effect, makes it a 
perfect example for the questions this study seeks to answer. 
This study focuses on the political impact of American foreign aid and American aid 
conditionality on Palestinian politics. It examines the role of American foreign aid in shaping 
the bilateral American-Palestinian relationship, and more specifically the role of this impact 
in feeding the discontent with the peace camp represented by President Mahmoud Abbas and 
Fatah. The study evaluates the use of foreign aid as a policy tool in achieving the objectives 
of U.S. foreign policy in the region such as advancing the cause of peace in an unstable part 
of the world that is of paramount geopolitical significance to U.S. interests and protecting 
Israel as America’s closest Middle East ally. 
The study finds that American foreign aid has played an instrumental role in the 
development of American-Palestinian relations, and that the use of aid as a policy tool has 
had unintended political consequences, particularly undermining the position of Abbas. There 
are two ways in which the U.S. has used foreign aid to influence the Palestinian leadership, as 
a reward and as punishment. The first involves providing aid as inducement; supporting the 
PA’s budget and security sector in return for policy concessions and adjustments, and the 
second involves withholding aid when the PA refused to act in accordance with the U.S.’s 
views. The study finds that neither of these ways has been particularly effective. On the 
contrary, using aid has sometimes negatively affected the public standing of the Palestinian 
leadership. By demanding policy adjustments and concessions at the risk of losing American 
aid, the U.S. has on multiple occasions put the Palestinian leadership, president Abbas, and to 
a lesser extent Yasser Arafat before him, at odds with the Palestinian public. Furthermore, the 
study finds that providing assistance, particularly to the PA’s security apparatus, has played a 
role in alienating Abbas from his constituents.  
There is an important issue that must be addressed at this juncture. This research 
argues that the U.S. uses foreign assistance as a means to influence the PA, rather than 
destroy it, or dismantle it. The U.S., and to a great extent, Israel, are interested in preventing 
the collapse of the PA for two related reasons. The first is that Fatah and the PA remain the 
only political institutions within Palestinian politics that are interested in reaching a 
negotiated peace settlement with Israel. Dismantling the PA would almost certainly result in 
further radicalization in the Palestinian territories, and may well result in expansion of both 																																																								
11 Ibid. 
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the authority and legitimacy of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) and other militant 
factions. The second reason is that the PA security apparatus serves Israel’s security. If this 
apparatus is dismantled, or radicalized, it would represent a serious security concern to Israel. 
Dismantling the PA seems to be leverage the Palestinian leadership threatens to exercise, 
rather than a goal of either U.S. or Israel’s foreign policy.  
This study focuses on the ways through which the U.S. attempted to influence the 
Palestinian leadership, and the effectiveness of this use in achieving America’s foreign policy 
objectives. The U.S. has a long history of using foreign aid to achieve certain policy 
objectives, and the Palestinian case is not an exception in this sense, but rather a continuation 
along a consistent historical pattern.  
Background 	
On January 25, 2006, nearly one million Palestinians went to election booths across the West 
Bank, the Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem to participate in the first legislative elections in a 
decade.12 The voters were to elect 132 representatives to the Palestinian Legislative Council 
(PLC), unbeknownst to them that their vote would herald the dawn of a new era in 
Palestinian politics, an era that began with the hope of elections and all that entails of 
optimism regarding political and social stability. Ten years have come and gone since that 
dawn, and the Palestinians are still waiting to see the first beam of light. The election results 
saw Fatah, which had dominated Palestinian politics for the previous 50 years, give way 
before Hamas, whose emphasis on liberating historic Palestine by military means, its 
adamant refusal to recognize the existence of Israel as a legitimate state, and its attacks 
against Israeli civilians, have placed it on many lists of terrorist organizations.13 Shortly after 
the elections, the U.S. and the EU suspended foreign assistance to the PA until Hamas 
changed its platform.14 
This shift in Palestinian politics, from center-left to right, was as clear a message as 
the Palestinians could send in 2006; they were in desperate need for change. In his first 
response to the results, President George W. Bush (2001-2009) accepted Hamas’ victory, 																																																								
12 Steven Erlanger, "Palestinians Vote in First Legislative Elections in a Decade," The New York TImes, January 
25, 2006.  
13 Countries include Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, United States, and of course Israel and most recently 
Egypt. There is an ongoing debate in the EU regarding Hamas’ status, after European Court of Justice ruling in 
December 2014 ruled Hamas off the list. The EU launched an appeal and the movement remains on the list for 
the time being. See Peter Beaumont, "Hamas Taken off EU Terror Blacklist," The Guardian, December 17, 
2014.  And AFP, "EU Keeps Hamas on Terror List Despite Court Ruling," YnetNews, March 27, 2015.  
14 David Gow and Conal Urquahart, "EU Suspends Aid to Palestinian Authority," The Guardian, April 11, 
2006. ; Sharp and Blanchard, "CRS Report for Congress: U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians," i. 
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albeit grudgingly, and warned at the same time that Hamas had to change its position with 
respect to Israel.15 President Bush stated that the results represented a rejection of the “status 
quo,” and that they expressed a need for a change from the “old guard” who had failed to 
provide	 honest government and services.16 The old guard refers to Fatah and Abbas, who 
succumbed to pressure by the Bush administration to hold these elections in the first place.17 
Abbas and Arafat before him did indeed fail miserably at providing honest government and 
services.18 The state institutions they have led have suffered from nepotism, severe corruption 
on practically every level, bankruptcy, authoritarianism, and perhaps worst of all, loss of 
legitimacy among Palestinians.19 
Shortly before the elections, in a pre-emptive measure, the United States House of 
Representatives passed resolution 575, which stated that “terrorist organizations, such as 
Hamas, should not be permitted to participate in Palestinian elections until such organizations 
recognize Israel's right to exist as a Jewish state, cease incitement, condemn terrorism, and 
disarm and dismantle their terrorist infrastructure.”20 The resolution warns that including 
Hamas or any terrorist organization in the PA government will “potentially undermine the 
ability of the United States to have a constructive relationship with, or provide further 
assistance to, the Palestinian Authority.”21 Later in 2006, congress passed the Palestinian 
Anti-Terrorism Act of 2006, prohibiting aid to the PA under Hamas’ control until such time 
as Hamas agrees to abandon terrorism, recognize Israel, respect already signed agreements 
and dismantle terrorist infrastructure, among other conditions.22 The act passed both houses 
by overwhelming majority, and was signed into law by president Bush in December 2006.23 
																																																								
15 Years in brackets following names of U.S. presidents indicate their time in office. 
16 President George W. Bush, Public Papers of the Presidents of the U.S.- Administration of  George W. Bush: 
The President's News Conference, January 26, 2006 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 
2006), 130. 
17 Steven R. Weisman, "Bush Defends His Goal of Spreading Democracy to the Mideast," The New York TImes, 
January 27, 2006.  
18 For a very critical account of Abbas and Arafat’s leadership, see Jonathan Schanzer, State of Failure: Yasser 
Arafat, Mahmoud Abbas, and the Unmaking of the Palestinian State (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 
19  Graham Usher, "The Democratic Resistance: Hamas, Fateh, and the Palestinian Elections," Journal of 
Palestine Studies 35, no. 3 (2006): 22. 
20 United States House of Representatives, "H.Res.575 - Asserting that Hamas and other terrorist organizations 
should not participate in elections held by the Palestinian Authority, and for other purposes"- December 16, 
2005, 109 Cong., 1 sess. (Library of Congress, 2006), 3. 
21 Ibid. 
22 United States Congress, United States Congress, Public Law 109-446, Palestinian Anti-Terrorism Act of 
2006, 109 Cong., 2 sess., Vol. Congressional Record, Vol. 152 (2006) (online: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 2006).  
23 President George W. Bush, "Statement on Signing the Palestinian Anti-Terrorism Act of 2006," in The 
American Presidency Project, Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley. 
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The Quartet, a committee comprised of the United States, the United Nations, Russia, 
and the European Union, was formed in Madrid in 2002 to serve as the mediator of the 
Middle East peace process, with former British Prime Minister Tony Blair as its special 
envoy to the Middle East to facilitate communication between the parties. On January 30, the 
Quartet issued a statement in which it concluded,  
“… that it was inevitable that future assistance to any 
new government would be reviewed by donors against 
that government’s commitment to the principles of 
nonviolence, recognition of Israel, and acceptance of 
previous agreements and obligations...”24 
 
According to local as well as the international observers who supervised the elections, 
which included the Carter Center and the National Democratic Institute, the election was fair 
and free.25 Over 17,000 observers oversaw the election, with 900 credentialed international 
monitors, who agreed that, “the conduct of the election was widely considered to be free and 
fair.”26 
Despite the fairness of the elections, the U.S. and the E.U., suspended foreign aid to 
the PA and left the average Palestinians in these territories with little support. Palestinians 
were, and have been the largest recipients of foreign aid per capita in the world and the loss 
of this aid was devastating to their livelihoods and economy.27 The international donors 
demanded that the new Hamas government accepts and recognizes Israel’s right to exist, a 
condition that Hamas rejected but offered to accept a long term truce with Israel should the 
latter agree to withdraw to the 1967 border, but remained adamant in its refusal to officially 
recognize Israel as a state.28 
For American policy makers, Fatah is the political party that began the peace process 
with Israel, and signed the Oslo Accords and the subsequent agreements with Israel. Hamas 
on the other hand, is a terrorist organization that does not distinguish between civilian and 
military targets. It is after all the infamous movement that planted bombs and carried out 
suicide attacks against Israeli buses, nightclubs, cafes and restaurants. Hamas has adopted 
violent methods to achieve what they call the liberation of the historic land of Palestine, and 																																																								
24 United Nations Organization, "Quartet Statement," news release, January 30, 2006. 
25 The Carter Center, "Palestinian Elections: Trip Report by Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter," (2006). 
"Final Report on the Palestinian Legislative Council Elections,"  (Washington D.C.: National Democratic 
Institute for International Affairs,  2006). 
26 Aaron D. Pina, Congressional Research Service, Report for Congress: Palestinian Elections (Online: 
Federation of American Scientists, 2006), 9-10. 
27 Sharp and Blanchard, "CRS Report for Congress: U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians," Summary, 1. 
28 Mahmoud al-Zahar, interview by Wolf Blitzer, January 29, 2006, "Hamas Leader Sets Conditions for Truce". 
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for that, the U.S. has never had any diplomatic relations or official communication with the 
movement. Consequently, the U.S. State Department has placed the organization on the list 
of foreign terrorist organizations since 1997. 29  Therefore, the choice before the U.S. 
administration has always been an easy one to make, supporting Fatah was the policy and 
ensuring that it remained in power was the objective.  
Fatah had demonstrated flexibility and willingness when it came to compromising on 
what the Palestinians believe to be their historic rights, since such compromise was essential 
to the success of the peace process.30 These historic rights, in the Palestinian view include 
Israel’s withdrawal to the pre-1967 borders, the return of the refugees who were displaced 
following the founding of Israel, and the establishment of a free and independent Palestinian 
state. The concessions, or policy adjustments, were required of Yasser Arafat and later 
Mahmud Abbas, to maintain the flow of international aid to the PA government. This 
dilemma raises the following questions; has Fatah’s close relationship with the United States, 
who is Israel’s closest ally, contributed to Fatah’s loss of popularity among Palestinians? And 
further, has American foreign policy in general, and what it entailed of financial assistance to 
the PA more specifically, contributed to Fatah’s decline? In other words, have the policy 
adjustments required of Fatah in order to receive foreign aid, contributed to the party’s 
decline in general and its failure in 2006 in particular? The answers to these questions are the 
subject of this research. 
In Hamas’ view, participation in the 2006 elections was a national and religious duty 
and necessity; the Palestinian cause was at stake, the security situation was deteriorating as 
armed gangs of political parties roamed the streets freely, and fiscal and political corruption 
had manifested itself in every layer of the Palestinian political structure. Perhaps worst of all, 
Fatah was willing to compromise of what Hamas perceived to be indisputable rights of the 
Palestinians.31 
Hamas’ victory was a major blow to an already struggling peace process in the 
Middle East. Since its victory, Hamas embarked on a struggle for power with Fatah that 
culminated in the military takeover of the Gaza Strip, and the resounding defeat of the PA’s 
forces in 2007. Today, Fatah remains in control of the West Bank and Hamas of the Gaza 
Strip. Since the takeover, Hamas has improved its fighting ability many folds, as the 																																																								
29  United States Department of State- Bureau of Counter Terrorism, "Foreign Terrorist Organization," (online: 
U.S. Department of State), 5, 158; United States Department of State Bureau of Counter Terrorism, "Country 
Reports on Terrorism 2014," (Online: U.S. Department of State,  2015). 
30 Emad Muhsin. Interview by author, Gaza City, July 15, 2013. 
31 Ahmed Yousef, interview by Author, July 29, 2014, Gaza City. 
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successive wars with Israel in recent years have proved. Since 2007, three serious military 
confrontations took place, and each time Hamas produced more advanced military 
capabilities and tactics, or what they refer to as “surprises.”32 However, Hamas’ real strength 
lies in the fact that it enjoys much support among the Palestinian populous, as well as the 
backing of the transnational “Society of the Muslim Brothers,” better known as the Muslim 
Brotherhood. For the U.S., a stronger Hamas means little to no chance of peace, since the 
movement has rejected the U.S. conditions for dialogue, and has demonstrated limited 
flexibility when it came to changing its platform. But Fatah, as it stands now, is too weak, 
fragmented, corrupt, and its leadership lacks the trust and the popular support it enjoyed in 
the early years of the peace process to face the firm challenges Hamas presents, and even be 
able to sell, for the lack of a better term, any future agreements with Israel to the Palestinian 
people. 
	 A distinction must be made at this point between Fatah, the PLO, and the PA. Despite 
the fact that the three political entities are chaired by Mahmoud Abbas, they remain distinct 
political institutions, in theory at least. This research discusses the roles and history of these 
institutions at a later point. For now, it suffices to know that the PLO is an umbrella 
organization that was founded in 1964 and it encompasses several Palestinian factions across 
the political spectrum, including Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
(PFLP,) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), among others.  
There are two Islamist political parties that emerged in the 1980s, the Palestinian Islamic 
Jihad, founded in 1981, and Hamas founded in 1987. The two parties have never been a part 
of the PLO, and are designated as terrorist organizations by the U.S. It is important to keep in 
mind that the U.S. does not officially send aid to the PLO.33 Until the late 1980s, the U.S. had 
no official diplomatic relations with the PLO and on numerous occasions, PLO factions, 
including Fatah, were involved in terrorist activities that claimed American lives. Until the 
present, some of the political parties within the PLO, such as the PFLP, remain on the State 
Department’s terror list.34 
Fatah is a political faction with its own military wings and sub organizations whereas 
the PA is the official governing authority of the Palestinian territories. As already mentioned, 
the PA was created as a result of the peace process to serve the Palestinians’ transition to 																																																								
32 Hamas military commanders in Beit Hanoun; Sh. A, and Ma. A, conversation with author, June 10, 2014. Beit 
Hanoun. 
33 Jim Zanotti, "CRS Report for Congress: U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians," ed. Congressional Research 
Service (Washington D.C. 2014), 11. 
34 Bureau of Counter Terrorism, "Country Reports on Terrorism 2014," 5, 177-79. 
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statehood. The various governments that have led the PA have been compromised mostly of 
Fatah loyalists. Moreover, the vast majority of the PA’s security forces personnel, 
government employees, and government ministers have been affiliated with Fatah in one way 
or another.  
Some Palestinians, particularly the minor factions within the PLO claim that these 
organizations have their own financial and political hierarchy and independent decision-
making. Such organizations have become small and ineffectual. In reality, the decision 
making power in all three institutions belongs to the Chairman, even if the PLO has an 
Executive Committee that supposedly determines policy, the executive can just ignore its 
decisions as he sees fit. Financially, while the U.S. only supports the PA, funds and accounts 
shift between the organizations. As early as 1995, a U.S. General Accounting Office report to 
the Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Relations found that “some of PLO’s 
administrative, military, and social welfare expenses have been subsumed under the 
Palestinian Authority’s budget.”35  
Another example, an issue that is often brought up by Israel, is that the PA uses 
American aid money to pay wages and compensations to Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails 
to support their families. Humanitarian considerations aside, this represents a violation of the 
limitations and conditions set by the U.S. since such prisoners are serving jail terms on 
terrorism charges. In 2013, the issue was brought up in British tabloids by pro-Israel groups; 
Wizo UK, an international women’s organization that supports social welfare and education 
in Israel; and the Zionist Federation, and caused rather a scandal.36 The British Department 
for International Development denied such allegations saying that the nearly $50 million 
annual aid is used to pay the salaries of PA’s civil employees.37 Congress acted in summer 
2014 by adding provisions in the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related 
Programs Appropriations Act of 2015, which required the Secretary of State to reduce aid to 
the PA “by an amount the Secretary determines is equivalent to that expended by the 
Palestinian Authority in payments to individuals and the families of such individuals that are 
imprisoned for acts of terrorism or who died committing such acts during the previous 																																																								
35  U.S. Government Accounting Office, National Security and International Affairs Division, Foreign 
Assistance: PLO's Ability to Support Palestinian Authority is Not Clear, GAO/NSIAD-96-23 (Washington 
D.C.: General Accounting Office, 1995). 
36 Edwin Black, "How British and American Aid Subsidises Palestinian Terrorism," The Guardian, November 
11, 2013. ; Jack Doyle, "Palestinians 'Give Our Foreign Aid Money to Convicted Terrorists': Cash is Given to 
Inmates in Israeli Prisons'," The Daily Mail, April 27, 2014. WIZOUK; Wizouk website, “Who we are.” 
www.wizouk.org, [22.02.2016]. 
37 International Development Committee- House of Commons, "The UK's Development Work in the Occupied 
Palestinian Terriroties," in DFID's Funding to the Palestinian Authority (Online: Parliament). 
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calendar year.”38 Abu-Joda Al-Nahal, a member of Fatah’s Revolutionary Council, and one 
of its prominent leaders in the Gaza Strip refused such allegations altogether saying that the 
budgets of these institutions remain separate.39 
Origin of Aid 
Officially, American foreign assistance is not intended for the use of the PLO, it is strictly 
provided to assist the PA. Aid began to flow to the PA following the signing of the Oslo 
Accords between PLO Chairman, Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin in 
Washington in 1993, though the U.S. had for long been providing millions of dollars to the 
United Nations Relief and Work Agency (UNRWA). President Bill Clinton organized an 
international donor conference for the purpose of securing financial aid to help the PLO with 
the transition process from a quasi-state institution to a fully functioning government over the 
territories Israel would evacuate as required by the peace agreements.40 The donors included 
the U.S., the E.U., Japan, Norway and Saudi Arabia.41 Clinton managed to secure $2 billion; 
the amount was later increased to $3.6 billion over a period of five years for developing the 
Palestinian infrastructure, security, economy and other aspects of life in the Palestinian 
territories. 42  Despite the contributions of other states and organizations present at the 
conference, the two main contributors were the United States with 15 percent, and the 
European Union with an astonishing 40 percent.43  
This study’s analysis argues that aid was justified under three rationales; paying for 
peace, paying for compromise, and paying for humanitarian assistance, which also had a 
strong political dimension. Furthermore, the study introduces a new paradigm for 																																																								
38 U.S. House of Representatives, U.S. House of Representatives, H.R.5013- Making Appropriations for the 
Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 
2015 and for Other Purposes", 113 Cong., 2 sess., 110-499 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
2014), Article 7041- (J3), p.146. See also Senate version of the bill S. 2499, Article 7041- (i3).   
39 Abu- Joda al-Nahal, interview by Ghassan al-Zaanin, February 2, 2016, Gaza City. (Interview was conducted 
on behalf of author) 
40 Scott Lasensky, "Underwriting Peace in the Middle East," Middle East Review of International Affairs 6, no. 
9 (2002): 92, 93, and 94. And Husam S. Zomlot, "Building a Palestinian State Under Occupation: Reassessing 
the Oslo Process," in The Failure of the Two-State Solution: the Prospects of One State in the Israel-Palestine 
Conflict, ed. Hani Faris (London: I.B. Tauris, 2013), 49. And, Abd al-Salam Majali, Jawad Ahmed Anani, and 
Munther J. Haddadin, Peacemaking: the Inside Story of the 1994 Jordanian-Israeli Treaty, U.S. ed., 
International and Security Affairs Series (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2006), 243-44. 
41 Scott Lasensky, "Paying for Peace: The Oslo Process and the Limits of American Foreign Aid," Middle East 
Journal 58, no. 2 (2004): 220. 
42 Palestinian National Authority, Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC), "MOPIC's 
2000 First Quarterly Monitoring Report, "May 2000, Ramallah. Quoted in "Underwriting Peace in the Middle 
East," 93. 
43 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Foreign Policy Aspects of the War against Terrorism: 
Foreign Report of Session 2005-2006, Report Together with Formal Minutes, Oral and Written Evidence, HC 
573 (London: The Stationary Office Limited, 2006), 158. 
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understanding and explaining American aid to the Palestinians, and the role it has played in 
the development of American-Palestinian relations in three overlapping historical phases 
based on these rationales. The first phase is the Humanitarian Phase, the second is the 
Development Phase, and the final is the Security Phase. 
Phase One, “Humanitarian Phase”; the humanitarian rationale is based on the fact 
that the Palestinian population is made up of refugees and displaced persons as a result of the 
wars that occurred in the Middle East in the last 60 years, most notably the 1948 and the 1967 
wars. These refugees, who still live in refugee camps in the Gaza Strip, West Bank, Lebanon 
Jordan, and Syria, have been receiving assistance from UNRWA. Ever since its induction in 
1949, UNRWA has helped provide health and education services to Palestine refugees from 
donations by the international community to ease the suffering of Palestinian refugees and 
provide life necessities.44 American foreign aid has been flowing to the Palestinians for over 
60 years as part of U.S. contributions to the UN and its sub-organizations, representing 
approximately 20 percent of UNRWA’s total budget.45  
This research argues that until the 1970s, the U.S. dealt with the Palestinian issue as a 
humanitarian issue; a problem of refugees displaced as a consequence of the founding of 
Israel. If the Palestinian issue were dealt with as a mere refugee crisis, the question of 
Palestinian statehood would not have to be answered. The research attempts to answer the 
question whether this policy was based on denial, ignorance, or perhaps both. Anthropologist 
Ilana Feldman at D.C.’s George Washington University argues that aid in this case made the 
Palestinian question a humanitarian rather than a political one. According to Feldman, there 
is a “paradox of humanitarian action… by providing aid, you can keep a conflict going, it is 
not specific to Palestine, but you can see it there. You make it possible for life to go on, you 
stand in the way of conflict to come to an end.”46 In other words, by providing aid to keep the 
Palestinian refugees in these camps, and providing UNRWA and neighboring countries with 
assistance to deal with this humanitarian problem by settling these refugees, questions of 
Palestinian statehood, and the political rights of the Palestinian nation would not have to be 
answered. It is for this reason that many of my relatives I spoke to regarding their flight in 
1967 refused food and other forms of assistance provided, fearing that doing so would 
enforce the refugee identity. 
																																																								
44 UNRWA, "About UNRWA," (Online: UNRWA website). 
45 "Government Partners, Funding Trends, Key Facts and Figures," (online: UNRWA website). 
46 Ilana Feldman, interview by author, October 30, 2014, Washington D.C. 
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The American administrations probably hoped that the Palestinian question would 
answer itself; with the refugees integrating in the societies they emigrated to given time. This 
gave rise in American policy circles to the “Jordan Option,” the idea that “Jordan should 
speak for the Palestinians,” and that Palestinian refugees there would be integrated into the 
Jordanian society.47 
 The Second Phase, “Development Phase.” The second reason for the post-Oslo 
donations was to establish a modern Palestinian economy so that Palestinians would taste the 
fruit of peace. The underlying idea is that once Palestinians begin to enjoy a stable economy, 
and are able to live a much-improved life, they would be more likely to abandon violence. In 
other words, if Palestinians taste the fruit of peace, why would they return to the bitterness of 
war? This sentiment was apparent in a speech delivered on September 20, 1993, by former 
Secretary of State Warren Christopher at Columbia University that was published in his The 
Stream of History. In his speech, Christopher stated that the “purpose of this conference 
[would] be to mobilize resources needed to make the agreement work. The international 
community must move immediately to see that the agreement produces tangible 
improvements in the security and daily lives of the Palestinians and the Israelis.”48  The 
agreement, according to Christopher must be “translated into results quickly and vividly.”49 
In his view, unemployment robs families of hope and fuels extremism. He expected the U.S 
to “assemble an initial 2-year package worth $250 million to dedicate to this cause.”50 
 This rationale, as the research later demonstrates, is not new to American foreign 
assistance. The rationale that development aid would lead to stability, and eventually 
democratization was used as early as the 1960s to justify assistance to underdeveloped 
countries in an attempt to contain communism during the Cold War. The research utilizes the 
principles of Modernization Theory, as advocated by Walt Rostow among others in the 
CENIS Groups at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in early 1960s, and the 
process of democratization as explained by Seymour Lipset, to explain the principles and 
ideas behind this rationale.51  																																																								
47 William B. Quandt, interview by Author, 07. November. 2014, Washington D.C; See also Peace Process: 
American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967, 3 ed. (The Brookings institution and University 
of Califronia Press, 2005), 6. 
48 Warren Christopher, In the Stream of History: Shaping Foreign Policy for a New Era (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1998), 84. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid., 84-85. 
51 Jeffrey F. Taffet, Foreign aid as Foreign Policy: the Alliance for Progress in Latin America (New York: 
Routledge, 2007), 21. Seymour M. Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," American Political Science 
Review 53, no. 1 (1959): 75. 
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 The Third Phase, “Security Phase.” The final rationale entails providing assistance to 
the security sector to ensure Abbas’ survival at the helm of Palestinian politics. This phase 
can be said to have begun in earnest after Hamas’ takeover of the Gaza Strip. To ensure that 
scenario does not repeat itself in the West Bank, the U.S. provides Abbas with aid, and has 
also created the office United States Security Coordinator for Israel and the Palestinian 
Authority (USSC). As already discussed, Abbas seems to be the U.S.’s best option to reach a 
peace agreement with Israel, therefore, his position needs to be protected. The problem with 
this rationale is that this aid has contributed significantly to undermining Abbas’ popularity 
among Palestinians, particularly with the USSC training Palestinian police to combat 
Palestinian militarism by Hamas, the Islamic Jihad, and even Fatah itself. 
 This study’s paradigm should be understood as a theory with overlapping principles 
and historical circumstances. The first and second phases, though they were the focus of 
earlier periods in history, still manifest themselves today. The U.S. still provides aid that is 
not specifically related to security, such as budget assistance, though as the research 
demonstrates, most of the PA’s budget goes to the security apparatus, and most U.S. aid goes 
to the security sector anyway.   
Literature Review 
The complexity, controversy, history, and scale of the Middle East conflict have made the 
region and its issues the subject of numerous academic and scholarly works. The Israeli-
Palestinian conflict in general, and the U.S. involvement in the region in particular, have been 
well covered in academic literature. The literature itself is diverse, extensive, and in some 
cases controversial and suffers from bias, especially when it comes to the conflict and the 
“facts,” surrounding it. The fact that the conflict has raged for decades has blurred the line 
between reality and fiction, between historical facts and nationalist rhetoric and propaganda. 
There are many works that have fallen into the emotional and personal traps the conflict has 
set in its long and bloody history, so much so that their work unfortunately falls short of the 
balance, reason and objectivity that distinguishes academic scholarship. The importance of 
this project stems from the fact that it compliments and completes the existing literature, 
while filling some of the gaps, particularly in the historical aspect, while remaining a 
balanced and an objective account of the impact of foreign assistance on Palestinian politics. 
This interdisciplinary study covers an array of subjects that have been studied by 
scholars from across the various disciplines, led chiefly by historians, political scientists and 
economists. The dissertation seeks to combine the theories and methods of history and 
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political science to provide a new understanding of American foreign aid, and its impact on 
American- Palestinian relations, one that is not constrained by the theories or school of 
thoughts of any one discipline, but a new integrated and balanced approach. 
The two main subject matters in this project are American foreign aid, and the role 
this aid plays in American-Palestinian relations. To best summarize the literature on the 
research subjects, this literature review is divided into three main sections; the first is foreign 
aid in general and American aid in particular; the second category covers the U.S. and Middle 
East conflict; and the third category will review works that integrate both categories, few as 
they are. 
1. Foreign Aid and U.S. Foreign Aid  
Foreign aid literature can be divided into two main categories. The first deals with 
foreign aid motives, determinants, and allocation and the second focuses on the results and 
impact of foreign aid. 
The fact that countless agencies, governments, non-governmental, inter-
governmental, and international organizations are all affected and effective by and in this 
phenomenon, it comes as no surprise that the in-house researchers and scholars from these 
organizations have provided numerous works and research studies on foreign aid and most of 
what relates to it. This sub-field focuses primarily on, to use the title of a 2000 article that 
always seems to find its way into scholarly work by David Dollar and Alberto Alesina, Who 
Gives Aid to Whom and Why.52 
One of the most important works in this field, and is often referred to in this study, is 
Carol Lancaster’s 2007 Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics. 53 
Lancaster was both a foreign aid scholar and practitioner through working as Deputy 
Administrator for the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) during 
the Clinton administration. She travelled regularly with then First Lady Hillary Clinton to 
less developed parts of the world, and had first-hand account of the workings and doings of 
the foreign aid establishment. Lancaster’s book, besides providing an excellent overall 
introduction to foreign aid politics and policies, focuses primarily on two issues: the purpose 
of aid giving, and the political forces that shape this purpose within domestic context. To 
																																																								
52 David Dollar and Alberto Alesina, "Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?," Journal of Economic 
Growth 5, no. 1 (2000). 
53 Carol Lancaster, Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago 
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illustrate this, Lancaster provides a comparative study of the foreign aid structure and history 
of five major donor countries: Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, and the United States.54  
Another important work in the field is Alesina and Dollar’s article that examines aid 
determinants and aid allocation by comparing aid motives of the major aid donors in the 
world according to various variables such as colonial history. They find that aid giving is 
“dictated by political and strategic considerations, much more than by economic needs and 
policy performance of the recipients.”55  Among the determinants for example, they find that 
colonial history is a crucial factor in aid allocation.56 In their study, which covered the years 
between 1970-1994, the authors find that a third of U.S. aid allocation went to Egypt and 
Israel, France had given “overwhelmingly” to its former colonies, and in the case of Japan, 
countries that vote with Japan in the UN receive more aid.57 The findings of Alesina and 
Dollar are very much in accord with the arguments presented in this study. The historical 
analysis of U.S. foreign aid reveals that US aid has always been dictated by national security 
and economic considerations rather than humanitarian needs. 
Continuing with aid determinants, there is a general agreement among scholars that 
during the Cold War years, American foreign aid was used primarily to counter Soviet 
influence (Schraeder, Hook and Taylor 1998; Krueger and Poe 1998).58 However, since the 
end of the Cold War, the motive of American foreign aid began to shift towards spreading 
American ideals and principles such as democratization, and human rights promotion 
(Allison and Beschel 1992; Clad and Stone 1993).59  
There are a number of empirical studies that focus on studying aid allocation, among 
them is McKinlay and Little’s 1977 publication, which finds that American security and 
military interests were the main determinants of U.S. foreign aid allocation, even more 
important than economic concerns.60 According to their findings, aid is motivated by the 
donors’ interests rather than the recipients’ needs.61 More recently, Randall Stone argued that 
foreign aid is a means of buying influence. Randall studied the era between the end of the 																																																								
54 Ibid. 
55 Dollar and Alesina, "Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?," 33. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid., 55. 
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Cold War and the September 11 terrorist attacks because during this period “geopolitical 
influence was weakest.” 62  Randall also makes the argument that smaller countries, or 
countries with smaller populations are more susceptible to being influenced.63  
One aspect of the foreign aid phenomenon remains seriously understudied. Very little 
literature on foreign aid and public opinion exists, whether the attitudes of the public in donor 
countries, and even fewer on perception and views of foreign aid in the recipient countries. 
Milner 2006; Paxton and Knack 2012; and Stern 1998 are some of the few works that cover 
this understudied aspect of the field. 64  The Palestinians’ perception of aid is greatly 
understudied by academics and researchers. Indeed, scholarly works that focus on aid to the 
Palestinians tend to focus more on the economic effects of aid, rather than the political, and 
even less so on what Palestinians actually think about it. The significance of this study stems 
from the fact that it focuses on the Palestinians’ perception, and on the impact foreign aid has 
had on the standing of its leadership. 
The second subfield in the foreign aid literature deals with the results and impact, and 
is where major disagreements can be found. For every place on planet earth, there seems to 
be two opposing views on the impact of foreign aid, one positive and the other negative. 
Seldom can one find agreement on the simplest question when it comes to the impact of 
foreign aid, whether it works or not. The ongoing debate between opponents and proponents 
of foreign aid, and the effectiveness of aid in achieving its goals, as diverse as they are, can 
be summarized by the debate in the works of the two scholars leading the debate; William 
Easterly and Jeffrey Sachs. 
Sach’s The End of Poverty; Economic Possibilities for Our Time provides an 
optimistic and positive account of foreign aid, arguing that what is needed is a “‘Big Push’ in 
public investments to produce a “rapid step” increase in Africa’s underlying productivity, 
both rural and urban.”65 Sachs believes that an increase in aid allocation to lift countries out 
of the poverty trap by boosting food production to end famine, improve health and end 
economic isolation. On the other hand, William Easterly’s, The White Man’s Burden: Why 
the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good, which was 																																																								
62 Randall W. Stone, "Buying Influence: The Political Economy of International Aid," in Annual Meeting of the 
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published the following year, provides a less optimistic view of foreign aid. In response to 
Sach’s idea of spending big to eradicate poverty, Easterly says “alas, we have already seen 
this movie, and it doesn’t have a happy ending.”66 The Easterly- Sachs debate is one of the 
many ongoing discussions and debates on foreign aid and its effectiveness.  
2. U.S. and the Middle East Conflict 
The second part of the literature review focuses on the U.S. and its role in the Middle 
East conflict, an area where there is an abundance of literature; yet, scholars and academics 
would do well to treat some of the publications with a sense of caution. Literature on 
America’s role in the Middle East, though numerous, some of it remains affected by bias. To 
overcome the problem of bias, one is confronted with two options; either focusing on the 
works that are considered balanced and unbiased, or focusing on as many works from across 
the spectrum as possible, and drawing one’s own conclusion concerning the stickier points in 
history.  
The research includes works by scholars from various cultural and educational 
backgrounds; Israelis, Palestinians, Americans, and Europeans. Within the following pages, 
there are publications that discuss the same event or person and come to different 
conclusions. This stark difference is best illustrated by two biographies of Yasser Arafat, 
written decades apart. One is entitled Arafat: Terrorist or Peacemaker? by British historian 
Alan Hart, and the other Arafat: a Political Biography by Barry Rubin, and Judith Rubin. 
The answer to Hart’s title is a bit of both, yet with more emphasis on Arafat as a freedom 
fighter for a just cause.67 Barry and Judith Rubin, in a way, attempt to answer the same 
question, yet seldom do they miss a chance to blame Arafat for the suffering of the 
Palestinian people and the failure of peace efforts.68 No doubt, both books have elements of 
good analysis in their folds, as well as unverified claims and analyses that seem to be based 
on personal views rather than the actions and character of the controversial man himself. 
Both books are used nonetheless, accompanied by three biographies of this controversial 
terrorist, peacemaker, villain, and hero. There are however more balanced and reliable 
accounts in the literature. William B. Quandt’s Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the 
Arab Israeli Conflict, and Steven L. Spiegel’s The Other Arab Israeli Conflict, both provide 
excellent historical accounts of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, the former since 1967 																																																								
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and the latter since the administration of President Harry S. Truman until the presidency of 
Ronald Reagan in 1981.  
3. U.S. Aid to the Palestinians 
While the conflict and America’s involvement have been extensively studied, U.S. 
foreign aid within the context of the Middle East conflict has received, in the words of Scott 
Lasensky, “scant attention.”69 With few exceptions, such as the works of Anne Le More, Rex 
Brynen, Michael Keating, and Scott Lasensky, the role of foreign aid in the Middle East 
conflicts remains substantially understudied. There are a number of publications that deal 
directly with this topic, albeit on different levels and to varying degrees of emphasis.  
Stephen M. Walt’s 1989 book, The Origins of Alliances, argues that states form 
alliances based on threats, rather than power, thereby replacing the balance of power theory 
with the balance of threat. Walt elaborates on the role of aid in the formation of alliances, 
especially in the Middle East during the Cold War era. 70  Nicole Ball, and Jordana D. 
Friedman in David Cortright’s The Price of Peace: Incentives and International Conflict 
Prevention, demonstrate the power of political and economic incentives in resolving some of 
the most complicated conflicts, while at the same time argue that the success of such 
incentives varies by case depending on the circumstances.71  
On foreign assistance to the Palestinians, and American foreign assistance in 
particular, there is a number of academic works, most of which tend to focus more on the 
economic consequences, rather than the political effects of aid on Palestinian politics, which 
is the prime focus of this project. Anne Le More’s, International Assistance to the 
Palestinians After Oslo; Political Guilt, Wasted Money, argues that foreign aid to the 
Palestinians has failed to produce substantial improvements due to the Palestinians’ 
dependence on Israeli economy and the various obstacles Israel implements, from roadblocks 
to settlement construction. Le More, who is also the author of Killing with Kindness: Funding 
the Demise of a Palestinian State, argues that humanitarian assistance, economic 
development, and reconstruction are poor substitutes for political processes.72  
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Another important contribution from Le More came in the form of an edited volume 
with Michael Keating and Robert Lowe; Aid, Diplomacy and Facts on the Ground: the Case 
of Palestine. This 2005 publication contains contributions from scholars on the question of 
Palestine and foreign aid; Scott Lasensky, Michael Keating, Anne Le More, Nigel Roberts, 
Rex Brynen, Jimmy Weinblatt and Yossi Alpher, to name a few. The contributors set out to 
explore the relationship between aid and politics in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the 
economic and political impact of this aid. They provide an excellent analysis of some of the 
events and policies that have been most influential in the Middle East conflict and question 
the role aid plays, or ought to play, in achieving political progress.73  
There are few scholars who focused intensively, and primarily, on the concepts of aid 
conditionality, and paying for peace, and fewer still who focused on the impact of foreign aid 
on the relationship between PA and the U.S., rather than the peace process or Palestinian 
economy. Daniel Ehrenfeld, Shira Yael Kogut, and Hilary Hove’s, Aid Conditionality and the 
Peace Process: An Analysis of Its Implementation, is one of these few works. In their article, 
the authors examine “the potential of aid conditionality to positively influence peace 
processes.” 74  They conclude that “peace conditionality is dependent on successful 
coordination among donors, a solid understanding of the situation on the ground in the 
recipient countries, and finally on the willingness to act on threats, rewards, and pledges to 
enhance credibility.”75  
Patrick Clawson, an American economist and Middle East scholar, tends to be more 
critical of the PA and its regime. Clawson and Gedal examine three kinds of American 
economic incentives, and the role these incentives play in advancing the cause of 
peacemaking; economic aid to specific countries, regional summits and regional programs to 
promote trade and investment.76 Clawson and Gedal argue, “economic efforts can be useful 
in supporting and consolidating progress toward peace, but they will rarely be forceful 
enough to pave a path from hostility to peace.”77 
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Lastly, one of the most important works to be published on foreign assistance to the 
Palestinian Authority is Rex Brynen’s 2000 book, A Very Political Economy: Peacebuilding 
and Foreign Aid in the West Bank and Gaza. Brynen who according to Clawson is “the most 
knowledgeable non-governmental observer of the Palestinian aid scene,” provides a positive 
account of foreign aid achievements in the Palestinian Territories.78 The very detailed study 
of the process by which foreign aid for peace building is mobilized, coordinated, delivered 
and allocated, includes criticism of the PA for bloated bureaucracy, inter-ministerial 
competition, corruption, and political patronage in its various forms. Brynen is also critical of 
Israel and blames its policy of closure for poor Palestinian economic performance.79 Brynen 
concludes that, “true sustainable development in Palestine can come only with peace.”80 
Finally, the 2006 elections, which can be said to have been the last nail in Fatah’s 
coffin, have been scrutinized by researchers from two main angles; Fatah’s own problems 
and Hamas’ rise. Observers, opinion polls before elections, as well as exit polls strongly put 
Fatah ahead of Hamas. Despite the numerous problems within Fatah, from financial 
corruption, political patronage, to even accusations by the general public of betraying the 
Palestinian principles and rights, Fatah was expected to win. Graham Usher’s Democratic 
Resistance, Hamas, Fatah and the Palestinian Elections, is one of numerous works that 
provide an overview of the corruption that led the Palestinians to seek an alternative 
leadership in Hamas. Usher also outlines the fragmentation within Fatah, and the lack of 
vision in its leadership as the reasons behind its failure to maintain its hold on the legislative 
council.81 
This rather short summary of the literature on foreign aid is a mere overview of the 
plethora of works in the field. This study advances the existing literature in two areas; public 
opinion and foreign aid, which is in a desperate need for further studies; and the political 
impact of aid on domestic Palestinian politics. This research also proposes a new paradigm 
for understanding aid and its role in the evolution of the U.S.’s relationship with the 
Palestinian question through its aid paradigm perspective which integrates some of the 
arguments in the existing literature and more importantly proposes new perspectives for 
understanding the role of aid and its political impact.  
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Methodology, Methods and Theory 
	 This part of the introduction is devoted to addressing the methodology and research 
methods of the project. It would be useful at this point to recall the main questions the study 
attempts to answer. As already mentioned, the study moves away from the economic impact 
of aid on Palestinian economy, and evaluating its success and failure, as this issue has been 
addressed in many academic and institutional publications, and focuses rather on the under-
studied issue of political impact. The overarching question is; what impact has American 
foreign aid had on the standing of the Palestinian peace camp, represented by Abbas and 
Fatah? Has American pressure, based on using foreign aid as reward and as punishment, 
delivered the general foreign policy objectives? If so, which method has been more 
successful, providing aid or withholding it?  
 
Literature and Documentary Analysis  
A natural starting source for students of American foreign policy is the Department of State’s 
Foreign Relations of the United States Series, FRUS. The series provides an official 
historical record of the diplomatic activities of the U.S. in foreign affairs. The series includes 
declassified documents as well as presidential papers, and documents from presidential 
libraries, Department of State, USAID, Department of Defense, and more recently documents 
by intelligence agencies. FRUS is an extremely useful source for students of U.S. foreign 
policy. The State Department’s Office of the Historian has published FRUS series as 
electronic books, available for free download on the department’s website.  
The historical analysis of the American foreign aid establishment, and to a lesser 
degree American-Palestinian relations, relied on a large number of primary sources that 
included presidential executive orders, speeches, statements to the press, congressional bills, 
resolutions, hearings and debates. Gerhard Peters and John Woolley publish many of the 
presidential documents online in their easily accessible and well-organized American 
Presidency Project database at the University of California, Santa Barbara. Congressional 
bills, resolutions and debates are also used on numerous occasions to elaborate the crucial 
role of congress in shaping American foreign policy in general and American foreign aid in 
particular. The Library of Congress’ THOMAS database includes many bills since the 93rd 
congress in 1973-1974. Earlier hearings and records of congressional debates were also used, 
some were available online digitalized by Google and the University of Michigan among 
others, and the rest are available the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) 
at College Park, Maryland which the author obtained through an archival visit to NARA. 
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Sources on early U.S. role in the Middle East, particularly Truman’s relationship with Israel 
can be found at the Harry S. Truman archives in Missouri. 
Another important source that came into being in January 2011 was the release by 
Aljazeera of over 1500 leaked confidential documents from the office of Saeb Erekat, the 
Chief Palestinian Negotiator. The Palestine Papers contained meeting minutes from 
negotiations and meetings between Palestinian, American and Israeli officials, hundreds of 
internal emails, draft agreements, studies and reports. The papers reveal important 
information regarding the important role of foreign aid in negotiations, and also demonstrate 
the incredible length the PA is willing to go in the security coordination sector with Israel, 
and the emphasis the PA places on its security sector. Some of the meetings’ attendees 
included Senator George Mitchell, former United States Special Envoy for Middle East 
Peace; Lieutenant General Keith Dayton, U.S. Security Coordinator for Israel and the 
Palestinian Authority, among other U.S. officials. 
Finally, the research uses a number of secondary sources in Arabic- identified by 
“Arabic,” in citations. Most of the books used were available at the Library of Congress, 
which has a large collection of secondary source material in numerous languages. Access to 
publications on U.S. foreign policy and U.S. Middle East relations in Arabic was severely 
limited as few of such books made their way into the Gaza Strip, and traveling to Egypt or 
another Arabic speaking country posed serious difficulties for the author. Al-Zaytouna Centre 
for Studies and Consultations, founded in Beirut in 2004 has an online collection of books in 
Arabic, and many of them focus specifically on the Palestinian territories and their economic, 
political, and social problems, particularly the center’s annual The Palestinian Strategic 
Report and The Palestinian Documents, which is also an annual publication, both edited by 
Mohsen M. Saleh. Some of the books published by Al-Zaytouna have been translated into 
English. 
Data Analysis 
The research relies on a large amount of data on foreign aid. The Congressional Research 
Service (CRS) has a number of publications on the U.S. foreign assistance programs, 
including assistance to the PA. The reports, which are made at the request of members of 
congress are “leaked” to the public, and are available from a number of websites, including 
few by the Department of State. The reports are concise, and provide a fair amount of 
information on the amounts and programs of U.S. assistance in general, including aid to the 
PA. The Federation of American Scientists’ (FAS) has the largest collection of these reports. 
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FAS is a Washington D.C. based organization that was founded in 1945 by scientists who 
worked on the Manhattan Project, which developed the first nuclear bomb. Their purpose, 
according to their website is to promote a safer world by “providing science-based analysis of 
solutions to protect against catastrophic threats to national and international security.”82 
The core of the actual data however, came from USAID and the Department of 
State’s budget requests and reports. The two institutions publish foreign assistance reports 
that contain data on quantities and distribution of U.S. foreign aid. USAID has a dedicated 
website that is informally known as the Greenbook. The website provides data on U.S. 
overseas loans and grants and includes “Foreign Aid Trends” and “Foreign Aid Explorer,” 
two interactive tools that are extremely useful for students of American foreign aid. It is user 
friendly and contains valuable information on amounts of aid, aid recipients, aid programs 
and the different agencies and departments and how much each spends on foreign assistance.  
The study also relies on State Department publications on budgetary issues such as 
the annual Congressional Budget Justification Department of State, Foreign Operations, and 
Related Programs. As implied in the title, the State Department submits such reports 
annually to congress to request funds for the upcoming fiscal year. The reports are readily 
available online on the State Department’s Budget and Planning International Affairs Budget 
homepage and include reports from FY 2002 to FY 2017. The State Department also 
provides testimonies by current and former secretaries before congressional committees on 
appropriations and foreign relations. The Project on Middle East Democracy, a Washington 
D.C. based think-tank, provided a number of the organization’s federal budget and 
appropriations studies, which also contain valuable data on U.S. aid spending in the Middle 
East in general. 
For the Palestinian public’s views on most issues, the research includes a number of 
public opinion polls conducted in the last 20 years by numerous Palestinian, Israeli and 
international research institutions such as; the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion; The 
Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research which conducts joint polls with the Harry 
S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University in 
Jerusalem; The Jerusalem Media and Communication Center; An-Najah National 
University’s Opinion Polls and Survey Studies Unit; and Fafo, a Norwegian research institute 
based in Oslo, among others. Most, but not all, of the opinion surveys conducted in the 
Palestinian territories have a sample population of approximately 1000 participants divided 																																																								
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according to the population of the Palestinian Territories; approximately 40 percent in Gaza 
and the other 60 percent in the West Bank. 
The difficulty arises when investigating PA finances, and venturing further into the 
finances of the PLO in earlier decades is near impossible. It is easier for a camel to pass 
through the eye of a needle than for a scholar to find data, and gain access to PLO finances. 
The world of PLO finance, historically, and contemporarily remains secretive with a sever 
lack of transparency when it comes to income and expenditure, and its exact figures and 
numbers are also a matter of speculation. Neither the PLO, nor PA, nor Fatah for that matter 
have a transparent financial system where scholars can find the financial data they require for 
their studies. Some scholars have ventured into this realm but their data is not always trust-
worthy, and their findings seem to be too politically oriented than actual academic research. 
The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) publish reports on Palestinian 
economy and the projects, loans and grants they conduct and provide. Their reports are also 
readily available online. The Palestinian Ministry of Finance, and also the Ministry of 
Planning and International Cooperation have released budgetary reports over the last few 
years and the Palestinian Bureau of Statistics provide some economic and social data, but 
such reports are focused on the PA, rather than the PLO or Fatah. 
Interviews 
It was not surprising therefore that the Fatah leaders who were interviewed were rather 
uncomfortable with budgetary questions, that is if they knew much about such issues in the 
first place. Some attempted to avoid the questions all together, others answered with patriotic 
slogans. The research relies on a number of interviews with academic experts, and current 
and former policy makers, and some who happened to be both, from both the United States 
and the Palestinian territories. Dr. William B. Quandt, who has been involved in the Middle 
East conflict since the 1960s as an academic and researcher, as well as an advisor to 
presidents Nixon and Carter through his position as a member of the National Security 
Council, is one of a number of experts interviewed during the research phase of this project. 
The experts also included Anthropologist Ilana Feldman of George Washington University, 
who focuses on the problems associated with humanitarianism in foreign aid and Dr. 
Mohammed Rabie, a Palestinian American scholar who, together with Quandt, played an 
important role in bringing about the first official communication between the U.S. and the 
PLO during the presidency of Ronald Reagan. Khaled Elgindy at the Brookings Institution is 
another expert. Elgindy had worked as an advisor to the Palestinian leadership during 
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negotiations, and he was present during some of the meetings whose minutes were leaked in 
the Palestine Papers.  
On the Palestinian front, the list includes Abu Juda Al-Nahal, a member of Fatah’s 
revolutionary Council and a prominent Fatah leader in the Gaza Strip. Dr. Atef Adwan, who 
occupied cabinet level position within the Hamas led government.83 Dr. Ahmed Yusuf, an 
American educated former advisor to Ismail Haniya, the former Prime Minister of Gaza and 
the second highest ranked Hamas official, was also among those interviewed. Yusuf is little 
liked in Hamas, as his views tend to be more liberal than his fellows in Hamas’ higher tiers. 
The purpose of studying the financial politics of other Palestinian factions, Hamas and the 
PFLP for example, is to examine their ability to resist aid conditionality in comparison to 
Fatah, and evaluate the extent of foreign aid impact on the independence of the Palestinian 
decision making process. Since “impact,” in this case cannot be measured in numbers, a 
parallel study of the decisions taken on part of Fatah and other Palestinian factions through a 
number of examples can prove useful.  
Finally, this research also includes discussions from email correspondence with 
academics such McGill University’s Rex Brynen, and Dr. Ramzy Baroud, who has written 
extensively on the subject of PA corruption.		 In order to illustrate the impact of the use of American foreign aid on Palestinian 
politics, and the standing and popularity of President Abbas, and President Arafat before him, 
the research describes and analyses a number of examples when the use of foreign aid had 
unintended consequences, particularly fueling public sentiments against the Palestinian 
leadership. The reason for this sentiment, or at least it was so perceived, was a result of 
Arafat and Abbas’ failure to resist American pressure, or their desire to gain financial 
assistance, particularly for the security sector of the PA. Furthermore, the project provides an 
analysis of the Obama administration’s handling of foreign aid in light of the recent political 
upheavals in the Middle East, particularly in Egypt due to the ramifications of this policy on 
the use of American aid as a weapon in the American diplomacy arsenal. 
 The first of these examples is the so-called “security coordination,” between the PA 
and Israel. Since the formation of the PA, a security department devoted to coordinating 
security matters between Israel and the Palestinians was formed. This “coordination,” has 
never been popular among Palestinians, who see it as a means to help Israel arrest members 
of the Palestinian fighting factions, and a way to protect Israel’s security at the cost of 																																																								
83 For disclosure: Prof. Dr. Atef Adwan is a relative of the author. 
Introduction  27 
Palestinian lives.84 The released Palestine Papers showed the extent to which the PA was 
“coordinating,” when it assisted in the assassination of the commander of Fatah’s own 
military wing in the Gaza Strip, as well as the killing of six Hamas militants in the West 
Bank, for which a Hamas spokesman labeled Abbas “a loyalist to the Zionists.”85 Abbas 
himself sees the cooperation as “sacred,” and has vowed that it would continue whether the 
Palestinians and Israelis agreed on policy or not.86 
It has been condemned by Palestinian political and military parties, amid calls for 
suspending it on regular basis. What intensified the situation was the formation of what 
Palestinians call the Dayton Police, or the Dayton Army, in reference to Lieutenant General 
Keith W. Dayton of the U.S. Army who served as the United States Security Coordinator for 
Israel and the PA between 2005 and 2010. Dayton assisted in the training of Palestinian 
security personnel, especially after Hamas’ takeover of the Gaza Strip in 2007. 87  The 
coordination has an important value to the Palestinians, but most of them are ignorant of its 
benefits, since Israel helps with the treatment of thousands of Palestinians a year, goods and 
services entering the Gaza Strip, are also supervised by the security coordination forces.88 
 Another case study that sheds light on America’s use of foreign aid was the attempt to 
dissuade the PA from joining the United Nations and other international organizations such 
as the International Criminal Court (ICC). The U.S. threatened to suspend, and did suspend, 
funding to the PA, and to any international organization that voted to recognize Palestine as a 
state. In 2011, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, Cultural Organization, (UNESCO), 
for example lost 22% of its budget as a result of recognizing Palestine, accounting to $80 
million a year.89 While Indonesia, Norway, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey have attempted to 
cover the budget deficit caused by losing American support, the organization is still suffering 
from severe budgetary problems leaving it unable to carry out some of its projects. 90 
Consequently, in November 2013, both the U.S. and Israel lost their voting rights in the 
organization for failing to pay their dues.91  																																																								
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The research also focuses on the Goldstone Report Controversy. Following the 
2008/2009 Gaza War, a UN fact-finding mission found that Israel and Hamas had committed 
war crimes during the three-week war.92 A vote on the report would have, eventually, even 
maybe, led to the prosecution of Israeli leaders as war criminals, something neither the U.S. 
nor Israel were pleased about, despite the improbability of something like that happening. To 
that end, President Mahmoud Abbas withdrew the report before the vote, and requested that 
the vote be postponed. Outraged by their president’s action, Palestinians took to the streets in 
protest.93 The Palestine Papers reveal the role of foreign aid in this process.94 
The problems policy makers face with foreign aid became apparent during the wave 
of social, political and economic upheavals that swept the Middle East in the last few years, 
and again brought the question of foreign assistance to the forefront in American foreign 
policy discussions. On multiple occasions, the administration of President Barack Obama had 
to decide whether to use foreign aid to influence the events that were quickly unfolding on 
the ground, particularly in Egypt, one of America’s closest allies in the region, and a country 
of immense geopolitical importance. The tension in American-Egyptian relations was met 
with renewed interest from Russia following the ousting of Mohammed Morsi by the 
Egyptian military in July 2013. 95  The purpose of discussing the Egyptian case is to 
demonstrate the importance of foreign aid in the conduct of international relations and the 
different obstacles and conundrums policy makers face with the use of this tool. The research 
briefly addresses this crisis and evaluates the Obama administration’s use of foreign aid. 
The fact that the Palestinian Authority and its systems are neither democratic nor 
transparent presents a problem when gathering financial data. Since the study is concerned 
with the standing of a political party, it would have been a much easier task to do this study 
on the Democratic and Republican parties for example. While the study relies on public 
opinion surveys, expert opinions, and general reaction to policies among Palestinians to 
investigate the research question, it would have been much easier to measure this impact if 
the PA held free and fair elections on regular basis so one can truly see the impact at the 
ballot box. Such elections do not even have to be nationwide, or even for the legislative 
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council, but even for labor unions, professional associations, or at local municipal level, the 
PA governments in Gaza and Ramallah have not permitted any. 
One of the main problems scholars of contemporary Middle issues face is simply the 
quick succession of events, which makes writing anything on the conflict difficult. As 
Michael Keating rightly points out, “publishing anything on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is 
a risky venture. The chances are high that words will be overtaken by events before the ink is 
dry.” 96  Indeed, the constantly evolving state of affairs in the Middle East can prove a 
formidable obstacle. For instance, in the time working on this project, the Middle East has 
undergone an era of revolutions and geopolitical developments, labeled the “Arab Spring” 
that cannot be entirely disconnected from this project. On more than one occasion, America 
threatened to suspend, and at a later point actually did suspend foreign assistance to Egypt 
following Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s military coup d’état against the elected government of 
Mohammed Morsi.97 Washington would eventually resume its military assistance to Egypt in 
early 2015, partly because that left room for Russia to move in and expand its influence.98  
 A major challenge was doing research in the Palestinian Territories. The most critical 
problem the project has encountered is the lack of data and archives on the Palestinian side, 
combined with the fact that there are two de facto governments, some with two websites and 
different archives and settings, that is in the rare case of actually having any archives. For 
instance, the Palestinian Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation had an excellent 
website that provided data on foreign assistance received by the PA, but unfortunately, the 
website is no longer active. Finding records of hearings of the Palestinian Legislative Council 
also proved impossible, as many records were lost during Israeli bombardments of the PLC 
building in Gaza City, therefore in many instances the research relies on local media; 
newspapers and news agency websites and their archives instead of official government 
documents. 
 The security situation in the region does not provide for a safe environment for 
academics and researchers. The last research trip for this dissertation was in June 2014, 
approximately two weeks before the start of the 2014 War. Finding Hamas and Fatah leaders 
during the campaign was not an easy task. The travel situation makes it all the more difficult. 
As a Gazan, I had been denied the permission by the Israeli government to enter the West 																																																								
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Bank and conduct interviews there. Egypt and Israel have imposed a blockade around the tiny 
strip and Egypt seldom bothers to open the Rafah crossing between Egypt and Gaza to permit 
Gazans to leave, or enter, leaving the author no choice but to conduct some of interviews by 
telephone and relying on a research assistant to ask the questions and record the answers. 
Detaching oneself from the realities and experiences of the last 25 years and 
producing work that is purely academic in nature on subjects as controversial as foreign aid 
and the Middle East dispute may indeed raise some eyebrows. The author strives to 
accomplish this hard task by examining the histories, facts, and realities both real and 
distorted, from an academic standpoint. To that end, certain steps to ensure the fairness of 
this research have been taken to avoid the trappings of writing a project of this scale. For 
example, all the names of the wars that have taken place in the Middle East are named 
according to the year in which they took place, while at the same time mentioning the names 
of these conflicts according to the belligerents. The 1973 War for example, is referred to it as 
such, rather than the Ramadan War, as it is called in Egypt, or the Yom Kippur War, as it is 
known in Israel.  
Another way to avoid balance is conducting the historical method of source criticism 
by consulting as many sources on matters, especially the controversial kind, as possible. If 
the two views are at extreme odd, both of them will be described and analyzed. For example, 
the 1967 War, considered in Israel and the United States as a preemptive measure on part of 
Israel, and therefore legal and just, while the Arabs argue that it was a preventative measure, 
and therefore illegal. In such situations, both points of view will be provided and discussed. 
There is also the problem with the term “Palestine.” Using the term contemporarily 
gives the impression that one is pro-Palestine, or anti-Israel, or both. In this study, when the 
term is used, it refers to that particular area of the Middle East prior to the establishment of 
Israel. To refer to that area after 1948, the study uses the term “Palestinian Territories,” since 
Palestine as a state does not exist, or at least the U.S. does not recognize it as such, nor does 
Palestine have a full member status in the UN. When “occupied” is used, it refers to the West 
Bank and Gaza prior to the signing of the peace accords, particularly when it comes to 
settlements, which have been deemed illegal under international law. The conflict itself is 
referred to, in alphabetically order, as the Arab-Israeli conflict, or the Israeli-Palestinian, or 
“Israel’s conflict with the Palestinians.” The term “Middle East,” in this study refers to the 
area that encompasses southwest Asia that encompasses the Levant, the Arabian Peninsula, 
Iran and Turkey, and Egypt in North Africa. The Middle East is sometimes referred to as the 
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Near East in American governmental records, as opposed to the Far East, which encompasses 
East Asia. 
Structure 
The project is divided into two main parts. The first, “Theory and History” is made up of the 
first three chapters and provides the theoretical framework and the historical foundations for 
the study. Part two, “Policy; Theory and Practice,” provides an account of American-
Palestinian relations, both historically and contemporary, the role foreign aid has played in 
the development of these relations, and its impact on domestic Palestinian politics and the 
standing of its leadership.  
A natural starting point for a study on foreign aid is “Conceptualizing Foreign Aid.” 
Chapter one defines foreign aid and explores the different aspects and types of this 
phenomenon. Several definitions from different scholars and organizations are discussed, and 
their strengths and weaknesses thoroughly analyzed. The chapter answers some of the 
foundational questions in the study of foreign aid: Who gives aid? Who receives it? For what 
purpose is aid given? What doctrines, or rationales justify such voluntary transfer of a 
country’s own resources to another. The chapter concludes with a discussion of foreign aid in 
major International Relations schools of thought, and how the three main International 
Relations theories; Realism, Liberalism, Constructivism, among others, explain the idea, role 
and purpose of foreign aid in the conduct of international relations.  
 Chapter two, “History of U.S. Foreign Assistance,” explores the United States’ 
historical involvement in the realm of foreign aid, since the first instance when the U.S. sent 
aid to foreign country during the Haitian Revolution, until the approval of the 2016 foreign 
aid budget. The chapter provides a historical account of the major developments, and 
evolution of the contemporary U.S. foreign establishment while paying special attention to 
historical periods, individuals, and legislations that played a role in the process. The chapter 
tracks the changes, not only in the structure of the foreign aid establishment, but also in the 
purpose, rationale, and emphases of the aid program, particularly during the Cold War and 
the new world order following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. It discusses the changes of 
emphasis in the role of aid in different inter-related policy objectives, such as containing 
communism, economic development, human rights promotion, and finally combating 
terrorism. 
 Chapter three focuses on the contemporary foreign aid establishment. Its purpose is to 
explain the rationale and objectives of the current aid and the different programs, categories, 
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and mechanisms employed by the U.S. government to deliver the various types of American 
foreign assistance from grains to guns. It also discusses the important ways in which 
domestic politics in the U.S. influences the foreign aid program, and examines how the ideals 
of the two major political parties in the U.S. differ on aid issues, and the impact of these 
beliefs on aid programs. The chapter also provides an account of the major players involved 
in making foreign aid policies, such as the executive branch and its federal agencies and 
departments, as well as congress and the different appropriation committees and the 
Congressional Budget Office. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the outlook of the 
aid program in president Obama’s 2016 federal budget. 
 Part two of the study “Policy and Practice,” begins with the fourth chapter, which 
provides a historical account of the early U.S. involvement in the Middle East and the 
developments of American-Palestinian relations that culminated in the first official 
diplomatic contact between the PLO and the Reagan administration. The position and 
importance of the Middle East ensured it would be a land of competition and debate between 
the U.S. and its allies on the one side, and the USSR and its allies on the other. The chapter 
elaborates on the different Palestinian factions and their loyalties to the different Arab 
regimes, based on these regimes’ financial support. It demonstrates how these regimes used 
their support for these factions to advance their own foreign policy interests using financial 
assistance. The chapter also discusses the role of foreign assistance in achieving and 
maintaining the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement during president Carter’s term in office.  
 Chapter five, “The Road to Decline,” focuses on the post Oslo period from 1993 to 
the present. It begins with a discussion of the origins of American aid to the Palestinian 
Authority following the donor conference that followed the signing of the Oslo agreement. 
The chapter focuses on the leadership of Yasser Arafat and the internal as well as the external 
problems Fatah faced that led to its eventual failure in the 2006 election. The chapter also 
pays attention to the rise of Hamas and the historical developments in American-Palestinian 
relations following the Islamic movement’s victory in the 2006 elections. 
 Based on these developments, the final section of the chapter provides a discussion 
based on the previous chapters. The project analyses a number of case studies when foreign 
aid was used to achieve certain policy objectives. The discussion evaluates this use, its 
successes and failures, as well as the consequences of using this mean of statecraft. These 
events are directly linked to American foreign aid and its use. Of special notice is the security 
cooperation between the PA and Israel, which has proved more detrimental to Abbas than 
any of the other policies related to foreign assistance. 
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This research is not an attempt to undermine the successes and unbelievable amount 
of energy and effort aid workers, whether as a part of the American aid structure or other 
institutions, in assisting desperate people across the world and in the Palestinian Territories in 
particular. Rather, it is an attempt to show the falls and shortcomings as well as the 
unintended consequences of this process on behalf of the policy makers rather than the aid 
organizations or the aid workers. The author of this project is himself a product of foreign 
aid. I was born and raised in the Gaza Strip, I went to UN schools for education and UN 
clinics to receive medications and vaccinations, and now I have come to learn that nearly 
22% of the money UNRWA spent on me was American taxpayers’ money. At the age of ten, 
I watched, in horror, as bulldozers tore our muddy street where we played football daily, and 
replaced the mud that saved us from many a fall, with bricks as a part of an infrastructure 
reconstruction project. It was the first time in my life that I first heard of the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID), and needless to say, I had very little liking 
for it at the time for destroying our football field.	
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1. Conceptualizing Foreign Aid 
“Of the seeming and real innovations which the modern age has introduced into the 
practice of foreign policy, none has proven more baffling to both understanding and action 
than foreign aid.”99 
                   - Hans Morgenthau, 1962 
 
Never in the history of hitherto existing human civilizations has the wealthy countries 
transferred such large amounts of financial support to the poorer countries “unilaterally and 
non-reciprocally,” until the 20th century.100 Indeed, the idea of foreign aid is not new in and 
by itself, what is new however are the scale of the contributions, as well as the rationale and 
objectives behind them. These features make the 20th century’s form of foreign assistance 
unlike any in the history of international relations.101 Countries have always bribed one 
another, sought allies in wars by providing financial and military support, and paid 
handsomely to exert their influence beyond their borders.102 Furthermore, the 21st century is 
promising to bring further changes in who gives aid, why it is given, aid organization and 
delivery and also its size and scale.103  
The history of modern foreign aid is the history of changes in the international order 
that occurred during the 20th century, particularly following WWII. The emphasis on the 
word modern serves to avoid a mistake that some scholars have made in discussions of the 
history of foreign aid when they argue that foreign aid is a post WWII phenomenon. It is 
not. As Riddell rightly points out, dating the start of foreign aid at the late 1940s ignores the 
overall aid efforts made by voluntary associations prior to the 1940s. 104  And it also 
disregards official assistance provided from government to government prior to the 1940s. 
Yet, as chapter two demonstrates, the emergence of the United States as a major power in 
the first decade of the 20th century, the growth of its economic and military might through 																																																								
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the two world wars, the Cold War, decolonization, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the 
accelerated rate of globalization, have all played a role in the evolution of the contemporary 
empire of assistance.  
 This chapter focuses on conceptualizing foreign aid, and providing the theoretical 
framework that will serve as the basis for the remainder of the research. The purpose of the 
chapter is to explain the complex and intriguing aspects of the nature of foreign aid. For the 
explanation of this behavior and its impact on international affairs, the research uses 
international relations theories; realism, liberalism, constructivism and world systems 
analysis to make sense of this phenomenon. It also analyzes the role of aid in the conduct of 
international relations, particularly to answer the question of why countries give aid.  The 
chapter begins by defining foreign aid and the problems associated with defining it. A 
number of definitions from scholars and institutions is provided, followed by a discussion of 
the shortcomings of each of these definitions. The study then explores the different types, 
categories and forms of foreign assistance, and the major differences between them. The 
chapter concludes with a discussion of the political nature of foreign assistance, and the role 
of aid in international politics.  
1.1. Defining Foreign Aid  
It is extremely difficult to find one comprehensive definition of foreign aid. Despite the fact 
that different institutions, governments, and scholars have provided numerous definitions, 
the problem of making sense of these definitions remains. In other words, the different 
definitions are read and understood differently by the different people involved in this 
massive process. Moreover, a government official in a donor country is likely to provide a 
different definition from their counterpart in a recipient country. A liberal definition is also 
likely to be different from a conservative one; a realist practitioner or student of realism’s 
definition will also differ from that of a constructivist or a Marxist’s.  
Carol Lancaster rightly points out that though foreign aid is thought of as a policy, it 
is a tool of policy, rather than a policy in and by itself.105 David A. Baldwin, labeled foreign 
aid as “techniques of statecraft.”106 A Policy is as a set of guiding principles, procedures, 
regulations, and protocols enforced to achieve and maximize certain values for a society. 
For example, the values U.S. foreign policy seeks to achieve are a peaceful Middle East, and 
therefore a secure Israel, and regular flow of oil into American and world markets. How can 																																																								
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such target be achieved? The United States can enforce a resolution on both parties and with 
the aid of the international community force both Israel and the Palestinians to accept the 
terms. As a way to achieve this target, the U.S. has various tools at its disposal, from the 
least likely military option of beating both parties into acceptance, or with the help of other 
states impose boycotts and leave both the Israeli and Palestinian governments in diplomatic 
and economic isolation and disarray. Another tool the U.S. could use is foreign aid, whereas 
the Israelis and the Palestinians are given handsome financial aid packages if they accept, or 
risk sanctions and loss of the existing aid programs if they refuse. In this sense, foreign aid 
is not a policy in and by itself, but rather a technique in the business of conducting policy. 
The definition of “foreign aid” has changed over the course of the 20th century. For 
example, when the “rich” United Nations member states agreed to provide 0.7 percent of 
their Gross National Income (GNI) as development assistance to countries by a 1970 UN 
General Assembly Resolution, the definition of “official development assistance was to be 
understood as bilateral grants and loans on concessional terms, and official contributions to 
multilateral agencies,” it was not meant to include emergency humanitarian assistance or 
debt relief, yet most contemporary literature on the issue includes such aid in their 
definition.107 Furthermore, aid has come to be defined “in terms of security or development 
policy objectives” for the most part; therefore a clarification must be made at this juncture 
between some terms associated with “foreign aid,” or “foreign assistance,” such as military 
aid and development aid. 108  
For the purpose of this research, while distinctions between the various types of aid 
are made, the term foreign aid encompasses all forms and shapes of aid, including military, 
diplomatic, development, and humanitarian. The distinction that must be made is between 
foreign aid and development aid. Some scholarly works tend to use the terms 
interchangeably. This should not be the case. Development aid, as it clearly states in the 
name, is foreign assistance provided for that purpose, development, in particular economic 
and social development, for the purpose of improving the living conditions in the recipient 
country by reducing unemployment and eliminating poverty. Therefore, development aid in 
this case is a part of the greater foreign aid, or foreign assistance paradigm. 
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1.2. What is Foreign Aid? 
Unfortunately, the most commonly used definition of aid by scholars and institutions alike 
comes from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). This international intergovernmental 
organization was founded in 1961 and is currently compromised of 34 countries, 21 of them 
are members of the E.U. together with Australia, Israel, Japan, Mexico, Norway, 
Switzerland, Turkey and the United States among others.109  Its mission is “to promote 
policies that will improve the economic and social well-being of people around the 
world.”110 Essentially, it serves as a forum that brings together governments to coordinate 
and manage development aid contributed by its members. OECD and its DAC are 
proponents of free trade, open market, and globalization.  
DAC defines Official Development Assistance (ODA), as “financial flows, technical 
assistance, and commodities that are (1) designed to promote economic development and 
welfare as their main objective (thus excluding aid for military or other non-development 
purposes); and (2) are provided as either grants or subsidized loans with at least 25 percent 
grant element.”111 
The unfortunate aspect of using this definition, though it is not a fault of DAC, is 
that it has become the standard definition of “foreign aid.” Scholars tend to use it without 
specifying that it refers to development aid, rather than foreign aid. It has become an 
“automatic” definition. As early as 1972, Samuel Huntington remarked, “Aid and 
development came to be so closely linked as to be about interchangeable.” 112  As the 
research explains below, development aid is one dimension of foreign assistance, and 
therefore the terms should not be used interchangeably lest they lose aspects of their 
meaning. Not all aid is given for development purposes. Development aid is given for that 
purpose, it is neither emergency humanitarian aid, nor is it military aid either. It is usually, 
though not exclusively, provided by the rich countries to poor countries. 
One of the major problems in DACs definition is its narrowness for focusing purely 
on development aid. Perhaps understandably for that reason, since the organization focuses 
on development. But this definition is being widely used that it has become essential to 
show its shortcomings. The definition assumes that aid is given for development. That may 																																																								
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be the case in some cases, but not in all. Furthermore, the definition does not include foreign 
aid between already developed countries. For example, the United States’ aid to Israel, 
Russia, and South Korea would not fall under DAC’s definition since it does not include 
military assistance, neither does it include “export credits or trade financing, funding for 
cultural exchanges, remittances, private charity, or funding for covert action by intelligence 
agencies.”113 ODA’s definition does not do credit to the U.S.’s empire of assistance, it is 
simply not suitable because it falls utterly short of capturing the magnitude of the American 
aid establishment. 
In 2005, Lancaster and Dusen proposed a slightly broader definition of aid in their 
Organizing US Foreign Aid: Confronting the Challenges of the Twenty-First Century. They 
define foreign aid as “a voluntary transfer of public resources from one government to 
another government, international organization, or non-governmental organizations 
(including not-for-profit organizations working on specific issues, public interest 
organizations, churches and their associated organizations, universities, foundations, even 
private, for-profit business enterprises) to improve the lives and livelihoods in the country 
receiving the aid, among other goals.”114 This broader, and longer, definition expands on 
DAC’s definition by being “more expansive in what it includes,” and by defining the impact 
of foreign aid more broadly.115  
 Two years later, in her Foreign aid: Diplomacy, Development, and Domestic Politics 
Lancaster defined development aid as “voluntary transfer of public resources, from a 
government to another independent government, to an NGO, or to an international 
organization (such as the World Bank or the UN Development Program) with at least 25% 
grant element. One goal of which is to better the human condition in the country receiving 
the aid.”116 One issue with Lancaster’s definition is that it sets a 25 percent grant element, 
which by implication means that loans that require the recipient to repay the loaner with 
interest, even the easy long term loans, do not qualify as foreign aid. Furthermore, the 
definition makes no mention of technical assistance provided to aid countries with economic 
and political reforms. 
In his discussion of the problems associated with defining foreign aid, Roger C. 
Riddell states, “at its broadest, it consists of all resources- physical goods, skills and 																																																								
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technical know-how, financial grants (gifts), or loans (at concessional rates)- transferred by 
donors to recipients.”117 But as Riddell himself points out, this definition lacks several 
important components; it does not specify who the donors and the recipients are, nor the 
reason for the transfer, its impact, nor does it address issues regarding conditionality or 
coercion.118 Riddell also points out that foreign assistance does not have to take place 
strictly between the rich and the poor, and the reason for the transfer could be helping the 
recipient, helping the donor or both.119 
Development aid can be defined in terms of those receiving it, in reference to its 
end-use, or it could be defined in terms of those giving it with reference to purpose for 
which it is given. Others define aid by motive, which is markedly harder to examine. Malek 
notes, “by its very definition the sole motive behind aid is altruism.”120 Zinkin adds, “Aid is 
charity. If it is not charity, it is not aid.”121 Such definitions however exclude the vast 
majority of aid, if not aid altogether since it is near impossible provide aid without political 
ramifications. Were these definitions to be followed, the chapter will conclude here and 
scholars will have little to study.  
Brown and Opie, whose 1953 book American Foreign Assistance, though outdated, 
remains one of the most comprehensive works on the history of American foreign 
assistance, provided a more realistic definition. According to the authors American Foreign 
Assistance “involves the use of public funds to finance the transfer of goods and services 
abroad as a means to obtaining stated objectives of American foreign policy. It does not 
include investments, loans, or gifts by private citizens or nongovernmental institutions.”122 
Brown and Opie’s definition refers to official development assistance, which originates 
from the federal government and the federal budget, and therefore serves the purpose of this 
study better than the others. 
Since this research is concerned with aid that originates, and is paid for by the 
federal government of the United States, it is only fitting that the official definition of 
foreign aid by U.S. Congress be considered. This institutional definition happened to be one 
of the most comprehensive definitions of foreign assistance. It is provided in the Foreign 																																																								
117 Riddell, Does Foreign Aid Really Work? 17. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Ibid. 
120 As cited in Peter J. Burnell, Foreign Aid in a Changing World (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1997), 
3. 
121 Maurice Zinkin, "Aid and Morals: Addressing the Aspirations of the Poor Countries," The Round Table: 
The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs 68, no. 271 (1978): 222. 
122 William Adams Brown and Redvers Opie, American Foreign Assistance (Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution, 1953), 1. 
1. Conceptualizing Foreign Aid  40 
Assistance Act of 1961, section 634, which defines foreign assistance as “any tangible or 
intangible item provided by the United States Government to a foreign country or 
international organization under this or any other Act, including but not limited to any 
training, service, or technical advice, any item of real, personal or mixed property, and 
agricultural commodity,” and this “includes but is not limited to, foreign assistance provided 
by means of gift, loan, sale, credit, or guarantee.”123  
For the purpose of this study, congress’ comprehensive definition is used as the 
reference point in defining what is meant by foreign aid. Foreign aid is a political tool used 
to advance specific and general policy goals through the voluntary transfer of resources, 
from a donor country to a recipient country, an NGO, a political party, or a multinational 
organization. In the case of the U.S.; the American foreign assistance program is a tool of 
state-craft that serves the greater policy agenda and targets of U.S.’s foreign policy such as 
protecting American national security and advancing the economic prosperity of the 
American economy, and those of their allies by providing economic, military, and 
humanitarian assistance to foster U.S. national security, economic prosperity and improve 
its standing in the world. 
The definition might be too political, in the sense that it makes no mention of 
humanitarian or development aid, but that is because these forms of aid do not lack for a 
political element. Humanitarian aid refers to aid given as emergency assistance in case of 
natural or nationwide disasters such as war, while development aid refers to aid provided for 
the purpose of economic development, usually between wealthy and poor countries. But as 
the research demonstrates, politics plays an important role in both development and 
humanitarian aid, and both forms of aid are dependent to a large degree on numerous 
political and economic considerations. To explain this argument further, the following 
section discusses the politics of the different types and categories of aid. 
1.3. Types and Categories 
Foreign aid takes myriad forms, and there is a number of ways in which these forms can be 
categorized; by donor-recipient relation, bilateral and multilateral; or by type of aid 
rendered, military, development and humanitarian; or by the level of purchase freedom 
provided to recipient, tied and untied.  
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One way to categorize foreign assistance is by the recipient-donor relationship, or to 
put it in a different way, by the channels via which aid is given. Bilateral aid takes place 
between two state governments. Direct U.S. aid to the Palestinians or to Israel is an example 
of such. Multilateral aid is provided by the governments of states to international 
organization such as the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank, 
which use this aid to provide assistance to other countries for various purposes by means of 
loans, and grants. Approximately two thirds of all development assistance worldwide is 
bilateral.124  According to OECD’s DAC, in 17 out of a total of 28 countries, bilateral 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) accounts for more than half of their total ODA.125 
The U.S. is the highest among the 17 countries with approximately 72 percent of total ODA 
provided bilaterally, leaving 28 percent for funding through multilateral channels. By way 
of comparison, the UK’s ODA is split between 38 percent bilateral and 62 percent 
multilateral.126 
 According to Axel Dreher, professor of Economics and expert of international 
development at the University of Heidelberg, bilateral aid makes tying aid much easier for 
the donor, and is more susceptible to non-economic factors, while aid provided through 
NGOs, multilateral aid, is less likely to be affected by political factors and pressure.127 In 
other words, it is easier for major donors to “tie” their aid when it is given through bilateral 
channels rather than through the World Bank and the IMF, though these organizations have 
their own sets of conditions on their grants and loans. Furthermore, without being entangled 
with a discussion on the influence of such institutions as the World Bank and the IMF, 
unlike state donors, these organizations do not have a foreign policy program or agenda. The 
aid contributions of multilateral agencies is provided on need basis, rather than being on 
good terms with the donor, or voting in tandem with the donor at the UN, or any other of the 
expected outcomes by the donor for providing aid. In general, multilateral aid is less bound 
to the political, diplomatic, and economic wishes of the donor than bilateral aid. 
1.3.1. Tied and Untied Aid 
Tied aid refers to foreign assistance wherein the recipient receives aid from the donor on the 
condition that the goods and services, raw materials, technical advice and know-how must 																																																								
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be purchased, wholly or partly, from the donor countries. According to OECD, tied aid 
increases the costs of development projects by 15 to 30 percent. 128  For example, 
hypothetically speaking, if the developing country of Yemen wished to receive German 
assistance to buy vehicles for the country’s police force, then Yemen must spend this aid on 
purchasing $50,000 Mercedes, BMW, and Audi cars, despite the fact that the price of these 
cars may be double their French, or even triple the cost of South Korean cars. Though it 
must be mentioned that Germany and the United Kingdom, among other major European 
donors have untied their ODA.129 Another example is food aid. Instead of purchasing food 
from local and regional markets, the recipient is required to buy such commodities from the 
donor, even if the said donor is 5000 miles away.  
 There are serious implications associated with tying aid that render aid in some 
circumstances ineffective. The most obvious implication is that, as the hypothetical example 
in Yemen’s case demonstrates, tied aid can be less cost-effective. Instead of spending such 
large sums on vehicles only, Yemen could use a fair amount on cheaper vehicles, and save 
enough to invest the remaining aid in different projects. Another implication, and perhaps a 
more serious one, is the major delays experienced by relief workers and organizations due to 
waiting for emergency products to arrive from the donor country, rather than purchasing it 
locally or regionally, and therefore delaying the delivery of necessary goods and services to 
recipients who need it. 
 U.S. emergency food assistance for example, is shipped from the Midwestern 
states to famine stricken areas.130 During a 2008 senate hearing on the global food crisis, 
USAID Administrator and Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance Henrietta Fore stated, “under 
the current system, U.S. procured commodities can take up to 6 months to reach the 
beneficiaries. In addition, less than half of every dollar spent actually goes to purchasing 
food in the United States.”131 Worse still, according to Thomas Melito of the Government 
Accountability Office, 65 percent of the U.S. food aid budget is spent on transportation, 
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rather than the actual food itself.132 By this standard, the U.S. could in principle at least 
supply double of aid shipments if the logistical costs were reduced to 15 percent. 
Since the U.S. stopped public reporting on tied aid in 1996, exactly how much of 
American aid remains tied is unknown. According to Aid Watch, an online blog of the 
Development Research Institute at New York University, written by William Easterly and 
Laura Freschi, when the United States stopped reporting tied aid statistics, 72 percent of 
U.S. aid was tied, as opposed to only 29 percent as the average for other donor countries.133 
A 2003 report by USAID proudly claimed that “the principal beneficiary of America’s 
foreign assistance programs have always been the United States. Close to 80 percent of 
USAID’s contracts and grants go directly to American firms.” 134  A 2012 analysis of 
hundreds of food aid contracts conducted by the Guardian newspaper found that two-thirds 
of the food purchased for U.S. aid came from three American multinational companies.135  
The system of American food distribution has also come under criticism, particularly 
the “monetization” process, wherein American goods are sold locally to sponsor other 
development projects, but by the time the food makes it to its destination, it has already cost 
too much to be recovered by selling it locally. A 2011 report by the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) on International Food Assistance blamed monetization for the 
loss of $219 million in development aid, and the report warned that monetization could 
cause “adverse market impacts.”136 In protest against the system, one of the largest charities 
in the world, Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE), rejected $45 
million of U.S. food aid in 2007, saying that American aid is “plagued with inefficiencies” 
and that such aid harms local farmers.137  
There have been a number of attempts to reform the food aid program, particularly 
food assistance, but such attempts have faced stern opposition in congress. As recently as 
2013, congress took no action on an amendment by the House Foreign Affairs Committee 
Chairman, Ed Royce, and Karen Bass, a member on the house Africa sub-committee, that 																																																								
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aimed to end the requirement that American food aid be grown in the U.S. and further 
“exempts emergency and private assistance activities… from requirements for… cargoes 
procured, furnished, or financed by the U.S. Government.”138  In FY 2014 budget, the 
Obama administration proposed reforms to the food aid program that would essentially 
loosen the ties on American food aid.139 The 2014 Farm Bill, or the Agricultural Act of 
2014, included provisions to allow food programs to purchase more local products and 
further established a program at the Department of Agriculture to purchase local products 
through “local and regional procurement” at a cost of $80 million annually.140  
Obama’s minor success in the 2014 Farm Bill, which he described as a “Swiss army 
knife” for its multitasking, though “did not represent the full scale of reforms sought by the 
administration,” was still important enough to consider further changes and reforms.141 In 
2015, USAID purchased regional rice, beans, oil and corn to respond to a crisis in the 
Central African Republic in which 1.3 million people were in need for emergency food aid, 
which needless to say, arrived much quicker than food aid originating from the U.S.142  
It is these economic and political benefits that make tied aid attractive to donors. 
This system ensures that most of the aid money is spent in the local economy rather than 
that of a foreign, far away country. It provides a buyer for American farmers’ produce, and 
it provides jobs for U.S. shipping companies. And should a leader prove unwise enough to 
attempt to change this system, there are armies of lobbying groups that would descend on 
the Hill to protect the interests of these farmers, food processors, and shipping companies as 
happened in 2013, months before Obama even proposed the changes in FY 2014.143 These 
lobbies aside, congress representatives whose constituents benefit from the current system, 
are unlikely to jump on the reform wagon that could lead to economic losses, even if 
minimal, in their home states. 
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1.3.2. Humanitarian and Development 
Humanitarian aid can best be described as assistance provided to alleviate the suffering 
inflicted upon a certain country, or a group of people, as a result of natural disasters; 
tsunamis, epidemics, earthquakes, and floods; or man-made disasters such as wars and their 
usual consequences of displacement, emigration, and general shortage of living necessities. 
Examples for this form of aid are numerous; aid to victims of the 2005 Tsunami in East 
Asia, and food and medical assistance provided to Haitians following the 2010 earthquake. 
Currently, aid provided to Syrian refugees in camps in Jordan and Turkey falls under the 
humanitarian aid category. Aid provided to Syrian rebels engaged in fighting the Assad 
regime however, does not fall under the humanitarian aid category. In general, humanitarian 
aid tends to be short term to resolve an immediate crisis. It usually consists of food 
assistance, such as the USAID’s food and water deliveries with the “Gift from the American 
People” stamp, medical supplies such as medicine and field hospitals, as well as army 
soldiers and volunteers carrying out various emergency relief tasks. 
 Humanitarian aid efforts are usually, but not exclusively, led by the International 
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and UN organizations such as the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and United Nations 
International Children’s Fund (UNICEF). Non-Government Organizations such as Oxfam, 
Mercy Corps, and CARE, among others, have also been prominent in delivering 
humanitarian assistance to stricken areas. This form of assistance is arguably the oldest and 
most global form of aid. Indeed, to help others in desperate need could be said to be an 
intrinsic value with which human beings are born. However, while there is usually a race 
among donors and relief organizations to meet the needs of desperate people, there is no 
doubt that such relief is based on political and economic considerations.  A discussion and 
an example of the political dimension of humanitarian aid would do much to clarify the 
argument further. 
Politics	of	Humanitarian	aid	
Heeding the advise of Political Scientist, David A. Baldwin, who rightfully points out that 
“until political scientists have reached a general agreement regarding the meaning of 
‘political,’ they would do well to provide explicit definitions when they use that term.”144 
For the purpose of this discussion therefore, two of the standard definitions of “politics” are 
used. Since politics is all about answering the question of power, and it is about “who gets 																																																								
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what when and how”,145 and it is “the authoritative allocation of values for a society”, it is 
impossible to think of a foreign aid system bereft of politics.146 Aid is political by nature. 
Whether it ought to be or not, is an entirely different question. It is truly beyond any 
politician or scholar’s control to depoliticize aid. This study argues that even in the direst of 
situations, politics plays a major role in shaping every aspect of humanitarian assistance. In 
order to explain this argument, the study provides a comparative analysis of the U.S. and the 
international community’s response to two natural disasters that occurred in the same year, 
in two different parts of the world. The first was the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti, and 
the other was the flooding in Pakistan in late July of the same year. 
 Haiti, an island nation with population of a little over 10 million, and Pakistan, a 
country of utmost geopolitical importance to the United States with a population of over 166 
million, suffered their worst national disasters in their history in 2010. The aftermath of 
these disasters threatened the political stability in both countries, which had not been that 
stable to begin with. The disasters left Pakistan and Haiti in desperate need for humanitarian 
assistance and emergency aid since they were not equipped to deal with disasters on this 
scale or of this magnitude. The international community’s response to both disasters was 
different, to put it mildly.  
Suffering cannot be measured in numbers, and the comparison does not attempt to 
judge which of the disasters was more terrible, or which was more devastating, or which 
people suffered more. It merely focuses on the financial cost of the quake and flood, and the 
cost of reconstruction of the devastated areas, as well as the international response to the 
disasters themselves and the international pledges for reconstruction. Elizabeth Ferris of the 
Brookings Institution compiled the table below in her study of the disasters.147 
 Haiti Earthquake Pakistan Flooding 
Date of Disaster 12, January 2010 Late July 2010 
Population affected (percent of 
total) 
3 million (29.4%) 17.2 million (10.35%) 
Death and injuries 220,500 and 300,000 1,539 and 2,055 
Displaced Est. 1.8 million 6 million 
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Original UN flash appeal 15 January for $ 575 
million 
11 August for $460 million 
Pledges two weeks after 
appeal as percent of total 
appeal 
82% 57% 
United States Pledges $ 211.6 million, part of 
the extended $1.4 
billion 
$150 million 
Reconstruction Pledges 
(worldwide) 
$ 9.9 billion, $ 5.3 
billion of which over 2 
years. 
World Bank $0.9 billion 
Asia Development Bank 
$2.0 billion (loans) 
Donation per affected person 
after two weeks of flash 
appeal 
$ 157.16 $ 15.25 
Estimated Damage $ 7.8 billion Est. $ 15 billion 
Figure 1:1, a comparison between the international community’s responses to the 2010 Haiti and the Pakistan 
natural disasters.  
There is a number of reasons that explain this disparity in the international 
community’s response to the disasters, yet they are not sufficient to draw the conclusion that 
“humanitarian aid,” is just that, humanitarian. The first reason is donor fatigue. The fact that 
the Pakistan floods took place few months after the Haiti earthquake, reduce the overall 
amount of aid. Countries had already contributed a fair amount to Haiti in January and 
February, by the time the flooding took place in Pakistan, donors’ wallets were not as full as 
they had been, and therefore they were not able to donate as much to Pakistan. The second 
reason is the nature and the time of the disaster. In the case of Haiti, the fact that the disaster 
was an earthquake and that it occurred suddenly with devastating effect left stronger impact 
than the two to three week time span it took for the flooding to destroy the areas it covered. 
In other words, the shock factor played a larger role in Haiti’s case, and therefore generated 
more sympathy. The final reason is the geographic proximity of Haiti to the U.S. the latter’s 
long involvement in Haitian affairs.148 Haiti falls within America’s sphere of influence; 
therefore it was only natural for the U.S. to demonstrate more willingness to aid Haiti than 
Pakistan, even though Pakistan can be said to have be of more significance in American 
foreign policy. 																																																								
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Despite all that, one cannot help but think that there is more to this disparity in 
response, particularly on behalf of the U.S., than the mere geographic closeness and 
America’s close ties with Haiti. America’s relations with Pakistan have deteriorated in the 
last few years and the perception of Pakistan in the U.S. amongst both the public and policy 
makers is at record low. According to a 2012 PEW Research Center survey, only 10 percent 
of the general U.S. public trust Pakistan, while only 6 percent of “experts” in the 
government trust Pakistan a “great deal or a fair amount.”149 There is no doubt that the 
September 11th terror attacks and the subsequent war in Afghanistan contributed to this level 
of trust, or mistrust rather.  
Another important dimension of the politics of humanitarian aid is the role of aid in 
conflict resolution. While humanitarian assistance is “a good” in and by itself, there is room 
to question, not just the motives, but also the consequences of such assistance. The 
consequences of humanitarian assistance vary according to each case. For example, 
humanitarian aid during conflicts can be ceased and used by belligerents. Instead of feeding 
hungry children, humanitarian aid ends up in the hands of combatants, and is used as 
leverage against civilians or an opposing party. In 2013, al-Shabab terrorist group in 
Somalia seized over $745 million worth of British aid supplies.150  
Finally, humanitarian aid comes with a string of conditions for the recipient to meet, 
or risk worsening an already bad situation. Even in the midst of severe crises, humanitarian 
aid can be used as a tool to advance ideological principles. In Afghanistan for example, 
prior to the removal of the Taliban, food assistance was tied to Taliban’s reforms with 
respect to gender equality.151 This is not to make light of such an important issue as gender 
equality, but when it is a choice between leaving Afghans without food, until their non-
elected, tyrannical, Taliban government carried out gender policy reforms, then it clearly 
makes humanitarian aid a tool of influence rather than relief. 
In the Palestinian case, one could argue that foreign aid is as much a part of the 
problem as a part of the solution. As briefly mentioned in the introduction, there is a 
paradox embedded in the idea of humanitarian aid.  If for the sake of the argument, one 
assumes that foreign aid to the Palestinians is given from purely altruistic perspective, that is 																																																								
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to say that donors had no motive but to aid the suffering Palestine refugees to ensure that 
they have proper education and health care. How important a role does this altruistic act 
play in enforcing the refugee identity? And if the U.S. or any other donor for that matter, 
decides to help the Palestinians’ movement by building a new road, or reconstructing an 
existing one, but this particular road had to circumvent an Israeli settlement, and its roads 
built illegally on Palestinian land, does this aid not answer future questions regarding the 
legality of the settlement? The altruistic road plays a role in the final solution, despite the 
motives being selfless, or a part of a larger policy to legitimize the Israeli settlement. In 
essence, even with all donor motives set aside, humanitarian aid is political simply because 
it plays a part in politics. It is involved in the question of who gets what when and how. 
Ilana Feldman probably summed it best when she said, “you cannot have aid that doesn’t 
have politics around it, but what the politics are can change.”152 
1.3.3. Aid for Development 
Development aid on the other hand is assistance provided for long term purpose of 
developing a country’s infrastructure, alleviate poverty, reduce unemployment, promote 
economic growth and bring overall improvements in people’s lives. It can be multilateral, 
through international organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund, or it can be bilateral, one government to another.  
Does	Development	Aid	Develop?	
Like many of foreign aid questions, there is no one answer to this question. There is a large 
amount of literature, historic and contemporary that answers the question with both yes and 
no.  There are considerations that must be kept in mind while answering this question. The 
first stems from the relative meaning of terms such as development, economic growth, and 
social development and the ways by which they are measured. The second reason for the 
lack of an answer is the lack of research on outcomes, rather than inputs.153 
There are two competing theories on this question, public interest theory and public 
choice perspective. Public interest theory argues that foreign aid is essential to fill a 
financing and investment gap, and this investment will serve to move countries out of the 
poverty trap.154 Jeffrey Sachs chiefly advocates this view in his book The End of Poverty: 																																																								
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Economic Possibilities for Our Time.155 The 2005 New York Times bestseller makes the 
argument that if wealthy countries donated more foreign aid, between $135 billion and $195 
in the next decade, extreme global poverty could be eliminated.156 Sachs adopts the World 
Bank’s definition of “extreme poverty,” wherein the income is less than one dollar a day.157 
According to Sachs, there is only one way out of poverty for the poorest of the poor, and 
that is to “climb the ladder of development.”158 
By contrast, the public choice perspective, argues that foreign aid has negative 
impact on economic growth, and therefore is ineffective, and damaging to recipients’ 
economies.159 This opposing view is advocated by William Easterly in his The White Man’s 
Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill ad So Little 
Good.160There is an enormous amount of empirical literature that supports the public choice 
theory and there is little empirical support for a positive correlation between development 
and foreign assistance.161  Indeed, Hristos Doucouliagos and Martin Paldam carried out a 
meta-analysis of the entire empirical literature on the effects of foreign aid that were 
published since 1970 in their 2007 Aid Effectiveness Literature: The Sad Results of 40 Years 
of Research, which concludes that “after 40 years of development aid, the evidence 
indicates that aid has not been effective.”162  
Earlier studies, such as Papanek’s 1972 article claimed that there was a positive 
impact of aid on economic growth.163 Mosley et al. 1987 argued that it was impossible to 
establish any significant relationship between aid and economic growth all together. 
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Boone’s 1996 article, argued the same, with a slightly more positive conclusion.164 Boone 
found that aid “Aid does not significantly increase investment and growth, nor benefit the 
poor as measured by improvements in human development indicators, but it does increase 
the size of government.”165 According to Boone, “short term aid targeted to support new 
liberal regimes may be a more successful means of reducing poverty than current 
programs.”166 Burnside and Dollar find that aid has a positive impact on growth in countries 
with sound fiscal, monetary and trade policies, but has little effect on growth in countries 
with poor policies.167 
Whichever theory is correct in its arguments, there is an undeniable link between the 
policies of the recipient and the impact of foreign aid, as Burnside and Dollar found. One 
major problem in the public interest theory is that it assumes that aid money is spent on 
what it is supposed to be spent on. There is no point filling a bottle with water if the water 
leaks right through holes. It simply does not make economic sense, even though it may 
make political sense, to pour money into any country if the recipient’s leadership is so 
corrupt that foreign assistance is wasted.168 Foreign aid in such cases becomes a part of the 
problem rather than the solution. The case of the PA and the corruption at the various levels 
of its hierarchy, discussed in details in chapter five, is a sound example to explain this link. 
1.3.4. Military Aid 
Military aid involves the voluntary transfer of material from one country to another, or a 
multinational organization, for military purposes such as defense and security. This vague 
definition requires some elaboration. The material can take many forms, and some of it can 
leave room for debate and controversy. These materials could be a nuclear bomb, guns, 
ammunition, or food and blankets. Food and blankets could fall under the humanitarian aid 
aspect, but when they are distributed among soldiers during combat, it leaves little space for 
a humanitarian argument. Indeed, even if donors account military aid as a part of their 
development aid, since it could be said to be a part of developing the recipient’s military and 
defense structure, OECD specifically and explicitly excludes military aid from their 
definition of aid.  																																																								
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There is a thin line that separates economic and development aid from military aid. 
The issue here is that with the exception of direct military assistance in form of weapons and 
ammunition, much else could be accounted as security and military aid. For example, roads 
and bridges facilitate the movements of individuals and goods, therefore, aid for road 
construction is accounted as development aid, but it is also used to facilitate the passage of 
military forces as well. Economic assistance to improve a country’s police force, or a 
country’s security in general is an example of how truly shallow this divide is. Military aid 
is often tied; therefore the recipient is required to spend aid funds on purchasing materials, 
goods and services from the donor.169  
 Few countries publish or at least make their military aid spending public, and such 
data is scarce and unreliable.170 Luckily, the U.S. is one of the exceptions. From 1970 until 
1975, U.S. military aid represented 53 percent of total U.S. by early 2000s, the share 
plummeted to 23 percent. However, if aid fungibility is taken into consideration, meaning 
funds that are earmarked for a purpose are spent on other purposes, such as military 
expenditure, it is estimated that 11 percent of development aid is turned into military 
expenditure, raising the percentage of total military aid to more than 23 percent to 
approximately 32 percent.171 Since military aid tends to be tied, it brings economic benefits 
to the donor. In Germany’s case for example, some military, or security assistance is 
provided for economic reasons. The military assistance provided by West Germany since 
the mid-1970s, argued Ball in 1988, had been motivated “at least in part by the desire to 
build links with countries interested in ordering equipment on a commercial basis from 
West German arms producers.”172 
 According to Collier and Hoeffler, one of the consequences of such aid is the 
promotion of arms races.173 The authors developed a model using global data from 1960 
until 1990 and find that “there are regional arms races which are fueled by aid.”174 This 
pattern appears in the Middle East, as the next chapter demonstrates, as Egypt, Syria and 																																																								
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Israel worked tirelessly to acquire more military aid from the Soviet Union and the United 
States during their years of belligerence. As Lifshitz points out, American aid to Israel 
between 1960 and 1979 could be explained by changes in defense expenditures of the Arab 
states.175 
 Military aid proved to be one of the most used aspects of American foreign aid 
during the Cold War years. As the next chapter demonstrates, military aid to Korea, 
Vietnam, Israel, Brazil, Chile, Japan, and China to name a few, was an indispensable tool in 
America’s policy of containing the Soviet Union. Though neither the U.S. nor the Soviet 
Union played much attention to African states, even if they happened to be the ones who 
were in most need of aid, military or otherwise. African states’ civil wars and regional wars 
were of little interest to the superpowers as they were seen to be “too underdeveloped and 
geographical remote from their perspective power centers to warrant providing African 
states with more than token military aid.”176  
1.4. Who Gives Aid to Whom? 
The United States is the highest contributor of foreign assistance in the world in terms of 
amount donated, but not in terms of percentage of Gross National Income (GNI). If the 
percentage of GNI is applied as the criterion, the U.S. drops from first to 20th. OECD has the 
target of 0.7 percent of the GNI of its members, but only five countries met the target in 
2013, Norway with 1.1 percent, Sweden with a little over 1 percent, Luxembourg with 1 
percent and Denmark with 0.83 percent and finally the UK with a little over 0.7 percent.177 
The idea of 0.7 percent of Gross National Product (GNP) to be donated as share in 
development assistance was introduced by the Pearson Commission in 1969 as a target to be 
reached by 1975, or 1980 at the latest.178 In October the following year, the UN adopted a 
similar resolution asking for the same percentage from its members.179 UNGA resolution 
2626 states “each economically advanced country will progressively increase its official 
development assistance to the developing countries and will exert its best efforts to reach a 																																																								
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minimum net amount of 0.7 per cent of its gross national product at market prices by the 
middle of the Decade.”180 The U.S. did not adopt a specific target or timetable, but remains 
the largest donor.  
The 0.7 percent requirement is not without controversy, and may be perceived as 
unfair considering the disparities between countries’ GNI, and population. To use an 
extreme example, the United States’ GNI was nearly $17 trillion in 2013, in comparison to 
the UK’s $2.5 trillion.181 The amount donated by the U.S. would therefore far exceed that 
donated by other countries. The U.S. has a population of over 315 million people, the UK’s 
is 64 million.182 If a certain amount was to be required instead, the U.S. and other developed 
countries may not find it hard to cover such costs, while Ghana and most African countries 
for example would struggle to meet this demand.183 	
	Figure	1:2,	Official	Development	Assistance	by	DAC	members	in	total	amount	(right)	and	as	percentage	of	GNI	(left)	in	2014.	(Source:	OECD).184	
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As can be seen in the figure above, the U.S. donates more money to development 
assistance than any other country in the world. With over $32 billion, the U.S. sits 
unchallenged atop the donor countries. According to DAC, over $134 billion were 
distributed by its member states as development assistance in 2014.185 The committee’s aid 
statistics show that while development aid rose by 6.1 percent in 2013, reaching the highest 
level in history, aid to sub-Saharan Africa, the countries that need it the most, actually 
declined.186 
 According to World Bank data, Egypt was the highest recipient of aid in 2013 
receiving over $5.5 billion, followed by Afghanistan, which received $5.2, a decline of over 
$1 billion from the previous year, Vietnam with $4 billion, Myanmar with $3.9 billion and 
Ethiopia completed the top five with $3.8 billion.187 One of the most controversial aspects of 
development aid is that not all the countries that need aid receive it, and some countries that 
do not need aid receive plenty of it. For example, the developing country of Argentina 
received only $30 million of aid in 2013, as compared to the developed Turkey, which 
received $2.7 billion.188 With recent developments in the crisis in Syria and the flow of 
refugees to Europe through it, aid to Turkey is likely to increase even more.189 
1.5. And Why? 
This is a question that does not have an answer, or rather it has too many answers. It has 
been the subject of numerous debates, research, and scholarly work. Why would a 
developed country like the U.S. provide such large quantities of tax dollars to another 
country half way across the world? The U.S. spends in the region of $50 billion annually, 
how many projects can this large sum fund within the U.S.? The entirety of the Interstate 
Highway System in the U.S., a total length of over 77,000 km, cost approximately $425 
billion or $5,5 billion for every 1000 km.190 With the annual aid budget alone, the U.S. 
could build 10,000 km of highways every year. To put it in perspective, the distance 
between New York City and Los Angles is a meager 4400 km in comparison.191  
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Is it a moral obligation to aid the needy as some suggest? Is it guilt or morality that 
drives the former colonizers to aid their former colonies? Do moral and humanitarian 
considerations a play a role in determining foreign assistance, or is it a means to advance the 
economic interests and protect the national security of the donor by building alliances and 
maintaining peace between allies? Do countries that adopt political and economic reforms 
and system, which are friendlier to the donors, receive more aid? Is the primary purpose of 
providing aid establishing alliances and make friends at the UN? Or do the donors ideals 
and principles play a role in this inter-state phenomenon? The answer is that it is probably a 
combination of all these factors, albeit to different degrees of significance. It is of course 
impossible, and unwise, to credit the thousands of aid transactions to simply the desire to 
“do good” or even to protect the security of the nation alone. 
There are few reasons that explain the existence of numerous answers. The first is 
that there are few major donors and each donor’s motives are not necessarily the same. 
Nordic countries for example have different motive for providing aid than the U.S. More so 
than American aid, aid in the Nordic countries is seen to be motivated more by humanitarian 
than security and economic concerns.192 Second, the purpose of aid itself has changed over 
the course of the last few decades. As already mentioned, aid was used to combat 
communism and contain its expansion, but once communism was no longer a threat, the 
purpose of aid had to change accordingly, and the focus became development, or spreading 
of American political and economic principles.  
Foreign Aid as a concept entails numerous questions within it. Starting from the 
definition, and types of foreign aid, to the more controversial and complex nature of foreign 
aid motives and rationales. The concept has wide political, social, and economic dimensions 
and implications. Furthermore, as implied in the term itself, and the definitions provided, 
foreign aid involves bargaining between two or more states, or players, on an international 
level, adding an inter-state dimension to the process. The following section provides an 
overview of the debate in international relations theories, expanding and evaluating the 
answers provided above. 
Foreign	Aid	and	IR	Theories	
In order to best understand foreign aid and its role in international relations, the principles of 
International Relations theories (IR) will be applied to explain this concept and its role in 
the conduct of international relations. American political scientist, Stephen M. Walt, argues 																																																								
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that there is “an escapable link between the abstract world of theory and the real world of 
policy.”193 Framing foreign aid within a theoretical framework is beneficial to both scholars 
and politicians in making sense of the large amount of information within “foreign aid.” The 
following analysis provides the explanations of these schools based on their principles, but it 
does not advocate that one is more right than the other. Indeed, if any argument in that 
regard is to be made, one is obliged to say that no single theory provides an adequate 
explanation on its own.  
There are four paradigms that provide explanations of foreign aid, particularly in 
answering the “why” question regarding the donors’ motives; realism, constructivism, 
liberalism and world systems theory. The following section of the research describes and 
analyses the principles of each of these theories, and the premises on which they build their 
views and arguments. The purpose of this analysis is to demonstrate the variety of 
explanations that surround this phenomenon. The various theories provide different 
explanations, but such explanations do not rule the others false. They should rather be seen 
as different lenses through which scholars and policy-makers see aid. 
The first of the IR schools is realism. The term “realism” must be understood to refer 
to multiple realist theories and not a single one in particular. Realism as an umbrella term 
includes classic realism, neorealism, neoclassical realism, and more recently realist 
constructivism. 194  The changes that have occurred and the different methods various 
scholars apply in their studies have ensured that realism as a school of thought in 
international relations evolved with time. This study focuses on the classic form of realism, 
as advocated by Hans Morgenthau, and the newer forms of realism, called neorealism or 
structural realism, introduced by Kenneth Waltz in his 1979 Theory of International 
Politics.195 While both forms of realism share many of the main principles in their theories, 
Waltz introduced the neo-form in response to criticism of classical realism for failing to 
produce a theory that would move beyond the normative thinking and introduce scientific 
																																																								
193 Stephen M. Walt, "International Relations: One World, Many Theories," Foreign Policy, no. 110 (1998): 
29. 
194  Two sources provide an excellent analysis on IR theories are ibid. and Ole R. Holsti, "Theories of 
International Relations," in Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations, ed. Michael J. Hogan and 
Thomas G. Paterson (Cambridge New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004; reprint, 2006). 
195 While Morgenthau and Waltz are credited for the founding of modern realism, realism as a tradition of 
thought can be said to date back to Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War. The Greek philosopher’s 
famous Melian Dialogue in which he stated, “…the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they 
must.” 16th century Italian philosopher Niccolo Machiavelli’s The Prince, and English philosopher Thomas 
Hobbes’ 1651 Leviathan are also some of realism’s earlier founding intellectual works. See Benjamin Frankel 
ed., Roots of Realism (London: Frank Cass, 1996). 
1. Conceptualizing Foreign Aid  58 
explanations for the workings of inter-state relations.196 Knud Jorgenson views structural 
realism as a “significant rupture,” from classical realism.197  
 According to Ole R. Holsti, both classical and structural realism share five core 
principles. The first premise is that they view the causes of war and the conditions of peace 
as central questions. Second, they believe that the structure of the international system as a 
necessary explanation, though it is not always sufficient. Third, according to both schools, 
the state is the primary actor in the international system. Fourth, states are rational since 
they are driven by their national interest. Finally, the state can be conceptualized as a 
“unitary actor,” meaning that their actions are a response to external rather than domestic 
political forces.198 
 German International Relations theorist, Hans Morgenthau, is accredited with being 
the founding father of classical realism. Morgenthau, who was influenced by Reinhold 
Niebuhr, a Protestant theologian and political theorist, and Thomas Hobbes, the renowned 
British political philosopher argues, “international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for 
power.”199  In his opus magnum, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and 
Peace, Morgenthau suggests that, like human beings, states share a desire to dominate 
others.200  
With this idea in mind, it is easy to understand how realism became the dominant 
school of International Relations during the Cold War era. In a bipolar world, with fierce 
competition between the two superpowers, and proxy wars and alliance forming, it is not a 
surprise that realism, with its emphasis on competition, struggle and general pessimistic 
view of human nature, whether in the theologian version, as Saint Augustine and Reinhold 
Niebuhr’s, or in the secular version as in Machiavelli, Hobbes and Morgenthau, would 
provide viable explanation for the international order during the Cold War.201 Walt argues 
that realism was “the dominant theoretical tradition throughout the Cold War,” because it 
provided simple but power explanations, and “its emphasis on competition was the central 
features of the American-Soviet rivalry.”202   
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For Morgenthau and realists, the United States’ interests abroad cannot all be 
protected by military means, or even by the “traditional methods of diplomacy,” which 
Morgenthau deemed insufficient on their own, so that if “foreign aid is not available they 
will not be supported at all.”203  Another prominent realist, the late American political 
scientist, Samuel Huntington, echoes Morgenthau’s belief, asserting that “the United States 
has frequently given economic assistance to achieve non-economic objectives, and with 
results which have been at least as relatively successful as its efforts to promote economic 
development.”204 The realist approach suggests that foreign assistance is a policy tool that 
originated during the Cold War years to influence developing countries during the 
American-Soviet struggle in a bi-polar world system.205 For political realists such as George 
Liska and Morgenthau, “foreign aid is an instrument of foreign policy.”206 It is designed to 
advance the strategic interests of the donor, particularly national security in a Hobbesian 
international system, wherein as Hobbes describes it “during the time men live without a 
common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre; 
and such a warre as is of every man, against every man.”207 As for the recipient’s economic 
development and humanitarian concerns, foreign aid is perceived as “minimally related” to 
such concerns.208 Much of the contemporary foreign aid regime is a product of the Cold 
War, and the political, economic, military, and diplomatic competition between the United 
States and the Soviet Union. In this sense aid is, as Lancaster states, “… in short, a child of 
hardheaded, diplomatic realism.”209  
But realism is not without shortcomings. In his study of the Reagan Doctrine and 
how structural realism explains aid to “‘freedom fighters,’” in reference to insurgencies 
aided by president Reagan, Mark Lagon finds that “the structural realist perspective is 
necessary to explain the Reagan Doctrine, but not sufficient,” as it fails to take the policy 
makers’ belief into consideration.210  According to Lagon, the origins of foreign policy 																																																								
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should be studied in terms of elite beliefs.211 He argues that an “‘elite beliefs theory’, would 
make rather different cues than structural realism to explain the origins of foreign policy.”212 
For that, one must turn to another school in international relations, constructivism, which 
focuses less on national security, economic interests and focuses more on beliefs, principles 
and ideas.  	 The second of the most prominent IR theories is the liberal tradition. This approach 
differs from the realist one in almost every respect. Liberalism adopts a less selfish, and 
perhaps more optimistic explanation for the lack of a better term, than their realist 
colleagues. 213  One of the major differences between the two schools of thought is 
ontological; realism emphasizes the darker aspects of human nature, and sees it as inherently 
bad, while liberalism emphasizes the positive aspects, and sees human nature as good. 
Whereas realists see war as the natural state, liberalism sees wars “as a consequence that can 
be attributed to historical circumstances, evil leaders, flawed sociopolitical systems, or 
inadequate international understanding and education.”214  
According to Walt, one strand of liberal thought argued that economic inter-
dependence would serve as a deterrent against wars between states because states would not 
be willing to threaten their prosperity.215 Another strand, which is influenced by Woodrow 
Wilson, saw the spread of democracy as the key to world peace.216 This belief can be found 
in the Democratic Peace Theory, which argues that democracies are inherently more 
peaceful and that democracies do not go to war with one another.217 This particular thread 
became more prominent in neoconservative political thought, which is said to have been 
influential during the presidency of George W. Bush.218 Finally, a third strand of liberal 
thought argued that international institutions like the World Bank and the IMF, “could help 
overcome selfish state behavior, mainly by encouraging states to forego immediate gains for 
the greater benefits of enduring cooperation.”219 
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Liberalism’s focus shifts away from national security and economic gains, to a more 
humanitarian need based explanation. They perceive humanitarian needs “as the cornerstone 
of many foreign aid programs.”220 Liberalism therefore sees foreign aid as a tool of a policy 
designed to improve the conditions in the developing world, a means to eliminate poverty 
and promote economic development.221 Furthermore, foreign aid in the liberal perspective 
can be said to facilitate “the real means of world peace and prosperity: commerce and 
trade.”222 According to some liberal views, the main problem is the domestic economic 
policies of the developing countries, which “reduce the productivity of land, labor, and 
capital; and intensify social and political rigidities.”223 
 The constructivist school of international relations is the newest of the three major 
schools. Alexander Wendt is usually credited with being the lead scholar in constructivist 
thought.224 He challenged the realist view on anarchy, which realists see as the natural order 
of the world, and the cause for conflict between different state actors. Wendt’s response is 
that “anarchy is what states make of it.”225 To Wendt, the natural order is not static, nor is it 
predetermined, it is what the interactions and actions between and of states make it. If states 
wished the system to be based on peaceful cooperation, it can be so. Wendt argues that there 
are three cultural forms that results from interaction between states; a Hobbesian form, a 
Lockian form, and a Kantian form.226 
 The Hobbesian form, which has been discussed in the realist perspective, is a state of 
competition and war, with a lack of central authority to keep states in check. The Lockian 
form involves competition between states, though a much friendlier form than in the 
Hobbesian form with states recognizing each other’s rights. The final form, the Kantian, is 
the newest world order, and in it states see one another as friends, and involves cooperation 																																																								
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against common threats.227 Wendt’s views on the three cultures can be summarized as; 
Hobbesian, enemy; Lockian, rival; Kantian, friend.228 
Whereas realism and liberalism emphasize the role of material factors to explain 
how international relations work, constructivism moves away from the traditional power 
struggle of the realist school, and liberalism’s emphasis on economic considerations, and 
focuses rather on the world of ideas and norms.229 Realism and liberalism both see ideas as a 
means to achieve national goals, constructivism adds that these goals are determined by 
ideas.230 As Veen argues, constructivism emphasizes the “importance of norms and ideas 
that reside in the nation’s collective consciousness, associated with conceptions of national 
identity.”231  National identity, for constructivists, represents the first building block for 
foreign policy analysis, because it is a reflection and a function of the domestic self-image. 
This self-image, which is based on the ideas people and governments, form for themselves 
is the basis of interests, which by turn is reflected in a country’s foreign policy.  
 The ideas American foreign policy makers adopt are therefore the basis of their 
foreign policy. If the War on Terror is taken an example here, constructivists, whether they 
agree on the war itself or not, see it as a reflection of American ideals and principles of 
guarding liberty and freedom against an enemy who possesses neither, and is adamant to 
overthrow such ideas, or it could be interpreted as a means to spread such American 
principles as democracy and market economy which spring from American Exceptionalism. 
Constructivists would also argue that ideas and interests are flexible, which explains the 
changes in American foreign policy.232 Through the emphasis on norms, ideas, and social 
construction of identities, constructivists attempt to explain the adjustments and changes in 
American foreign policy. To constructivists therefore, American foreign aid is founded on 
prevailing ideas and norms that motivate the U.S. to provide aid to other countries for 
economic, security, or pure humanitarian and altruistic considerations. 
 David Lumsdaine’s Moral Vision in International Politics is a prime example of the 
constructivist paradigm. Other works that have reached similar conclusions to Lumsdaine’s 
include, Robert W. McElroy’s Morality and American Foreign Policy, Dorothy V. Jones’ 																																																								
227 Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 43. 
228 Ibid., 257-58. 
229 Walt, "International Relations: One World, Many Theories," 40. 
230 A. Maurits van der Veen, Ideas, Interests and Foreign Aid, Cambridge Studies in International Relations 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 26. 
231 Ibid. 
232 Colin Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture and Chance in American Grand Strategy (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2006), 14-15. 
1. Conceptualizing Foreign Aid  63 
Code of Peace, Louis Henkin’s The Age of Rights, and Amitai Etzioni’s The Moral 
Dimension.233 Relying on foreign aid data since WWII, Lumsdaine shows how such aid is 
the largest source of capital for the developing world. Lumsdaine argues that foreign aid is a 
result of humanitarian ideas and moral values that have shaped American foreign policy.234 
Such ideas and values were founded in the domestic politics and religious and moral 
traditions of the West. According to Lumsdaine,  
“Foreign aid cannot be accounted for on the basis of the 
economic and political interests of the donor countries alone; 
the essential causes lay in the humanitarian and egalitarian 
principles of the donor countries, and in their implicit belief 
that only on the basis of a just international order in which all 
states had a chance to do well was peace and prosperity 
possible”235  
 
 Lumsdaine asserts that “foreign aid is a paradigm case of the influence of crucial 
moral principle because of its universal scope, as assistance from well-off nations to any in 
need, its focus on poverty, and its empowerment of the weakest groups and states in the 
international system.”236 According to Lumsdaine, liberal or left leaning governments are 
more likely to provide more aid, and even more effective aid.237  
As the next chapter demonstrates, there is hardly a relation between party affiliation 
of the president, and of congress, when it comes to the amount of foreign aid. Indeed, the 
historical review argues that Nixon and Reagan on one end, and Obama and Carter on the 
other, to use the two extremes, were just as devoted to foreign assistance, and that there has 
been a genuine willingness in congress to maintain, if indeed, not increase the amount of 
aid, whether congress is controlled by Republicans or by Democrats. That is not to say that 
there are no differences between the two parties, the differences are apparent in the focus of 
this aid, and its use, rather than the amount or the general structure of the aid establishment 
or even the motivation when it comes to spreading such principles as abortion and gay 
rights. 
 Lumsdaine’s arguments fail at explaining some aspects of U.S. foreign aid. If 
Lumsdaine’s vision were correct, then naturally U.S. aid would be dedicated to those who 																																																								
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are suffering the most, which is clearly not the case. Instead of aiding the developed Israel, 
and the less developed Egypt, the billions of aid these two states receive would be sent to 
poorer African or Latin American countries instead. The same can be said of military aid. 
As discussed in the next chapter, there is no correlation between the allocations of U.S. 
military aid and the level of the recipients’ need. To use Israel and Egypt as examples again, 
neither Israel nor Egypt is currently in a desperate need for arms and ammunition, but other 
countries and groups that are influenced by such American norms as “democracy,” and 
“freedom,” need it far more desperately, yet they receive little to none.  
Lumsdaine leaves one to wonder, had Western Europe fallen within the Soviet 
sphere of influence after WWII, with all the devastation, hunger and starvation, would the 
U.S. had been in such a hurry to implement the Marshall Plan? The U.S. would have 
probably sent food and such essential aid as was needed to keep the Europeans alive, no 
doubt, but under no circumstance would the Marshall Plan have been as big as it was. The 
moral and idealist values seem to have been replaced by concerns over national security and 
economic opportunity. 
The last of the international relations schools are the World-systems theory, which is 
also known as world-systems analysis, and that Marxist theory. The world system analysis 
focuses on the study of the world as a total social system. It originated with Immanuel 
Wallerstein’s 1974 paper The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: 
Concepts for Comparative Analysis.238 In the same year, Wallerstein published The Modern 
World System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in 
the Sixteenth Century. 239  According to Wallerstein, a world system is a “multicultural 
territorial division of labor in which the production and exchange of basic goods and raw 
materials is necessary for the everyday life of its inhabitants.”240 This division of labor 
describes the relations between the states in a world economy.  
Accordingly, the world is divided between core, periphery, and semi-periphery 
states.241  The core states are powerful and wealthy and they dominate and exploit the 
weaker and poorer peripheral states. This view argues that the core and peripheral states 																																																								
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“generally retain their positions relative to one another over time, although there are 
individual cases of upward and downward mobility,” in this hierarchical structure.242 Within 
this framework, foreign aid is understood as a tool to “constrain the development path of 
recipient countries, promoting the unequal accumulation of wealth in the world.”243 Foreign 
aid increases the peripheral countries reliance and dependence on the core countries’ 
economies, thereby making their own systems and economies subordinate to that of the 
donors. 244  In the meantime, the capitalist economies of the donor countries enjoy the 
benefits of having large markets in peripheral countries and therefore accumulate more 
wealth. 
The Marxist paradigm shares much with the world system theory. The essence of the 
Marxist political thought, whether on state or international level, views the struggle between 
the nation states as primarily an economic struggle. Marxist and neo-Marxist theories 
strongly oppose the liberal perspective. The problem is not necessarily the domestic 
economic policies, but rather because of “the recipients’ history as subordinate elements in 
the world capitalist system.” 245  Their neo-Marxist colleagues argue that foreign aid 
“constitutes an extension of highly exploitative North-South relationships that either 
preserve or widen economic disparities between wealthy states and Third World 
countries.”246 
There is no right and wrong answer in this discussion, nor is it possible to prevent 
the insights and explanations of these theories from overlapping. This study concludes that 
no single theoretical approach can adequately explain foreign assistance on its own. 
Lancaster’s statement regarding aid being born of hardheaded realism is certainly true when 
considering that the evolution of the modern aid regime was a reflection of the structural 
changes in the international system that occurred as results of the East-West Cold War 
divide, and the new world order of the 1990s. But as the constructivist suggests, these 
changes cannot be understood without the ideological environment in which they were 
produced. For what was the Cold War, though it was a struggle for national security and 
economic prosperity, if not also a battle of ideologies and principles that each side strove to 
spread?  																																																								
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Foreign aid is indeed a “tricky concept,” and not just because it is thought of as a 
policy, rather than a tool of a policy.247 The “trickery” of foreign aid does not end there. The 
concept has wide political, economic, and social implications, and numerous players from 
all backgrounds are involved in making and shaping it and many more are influenced by it. 
From this broadness rises difficulty of finding a general agreement among scholars on such 
issues as simple as defining it, let alone finding an agreement on the broader implications of 
using this tool and the motives behind it.  
In conclusion, what seems to be certain is that whether it is a $100 bribe or a trillion 
dollar grant, politics plays a role in every part of the aid process. Politics infiltrates aid when 
it is a mere idea, and continues to be present until the results of aid manifest themselves. 
Since politics is all about answering the question of power, and it is about “who gets what 
when and how,”248 and it is “the authoritative allocation of values for a society”, it is 
impossible to think of a foreign aid system bereft of politics.249 And just as impossible to 
think that this phenomenon can be explained within one rationale or one motive or within 
one framework. It is the combination of changes in the international system, and the ideas 
behind these changes, that have made foreign aid into the phenomenon it is today.250 What 
also seems to be certain is that these explanations may have prevailed, or became more 
dominant for a certain period, and gave way at others. An analysis of the history of aid 
giving by the world’s most prominent donor would do much to clarify these rationales in 
practice, rather than just in theory. 
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2. History of U.S. Foreign Aid 
The United States’ involvement in the realm of foreign aid dates back to the early days of its 
founding. Interestingly, America in 1776 was on the receiving end of this process. Indeed, if 
it were not for foreign military and economic assistance that the United States received 
during the Revolutionary War from European powers, France chief among them, one would 
be left to question whether the American colonies’ revolution would have fallen utterly short 
of the level of success it enjoyed, if not failed altogether.251  
The French support to the American cause cost France in the region of 1.3 billion 
Livres, which amounts to $13 billion in contemporary American dollars.252 France’s military 
support, in terms of arms, munitions, and logistics was instrumental in aiding George 
Washington’s Continental Army; providing arms, munitions and, equally essential; clothing, 
which proved to be one of the most difficult tasks to face Washington.253 The United States 
sought the aid of Holland as well, sending John Adams to secure loans for the war efforts and 
the building of the newly born republic.254 
 Today, the United States has the largest economy in the world, the biggest and most 
powerful military force, an army of diplomats, and has stood unchallenged atop the donor 
pyramid of foreign assistance since WWII, with the exception of few years between 1989 and 
2001 when Japan overtook the U.S. in terms of amount donated.255 The U.S. provides food 
and assistance to every continent, and has shown that it has the power to influence the 
outcomes of elections and wars alike, to change regimes by military means, or gain 
concessions by imposing economic sanctions, all in the service of U.S. foreign policy goals. 
All this aid, from grains to guns, is provided under the supervision of the American foreign 
aid establishment, which has undergone an evolutionary process extending from the early 
days of the country’s founding to the present, with most notable expansion and change 
occurring during the presidencies of Democratic presidents Harry S. Truman and John F. 
Kennedy.  																																																								
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 This section of the research provides an account of the evolutionary process of the 
United States’ involvement in foreign aid. It describes and analyses the evolution of the 
American foreign aid establishment, and how the policies and institutions of this 
establishment changed overtime, as well as the historical circumstances that shaped this 
process, both domestic and foreign. The chapter traces the evolution of the United States’ 
foreign assistance program from its early years to becoming the biggest aid donor in the 
world in the 20th century. Understanding the historical circumstances that shaped the 
contemporary American foreign aid establishment is essential to understanding the current 
system and the different players involved in making and shaping foreign policy, and the way 
foreign aid is used as tool to advance foreign policy goals by American foreign policy 
makers.256  	 For the first century after its independence, the United States remained, to a great 
extent, occupied with its own affairs and the affairs of its continent and the Western 
hemisphere in general. It was not until the turn of the 20th century that the United States 
began to exercise its military, diplomatic and financial powers beyond its borders on a more 
significant level. The two world wars had a profound impact on U.S. foreign policy, and on 
both occasions the U.S. was left as the only major power still able to sustain itself and 
provide assistance to other states in need.  
The emergence of the Soviet Union on the other pole of the post WWII world order, 
and the ensuing Cold War, was a major force in shaping the contemporary American foreign 
aid structure as the country looked to expand its influence in order to contain the influence of 
the Soviet Union, and protect America’s allies and America’s economic and geopolitical 
interests in the world. Finally, more recently the threat of terrorism from groups such as al-
Qaeda, and the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), has forced the U.S. to 
look beyond the conventional means of aid and focus more on development, education, and 
providing healthcare to societies that are susceptible to falling victims to such groups as ISIL, 
as President Obama has recently suggested.257 
The historical analysis of U.S. foreign assistance reveals that U.S. foreign aid has 
always been used as a tool to advance the security and commercial interests of the United 
States, in varying means and to various degrees of success. National security remains the 
paramount goal of U.S. foreign assistance, followed by commercial and economic interests, 																																																								
256 Foreign aid establishment: the term refers to the American foreign assistance program, the policy-makers, aid 
agencies, and all those involved in the different stages of policy-making related to American foreign aid, its 
appropriation, use, etc. 
257 Barack Obama, interview by Shane Smith, 17.03.2015, "President Obama Speaks with VICE News". 
2. History of U.S. Foreign Aid  69 
and last and least humanitarian concerns. Even when aid was rendered for humanitarian 
reasons, tactical and strategic political considerations have always played a pivotal role in 
dictating the nature, recipients, and sums of foreign assistance. Furthermore, the analysis has 
found two patterns in the history of U.S. aid donation; in the vast majority of cases, U.S. aid 
was provided upon the recipient meeting certain conditions, and that most of aid rendered 
over the years was also tied, meaning that it required the recipients or the federal government 
to spend American aid funds on the purchase and transport of American products, despite the 
consequences of such aid on local economies and markets. The analysis has found little 
evidence that suggests that American principles and ideals played a role in determining aid 
allocation and distribution, but that such norms have in the majority of cases given way to 
national security and economic interests. 
2.1. Pre-World War II Aid 
As discussed earlier, foreign aid is not wholly new to world politics. The U.S. government, 
and American private donors provided foreign countries with humanitarian aid since the early 
years of the American republic.258 American charity and philanthropy have always been 
present side by side with official government aid, particularly during humanitarian crises.259 
The research is concerned with aid originating from the federal government rather than 
private American donors, though in some instances, some philanthropic organizations have 
played a role in foreign policy.260  
Since discussions on American policy and politics always return to the Founding 
Fathers, and the fact that their actions and writings have played an influential role in setting 
precedence for their successors, and are often times used for reference and justification, the 
first instance of U.S. foreign aid is a natural starting point for the historical discussion.  
It is usually assumed that the first instance of U.S. foreign assistance took place 
during the presidency of James Madison (1809-1817), when the young republic aided 
earthquake stricken Venezuela in 1812.261 However, there is an earlier instance that has not 
been given much coverage. The first time the U.S. sent aid to a foreign country was during 																																																								
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the presidency of George Washington (1789-1797), when the U.S. sent aid to the white 
colonial rulers of Santo Domingo during the Haitian Revolution and slave revolt.262  
 There are few publications that have dealt with Washington’s foreign assistance. 
Timothy M. Matthewson’s George Washington’s Policy Toward the Haitian Revolution, 
published in 1979, is one of few works that goes into details of this aid. 263  In 2003, 
Matthewson published a book entitled A Proslavery Foreign Policy: Haitian- American 
Relations During the Early Republic, in which the author delved further into American- 
Haitian aid relations.264 The reason for this lack can best be explained by the fact it is better 
to say that young America aided the destroyed and starving Venezuela, rather than America 
aided white slavers against a rebellion that was inspired in whole or in part by principles of 
the American Revolution itself.265  
This event serves the greater narrative that protecting American national security, and 
advancing its commercial interests, have been the main driving goals of American foreign aid 
from the onset. The first instance of U.S. aid involved prioritizing national domestic 
considerations, and the commercial interests of the states over America’s founding principles, 
ideals, and humanitarian concerns. 
According to Mathewson, the U.S. administration under Washington supplied the 
white slavers with over $726,000 in aid to purchase arms, ammunitions and supplies for the 
plantation owners in Haiti.266  In a letter in September 1791, Washington wrote to Jean 
Baptiste Ternant, French ambassador to the U.S., granting the latter’s requests for financial 
and military assistance, Washington stated that “…the United States are to render every aid in 
their power to quell ‘the alarming insurrection of the negroes of Hispaniola’.”267 Washington 
then ordered secretaries of the treasury and war; Alexander Hamilton and Henry Knox 																																																								
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respectively, to deliver on his promises to the French slavers.268 Both secretaries were in 
agreement with the president regarding this course of action, and so was Secretary of State, 
Thomas Jefferson, who had insisted that all funds must be spent on American goods.269 
 Despite the sociopolitical instability in the region due to the rebellion, and the threat 
of slave revolt spilling over into the U.S., one economic advantage presented itself, the 
Washington administration used this aid to re-pay France by deducting the aid from 
America’s debt to France, both financial and moral, during the American Revolution.270 
Jefferson’s insistence on spending the funds on American goods and services also shows that 
U.S. aid was tied from the start, a pattern that still endures to the present day. 
The Haitian Revolution represented a serious threat to domestic American politics, 
particularly the southern states and their plantations. Washington’s aid was based on 
domestic considerations for the most part. It was feared that the Haitian revolution could 
inspire slaves in the southern states to do likewise. It was these domestic considerations, 
particularly slavery that delayed America’s recognition of Haiti’s independence until 1862.271 
Furthermore, a free Haiti was more likely to increase its commerce with Great Britain, at the 
cost of trade with the United States as Thomas Jefferson warned ambassador Ternant as early 
as November 1891, that should France lose the Saint Domingo, Britain would enjoy 
monopoly over trade in the region.272  
The importance of Washington’s actions with regards to the Haitian Revolution 
represented a milestone in establishing the executive branch as the main player in the foreign 
policy realm. As Robert Reinstein points out, the six administrations from Washington to 
John Q. Adams (1825-1829), expanded the executive power by taking “effective control over 
the nation’s most important dimensions of foreign policy, creating and employing 
instruments of power that are used to this day.”273 During the revolution, argues Reinstein, 
presidents provided funds and military equipment, intervened in a foreign civil war, 
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negotiated secret agreements, and used force abroad among others. 274  Such actions, 
concludes Reinstein, formed a blueprint for executive dominance in foreign affairs. 
One of the consequences of the Haitian Revolution was an influx of French refugees 
to the U.S. The arrival of these refugees raised questions on the constitutional basis of foreign 
aid. The French refugees made their way to the American states since the U.S. was a close 
ally of the “Ancien Régime.” They landed with little to nothing, relying heavily on the 
assistance of their host states, which struggled to pay for their care and upkeep. These states 
therefore sought assistance from the federal government. 275  Accordingly, with President 
Washington’s support, congress passed An Act Providing for the Relief of Such of the 
Inhabitants of Saint Domingo, Resident Within the United States, as May be Found in Want 
of Support.276  
At this early point in U.S. foreign aid history, the question of the constitutionality 
arose. Jefferson was more reluctant than his Commander in Chief, at least on the 
technicalities. Jefferson, who said of the slaves revolt “[n]ever was so deep a tragedy 
presented to the feelings of man,” felt that the power to apply money to such a purpose, 
“should belong to State governments,” rather than the “general,” federal government.277 The 
federal aid did not deter southern states from aiding the slave owners in Haiti, the state of 
South Carolina, a slave-state with majority black population, sent thousands of dollars to the 
slavers, and even debated sending a part of its state militia to aid the slave owners in Haiti.278 
Jefferson’s successor, James Madison, speaking in his capacity as a House 
representative from Virginia in 1794 during the congressional debate on the proposed bill, 
questioned the constitutionality of sending aid to these refugees. 279  Madison, while 
acknowledging the special bond between France and the U.S., particularly the latter’s role in 
the American Revolution, argued that he “[cannot undertake to lay [his] finger on that article 
of the Constitution which granted a right to Congress of expending, on objects of 
benevolence, the money of their constituents.”280 According to the Annals of Congress in 																																																								
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which the debate was recorded, Madison feared that such aid would set a dangerous 
precedent, “which might be perverted to the countenance of purposes very different from 
those of charity.”281  
Yet, when James Madison became president, he sent aid to earthquake stricken 
Venezuela. The second instance of U.S. foreign aid took place when news reached congress 
in April 1812 that an earthquake had struck Venezuela and that much of the city of Caracas 
was destroyed. In the following days, congress met and passed a bill under the title An Act for 
the Relief of the Citizens of Venezuela, authorizing Madison to “cause to be purchased such 
provisions such as he shall deem advisable, and to tender the same in the name of the 
government of the United States to that of Venezuela, for the relief of the citizens who have 
suffered by the late earthquake.” 282  The act further appropriated $50,000 to purchase 
provisions. 283  An explanation for the change in Madison’s perspective on “objects of 
benevolence” could not be found in existing literature. Therefore one is left to consider the 
following three explanations.  
The first possible explanation is that Madison was occupying a different office. Being 
the President of the United States carries a different weight and different obligations from 
being a congressman in the House of Representative, where the former is seen as the head of 
the state and head of the nation and chief foreign policy conductor, a state representative is 
far more likely to be concerned about how much their state will have to contribute to this aid. 
The second possible explanation is that Madison did not wish to go against Congress who 
had agreed to aid Venezuela with little debate, and therefore act against the will of the 
American people. However, if Madison was concerned about the relationship between the 
executive and the legislative branches of the government, he would not have used the veto 
right five times, and furthermore, would not have initiated the whole idea of “pocket veto.”284 
The final explanation, and by far the more likely, is that Madison, as president of the 
U.S. was concerned about developments in Latin America and sought to establish friendly 
relations with the emerging republics to the south. This was the time of revolutions and the 																																																																																																																																																																												
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collapse of the Spanish Empire, and if the newly born republic that came to life in a struggle 
against Imperial Britain were not to support their southern neighbors whose revolutions were 
inspired, in part at least, but the American Revolution, then who would?285 European powers 
certainly had designs for Latin America, designs that in all likelihood did not include a free 
and independent Venezuelan republic.286 Therefore, Madison’s act was not merely a charity 
or an act of benevolence, but a well calculated pre-emptive political move to strengthen 
America’s position in the Western hemisphere to keep the European powers out of America’s 
backyard.  
It was the events in South America that led Madison’s successor, President James 
Monroe (1817-1825), to introduce one of the most important U.S. foreign policy doctrines in 
1823, designed and written by his Vice-President John Quincy Adams, the Monroe Doctrine 
served as a warning to European powers to stay out of the Western hemisphere, and a 
declaration of non-intervention in European struggles and affairs.287 The Monroe Doctrine 
declared that European attempts to re-colonize the already free nations in South America 
would represent a threat to the U.S.288 
The Founding Fathers acted based on the geopolitical and commercial interests of the 
United States. In the case of Washington and his close advisors Hamilton and Jefferson, 
humanitarian needs and ideological principles were put on the margin, and a realist approach 
was adopted instead. The example of the Haitian Revolution is both the first time the U.S. 
government sent aid to a foreign nation, and the first time it used foreign assistance as a tool 
to influence the domestic politics of a foreign nation by supplying and supporting the white 
slave owners rather than their slave to protect slavery in the American south as well as 
protect American trade. 
2.1.1. Dollar Diplomacy 
Historically speaking, the term “dollar diplomacy,” has had a two-fold meaning; it may refer 
to general policy, as a set of tactics that involve the use of money to achieve policy 																																																								
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objectives. 289  In this sense the term has the same meaning as the more contemporary 
“checkbook diplomacy.”290 The other meaning refers to a specific U.S. foreign policy that 
originated during the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt (1901-1909), and became more 
dominant during his successor William Taft’s time in office (1909-1913).291  The policy 
emphasized advancing the national interests of the U.S. with the use of economic power, 
rather than military intervention or territorial expansion, by extending loans to foreign 
countries.292 In theory, American corporations and banks as well as the recipient countries 
benefited from dollar diplomacy; one by receiving money for development, the other through 
interests when these loans are paid back. But as one would expect, the process did not 
accumulate in much benefit for either side. 
By the end of 1905, the U.S. had overtaken Great Britain as the world’s largest 
industrial manufacturer, and could deploy one of the largest navies in the world, second only 
to the Royal Navy.293 This era was a period of American expansion as the U.S. fought an 
easy war against Spain that ended with U.S. occupation and acquisition of Cuba, Guam, 
Hawaii and the Philippines among others.294 American expansion, or imperialism, has been 
the subject of numerous academic works that deal with the reasons and motivations, the 
public perception, the economic and political dimension, Darwinist influence and the 
consequences of the era on the significance of U.S. geopolitical standing in the world. 
President William McKinley summarized America’s motivation for expansion as well as any 
scholar in four points; national glory, commerce, racial superiority and evangelism.295 
 McKinley’s successor shared a similar mindset on expansion, if not a stronger one 
indeed. Theodore Roosevelt has been described as “an all out imperialist,” who had a “racist, 																																																								
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expansionist, nationalistic arrogance.”296 Roosevelt, whose name has become synonym with 
his policy of “walk softy and carry a big stick,” became the 26th president of the U.S. 
following the assassination of President William McKinley in September 1901, having 
served as vice president since January of the same year.297 By our contemporary standards, 
Roosevelt’s views may be extreme, yet they are not more so than those of his 
contemporaries.298 Roosevelt pursued an aggressive, expansionist foreign policy that was 
inspired by his belief in maintaining naval supremacy, and projecting American power and 
principles. Historian Walter LaFeber views Roosevelt to have “personally exemplified central 
themes of post- 1890 U.S. Foreign policy.” 299  These central themes, according to LaFeber 
were the willingness to use force to obtain order, the responsibility of the U.S. to guarantee 
stability in Latin America and Asia, and finally the belief that the values and successes of 
Anglo-Saxon America provided the right to conduct such policy.300 
In December 1902, Germany and Britain provided Venezuela’s government with 
loans for railroad construction, only for military hostilities to break out over the former’s 
failure to pay back its debts.301 The European intervention, which came in breach of the 
Monroe Doctrine, would have diminished the doctrine’s prestige.302 A court ruling in The 
Hague justified Germany and Britain’s use of their military to acquire unpaid debts.303 
Furthermore, the ruling put Germany and Britain ahead in the pay back roll for using their 
military while other countries did nothing. 304  Consequently, fearing further European 
interventions, Roosevelt addressed congress in December 1904 in his State of the Union 
Address stating that, “chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence… ultimately require intervention 
by some civilized nation.”305 The wrongdoing in this case was Venezuela’s inability to pay 																																																								
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back its debts, and the civilized nation in this case, as Roosevelt explained, was the U.S. due 
to its adherence to the Monroe Doctrine, and therefore the U.S. would be forced, though 
reluctantly, to the “exercise of an international police power.”306  
After the Venezuelan crisis, Roosevelt issued the Roosevelt’s Corollary to the 
Monroe Doctrine, best described by a former Political Science teacher as the “Monroe 
Doctrine on steroids.”307 The difference between the two doctrines is obvious in Roosevelt’s 
willingness to enforce his corollary with the force of arms. While the Monroe Doctrine 
clearly states that the U.S. would neither intervene, nor allow Europeans to do so, 
Roosevelt’s additions on the other hand provide the grounds for future incursions in Latin 
America; something Roosevelt and his successor made use of during the years of dollar 
diplomacy. In the succeeding decade, the American military entered Central America over a 
dozen times.308 
The first test to Roosevelt’s bold declaration came during the Dominican crisis when 
Roosevelt arranged for the Dominican Republic to receive American loans in exchange for 
the U.S. right to name the island’s custom officer and effectively take control of the custom 
houses.309 However, the Senate was reluctant to approve the agreement. Roosevelt bypassed, 
or rather ignored, the Senate by making the authorization for J.P. Morgan and Kuhn, and 
Loeb and Company, two major New York bankers, to assume the debts of the Dominican 
Republic.310 As Roosevelt recalls in his autobiography, he “put the agreement into effect, and 
[he] continued its execution for two years before the Senate acted; and I would have 
continued it until the end of [his] term, if necessary, with any action by congress.”311 By 
controlling the custom, the source of nearly all government revenue, the officials provided 
the government with only 45 percent of the revenue and the other 55 percent were dictated to 
paying back creditors.312  
Roosevelt’s handpicked successor William Taft is usually accredited, or blamed, for 
dollar diplomacy. Taft’s vision constituted a world order based on economic 
interdependence, with international corporations playing an important role in bringing about 																																																								
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international peace.313 President Taft, and his “lazy,” Secretary of State, who happened to be 
one of the best known corporate lawyers in the U.S. at the time, Philander Knox, and the 
founder of the conglomerate U.S. Steel, believed that international corporations can help 
create stability and promote America’s commercial interests.314 Furthermore, if the Latin 
American nations were unable to pay back their debts, European lenders would have cause to 
intervene militarily.315 In order to steal a march on the Europeans, American banks would 
provide loans to these countries. According to President Taft “… it was far better to use 
dollars than bullets as a means of achieving national goals.”316 
 On this basis, Knox negotiated the Knox-Castrillo Convention of 1911 with 
Nicaragua to secure the nation’s debts.317 Instead of waiting for senate approval of the treaty, 
the Taft administration encouraged New York bankers to grant the Nicaraguan government a 
loan, only for the senate to refuse the treaty.318 The loan was implemented, and subsequent 
treaty gave U.S. bankers control of 51 percent of the stock in the Nicaraguan National Bank, 
and the country’s rail and steamships.319 A year later, the government of Nicaragua fell to a 
revolution, and Taft ordered the military to occupy the country.320  The Nicaraguan and 
Dominican models are two primary examples of the use of dollar diplomacy. Unfortunately 
for Taft, dollar diplomacy proved unpopular both at home and abroad.    
Dollar diplomacy came to an end by the time President Taft left office. His successor, 
President Woodrow Wilson (1913-1921) was very critical of Taft’s approach to foreign 
policy. During the election campaign, Wilson denounced the “concentration of financial 
power and promised to bring monopolistic practices under government control.”321 However, 
Wilson accepted the basic idea of dollar diplomacy, linking loans to financial supervision.322 
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Yet for all his denunciation of Taft, during Wilson’s time in office the U.S. invaded Cuba, the 
Dominican Republic and Haiti, while continuing “financial supervision,” of Nicaragua.323  
Dollar diplomacy was dismissed as an unconvincing mask, an ill-fitting disguise for 
“Yankee imperialism.”324 Yet, as the research demonstrates later, these very ideas of Taft 
would resurface again and dollar diplomacy, while it is not applied in its original sense, one 
can make a case that the contemporary foreign aid program is in fact a form of dollar 
diplomacy. It seems that President Taft was not wrong, as he said later he was simply ahead 
of his time by a number of decades.325  The use of Dollar Diplomacy in foreign policy 
represents the first direct use of America’s financial might to influence the domestic politics 
of other countries since Washington’s aid to Haiti. By providing loans in return for having a 
say in Caribbean and Latin American domestic affairs, presidents Roosevelt and Taft 
abandoned using America’s marines and military, and introduced using America’s economic 
might as a new tool in the conduct of American foreign policy, backed all the same with a 
strong military establishment to protect the economic and commercial interests of the United 
States. Dollar diplomacy can be summarized as an interaction of foreign assistance and 
business, rather than an interaction of foreign assistance and national security, as was the case 
in the early republic’s foreign aid. 
2.1.2. Aid During World War I 
On the outbreak of the First World War, the U.S. was a debtor nation.326 Meaning that the 
balance between the country’s investment abroad, and the world’s investment in the country 
was negative. As Brown and Opie explain, European investors provided funds for financing 
development projects in the U.S. This investment proved extremely important to Europeans 
at the break of the war. In order to finance the war, and purchase American goods, these 
investors were forced to sell their investments in the U.S. Yet, in spite of these funds, the 
Allied nations found themselves in a desperate need of further American assistance as the 
Great War went on relentlessly.327 
 The assistance came in the form of the Liberty Loan Act of 1917. The act authorized 
the Treasury Department to issue “bonds to meet expenditures for the national security and 
defense, and, for the purpose of assisting in the prosecution of the war, to extend credit to 																																																								
323 Ibid., 86. 
324 Peter H. Smith, Talons of the Eagle: Dynamics of U.S.-Latin American Relations, 2nd ed. (New York ; 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 56-57. 
325 Eckes and Zeiler, Globalization and the American Century, 29. 
326 Brown and Opie, American Foreign Assistance, 2. 
327 Ibid. 
2. History of U.S. Foreign Aid  80 
foreign governments…”328 It further authorized the Treasury Department to purchase the loan 
obligations of foreign governments at war with the enemies of the United States as well as 
issuing special bonds to investors to raise funds to finance the war through what became 
known as the “Liberty Bonds.”329 The act provided up to $5 billion to the Treasury for 
issuing liberty bonds.330  During the two following years, the Treasury Department issued 
bonds totaling $20.5 billion.331 Other acts followed, providing loans and credits of over $7 
billion to the allies.332 There were voices within the U.S. that called for providing France with 
a financial “gift” for the latter’s assistance during the Revolutionary War. The French 
government rejected the offer, stating in response that such charity was harmful to the French 
national pride.333 
 American assistance expanded further after the war, providing loans for 
reconstruction and relief efforts. The immediate post war era marked the emergence of 
American relief organizations to combat problems in post conflict areas.  
2.1.3. Post War Relief 
American relief organizations emerged in the post war era to assist the economic recovery of 
Europe, provide much needed supplies to rebuild the European economies, and to deal with 
food shortages and spread of diseases. The main organization that led these efforts was the 
American Relief Administration, ARA. The U.S. provided $1 billion of unexpended wartime 
credits, $2.4 billion in new credits under the authority of the Liberty Loan acts and under the 
provisions of the various legislations, the U.S. provided over $10 billion in loans to Allied 
powers during and after WWI, including $700 million under special legislation to the ARA, 
and the United States Grain Corporation.334 The roots of the relief efforts and the eventual 
establishment of the ARA date back to the start of WWI and the organizational efforts and 
skills of Herbert Hoover which he displayed during the war relief efforts in London, with 
aiding stranded Americans, and the eventual establishment of the Committee for Relief in 
Belgium, CRB, to combat the food crisis that developed during the war.335 																																																								
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Following the invasion of Belgium by the German army in 1914, the small nation 
suffered from severe food shortages as well as breakdown of morale following the quick 
defeat and the humiliation that followed.336 Belgium had not been a major food producer to 
begin with, producing only one third of the consumed food within its territories.337 With the 
arrival of the German army, food from outside could no longer arrive. What made matters 
worse for the Belgians was that the Germany army seized the food to feed its own soldiers, 
leaving the Belgian population with little and less for themselves.338 
 It was Herbert Hoover the Engineer, and the “Great Humanitarian,” who had the 
solution.339 Hoover, who would later become the 31st president of the U.S. (1929-1933), was 
a financier and a mining engineer living in London. 340  When WWI broke out, Hoover 
assisted thousands of Americans who found themselves stranded in belligerent Europe, 
unable to cross the Atlantic back to the U.S. since most of them lacked the hard currency to 
pay for their passage on the few ships that still sailed the Atlantic.341 Hoover established the 
“American Committee” to send “the busted Yankees” home, by providing loans and cashing 
their traveler’s checks, and by September 1914, most of the stranded Americans had returned 
home.342  
The impending disaster in Belgium was brought to Hoover’s attention in early 
October 1914 when he met Millard Shaler, an American expatriate miner.343 Shaler informed 
Hoover of the situation and of the British refusal to permit food shipment.344 Negotiating the 
muddy waters of European relation proved a hard task, yet not unachievable. Through 
Hoover’s efforts, and endless meetings with high ranking American and European decision 
makers, the Commission for Relief in Belgium (CRB) was born with Hoover as its Chair to 																																																																																																																																																																												
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begin what Hoover’s biographer George Nash described as “an undertaking unprecedented in 
world history.”345 The commission faced numerous difficulties. They were to first raise the 
money to buy food, then buy the food from North and South America and Australia, ship it to 
Rotterdam in the Netherlands as a neutral port, then ship it by canal to Belgium, where it was 
delivered to processing-mills before eventually being delivered to more than 2500 villages, 
cities and town.346 Today there is a statue of the Egyptian goddess of life Isis in Hoover’s 
hometown that was given to Hoover in appreciation of his efforts in December 1922 by 
Belgian senator Albert Lejeune.347 
 The successes of the CRB in avoiding a major humanitarian disaster, and Hoover’s 
administrative, leadership and negotiating skills soon impressed President Wilson who 
appointed him as U.S. Food Administrator upon America’s entry into the war in 1917.348 The 
historical significance of the works of the CRB is represented in the fact that it is the first 
institutionalized relief organization, which served as the foundation for future organization 
such as the U.S. Food Administration and the post-war ARA, all under the leadership of 
Herbert Hoover. Hoover, who was so successful during and after WWI, that “he was one of 
the few men whose reputation was enhanced by wartime service; ‘to hoover’ entered the 
American lexicon as a term for providing help,” or as a synonym for “economize.”349 The 
CRB itself remained an international organization, and not an official American relief 
organization, yet Hoover carried on his experience into the official American relief program 
in post WWI. 
At the end of the war, President Wilson traveled to Paris to the Versailles conference, 
accompanied by Herbert Hoover as an advisor. Hoover was made Director General of Relief 
for the Allied Governments.350 In the nine months following the armistice, Hoover organized 
the distribution of over $1 billion in relief; four million tons of food and other supplies and in 
January 1919, at Hoover’s suggestion, President Wilson requested $100 million for European 
relief. The American Relief Administration was composed mostly of staff who worked with 
Hoover in the CRB and the U.S. Food Administrations, veterans with extensive experience 
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with relief in Europe. By the end of 1919, Hoover’s ARA had helped feed 300 million people 
from 21 countries across Europe and the Middle East.351 
 In Russia, revolutions in February and October 1917, saw the former Tsarist 
monarchy collapse and the country divided in multiple factions, the most notable of which 
were the Red; Bolsheviks fighting for a socialist Russian led by Vladimir Lenin, the founding 
father of the Soviet Union; and the White, which was a coalition of anti-Bolshevik forces 
made up of those who favored monarchism, capitalism and other forms of socialism.352 The 
civil war that ensued lasted for five years and claimed millions of lives.353 In the midst of the 
conflict, a terrible famine struck Russia. As if the devastation and food shortages brought by 
the war were not enough, a drought, according to an ARA staffer “the likes of which the 
Russian land had never known,” made food production extremely hard.354  
American-Bolshevik relations, to put it mildly, were never warm to start with. The 
Bolshevik’s coming to power resulted in suspension of official American-Russian relations as 
President Wilson withheld diplomatic recognition and even supplied the Bolshevik’s 
opponents with arms.355 Furthermore, the U.S. actually landed troops in northern and eastern 
Russia in 1918.356 Soviet leaders were never able to forget this instance, and it played a role 
in ruining any chance of closer ties early on. In September 1959, during Soviet Primer Nikita 
Khrushchev’s visit to Hollywood for example, he declared that America’s “armed 
intervention in Russia was the most unpleasant thing that ever occurred in the relations 
between our two countries… our troops have never set foot on American soil, while your 
troops have set foot on Soviet soil.”357 America’s intervention is little known among policy 
makers and public alike, argues David Foglesong. Presidents Richard Nixon (1969-1974) and 
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Ronald Reagan (1981-1989) both made statements that suggested that the two nations never 
fought directly.358  
The U.S. did not commit to an all out military course of action to oust the Bolsheviks, 
in part due to Hoover’s advise to follow a different course other than military confrontation. 
In a letter to President Wilson in early 1919, Hoover provided Wilson with a clearly defined 
plan to deal with Bolshevism. Hoover suggested a plan of three principles; non-intervention, 
non-recognition and the establishment of a “second Belgian Relief Commission for Russia… 
to enter upon the humane work of saving lives.”359 Hoover’s new relief commission was the 
ARA, which would need funding from congress. Wilson’s successor President Warren 
Harding (1921-1923), in “a move orchestrated by Hoover,” requested funds for the ARA for 
Russian relief.360  
Hoover was both the ARA administrator and Secretary of Commerce under Harding. 
He had the grand economic idea of using these ARA funds to buy American grains and ship 
it to Russia, this was a way to relieve American farmers of unwanted products, and raise farm 
values by stimulating foreign purchase of American goods, which would increase farmers’ 
purchase of manufactured goods, which in turn would increase manufacturing and reduce 
unemployment.361 Congress passed the Russian Famine Relief Act in December 1921, and 
the president signed it into law on the same day. Harding also signed an executive order two 
days later, written and prepared by Hoover, outlining how the $20 million sum is to be 
spent.362 By the summer of 1922, American aid workers were feeding 11 million Soviet 
citizens a day, with the total cost of the relief effort amounting to $60 million, 20 million of 
which was appropriated by congress.363 
 The question that remains unanswered is why? Were the economic benefits outlined 
in Hoover’s economic plan for Russian relief sufficient to aid a country under a regime that 
stood ideologically against the U.S. and represented a threat to American interests? Did the 
Great Humanitarian, Herbert Hoover, prove to have political and economic motives and 
agenda? Was the work of the ARA a part of a plan to bring down the Bolsheviks, as some on 
the left accused him then? Or was it a master plan to help American businesses flourish in the 																																																								
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vast Soviet market ahead of western European competitors? Kasper Brasken, among others, 
believes so.  
Brasekn analyses the motives behind the ARA’s Russian relief arguing that the 
ARA’s mission was “ultimately founded on the belief that famine relief in itself would help 
the Russian ‘to come to their senses’ and, once recovered from hunger, to overthrow the 
Bolshevik Regime.”364 American humanitarianism was of concern to Soviet leaders, who 
were afraid that such aid was a pretext to influence the ongoing civil war. Historian 
Patenaude recalls the story of Soviet diplomat Maxim Litvinov in August 1921 who, while 
negotiating an agreement with the ARA in Riga, Latvia, kept repeating to the ARA 
representatives, “somewhat nervously” states Patenaude, “Gentlemen, food is a weapon.”365 
Patenaude also saw Hoover and the ARA’s food relief as a weapon. “Hoover did 
indeed intend to use food as a weapon in Russia, but not in the crude way his critics 
imagined. His plan was to accomplish political ends in Russia not under the guise of famine 
relief, as they suspected, but rather by means of it.”366 Like Brasken, Patenaude argued that 
Hoover believed that once the Soviet recover their physical strength, and further saw the 
energy and efficiency of the ARA, they would see what Hoover called the “foolish” Soviet 
economic system and its frailties and overthrow the Bolsheviks.367 Furthermore, Hoover was 
aware that the ARA’s presence in Russia would put the U.S. ahead of its European 
counterparts in future trade and investment in Russia.  Finally, Hoover used the relief as a 
means to ease an economic depressed, as Hoover himself proudly said in a Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee during Russian relief hearings in December 1921, “The food supplies 
that we wish to take to Russia are all in surplus in the United States. . . . I have a feeling we 
are dealing today with a situation of a great deal of [economic] depression and that we have a 
proper right to inquire not only whether we are doing an act of great humanity, but whether 
we are doing an act of economic soundness. To me, after assessing our ability to give, no 
other argument is needed beyond the sheer humanity.”368 																																																								
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The relief efforts of these organizations, particularly the ARA, were unprecedented in 
American foreign assistance history in both scale and concept. While the U.S. had been 
involved in relief efforts, as in the Venezuelan case for example, these efforts were done on a 
much smaller scale in terms of amounts of aid sent, and in also in terms of logistics and 
manpower. The works of the CRB laid the foundational work for successive relief efforts for 
decades to come. Furthermore, the ARA expanded further in scale and concept as well by 
being used as a weapon against the early Bolshevik movement. Food assistance became a 
weapon as well. It is for this reason that some scholars see the work of the ARA as the seeds 
of the Marshall Plan. The concept and ideas behind both plans is that bread can defeat 
communism. Indeed, as Bertrand Patenaude of the Hoover Institution put it, “American food 
was widely seen as having prevented this period of crisis from becoming Europe’s ‘October 
Revolution.’ Thirty years later, ‘containment’ would be the fundamental principle behind the 
Marshall Plan.”369 
2.2. Aid During WWII 
The Second World War and the subsequent struggle between the U.S. and the Soviet Union 
were extremely important in bringing about the fundamental changes and overall expansion 
that came to the American foreign assistance system. This era usually marks the beginning of 
foreign aid history in contemporary literature, whether in academic work or in institutional 
history. It also marks the emergence of the contemporary foreign aid establishment that 
emerged with its own program, appropriations through congress, and staff.  
The U.S.’s entry into WWI cost the federal government an estimated $32 billion.370 
The war also led to the deaths of nearly 116,000 Americans, the vast majority of whom were 
combatants sent to Europe. 371  Isolationism and non-interventionism were the dominant 
sentiments in the U.S. during the inter-wars period. Consequently, as Nazi Germany began its 
war and occupation of the neighboring countries, the administration of president Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt, FDR, found their hands tied as they attempted to aid the European powers, 
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particularly Great Britain and France, by the neutrality acts of the 1930s which were passed 
in congress to ensure that the U.S. would not dragged into yet another European war. 
  Congress, FDR, and American public opinion were all opposed to another major 
entanglement in European affairs. The Ludlow Amendment to the constitution, which 
required a public referendum before going to war, unless in case of invasion by another 
country, failed in the House of Representatives by few votes only, and yet enjoyed the 
support of 60 percent of the American public until seven months before the war.372 Opinion 
polls taken between 1938 and 1941 found the vast majority of Americans opposed to joining 
the war on side of the allies, and a series of Gallup surveys conducted in the Spring and 
Summer of 1940 showed that only 10 percent of Americans were in favor of declaring war on 
Germany and Italy, and by June 1941, support was only at 23 percent.373 
 In congress, Isolationist sentiment also prevailed. Between 1918 and April 1942, at 
least 170 bills and resolutions were introduce to reduce or eliminate “war production profits;” 
measures to limit the power of the industry and banking sectors on politics.374 The findings of 
the Nye Committee hearings between 1934 and 1936 did little to reduce the number of such 
bills or reduce the general isolationist sentiment that prevailed at the time.375 The hearings, 
led by Isolationist Senator Gerald Nye (R-North Dakota), investigated the profits made by the 
banking and munitions industries during the First World War.376 The committee argued that 
American loans to the UK and its allies totaled $2.3 billion, 100 times larger than the $27 
million loaned to Germany.377 Losing the war was no longer an option for these industries. 
Senator Nye went so far as to say that President Wilson took the U.S. to war to protect 
American investments in France and Britain.378 
The passage of the four neutrality acts between 1935 and 1939 was a clear a message 
as any that congress could send regarding involvement in the European theatre. The acts 
crippled the foreign aid establishment, though it had not yet developed into a full-scale 
assistance program. The first of these acts, passed in 1935 imposed an embargo on arms trade 
with any country at war, regardless of its relations with the U.S. The Neutrality Act of 1936, 																																																								
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renewed the provisions of its 1935 predecessor and forbade all loans and credits to fighting 
parties. The 1937 act enforced the two earlier acts and expanded the provisions to include 
belligerents in civil wars. Furthermore, the act forbade American ships from carrying any 
articles, or passengers to belligerent parties and U.S. citizens were forbidden from traveling 
on belligerents’ ships.379  
 Across the Atlantic, the Nazis had invaded and occupied Czechoslovakia in early 
1939.380 FDR’s position began to change as he became convinced that Hitler’s actions “were 
part of conscious and planned attempt not only to transform the European status quo,” but 
world domination, as he told the Senate Military Affairs Committee in January 1939.381 It 
was not until November that the Neutrality Act of 1939 was passed. The act allowed the 
administration to sell arms and trade with Great Britain and France on “cash- and carry” basis 
and repealed the previous neutrality acts of 1935 and 1937, though certain provisions such as 
the ban on loans and barring American ships from transporting goods to belligerent ports 
remained in effect.382  
The Lend-Lease program, enacted in March 1941, provided another way through 
which the U.S. supplied the Allies, including the USSR, with war material between 1941-
1945.383 The Lend- Lease act authorized the president to “sell, transfer title to, exchange, 
lease, lend or otherwise dispose of, to any such government any defense article.”384 The act 
included an initial appropriation of $7 billion,385 and by September 1946, the Roosevelt 
administration provided a total of $50.1 billion, equivalent to nearly $611 billion today, of 
supplies to allied powers; $31.4 billion to Great Britain, $11.3 billion to the Soviet Union, 
$3.2 billion to France, and $1.6 billion to China.386 
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  On December 7, 1941, America’s neutrality was no longer an option as Imperial 
Japan launched an attack against the American Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor. Despite earlier 
attacks by German submarines and the resulting deaths of Americans, the attack on Pearl 
Harbor was different altogether. It was an attack on U.S. soil, though Hawaii was only a U.S. 
territory then, and the national pride demanded a response. FDR, congress and the American 
public were not ready for war. Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg (R-Michigan), who was the 
spokesperson for the isolationists in the senate, and a member of the Nye Committee, 
declared that isolationism ended forever that day.387 He delivered a patriotic speech in which 
he declared that he had done all he could to keep the U.S. from entering into a needless war, 
but now that war had come to the United States, “as a thug in the night,” declared the senator, 
he would stand with his “Commander in Chief for the swiftest and most invincible 
reply…”388 President Roosevelt went to congress on December 8, and delivered a speech 
before both chambers of congress in which he stated: “I ask that the Congress declare that 
since the unprovoked and dastardly attack by Japan on Sunday, December 7th, 1941, a state 
of war has existed between the United States and the Japanese Empire.”389 Congress granted 
the president his request and declared war on the Axis powers.  
 Between 1941-1945, the years of active U.S. involvement in the war, the war cost the 
U.S. $296 billion in current dollars, nearly 36 percent of U.S. GDP in 1945.390 But the costs 
of the war did not end there, the Truman administration found itself spending more billions in 
the post war era as the U.S. took on the task of assisting European countries to stand back on 
their feet, through a plan that simply revolutionized the American foreign assistance program 
forever. 
 The Marshall Plan has been praised by people on both side of the Atlantic, it was 
“the most generous act of any people, anytime, anywhere, to another people,” according to its 
chief administrator Paul G. Hoffman. 391  It was “the most staggering and portentous 
experiment in the entire history of our foreign policy,” wrote Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. in the 
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New Republic in 1948.392 On the European side, the plan was also praised. It was “among the 
most noble experiences in human affairs,” said the plan’s representative in Europe Averell 
Harriman in July 1949.393 It was “like a lifeline to sinking men,” declared British Foreign 
Secretary at the time Ernest Bevin, “it seemed to bring hope where there was none, the 
generosity of it was beyond our belief”.394 The following section of the research focuses on 
the Marshall Plan and the impact of post WWII assistance on the evolution of the 
contemporary foreign aid establishment, paying special attention to the rule of Truman and 
his close circle of advisors. 
2.3. Post WWII Aid  
2.3.1. The Truman Doctrine  
World War II left Europe in an extremely devastated state in all aspects of life; politically the 
content was fragmented and despite the end of the war, the tensions between the victors, 
particularly the U.S. and the USSR left Europe unstable. Economically, the deaths of millions 
and the destruction of infrastructure left European economies in a devastated state, industrial 
production all but seized. Socially, disease and post war hunger spread across the continent as 
states lacked the resources to provide the basic life necessities to their surviving populations. 
The Germans call the post war era “Stunde Null,” it marks leaving that bloody chapter behind 
and starting anew. “Stunde Null” could as easily have applied to the whole content, and not 
just with “restarting history,” but rebuilding Europe almost from scratch. The hour when the 
continent had nothing and began to rebuild its states and institutions as if they had not been in 
existence just few years back. All these factors; the loss of life, destruction of buildings and 
infrastructure, the shortages in the labor market, the lack of food, shelter and water, among 
other difficulties left Europe in a condition best described by the New York Times in March 
1945, as one “which no American can hope to understand,” Europe had become the “New 
Dark Continent”.395 
 To compile the difficulties, from an American point of view, it was feared that such 
socioeconomic and political conditions would provide a fertile environment for communism 
to expand further west. The threat of the spread of communism was a major concern for the 																																																								
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United States and its Western allies. The early post war civil war in Greece and the Soviet 
threats posed to Turkey at the time were mere warning signs of what was to come. Greece 
was being torn by a civil war and only British intervention in 1944 saved Athens from falling 
into the hands of the communist National Liberation Front.396 But by the beginning of 1947, 
the exhausted and consumed Britain could no longer support the elected Greek 
government.397  
 In Turkey, the Soviet Union sought to extend its control over the strategically crucial 
Dardanelles and Bosphorus straits, which connect the Black and the Mediterranean seas; an 
idea the U.S. and the western powers rejected.398 The straits were governed by the Montreux 
Convention, signed in 1936 between Turkey and the Soviet Union among other powers.399 
The agreement required that only ships originating from Black Sea bordering countries may 
flow through the straits, and left the Turkish government responsible for maintaining and 
policing the straits.400 The Soviet Union claimed that non-Black Sea ships had been allowed 
to pass, and furthermore claimed territories from Turkey, which the Ottomans had “stolen,” 
and that these territories belonged to Georgia, which was a part of the Soviet Union at the 
time.401  
When the Turkish government rejected the Soviet demands, the situation escalated 
further when the Soviet Union began a show of power in the straits in August 1946 after 
sending the Turkish government a note claiming that Turkey had violated the agreement and 
a new convention was required. Unable to face the Soviets alone, Turkey turned to the United 
States for support.402  
President Truman, who first said that the crisis was a domestic affair between the two 
nations, quickly changed his mind and sent the battleship U.S.S. Missouri, though under the 
pre-text of sending the remains of the Turkish ambassador to the United States home to 
Turkey in April 1946.403 In an unsent letter to his Secretary of State at the time, James F. 
Byrnes, in January 1946, Truman expressed his frustration and anger with the Soviets, and 																																																								
396 Stanley G. Payne, Civil War in Europe, 1905-1949 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 219. 
397 President Harry Truman, Harry S. Truman Library, Special Message to the Congress on Greece and Turkey, 
March 12, 1947 (Independence, MO). 
398 Martin McCauley, Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1949, Rev. 3rd ed. (Harlow: Pearson Longman, 2008), 80. 
399 Ibid. 
400 William M. Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy Since 1774, 3rd edition. ed. (New York, NY: Routledge, 2013), 
271. 
401 Bruce R. Kuniholm, "Turkey and the West Since World War II," in Turkey Between East and West: New 
Challenges for a Rising Regional Power, ed. Vojtech Mastny and R. Craig Nation (WEstview: Boulder, CO, 
1996), 45. 
402 See account in Ekavi Athanassopoulou, Turkey: Anglo-American Security Interests, 1945-1952: the First 
Enlargement of NATO (London: Frank Cass, 1999), 49-51. 
403 Ibid., 49. 
2. History of U.S. Foreign Aid  92 
with Byrnes stating that “… unless Russia is faced with an Iron Fist and strong language, 
another war is in the making. Only one language do they understand- ‘how many divisions 
have you?’ … I’m tired of babying the Soviets.”404 
Two months later, on March 12, 1947, President Truman delivered a speech in a joint 
session of the United States Congress. The speech, which would later be called the “Truman 
Doctrine,” outlined the United States’ policy in facing communism, particularly in the cases 
of Greece and Turkey. According to Truman, the Greek government had requested urgent 
economic and financial assistance. Without mentioning the USSR, Yugoslavia or 
communism in his address, Truman declared “I believe that it must be the policy of the 
United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed 
minorities or by outside pressures.” 405  Finally, Truman said that the U.S. was the only 
country capable of assisting Turkey and Greece now, with Britain finding itself “under the 
necessity of reducing or liquidating its commitments in several parts of the world, including 
Greece.”406  
Congress had changed hands in the last elections to become controlled by Truman’s 
opponents in the Republican Party who scrutinized the president’s proposal for over two 
months, before eventually passing both houses as the Greek Turkish Aid Bill in late April in 
the Senate by 67 to 23, and early May in the House by 287 to 108 votes.407 Opponents of the 
bill, mostly Isolationist Republicans from mid-Western states, saw the Truman Doctrine as 
described by Ohio Republican representative George Bender as a “sinister conspiracy to draw 
the United States into open warfare on the side of very reactionary government throughout 
the world.”408 The margin in votes between opponents and supporters of the plan speaks for 
the general support for sending aid to Greece and Turkey.  
The American public was generally supportive of the Truman Doctrine as well. 
According to a Gallup poll, 56 percent approved financial aid to Greece, and 49 percent 
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approved of sending financial aid to Turkey. 409 On the question of sending civilian advisers, 
there was much larger support, 83 percent in Greece’s case and 77 percent in Turkey’s.410 
The President signed the bill on May 22, 1947 and on the same day issued Executive Order 
9857, in which he outlined the regulations for carrying out the congressional act, among these 
regulations was the delegation of the powers granted to him in the act to Secretary of State 
Marshall.411 
The provisions of the bill provided an initial $400 million and an additional $225 
million.412 Of the $625 million total, $345 million was to be sent to Greece and $152.5 
million to Turkey, for military assistance to both countries, while the remaining funds were to 
be directed for economic development.413 
2.3.2. The Marshall Plan 
With the Turkish-Greek aid bill, the U.S. under Truman took the first step in a long journey 
that would evolve the American foreign aid system into the largest and most influential in the 
world. The Truman administration was set on a path of containing communism by assisting 
countries of critical geopolitical importance to the U.S. in resisting Soviet expansion and the 
temptation to join the eastern block in the same time. 
In June 1947, Secretary of State George C. Marshall, who was described by Winston 
Churchill as the “true architect of victory,” delivered an address at Harvard University that 
became the basis for the largest expansion in the American foreign aid program; the 
European Recovery Program, which became better known as the Marshall Plan.414 The plan 
was called the Marshall Plan at President Truman’s insistence, crediting Marshall with being 
the “greatest living American,”415 and naming it after Marshall would be “a whole hell of a 
lot better in congress.”416 In his historic speech, Marshall called for a comprehensive aid plan 
to bring about political stability. “It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is 
able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there 																																																								
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can be no political stability and no assured peace,” said Marshall.417  Further assistance, 
according to Marshall, “must not be on a piecemeal basis as various crises develop,” instead 
it must work as a cure rather than a palliative.418  
In December of the same year, President Truman addressed congress on the Marshall 
Plan, recommending the program with full confidence in its “wisdom and necessity as a 
major step in our nation’s quest for a just and lasting peace.”419 And in February 1948, the 
Committee on Foreign Relations published a report in which they stated that, “the committee 
believes that the program proposed is a sound one, that it will impose no dangerous strain 
upon the economy…. And that it will be adequate to provide the margin for success in an 
effort which must be essentially and primarily European.”420 Senator Arthur Vandenberg, the 
already mentioned former Isolationist until Pearl Harbor and Chairman of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee was supportive of the plan calling on congress in a March 1948 speech, 
“in the name of peace, stability, and freedom it deserves prompt passage.” 421  In fact, 
Vandenberg became the leading internationalist in the U.S. at this time. George Marshall 
later said of Vandenberg “I feel that Vandenberg has never received full credit for his 
monumental efforts on behalf of the European Recovery Program…. Vandenberg was my 
right-hand man and at times, I was his right-hand man.”422 
 Opponents of the bill in congress, such as Senator William Jenner (R-Indiana), 
rejected the idea of a “well-fare state at home and abroad.”423 Former President, Herbert 
Hoover was also critical of the plan at first, questioning whether the American economy 
could handle the financial costs of the aid package.424 Hoover became involved, to an extent, 
by providing recommendations. In a letter to the House Speaker, Joseph Martin in March 
1948, Hoover provided further recommendations while praising congress for adopting some 																																																								
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of the earlier measures that included suggestions and conditions such as recommending that 
Marshall Plan countries be prohibited from trading munitions with satellite countries, as well 
as recommending the founding of a business administration to run the Marshall Plan aid 
operations.425 
 The Department of State set the following six conditions on the recipients: First, 
participants in the recovery program should provide commitments regarding the fulfillment 
of the major production programs; second, participants should take immediate steps to create 
internal monetary and financial stability; third, recipients are to reduce trade barriers with the 
principles of the proposed International Trade Organization; fourth, recipients should 
consider other sources of credit, such as the International Bank in order to reduce reliance on 
U.S. creditors; fifth, a formal recognition of their common objectives and assume common 
responsibility for achieving them; finally, an international organization to coordinate the 
relief efforts should be established.426 Furthermore, the bilateral treaties signed with each 
recipient included economic policies and commitment to trade liberalization on behalf of the 
recipient.427  
It must be mentioned that the U.S. extended an invitation to the USSR to participate 
in the recovery program. The Soviet leaders, however, were suspicious of the plan altogether, 
which came only few months after Truman’s speech in congress in which he called for 
support to Greece and Turkey, against the communists in the former and the USSR itself in 
the latter. In July 1947 in a meeting of foreign secretaries in Paris, Soviet Foreign Minister 
Vyacheslav Molotov, who had arrived Paris with no less than 80 advisors, rejected the U.S. 
offer and left the Paris conference.428 His deputy, Andrei Vyshinsky, delivered a speech later 
at the UN in which he denounced the Marshall Plan arguing that it “will mean placing 
European countries under the economic and political control of the United States.”429  
The implementation of the plan, and the Soviet rejection, is seen as a major 
development in the history of the Cold War. As Adam Ulam put it, “with the Marshall Plan, 
the cold war assumes the character of position warfare.”430 The Cold War took a harsher 
character after the plan because Stalin’s misinterpretation of the plan due to his ideologically 																																																								
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driven fear of Western aggression, according to Ulam.431 Ulam’s interpretation is one of 
many explanations that have been put forth for the Marshall Plan, these explanations also 
highlight the reasons why the Soviet leadership rejected the plan.  
 
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
		Figure	2:1,	Recipients	of	the	Marshall	Plan,	1948.432 
Historians have debated the Marshall Plan quite intensely. The debate was between 
two main camps: the Traditionalists, or the Orthodox interpretation and the New Left. The 
traditionalists, particularly early historians, such as Herbert Feis, John W. Spanier, and Arthur 
Schlesinger, Jr, argued that the Marshall Plan was a response to Soviet initiatives in the 
postwar world. The Soviet actions in Poland, Germany, and Greece, as well as their support 
for communist parties in France and Italy, required a response from the United States who 
initially responded to each case reluctantly, then piecemeal before producing a “program of 
containment.”433 While other Historians such as Joseph M. Jones and Harry B. Price viewed 
the Marshall Plan as an initiative to prevent economic catastrophe in Western Europe, and 
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portrayed Soviet rejection of the plan as expressive of Soviet expansionism and aggression, 
and therefore assign the blame for the start of the Cold War on the Soviet Union.434  
 The New Left, or Cold War revisionists, such as 
William A. Williams, Gar Alperovitz, Lloyd C. Gardner, 
and Gabriel Kolko on the other hand, argue that the U.S. 
wanted to deny Russia its legitimate concerns regarding 
the security situation in Eastern Europe.436 Furthermore, 
the United States used its economic and newly acquired 
nuclear power as leverage in order to establish a world 
economy based on the American principles of open door, 
and multilateral trade to eventually undermine 
communism. To Cold War revisionists, the Marshall Plan 
was an aggressive policy to expand capitalism, and the 
Soviet reaction to the plan was a defensive measure in 
order to protect communism from being integrated into 
the global capitalist system the United States was 
constructing.437 William Taubman’s Stalin’s American Policy concluded that the Marshall 
Plan triggered a shift in Soviet policy away from pursuit of a limited form of detente and 
toward confrontation.438  
Political Scientist Ole R. Holsti provides a survey of the history of American public 
opinion through different public opinion surveys conducted at different times during the 20th 
century. The majority of the American public favored the European Recovery Program. 
According to a Gallup survey conducted in November 1948, 65 percent of the American 
public supported the plan and only 13 percent opposed it.439 
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Marshall Plan Recipients (1948-
1952) in USD Billions 
United Kingdom 3,190 
France 2,714 
Italy 1,509 
Germany 1,391 
Netherlands 1,083 
Austria 678 
Belgium 559 
Greece 707 
Turkey 225 Figure	2:2,	European	Recovery	Program,	recipients.435 
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The Marshall Plan passed in congress by a 69 to 17 votes in the Senate and 329 to 74 
in the House,440 as the “Economic Cooperation Act of 1948,” or the “Foreign Assistance Act 
of 1948,” as a short title, and as “An Act to promote world peace and the general welfare, 
national interest, and foreign policy of the United States through economic, financial, and 
other measures necessary to the maintenance of conditions abroad in which free institutions 
may survive and consistent with the maintenance of the strength and stability of the United 
States.”441 The congress’ long title of the act best describes the purposes and goals of the 
Marshall Plan as well as any scholarly work, whether in the traditional or in the revisionist 
camps. 
The reasons behind the Marshall Plan, though can be heavily debated, and the motives 
behind it can be questioned, one cannot help but argue that all of the reasons are true, but to 
different degrees of importance. 
The United States had political motives; such as ensuring that whatever system 
emerged in the new built Europe, would be a liberal democratic system that is wholly 
friendly to the U.S. Restoring economic growth, as well as social and political stability was 
of utmost importance in order to limit the influence of Communism and the Soviet Union 
which could and would have been far greater in Western Europe had the U.S. simply stood 
aside. Post WWII Europe represented a fertile environment for communism to grow, and this 
growth would have been aided greatly by the Soviet Union. In France for example, by 
November 1946, over one fourth of the French electorate had voted for the French 
Communist Party.442 And in Italy, the signing of the act on April 3, 1948 came in time to 
influence the elections that year in favor of non-communist parties.443 
The United States also acted in order to advance its economic interests and the 
interests of American corporations and banks. The vast majority of the Marshall Plan funds 
would be spent on purchasing American products. American corporations built trade 
networks with their European counterparts, American exports to Europe increased, and 
American banks were encouraged to provide loans to Europe. The long standing American 
“Open Door” policy was of paramount importance to the U.S. government.444 The creation of 																																																								
440 Dennis W. Johnson, The Laws That Shaped America : Fifteen Acts of Congress and Their Lasting Impact 
(New York: Routledge, 2009), 251. 
441 United States Congress, U.S. Congress, Foreign Assistance Act of 1948, Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, 
80 Cong., 2 sess. (Washington D.C., 1948). 
442 Vivien A. Schmidt, Democratizing France: the Political and Administrative History of Decentralization 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 163. 
443 Peter J. Duignan and Lewis H. Gann, "The Marshall Plan," The Hoover Institution, Hoover Digest 4 (1997). 
444 Open Door Policy: Refers to U.S. policy that began with Secretary of State John Hay’s Open Door Note in 
1899 to the major powers proposing to keep China open to all trade with all nations on equal basis. The Open 
2. History of U.S. Foreign Aid  99 
a single European economic era, with the U.S. as the closest political and economic ally 
would result in growth and advancement of American investments and economy in 
general.445 American officials at the time, including Marshall, saw the other side of the coin. 
Not only would European economic recovery be beneficial to U.S. economy, but also that the 
economic chaos of Europe at the time was harmful to American prosperity.446  
 The final reason for the Marshall Plan in the debate is that United States acted from a 
humanitarian standpoint; to aid the starving and struggling European populations at home, 
and the millions who were displaced, stateless and living as refugees, simply because it was 
the humane thing to do. If the situation in Europe continued to deteriorate, it would have 
threatened the U.S. in many ways, since more Europeans would look to migrate westwards to 
the United States, for example. The Marshall Plan came with its own form of “soft power”, 
improving America’s image among Europeans, winning their hearts and minds, within the 
greater strategy to counter the Soviet Union. The humanitarian justification however remains 
the weakest when compared to the political, security and economic benefits of the plan as 
well as the conditions imposed by the administration in charge of carrying out the plan, the 
European Cooperation Administration. 
 British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, addressing the British House of Commons in 
January 1948, claimed that he was convinced that the Marshall Plan had no political motive 
other than “the valuable human motive of helping Europe to help herself, and so restore the 
economic and political health of this world.”447 Bevin, who had hailed the plan as a “life-
line,” argued that such restoration is of course an interest of the United States, but it is also in 
everyone’s interest.448 
Bevin’s statement raises questions regarding the effectiveness of the Marshall Plan in 
restoring European economy and achieving its original humanitarian and economic goals. 
There have been numerous studies on the subject, and there is an agreement among the plan’s 
early historians that the plan was extremely successful, such as Richard J. Mayne’s 1970 The 
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Recovery of Europe: from Devastation to Unity.449 Revisionist accounts, such as Alan S. 
Milward’s The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-1951, a 1984 publication, argued 
that the effect of American aid on economic growth was small, and that the United States 
failed to reconstruct Europe according to its own blueprint. 450  In response, American 
Economist Barry Eichengreen and his colleagues published a number of works that argue in 
favor of the economic benefits of the Marshall Plan. To Eichengreen, the Marshall Plan 
played an important role in promoting financial stability, market liberalization, and the social 
contract on which the plan was based.451 
Debates regarding the effect and effectiveness of aid tend to yield more arguments 
and questions than results and answers. The same applies when measuring the effectiveness 
of the Marshall Plan. Aid effectiveness is one of the hardest aspects to measure in aid. Europe 
was recovering, with American aid, would Europe have recovered at the same rate during its 
“Golden Age” in the 1950s and 1960s, had the U.S. simply stood aside and let the Europeans 
handle their own recovery entirely? In all probability, the answer is no. But does that mean 
that Europe would not have recovered had the U.S. not adopted the Marshall Plan and 
invested knowledge and money? The answer again, in all probability is no.  
The research takes a middle approach and argues that the Marshall Plan accelerated 
European economic recovery and served European countries mostly by providing additional 
aid which prevented these countries from adopting extreme austerity measures that would 
have further destabilized them socially and politically, and thereby provided a chance for the 
USSR to expand its influence over Western Europe. The U.S. would have witnessed various 
communist parties ascended to power, and that was a chance that neither Truman nor his 
administration were willing to allow.  
The Truman administration saw both a threat and an opportunity in the economic 
chaos that ensued following WWII. Besides the obvious threat of Western Europe falling 
under Soviet influence and becoming more communist than capitalist, more closed than open 
in terms of markets, and more friendly towards the U.S.S.R in terms of trade and investment. 																																																								
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In his provocative book, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the 
Present, Christopher Layne argues that “economic interests- and the concomitant geopolitical 
need for stability and the ideological need for an ‘open’ international system in which U.S. 
core values would be secure- impelled the United States to revive Western Europe and to 
incorporate it into the postwar international economic order.”452 According to Layne, the U.S. 
would have pursued the same objectives regardless of the Cold War and the clash with the 
Soviet Union.453 
2.3.3. Mutual Defense Assistance Act, 1949 
With America’s aid through the Economic Cooperation Act, the Marshall Plan, Europe was 
set on a path to economic recovery by the end of the 1940s. The European themselves saw 
the devastation inflicted by the successive wars, and it became essential to find a final 
solution to Europe’s hostilities. To that end, a plan for the unification of Europe was begun 
through dialogues and conferences that led the UK, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and 
Luxembourg to form a treaty of collective military aid and economic and social 
cooperation.454 The Treaty of Brussels was signed on March 17, 1948 as a treaty of mutual 
defense, setting the course for the founding of the Western European Union, and the eventual 
formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization the following year.455 
 At the time the European representatives were signing the treaty in Brussels on March 
19, 1948 Truman was delivering a special message to a join session of congress. He praised 
the efforts of the five European countries, calling the treaty a “notable step in the direction of 
unity in Europe for the protection and preservation of its civilization.”456 Truman further 
declared that the determination of these countries to protect themselves “will be matched by 
an equal determination on [U.S.’s] part to help them protect themselves.”457  
 As already discussed, a month after Truman’s address, congress passed the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1948, the Marshall Plan, by overwhelming majority in both houses.458 With 
the Marshall Plan approved and European economic recovery on the way, the next topic on 																																																								
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U.S. foreign policy agenda was securing a political and military alliance with Europe, 
particularly with the recovering European countries that signed the treaty of Brussels and 
subsequent mutual defense pacts.  
In June 1948, the Senate passed Resolution 239, better known as the Vandenberg 
Resolution by 64 votes to 4.459 The third article of the resolution set the “association of the 
United States, by constitutional process, with such regional and other collective arrangements 
are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid,” as a foreign policy 
objective.460 The resolution gave the administration the green light to enter into negotiations 
with European allies, resulting in the signing of the NATO agreement in Washington D.C. on 
April4, 1949. In the fifth article of the NATO charter, the participating countries; Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
the United Kingdom and the United States, agreed that “an armed attack against one or more 
of them in Europe, or North America, shall be considered an attack against them all,” and 
pledged assistance and use of armed force if deemed necessary.461 
The funds for NATO came in the form of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act in 
October 1949.462 The act had initially faced fierce resistance in congress, with both houses 
insisting on reducing the overall budget of the act by half.463 The general opinion changed on 
September 23 1949 when the USSR announced that it had successfully donated a nuclear 
bomb.464 The act, “to promote the foreign policy and provide for the defense and general 
welfare of the United States by furnishing military assistance to foreign nations,” included 
provisions for funding NATO countries and reaffirmed previous U.S. commitments to aiding 
Greece and Turkey.465 The following are some of the main provisions of the act: 
- Authorization for the president to provide military assistance to North 
Atlantic Treaty countries in the form of equipment, material and services.466 
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- Total appropriation of $500 million for carrying out the provisions of the 
act.467 
- Provides $211 million in aid to Greece and Turkey, and additional aid Iran, 
Korea, and the Philippines and $75 million in aid to China.468 
- Establishment of Mutual Assistance Programs (MAP); unlike lend-lease of 
WWII which required repayment, these programs provided services and 
equipment free of charge, mostly to European allies. ($3.5 billion of a total 
of $4.0 under MAP by 1955).469	
Congress attached three conditions for receiving aid; firstly, only countries that had 
requested assistance prior to the passage of the act qualify for this aid.470 Secondly, of the 
$500 million, $400 million will be available only after the president approves 
recommendations for an integrated defense of the north Atlantic area,471 and finally recipient 
countries must enter into an agreement with the U.S. regarding the use of this aid.472 These 
conditions ensured that the money is spent only on strengthening the military capabilities of 
NATO allies.473 Furthermore, the second condition, which required an integrated defense 
area, ensures that American allies are strengthened in this collective unit, which makes 
American aid itself more efficient and more cost effective in the long run; the logic behind it 
was that the stronger the allies within this integrated defense area with U.S. support, the less 
aid they would require in the future.474 
The provisions for aid in Korea came during the first of the Cold War’s proxy wars. 
After Japan’s defeat in WWII, two separate governments emerged in the Korean Peninsula; 
South Korea supported by the U.S. and North Korea supported by China and the USSR.475 
Both claimed to be the legitimate government of Korea. In late June 1950, North Korean 
forces backed by the Soviet Union and China invaded the south, resulting in a full-scale 
military confrontation. With UN approval, the U.S. formed an international coalition of 18 
countries to counter North Korea’s invasion. 476  The U.S. contributed most in terms of 
personnel and funding. According to Tindall and Shi, Truman assumed that Stalin and the 																																																								
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Soviets were behind the North’s invasion as diversion to invade Western Europe. He then 
ordered an expansion of U.S. forces in Europe and more importantly increased assistance to 
the French fighting communists in Indochina, laying the foundation for further U.S. 
involvement in Indo-China’s affairs in few years time.477 The Korean War eventually ended 
in 1953 by an armistice along the 38th parallel and creating a militarized zone, though no 
peace agreement has been reached to the present.478 
2.3.4. Truman and Point Four, 1949 
After the successful campaign and electoral victory in 1948, President Truman and his team 
began their preparations for the inaugural address to be delivered on January 20, 1949 at the 
U.S. Capitol. One member of the Truman team was Benjamin H. Hardy, Deputy to Francis 
H. Russell, Head of Public Affairs Office. Hardy had served with the U.S. Navy during 
WWII and had the chance to travel and see less developed parts of the globe. Hardy was a 
speechwriter who had developed “clear ideas on what was wrong with American foreign 
policy.”479 According to Hardy, U.S. assistance focused on the wealthy and powerful and 
paid little regard to the average people.480 In a memo to Russell, Hardy wrote of his idea, 
“this is the way to make the greatest psychological impact and to ride and direct the universal 
groundswell of desire for a better world.”481  Hardy went behind his superiors, who had 
originally rejected his idea of adding technical assistance as a new pillar of U.S. foreign 
policy, and met with Truman’s military advisor, George Elsey, who brought it to Truman’s 
White House Counsel, Clark Clifford. Elsey and Clifford were more enthusiastic about the 
idea than their colleagues at the State Department.482 
 But the real enthusiasm came from President Truman himself. Truman, who had been 
a Missouri farmer, was fully aware of the true value of sharing technical advancements in the 
field of agriculture, embraced the idea and even elaborated with ideas of his own in a meeting 
speaking of the Tigris-Euphrates Valley, Zambezi River valley in Africa and also in Brazil, 
and how these areas could benefit from American know-how.483 By the time the president’s 
inaugural address was completed, it included four points on the direction American foreign 																																																								
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policy was to take during the administration’s time in office.484 The fourth of which was 
concerned with providing American know-how, hence calling the program the Point Four 
Program (PFP). 
First, the U.S. would support the United Nations as a “means of applying democratic 
principles to international relations.” 485  Second, the U.S. would continue supporting the 
recovery of world economy, particularly in Europe. Third, the U.S. would “strengthen 
freedom-loving nations against the dangers of aggression,” and fourth, the U.S. “must 
embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and 
industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas.”486 
The importance of the program stems from the fact that it was the first economic 
development plan on a global scale in U.S. history. Until the establishment of the Technical 
Cooperation Administration (TCA), which was founded exclusively to run the program 
within the Department of State, post WWII economic aid had been restricted by and large to 
aiding the devastated European countries. Congress however was not quick to support the 
plan, having spent millions of dollars already on the Marshall Plan not long before, congress 
hesitated and delayed the program until June 1950 when the program was finally approved 
with a budget of $34.5 million for fiscal year (FY), 1950/1951.487 By March 1951, there were 
236 Point Four trainees from 34 countries, with plans to bring many more. U.S. assistance 
reached countries further east from Europe, such as Israel, Iran and Pakistan.488 
Finally, with the arrival of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, the PFP became known 
as the Technical Assistance Program, and the TCA was reorganized as the Foreign 
Operations Administration, the forerunner of the contemporary United States Agency for 
International Development, USAID.489 It is also worth noting that President Kennedy’s Peace 
Corps grew out of Truman’s Point Four program as well.490 
To conclude the historical analysis of the Truman administration’s contribution to the 
birth of the contemporary American foreign aid program, it is clear that the role of the 
administration of the former Missouri former, was of the most, if not the most, important in 																																																								
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the evolution of the modern day American foreign aid establishment in numerous forms. It 
laid the foundations for the entire U.S. foreign establishment for decades to come. While the 
rules, regulations and size of this establishment would evolve with time and events in the 
next 60 years, the legislations passed during this era of American history, from the Greek- 
Turkish Aid Bill, to the Economic Cooperation Act and the Mutual Defense Assistance Act 
represent the founding, not only for the administrative and bureaucratic aspect of the foreign 
aid program, but also the broader political dimension with the goals and objectives of the 
broader American foreign policy, the tools required to achieve these objectives and how to 
use this new tool as a new arm for American foreign policy makers; in much the same way as 
diplomacy and military. 
It should also be remembered that while most of the early aid legislations and ideas 
for these programs came from individuals associated with the executive branch, such as 
secretary Marshall, Clifford and Hardy, Congress was mostly supportive of the president’s 
plans, and congress members such as Senator Vandenberg played a particularly important 
role during these developments in the early period. 
During Truman’s time in office, the U.S. won the war, recognized Israel, played a 
paramount role in establishing the U.N. and NATO, and dropped two nuclear bombs on 
Japan. Truman established the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, the 
National Security Council, and he was the first president to write congress on racial 
desegregation.491 Yet for all these achievements, Truman is perhaps best remembered for the 
Marshall Plan and European economic recovery. He was not wrong when he said to one of 
his aides in 1952, “If I’m ever remembered fifty years after I’m dead, it will probably be 
because my name is associated with some of these programs,” in reference to his foreign aid 
programs.492    
2.3.5. The Eisenhower Years 
By the time President Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953-1961), arrived in office, the Cold War 
had taken its roots and the tensions between East and West were running high. The former 
Supreme Allied Commander-Europe came to the White House with extensive military 
experience having devoted most of his life to serving in the U.S. military, ascending from 
rank of Lieutenant after his graduation from West Point Military Academy in 1915 to become 																																																								
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the highest ranked officer in the U.S. army.493 Like his predecessor, Eisenhower held the 
belief that the best way to deal with the Soviet Union was to contain it.494 In order for 
containment to work, Eisenhower believed, the U.S. must maintain strong alliances and 
powerful military as well as powerful international institutions.495  
In the beginning of his time in office, Eisenhower wished to “curtail” foreign aid as 
he urged congress to do so in a March 1954 special message on foreign economic policy.496 
As figure 2:3 demonstrates, there was a general decline in the levels of U.S. assistance during 
the Eisenhower presidency, yet this decline, explains Lancaster, was to be expected after the 
very high levels of aid during the Marshall Plan years.497  
However much Eisenhower and his administration wished to reduce foreign aid, 
necessity required that they continue funding essential programs that had been initiated 
during the Truman administration. 498   Lancaster argues that necessity was not the only 
reason. She adds that the Eisenhower administration found foreign aid too useful a tool to 
disregard completely. 499  Furthermore, the fierce competition with the Soviet Union in 
numerous aspects, the least for which was the search for friends, allies, and influence among 
the nations of the developing world who were gradually becoming more important in world 
affairs at the time, could not permit a decline in foreign assistance.500 Eisenhower himself 
admitted as much when he left office stating that he would be willing to “give up part of his 
own salary to ‘meet the pressing need of adequate funds for foreign aid.”501 
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The Food For Peace program, an important pillar of the contemporary American 
foreign aid structure, originated during the Eisenhower administration, though the credit for 
the congressional act that brought about the program belongs to Senator Hubert Humphrey 
(D-Minnesota).502 Humphrey’s constituents from the farm filled state of Minnesota, lobbied 
intensely to send surplus American food to foreign countries in order to maintain the prices of 
these goods in the local American market.503 The other choice would have been to destroy it, 
so why not send it abroad as a loan or a grant through American transport, and by doing solve 
a humanitarian crisis, protect domestic prices, increase agricultural exports and extend and 
enforce American friendship and influence? Humphrey’s efforts culminated in the passage of 
the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, also known as the Food for 
Peace Act, and commonly referred to as P.L.480. 504  The act was signed by president 
Eisenhower on July 10, 1954, declaring in a statement that that the act “will lay the basis for 
a permanent expansion of our exports of agricultural products, with lasting benefits to 
ourselves and peoples in other lands.”505 
Figure	2:3,	Foreign	aid	from	Truman	to	Kennedy	with	the	Eisenhower	decline.	(USAID	Greenbook).506  
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Another major milestone in the evolution of the American aid program during 
Eisenhower’s administration was the passing of the Mutual Security Act of 1954. The act 
incorporated all previous foreign aid legislations into a single legislation, and it further 
repealed all previous foreign assistance acts, including the 1949 Mutual Defense Assistance 
Act, the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948 and the Greek-Turkish Assistance Act of 1948 
among others.507 The most important titles of the act were; title I, Mutual Defense Assistance 
whose purpose was “to authorize measures in the common defense, including the furnishing 
of military assistance to friendly nations and international organizations.” 508  Title II: 
Development Assistance designed “to promote economic development, and to assist in 
maintaining economic and political stability.”509  Finally Title III: Technical Cooperation 
whose purpose is “to aid the efforts of the peoples of economically underdeveloped areas to 
develop their resources and improve their working and living conditions by encouraging the 
exchange of technical knowledge and skills and the follow of investment capital….”510 The 
new act did not just embrace previous legislations into one, but it also expanded the 
definition and scope of these acts, particularly within title one.511 
The Eisenhower administration used foreign assistance to combat communism in a 
number of countries. According to newly declassified CIA documents, the U.S. aided in 
bringing Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi to replace the elected Prime Minister Mohammad 
Mosaddegh in the 1953 CIA and British MI6 orchestrated coup d’état in Iran.512 Mosaddegh 
sought to nationalize Iranian oil, and it was believed that he had support from communists, 
though the declassified documents suggest that the communist threat was not particularly 
real.513 Eisenhower first withheld $25 million in loans from Mosaddegh’s government, and 
later provided the new leader with over $70 million to enforce his rule.514 Recording the Iran 
developments in his diary on October 8, 1953, Eisenhower wrote “now if the British will be 
conciliatory and display some wisdom; if the Shah and his new premier, General Zahedi, will 																																																								
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be only a little bit flexible, and the United States will stand by to help both financially and 
with wise counsel, we may really give a serious defeat to Russian intensions and plans in that 
area.”515 
A year later, Guatemala was destined for yet another American intervention when the 
U.S. brought down the elected regime of Jacobo Arbenz by assisting in the military coup led 
by Carlos Castillo Armas in a CIA covert operation.516 Arbenz represented a threat to the 
economic interests of United Fruit Company, a Boston based company that had owned over 
60% of Guatemala’s arable land.517 Arbenz appropriated land from UFC, and received a 
small shipment of arms from the eastern bloc, which rendered him a communist.518 After the 
coup, American aid to Guatemala increased from a little over half a million dollars in 1954 to 
$130 million in the six years following the coup.519 The Eisenhower administration provided 
Armas’ government with nearly $100 million in direct aid “during a ‘period when total U.S. 
aid to all of Latin America was under $60 million annually.’”520 
The Iranian and Guatemalan examples provide further evidence to the greater 
narrative that neither humanitarian concerns, nor American principles and ideals play as 
important a role in dictating foreign aid policy when it comes to the national security and 
economic interests of the U.S. Indeed, in both examples, the U.S. assisted in the overthrow of 
elected politicians, and helped install tyrants in their place. Guatemala’s Armas was a brutal 
dictator who had returned the land his predecessor had appropriated from the Boston fruit 
company, and executed the opposition without a second thought.521 Iran’s Mosaddegh and his 
nationalization ideas represented a threat to oil flow from the region, and therefore a threat to 
the commercial interests of the U.S. The Shah was a brutal monarch who tortured and killed 
his opponents, with technical, financial and know-how aid from the Eisenhower 
administration, in violation of America’s democratic principles and ideals.522 
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 Toward the end of the Eisenhower administration, foreign aid was facing growing 
unpopularity among both the American public and their congressional representatives, 
particularly within the Republican Party. 523  A series of public opinion polls among the 
American public between 1955 and 1957 conducted by NORC and Gallup, demonstrate the 
level of dissatisfaction among the public.524 In general, public support for foreign aid among 
the American public declined in the 1950s and early 1960s.525     
Date/Poll                Issue Response by Party Affiliation (Percent) 
Response Republican Democrat Independent 
February 
1946  
Gallup 
Role U.S. 
should play 
in World 
Affairs 
Active 
Stay Out 
72 
23 
 
72 
22 
 
NR 
NR 
 
March 1947 
Gallup 
Aid to 
Greece 
Approve 
Disapprove 
56 
31 
56 
32 
NR 
NR 
April 1948 
Gallup 
Military 
alliance 
with 
Marshall 
Plan 
countries 
Yes 
No 
 
66 
22 
68 
16 
57 
29 
December 
1956 
Gallup 
Foreign aid 
to help stop 
communism 
Yes  
No 
59 
28 
58 
28 
58 
28 
January 
1963 
Gallup 
Foreign Aid For 
Against 
54 
35 
59 
28 
61 
28 
Figure	2:4,	selected	American	public	opinion	surveys,	with	party	affiliation,	on	foreign	aid	issues	1946-1963.526	NR:	Not	reported.	
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Perhaps a part of the reason for the decline was the publication of a number of 
popular books, the most notable of which was the 1958 best-selling novel by William J. 
Lederer and Eugene Burdick The Ugly American. The novel told shocking stories about 
American foreign aid, and American aid workers that further worsened Americans’ 
perception of foreign aid.527 The novel was centered on the failure of the American foreign 
service and diplomatic corps’ incompetent staff, who knew little of the domestic affairs of the 
country where they were based, and could not even speak the local language, in sharp 
contrast to their Soviet counterparts who possessed such skills and were always one step 
ahead of the Americans.528 The officials were more interested in securing personal benefits 
and luxurious life-style, than serving their original purpose of limiting the spread of 
communism. Taken by the book, Senator John F. Kennedy sent a copy to each of his 
colleagues in the U.S. Senate.529 And in one of his last speeches during his election campaign 
in San Francisco in November, Senator Kennedy referred to The Ugly American saying, “the 
United States is going to have to do much better in this area if we are going to defend 
freedom and peace in the 1960s.”530  
2.3.6. Change and Reform 
The short presidency of John F. Kennedy (1961-1963) was one of the most important in the 
history of the evolution of the American foreign aid program. It truly revolutionized the 
American foreign aid establishment in terms of structure and consolidation, the formalization 
of rules and regulations, the separation between economic aid and military aid, and the 
establishment of the United States Agency for International Development, USAID. 531 
Furthermore, Kennedy himself brought “an enthusiasm for foreign aid that was replicated by 
no other twentieth–century president.” 532  During the early years of the 1960s, argue 
Lancaster and Van Dusen, “foreign aid was seen as a tool to reduce discontent generated by 
poverty and the subsequent temptations of communism by spurring economic progress in 																																																								
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these regions and addressing the social and political tensions created by rapid economic 
change.”533 Yet in the beginnings of the 1960s, a “concern for the human condition began to 
slowly creep into the foreign assistance calculation” as well.534 It took another decade and 
another president for human rights to become a more contentious issue in foreign aid policy 
circles.   
One of the first tasks Kennedy and his new team faced was restoring the image and 
trust of people both at home and abroad in the American foreign aid system. To say that the 
young president was determined to fix what he perceived to be major flaws in the foreign aid 
establishment would certainly be an understatement. Kennedy was greatly influenced by The 
Ugly American, and was determined to improve the image the novel portrayed. To that end, 
he initiated three major reforms within the first 100 days of his office. 
  The first reform was amending the Food for Peace Act. President Kennedy’s second 
executive order, issued on his 3rd day in office created the office of the Director of the Food-
for-Peace Program.535 Shifting the focus from containment to development implies a change 
in tactics rather than strategy. The overarching goal remained unchanged; containing 
communism. Lancaster shares this view when she argued, “it was in Kennedy’s 
administration that promoting development became an established priority of US foreign aid, 
although, for Kennedy and others in his administration, development was still primarily a 
means to the end of Cold War containment.” FFP under Kennedy became, in the words of 
Kennedy’s advisor at the time Arthur Schlesinger, “the great unseen weapon of Kennedy’s 
third world policy.”536 During the Kennedy administration, good shipments averaged $1.5 
billion a year.537 
 The second of Kennedy’s reforms was establishing the U.S. Peace Corps by 
executive order in March 1960.538 Kennedy’s idea to establish the Peace Corps was first 
mentioned by in a speech by Kennedy in 1951, when he was a House representative (D- 																																																								
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Massachusetts), when he called for “young college graduates would find a full life in 
bringing technical advice and assistance to the underprivileged and backward Middle 
East.”539 And in the November 1960 San Francisco speech, the soon to be president called for 
a “peace corps of talented young men and women, willing and able to serve their country… 
well qualified through rigorous standards, well trained in the languages, skills, and customs 
they will need to know.”540 Kennedy’s emphasis on language, skills and training speaks 
directly to the impact “The Ugly American,” left on him, particularly when the ‘factual 
epilogue’ written by the authors argues that what America needed was  “a small force of well 
trained, well-chose, hard-working, and dedicated professionals… they must go equipped to 
apply a positive policy promulgated by a clear-thinking government. They must speak the 
language… and they must be more experts in its problems than are the natives.”541  
The executive order established the Peace Corps as an agency within the Department 
of State, headed by a director. The Peace Corps’ mission is “to promote world peace and 
friendship,” by fulfilling three goals: provide assistance of trained men and women to share 
their skills and training, help promote a better understanding of America in other parts of the 
world, and a better understanding of other parts of the world in America.542 
The third and most significant of Kennedy’s immediate reforms was sending a special 
message to the congress on March 22 urging revision of the foreign aid organization and 
major overhaul of the system. The president’s letter would lead to the eventual passage of the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. According to Kennedy, the existing foreign aid system was 
“bureaucratically fragmented, awkward and slow, its administration is diffused over a 
haphazard and irrational structure covering at least four departments and several other 
agencies.”543 Kennedy further argued that the existing program was based on legislative 
measures and administrative procedures at different time than 1960s and for different 
purpose, many of these measures and procedures, wrote the president, “now obsolete, 
inconsistent and unduly rigid and thus unsuited for our present needs and purposes.”544  
In his detailed message, Kennedy urged more than mere structural changes to the 
program, but urged changes to the purpose and goals. Instead of fighting communism, the 																																																								
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fundamental task should be to “help a historical demonstration that in the twentieth century, 
as in the nineteenth-in the southern half of the globe as in the north--economic growth and 
political democracy can develop hand in hand.”545  
The passage of the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) in September, which is seen 
as the constitution of American foreign aid, and often referred to with such terms as the 
“cornerstone” of American foreign aid, is perhaps the single most important piece of 
legislation in U.S. aid history.546 The act is often referred to in such cases when debate on 
financial assistance comes to the forefront due to developments in recipient countries or 
during public debates on foreign aid and its role. The act serves as policy guidelines for 
decision makers on who should receive aid, and who should not, and whose aid is to be 
suspended. The importance of the act in the history of American foreign aid requires that it be 
discussed more thoroughly, from its emergence to the signing and the major subsequent 
amendments that followed, the main reason for the passage of the act was the instance of 
President Kennedy on reforming the foreign aid establishment. 
The act included major restructuring of the U.S. foreign assistance program, it marked 
the end for some institutions and the birth of others. Furthermore, it brought new laws and 
regulations, some of the major provisions of the act-as enacted- included,  
§ The creation of the United States Agency for International Development, USAID, 
which was created by Executive Order 10973,547 though the authorization for the 
new agency came in the FAA to have the responsibility for “coordinating all 
United Sates Development-related activities,” under the “policy guidance of the 
Secretary of State.”548 
§ Merging existing foreign aid programs, and separating economic and military aid. 
§ Creating the Economic Support Fund (ESF). 
The ESF provides grants or loans to countries of “special political 
significance.”549 Its funds are used for enhancing political stability, 																																																								
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promoting economic reforms important to the long-term development, 
promoting economic stabilization through budget and balance of 
payments support, and assisting countries that allow the United States 
to maintain military bases on their soil.550 Since ESF’s induction, Israel 
and Egypt have been the highest recipients of ESF funds, doubtless 
due to the 1979 peace agreement between the two countries and the 
special political significance of the two countries.551 
Kennedy also established the Alliance for Progress, an aid initiative to assist Latin 
America. Aid to Latin America during the early 1960s increased from representing five 
percent of total U.S., to receiving 25 percent of it by 1964, a fivefold increase that saw the 
total funds rising from $157 million to $989 million.552 The reason for this increase is the 
same as before; containing communism, particularly after Fidel Castro’s Marxist Revolution 
in Cuba.  
By providing aid for economic development, supporting land and tax reforms, 
supporting education and building infrastructure, The Alliance for Progress initiative would 
serve to make communism less “appealing,” in the Western Hemisphere, and such reforms “it 
was hoped, promote modernization, development, and democracy and diminish radical 
impulses.”553 Jeffrey Taffet questions the results and motives of the program in his book 
Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy: The Alliance for Progress in Latin America, where he argues 
that the program did not deliver “any qualitative or quantitative progress….” The alliance 
was a political program rather than an economic one continues Taffet; it was a political 
program “designed to create certain types of political outcome.”554 
2.3.7. From Johnson to Ford 
Lyndon Baines Johnson arrived in Washington D.C. in the early 1930s to work as a 
congressional staffer and New Deal bureaucrat.555 He won elections for the house in 1937, 
and won a senate primary to become Texas’ senator before climbing the ranks to become, as 																																																								
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Fred Harris described him “the most powerful and influential majority leader in U.S. Senate 
history.”556 After his failed bid to win the Democratic nomination for president in 1960, he 
accepted to become Kennedys running mate and vice-president.557  
 The most notable event during Johnson’s time in office was the expansion of 
America’s involvement in Vietnam, and the impact of this involvement on American foreign 
aid. The Vietnam War had started during the Eisenhower administration, and the U.S. 
committed itself to aiding South Vietnam in opposition to the communist North Vietnam and 
their Viet Cong allies in South Vietnam.558 The 1954 Treaty of Geneva divided Indo-China 
into Laos, Cambodia, North Vietnam and South Vietnam. 559  In 1960, Ho Chi Minh 
established the National Liberation Front (NLF) in South Vietnam, with aid from China, with 
the aim of bringing down the U.S. backed Ngo Dinh Diem. Diem’s government was made up 
of the rich landowners that prosecuted Buddhist peasants. Diem was corrupt and unpopular 
and by 1963, he had lost control of South Vietnam’s rural areas to the Vietcong. The U.S. 
supported a military coup against Diem, which resulted in the military takeover of South 
Vietnam and the death of Diem.560 
The Vietnam Theater was yet another stage on which the U.S. and the Soviet Union 
collided, much like the Korean War discussed earlier. There was a fear that losing Vietnam, 
as the Domino Theory that dominated at the time argued, would soon be followed by losing 
neighboring nations to the communist regimes in the USSR and China before eventually 
losing all of south east Asia.561 To counter the communist threat, and contain it, the U.S. 
turned to its foreign aid program. Between 1955 and 1962, the U.S. supplied Vietnam with 
more than $2 billion worth of aid, $1.4 billion of which was intended for economic 
assistance.562 Most of this economic aid however was donated for “defense support,” only 20 
percent of American aid was assigned to social and economic projects, and much of the 20 
percent was also directed toward improving the military support program.563 Various official 
estimates have argued that between 60-75 percent of South Vietnam’s budget was supplied 																																																								
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by the U.S. South Vietnam was so dependent on American aid that on April 2, 1959, a Wall 
Street Journal journalist said “… the accomplishment, so far, rests on American aid. Without 
that aid there would be no Vietnam!”564 The efforts of American presidents until Nixon were 
focused on containing communism using whatever means necessary. Foreign aid was one of 
the most crucial of these means. 
For all his experience as a congressman, Johnson’s tenure marked a strained and 
conflict-ridden relationship with congress, particularly over foreign aid appropriations. With 
declining public approval of Johnson’s actions with respect to Vietnam, and the strong 
opposition to the war at home, congress used foreign aid legislation to express their 
dissatisfaction with Johnson’s policies. 565  In once instance in 1963, congress slashed 
Johnson’s request for foreign aid, reducing it by nearly $1 billion.566 Representative Otto 
Passman was Johnson’s fiercest adversary when it came to foreign aid budget. Passman, who 
once told an Eisenhower administration official, “Son, I don’t smoke; I don’t drink; my only 
pleasure in life is to kick the [expletive deleted] out of the foreign aid program of the United 
States,” was the Chairman of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the House 
Appropriations Committee.567  
Johnson was less than fond of Passman, indeed hardly any president who dealt with 
Passman actually liked him.568 In a phone conversation with Jack Brooks on the foreign aid 
issue, Johnson denounced Passman as “a goddamned Cajun from the hills of Louisiana.”569 
The president said, “I’m really humiliated that I’m President, and I’ve got a friendly Speaker, 
and I’ve got a friendly Majority Leader, and I’ve got a friendly Albert Thomas, I’ve got a 
friendly Jack Brooks, and Otto Passman is King. I think that’s disgraceful…”570 Passman 
outmaneuvered the man who was dubbed “Master of the Senate,” and managed to reduce the 
administration’s foreign aid request by 33 percent, for which Johnson called him “Son of a 
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[expletive deleted].”571 The backlash against Vietnam continued, and the foreign aid budget 
for FY 1969 was reduced to the lowest level in twenty years.572  
When Richard Nixon became president in 1969, he attempted to “revive support for 
foreign aid… As with Johnson, presidential conflicts with Congress over the Vietnam War 
doomed all but one of his efforts.”573 A Technical Assistance Bureau was established to lead 
USAID’s efforts in research and development in collaboration with American universities 
and international research centers.574 On May 28, 1969, President Richard Nixon sent a 
special message to congress on foreign aid in which the “development” aspect of aid was 
mentioned often. Nixon’s approach marked an emphasis on the moral dimension of the 
American aid program stating, “there is a moral quality in this Nation that will not permit us 
to close our eyes to the want in this world… we are doing what is right to do.”575 The hard 
realism of Nixon was beginning to take a more humanitarian and a more altruistic approach, 
to “balance an aggressive military posture in Indochina with more humanitarian policies 
involving development aid,” in order to gain domestic liberal support to pass aid 
legislation.576 
 With criticism of foreign aid carrying into his term from Kennedy and Johnson’s time 
in office, in September 1969 President Nixon established a panel of 16 private citizens 
chaired by former Bank of America president Rudolph Peterson to review the aid program.577 
In September the following year, Nixon sent another message to congress based on the 
recommendations of Peterson Task Force with propositions to channel most U.S. capital aid 
through multilateral channels in order to reduce the risk of U.S. entanglement in foreign 
countries.578 The force also proposed doubling the annual U.S. contribution to these channels 
from $500 to $1 billion.579 The recommendations also included provisions to abolish the 
Agency for International Development, and replacing it with U.S. International Development 																																																								
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Corporation to deal with “lower income nations on a businesslike basis,” and U.S. 
international Development Institute to assist with using U.S. know-how to solve development 
problems, and a new international security assistance program to provide military aid.580 
Nixon also sought to support trade with Latin American countries, encouraging U.S. 
companies with interest in investment abroad by providing “financial assistance, insurance 
and guidance about local conditions.”581 
 It was During Nixon’s term that the issue of human rights began to surface in foreign 
aid policy making. Congress attempted to impose further restrictions on assistance by linking 
aid to human rights conditions in the recipient countries, an idea that was not accepted by 
Nixon and Kissinger, with their realist approach to international relations. The president and 
his National Security Advisor were of the opinion that national security in the form of 
containing communism should prevail over such ideas as human rights promotion, which 
they saw as a domestic affair of the recipient. During this struggle, congress rejected a 
foreign assistance bill in 1971 for the first time since the enactment of the Marshall Plan. 
Opposition to the Vietnam War was perhaps a primary cause for congress’ action, couple 
with what congress believed to be “over-emphasis on short term military goals, and the idea 
that economic aid was not helpful in achieving any foreign policy goals.” 582  In 1973, 
congress amended the Foreign Assistance Act making “assistance for the poorest sectors of 
developing nations… the central thrust of the reform.”  
During the presidency of Gerald Ford, further amendments to the FAA of 1961 
mandated the State Department to compile an annual report on the status of human rights in 
countries receiving U.S. foreign assistance to begin with, before expanding to include all 
U.N. member states.583 This annual report works in accordance with the principles of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UDHR.584  According to the 2005 report, these 
reports “have served as a reference document and foundation for cooperative action among 
governments, organizations, and individuals seeking to end abuses and strengthen the 
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capacity of countries to protect the fundamental rights of all,” claimed the report.585 These 
reports doubtless served congress while debating foreign aid allocations, and could 
theoretically be used to deny aid to countries where human rights abuses are committed. 
2.3.8. Human Rights between Carter and Reagan 
Over the one term of his presidency, Carter and his team sought to “institutionalize the 
process of decision-making on human rights within the U.S. government.” 586  U.S. 
ambassadors were now held responsible for pursuing U.S. concerns with human rights abuses 
in the countries where they serve.587 The administration also established the Interagency 
working Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance, assigned an NSC staffer to focus 
on human rights, and required that each State Department Bureau assign a human rights 
officer as well.588 Human rights, their respect and violations, became a measure for U.S. 
assistance during the Carter years. 
 Yet for all its efforts in promoting human rights, even going to the extent of 
conditioning human rights conditions on receiving American assistance, Carter and his team 
were often confronted with the result of their cost-benefit calculation wherein human rights 
promotion was outweighed by American security and economic considerations. American 
presidents are often confronted with these dilemmas; promoting human rights and American 
liberal democratic principles, while at the same time preserving the friendship of certain 
nations where such principles do not settle well with these countries’ rulers. It becomes a 
question of approach, and the answer more often than not has been the realist one; national 
security trumps human rights concerns. Carter’s Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 
Human Rights and Security Assistance, Stephen Cohen wrote in 1982 that Carter’s 
administration “exhibited a remarkable degree of tentativeness and caution,” in its pursuit of 
its human rights goals, “U.S. interests were often found to outweigh human rights concerns 
under the exception for ‘extraordinary circumstances.’”589 	 Clair Apodaca elaborates on this paradox in her Understanding U.S. Human Rights 
Policy: A Paradoxical Legacy. She points out that Carter’s use of foreign aid as a tool to 																																																								
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advance the cause of human rights came under criticism from practically every side of the 
political spectrum.590 Some believed that Carter’s pursuit was mere rhetoric, and that the 
president was not going far or fast enough. Other groups that did not view human rights 
promotion as essential to America’s interests, saw Carter’s policies as dangerous, and 
damaging to America’s interests abroad, particularly when such criticism was directed at 
friends and allies.591 A third group, argues Apodaca, “protested that Carter’s human rights 
policy penalized strategically unimportant states while human rights abusing states viewed as 
vital to U.S. interests were ignored.”592  
The third group’s argument is not without justification considering the states which 
lost American aid due to Carter policies; Ethiopia, Guatemala, El Salvador, Argentina and 
Uruguay.593 Countries that happened to be of more geopolitical importance such as South 
Korea, Iran, and the Philippines, all of which had an “equally abysmal human rights 
conditions,” enjoyed an increased in U.S. aid.594 Writing in 1979, Schlesinger echoed this 
very same sentiment,  
“Washington was fearless in denouncing human rights 
abuses in countries like Cambodia, Paraguay and Uganda, 
where the United States had negligible strategic and 
economic interests; a good deal less fearless toward South 
Korea, Saudi Arabia, Yugoslavia and most of black Africa; 
increasingly circumspect about the Soviet Union; totally 
silent about China.”595  
 
Human right had little to no place in the realist mind of Carter’s successor. President 
Ronald Reagan arrived at the White House after running a campaign based on preaching 
small government, economic recovery from the high levels of unemployment and inflation at 
the time, ending détente with the Soviet Union and finally reducing government spending in 
general, while increasing military spending.596  
There is no evidence that suggests that human rights abuses, or advancing human 
rights played an important rule in dictating U.S. foreign aid policy during the three terms of 
these two presidents. Indeed, as Carelton and Stohl found in their 1985 study, The Foreign 																																																								
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Policy of Human Rights: Rhetoric and Reality from Jimmy Carter to Ronald Reagan, “there 
was not a significant relationship between human rights and United States foreign policy 
assistance at any time during the Nixon, Ford, or Carter Administrations. … At no point 
during either administration, Carter and Reagan, does it appear from our analysis that human 
rights concerns significant influenced the distribution of United States Foreign 
Assistance.”597 
Well before becoming president, Reagan held strong views on foreign assistance. In 
his famous “a Time for Choosing” speech, which he delivered in support of Republican 
presidential candidate Barry Goldwater in the 1964 election, Reagan criticized foreign aid 
sharply. Although the “Great Communicator” failed in preventing Goldwater from suffering 
the heaviest defeat in the history of U.S. presidential elections, his speech remains a reference 
for advocates of small government.  
In his speech, Reagan criticized what he described as “doling out money government 
to government, creating bureaucracy, if not socialism, all over the world.”598 He argued that 
the U.S. sat out to help 19 countries, in reference to the Marshall Plan recipients, and “now 
we are helping 107.” He criticized the mismanagement of funds, saying that the U.S. had 
spent 46 billion dollars “with that money, we bought a 2 million dollar yacht for Haile 
Selassie [Ethiopian monarch]. We bought dress suits for Greek undertakers, extra wives for 
Kenyan government officials. We bought a thousand TV sets for a place where they have no 
electricity. In the last six years, 52 nations have bought 7 billion dollars worth of our gold, 
and all 52 are receiving foreign aid from this country.”599 
Three main patterns became apparent in the Reagan administration’s view on foreign 
aid; a decline in economic aid at the expense of increasing military aid; fewer countries were 
receiving larger percentage of U.S. aid; an increase in bilateral aid at the expense of reducing 
multilateral aid and contributions to international organizations such as the World Bank and 
the United Nations.600 Reagan preferred that USAID, rather than international organizations 
provide financial aid to developing countries.601 These patterns were a reflection of the ideas 
and beliefs advocated by Reagan in his election campaign.  																																																								
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One of the changes the Reagan team attempted to make was the termination of U.S. 
contributions to the International Development Association, one of the lending arms of the 
World Bank.602  Established in 1960, the IDA provided loans and grants to the world’s 
poorest countries for development and humanitarian needs.603 During the 1970s, demand for 
IDA loans increased significantly from $162 million in the beginning of the decade to $1.6 
billion by the end of the 1970s.604 According to Carol Lancaster, who had just left her office 
as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Africa when the Reagan team arrived, external 
pressure by foreign governments from developing countries, as well as U.S. allies and the 
State Department, resulted in a reduction rather than complete termination of U.S. 
contributions to IDA.605 The World Bank was not alone as the Reagan administration reduced 
aid to multilateral institutions by an average of 22 percent from 1986-89.606 Like Eisenhower 
before him, Reagan found foreign aid too useful to abandon totally as the “administration 
soon found the World Bank useful in promoting what President Reagan called ‘the magic of 
the market place…’” promoting economic reform with a lesser role for government and free 
market economy.607     
2.4. Aid in New World Order 
The fall of the Soviet Union marked another important milestone in the history of the 
American foreign aid program. It would be useful to recall at this point that the modern day 
foreign aid system was born in the early period of the Cold War, or at the end of WWII. 
Therefore, much of the program’s goals, rationales and even structure were influenced by the 
competition with the Soviet Union. After all, foreign aid proved a useful tool of America’s 
containment policy. Now that the Soviet Union was gone, the role and purpose of foreign aid, 
and indeed the quantity and structure, were destined to change, as Secretary of State under 
Clinton, Madeleine Albright declared, “traditional notions of ‘foreign aid’ have become 
virtually obsolete,” in face of the new dangers the U.S. faces such as international terrorism, 
possibility of conflict in key regions, the risk of renewed financial crisis, drug trafficking and 
spread of weapons.608 
 According to Lancaster, the decade of the1990s was a decade of important changes in 
foreign aid. It marked the emergence of new purposes for aid such as supporting economic 																																																								
602 Lancaster, Foreign Aid: Diplomacy... 2007, 81. 
603 International Development Association, "What is IDA?," (Online: The World Bank). 
604 Lancaster, Foreign Aid: Diplomacy... 2007, 42. 
605 Ibid., 81. 
606 Ibid., 82. 
607 Ibid. 
608 Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, "Investing in Our Interests," The Washington Post, 09.09.1999.  
2. History of U.S. Foreign Aid  125 
and political change in former Soviet countries as well as promoting democracy and post-
conflict rehabilitation in these areas.609  The decade also marked a decrease in aid level 
worldwide. Lancaster explains that at this time, economic problems in donor countries were 
the reason for the general decline. In Europe, countries were preparing to enter the E.U. 
monetary union, so they were required to maintain a budget deficit of no more than three 
percent of their respective gross national products.610 As countries sought to reduce their 
overall spending to reduce their budget deficits, aid levels declined. Japan was also suffering 
from slow economic growth and economic problems at home.611 
In the U.S., the administrations of George H. W. Bush (1989-1992), and Bill Clinton 
(1992-2000), also reduced foreign aid funding in an attempt to reduce the overall federal 
budget deficit.612 Further aid cuts were made when the Republicans came to control Congress 
after the 1994 mid-term elections, with the goal of balancing the budget. 613  Incoming 
chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee Jesse Helms was critical of the foreign aid 
establishment, proposing in a November 1993 news conference to cut U.S. foreign aid by 20 
percent.614 Helms said that foreign aid money was “going down foreign rat holes, to countries 
that constantly oppose us in the United Nations, and many which reject concepts of 
freedom.”615 The Republicans in congress also refused to approve President Clinton’s request 
to meet U.S. obligations to the World Bank International Development Association, the 
largest contributor of international aid to Africa.616 The Republican congress continued to 
slash foreign aid funding in the 1990s, marking the largest decline in foreign aid since the 
1960s.617 While aid spending began to recover towards the end of the decade, the levels 
remained well below what they were in 1995.618  
By the dawn of the 21st century, American aid had reached every corner of the globe; 
it was aiding Kosovo in its struggle for independence, it was paying for peace between the 
Palestinians and Israelis, fighting drug dealers in Latin America, assisting former Soviet 
																																																								
609 Lancaster, Foreign Aid: Diplomacy... 2007, 44.  
610 Ibid. 
611 Ibid. 
612 Ibid., 47. 
613 Helen V. Milner and Dustin Tingley, Sailing The Water's Edge: The Domestic Politics of American Foreign 
Policy (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2015), 216. 
614 Ibid. 
615 Jesse Helms as quoted in ibid. 
616 Gene B. Sperling, The Pro-Gowth Progressive: an Economic Strategy for Shared Prosperity (New York, 
NY: Simon & Schuster, 2005), 259-60 and note 18, 332  
617 Lancaster, Foreign Aid: Diplomacy... 2007, 48. 
618 Ibid., 47-48. 
2. History of U.S. Foreign Aid  126 
states with economic recovery, and dismantling Soviet era nuclear weapons.619 But the new 
century brought new threats and challenges that had until then remained distant, by and large, 
from the American homeland. Now, the 21st century’s form of terrorism has reached 
America’s shores, and American foreign policy, with the aid program as an important tool, 
had to adjust to these new challenges and make further changes in emphasis, goals, and 
structure. 
2.4.1. September 11 and Foreign Aid  
The 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States had a profound impact on U.S. foreign aid and 
its use as a policy tool. Following the attacks, the Bush Administration declared a War on 
Terror, invaded Afghanistan in search for Al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden, invaded and 
occupied Iraq toppling the regime of Saddam Hussein. President Bush outlined his vision of 
foreign aid in the U.S. National Security Strategy in 2002. The president said that the 
principles of the United States would guide the government decisions with respect to foreign 
assistance and allocation of American resources. He stated that the United States “… will use 
[its] foreign aid to promote freedom and support those who struggle non-violently for it, 
ensuring that nations moving toward democracy are rewarded for the steps they take.”620 For 
the first time in U.S. history, foreign assistance officially became a third pillar of U.S. 
national security strategy, together with the military and diplomacy.   
	Figure	2:5,	U.S.	Foreign	aid	obligations,	President	Bush’s	terms,	post	9/11	(Source:	USAID	Greenbook).621 
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621 USAID, "Foreign Aid Explorer: Foreign Aid Trends: Greenbook." 
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During his election campaign in 1999, the former conservative governor of Texas was 
critical of his predecessor for being involved in nation-building, and declared that “if we 
don’t stop extending our troops all around the world in nation-building missions, then we’re 
going to have a serious problem coming down the road.”622 What that problem exactly would 
be, Bush did not elaborate. He arrived at the office with very limited foreign policy 
experience, and little liking for foreign aid; consequently, it was up to those who surrounded 
him to assist him with foreign policy decisions, and from that lack of experience, the 
influence of few individuals who subscribed to the Neoconservative school of thought 
became influential in the Bush administration.  
The research does not subscribe to the notion of total neoconservative dominance of 
the Bush administration, particularly in the foreign policy realm. It does, however, argue that 
neoconservative ideology found its way to the president by the presence of certain individuals 
who occupied prominent positions within the administration such Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy 
Secretary of Defense; Douglas Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Lewis "Scooter" 
Libby, the Vice President's Chief of Staff; Elliott Abrams, the National Security Council 
(NSC) staffer for Near East, Southwest Asian, and North African Affairs; and Richard Perle, 
a member of the Defense Policy Board, among many others.623 There is no conceivable way 
in which one can argue that the presence of all these neoconservatives in such high ranking 
positions did not play a role in shaping the president’s foreign policy, particularly when the 
president had limited foreign policy experience to begin with. The president’s strategy, 
including the 2002 NSS drew heavily on Neoconservative ideology, particularly a 1992 
Department of Defense “Defense Planning Guidance,” prepared by none other than 
Wolfowitz and Libby, who were working under Secretary of Defense at the time, Dick 
Cheney, President Bush’s vice-president.624 	 The National Security Strategy is a document prepared by the executive for congress 
as required by section 603 of the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986.625 The 
executive is required to send congress a “comprehensive report on the national security 
strategy of the United States.626 The report must contain a “comprehensive description and 																																																								
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discussion,” of U.S. foreign policy’s interests, goals, and objectives. Furthermore, it must 
also include a discussion of the “The proposed short-term and long-term uses of the political, 
economic, military, and other elements of the national power of the United States to protect 
or promote the interests and achieve the goals and objectives referred to in paragraph.”627 In 
other words, the act requires the executive to explain how the president intends to use the 
economic power, foreign assistance included, to advance the strategic interests and objectives 
of the nation. 
Since the signing of the act in 1986 by president Ronald Reagan, a total of 16 reports 
have been submitted to congress; Reagan two, George H. W. Bush three, Bill Clinton seven, 
George W. Bush two, and finally Obama two.628 Of all 16 reports, the 2002 NSS is one of the 
most important policy changes in U.S. foreign aid history. The president promised 
“significant new levels of assistance” to countries that implement real policy changes.629  
Bush urged the U.S. and other developed countries to double the size of the economy 
of the world’s poorest countries within a decade. Furthermore, the president called for a 50 
percent increase in the core development assistance given by the U.S., and the establishment 
of a new Millennium Challenge Account specific for countries “whose governments rule 
justly, invest in their people, and encourage economic freedom,” governments that respect 
human rights, and embrace the rule of law. Finally, Bush promised an increase in grants, and 
a decrease in aid given in the form of loans.630 In 2003, USAID published a report in which 
this belief was echoed further. The “main message” of the report, as Andrew Natsios, the 
USAID administrator at the time, explained is that “foreign assistance will be a key 
instrument of foreign policy in the coming decades.”631 The authors argued that advancing 
democratic governance is one of the most pressing needs.632  
Behind the president’s policies stood the belief that economic development, and the 
elimination of global poverty were essential to bring about stable democratic regimes. To say 
that the Bush administration was perhaps obsessed with democratization is an 
understatement. As chapter four and five demonstrate, this research topic was inspired in part 
by the failed democratization policy of the Bush administration as pressure on the Palestinian 																																																								
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leadership for reforms and holding elections resulted directly in Hamas’ electoral victory in 
2006, and the deterioration of the Middle East peace process.   
The presidency of George W. Bush will probably be remembered for the War on 
Terror and the economic recession towards the end of his second term, but one achievement 
at least if worth some praise. Of special note is president Bush’s initiative to fight HIV/AIDS, 
Malaria and Tuberculosis. The President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) was 
established in 2003. The $15 billion plan, with an additional $10 billion over a five year 
period was overseen by the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator and the vast majority of its fund 
was to be provided though bilateral aid channels.633 
2.4.2. The Obama Years 
By the time President Bush and his team left the White House, America’s image in the world 
was at records low, and Bush’s own approval ratings within the U.S. ranging between the 
high 20s to low 30 percent.634  Abroad, Bush’s War on Terror did little to improve the 
country’s image. In Germany for example, a country where the U.S. generally enjoyed 
positive views, favorable views of the U.S. in 2000 was 78 percent, and by the time President 
Bush left office, it was at 31 percent among Germans.635 The arrival of Barack Obama could 
not have come at a better time to improve much that required improvement regarding U.S. 
standing in the world. President Barack Obama arrived at the White House with high 
expectations, not only in the U.S., but also across the world. He was young, charismatic, and 
the story of his life struggle was an inspiration to many. People across the world, from 
average citizens to high ranked state officials were looking forward to seeing him replace 
President George W. Bush, who was undoubtedly, one of the least favorite of American 
presidents in living memory, both at home and abroad.636  
 Obama’s foreign policy doctrine is not as clearly defined as his predecessor’s. It 
cannot be attributed to a single speech, as is the case with Truman, or a letter to congress as 
the case with the Monroe Doctrine, nor through a specific document as is the case with the 
Bush Doctrine. Dominic Tierney described the Obama doctrine in 2012 as the “Holy Grail,” 
since it has proved hard to find.637 Therefore, scholars are left to establish the principles of 
the Obama Doctrine based on the president’s policies over his two terms in office, his 																																																								
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principles on the use of U.S. military, and his approach to the international system and 
America’s role in it.  
Obama himself is not over enthusiastic about having a doctrine. During his first 
election campaign in 2007, he was asked about his doctrine during a Democratic primary 
debate. His response was that his doctrine was “not going to be as doctrinaire as the Bush 
doctrine, because the world is complicated.”638 Some scholars and policymakers alike have 
criticized the lack of a doctrine, or a “grand strategy.” Conservative British historian Niall 
Ferguson for example was quick to blame the U.S. failure to deal with developments in Libya 
in 2011 on Obama arguing that what happened was “the predictable consequences of the 
Obama administration’s lack of any kind of a coherent grand strategy…”639 Others see it as a 
point in Obama’s favor. Michael Hirsh for example argues that the lack of a doctrine is not 
necessarily a bad thing, “the real Obama doctrine is to have no doctrine at all, and that’s why 
it’s likely to remain,” argues Hirsh.640 
 In a speech at The Woodrow Wilson Center during the campaign for the 2008 
elections, the young senator from Illinois spoke eloquently as ever, and highlighted his 
policies should he be elected president. Obama heavily criticized the policies and actions of 
the Bush administration in Afghanistan and Iraq.641 Obama argued that the solutions for 
Afghanistan was not just military, but economic and political as well. He vowed to increase 
non-military aid to Afghanistan by $1 billion to “fund projects at the local level to impact 
ordinary Afghans, including the development of alternative livelihoods for poppy 
farmers.” 642  Furthermore, Obama wished to toughen anti-corruption safeguards on aid 
money. On a related note, after explaining the threat of terrorism from Pakistan, Obama 
promised to make U.S. aid to Pakistan conditional, based on the Pakistani government’s 
performance in fighting terrorism. Senator Obama also promised to increase American 
investment in 643 
In his 2010 National Security Strategy, Obama argued for a change in U.S.’s 
approach to aiding the developing world. He stated that, “instead of simply providing aid for 
developing countries, we are focusing on new methods and technologies for agricultural 																																																								
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development. This is consistent with an approach in which aid is not an end in itself—the 
purpose of our foreign assistance will be to create the conditions where it is no longer 
needed.”644 
In an interview with Vox in February 2015, Obama spoke of his desire to “try to erase 
this very sharp line between our military efforts in national security and our diplomatic and 
foreign assistance efforts.”645 According to Obama, combining the defense budget with the 
diplomatic budget and the foreign assistance budget, of which the president said “a tool in 
our national security portfolio, as opposed to charity,” then there is “a lot more that we 
should be doing when it comes to helping Honduras and Guatemala build an effective 
criminal-justice system, effective police, and economic development that creates jobs.”646 
Unfortunately, the president did not elaborate further on his new idea for the 
combination, and whether it would result in radical structural changes in the American 
foreign aid establishment, or merely working on increasing coordination between the 
different departments and agencies that are involved in foreign assistance. Such news may 
not be welcomed by all, and will doubtless reignite a wide debate on the role of the military 
and the struggle between the Department of State and Department of Defense. Despite 
foreign aid questions arising in a number of interviews that followed, Obama is yet to 
elaborate further on this budget merger. Obama concluded that part of the interview by 
saying that foreign aid reduced the need for military engagement, and also by highlighting the 
economic benefits of foreign aid investments on development.647 
One of these interviews in which foreign aid was brought up was in August 2015, 
with the mounting threat of the Islamic State (ISIL) to America’s allies and interests in the 
Middle East. The group, which now controls large parts of Syria and Iraq, carried out 
bombings in Turkey, America’s NATO ally and close friend in the region. Turkey responded 
by bombing ISIL in Iraq and Syria, and the U.S. was quick to send fighter jets to Turkey to 
aid in the bombing raids. President Obama is not wholly convinced that ISIL could be 
defeated by military means. Up to the time of writing these lines, the U.S. has not committed 
troops to fighting ISIL, fighting from the air, and supporting Iraq and Syrian factions fighting 
ISIL. He argued that ISIL was a direct growth of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, an example of 
unintended consequences, that’s why, said the president “we should generally aim before we 
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shoot.”648 The president was quick to point out that the existing coalition, which is made up 
of over 60 countries is capable of defeating ISIL,  
“We can’t keep thinking about counterterrorism and 
security as entirely separate from diplomacy, 
development, education, all these things that are 
considered soft, but in fact are vital to our national 
security, and we do not fund those…. We should be 
thinking about making investments there, that 
ultimately save us from having to send our young 
men and woman to fight, or having folks come here 
and doing great harm.”649 
 
 Obama’s ISIL strategy reflects the norms apparent in the post 9/11 foreign aid system; 
the combination of foreign aid, diplomacy and the military, albeit with less emphasis on the 
military than his predecessor president George W. Bush. It is much the same story as the 
Marshall Plan in a way, but instead of communism, the new threat that requires the use of 
foreign assistance to combat and contain is terrorism. In order to combat terrorism, Obama 
believes that the U.S. must eliminate the environment in which these terrorists grow. This 
environment is made up of extremism, unemployment, human rights abuses, racial and ethnic 
discrimination, and lack of education and economic opportunities. 
 Another major development in the use of American foreign assistance during the 
Obama administration is conditioning or tying American assistance with the treatment of 
sexual minorities in countries that receive American aid. In a 2011 Presidential 
Memorandum, Obama directed “all agencies engaged abroad to ensure that U.S. diplomacy 
and foreign assistance promote and protect the human rights of LGBT persons.”650 Much like 
abortion, and to a lesser degree gun-laws, the issue of gay rights in the U.S. is a matter of 
deep divide in American society. The president’s memorandum was issued in December 
2011, less than a year before the 2012 elections that saw President Obama defeat Republican 
opponent Mitt Romney who disapproved of the memorandum, arguing that he “will be 
looking at foreign aid, whether it meets our national security interests and, number two, 
whether these nations are friends of ours and are willing to be friendly with us in ways when 
it matters the most.”651 Rick Perry, another Republican presidential hopeful at the time said 																																																								
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that spending money on advancing gay rights is not worth a dime of taxpayers’ money.652 It 
is not rare, as the next chapter demonstrates, for domestic social issues become entangled 
with the use of foreign aid, or when foreign aid is used to advance certain ideological stances 
on these very issues.  
 With less than a year left for President Obama, and the budget for the president’s last 
year in office already submitted and approved, it is not expected that his administration will 
bring fundamental changes to the foreign aid establishment. Obama’s biggest contribution to 
the American foreign aid system was his attempt to untie, or at least reduce the “tieness,” of 
American foreign aid. That is to say increasing U.S. foreign aid in which the recipient is not 
required to purchase American goods, or transport such aid through American companies 
only. As discussed in chapter one, in FY 2014 budget the Obama administration proposed 
reforms to the food aid program that would essentially loosen the ties on American food 
aid.653 The 2014 Farm Bill, or the Agricultural Act of 2014, included provisions to allow food 
programs to purchase more local products and further established a program at the 
Department of Agriculture to purchase local products through “local and regional 
procurement” at a cost of $80 million annually.654 Earlier still, the president eluded in a July 
2009 interview to the administrative costs of foreign aid. Obama said in the interview, “one 
of the concerns that I have with our aid policy generally is that Western consultants and 
administrative costs have been gobbling huge percentages of our aid overall,” whether the 
president will be able to reduce such costs or not, remains to be seen. 655 
In his final State of the Union address, president Obama made mention of foreign 
assistance just once in his shorter than usual speech. He reiterated the importance of foreign 
assistance as a part of the national security strategy of the U.S., and as a part of America’s 
duty to the world as the world leader. According to Obama, world leadership “means a wise 
application of military power, and rallying the world behind causes that are right. It means 
seeing our foreign assistance as a part of our national security, not something separate, not 
charity.”656 Obama explained his argument by drawing examples from his administration’s 
use of foreign aid in limiting the spread of diseases in Africa before they reach American 
shores, in reference to American efforts combating the Ebola outbreak. He also justified 																																																								
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aiding Ukraine in recent its struggle with Russia, arguing that defending Ukraine’s 
democracy, and combating Colombia’s decade long war is essential to maintaining the 
international order.657 
The analysis of the history of American foreign assistance since President 
Washington sent aid to slave owners during the Haitian Revolution, to the present, 
demonstrate that the U.S. has unabashedly used its foreign assistance as a tool to extend its 
political, economic, as well as ideological influence, in much the same way the various 
administrations had deployed the might of the American military to protect these very same 
interests. The chapter followed the development of the foreign aid structure through the 
actions of both the legislative and executive branches of the government, and how domestic 
and international developments, particularly WWII and the Cold War, shaped the foreign aid 
program. While the program did not exist officially with the bureaucratic and administrative 
structure it has today, the U.S. had long been involved in using foreign assistance to 
accomplish foreign policy objectives; short and long terms. It would seem that foreign 
assistance after WWII was a continuation of previous policy, rather than a new one. That, 
however, should not undermine the major expansion in scope, amount, structure and 
approach that occurred simultaneously in response to political developments, particularly 
during the Cold War years.  
While the executive branch seemed to have led the charge for creating and developing 
a foreign assistance program with enough influence to replace the military and conventional 
diplomacy, congress has also played an important role in this process. Yet the truth of Robert 
A. Dahl’s statement regarding the role of Congress in foreign policy, “perhaps the single 
most important fact about congress and its role in foreign policy… is that it rarely provides 
the initiative,” is as true when it comes to foreign aid policy as any other aspect of foreign 
policy.658 However, just because congress did not seize the initiative, it does not mean it did 
not influence policy outcomes, as the analysis of the Vietnam era and the backlash against 
Johnson’s aid appropriations demonstrated. Furthermore, while the administrations of 
President Truman and John F. Kennedy may have contributed most in terms of structuring 
the contemporary foreign aid establishment through the legislations and executive orders 
passed during their respective terms in office, other presidents, such as Eisenhower and 
George W. Bush were responsible for creating different assistance programs that have 
extended the reach and purpose of American assistance in new ways. 																																																								
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An indispensable aspect of American Exceptionalism is the constitutional system of checks 
and balances, which was envisioned and designed to ensure that no one branch of 
government may hold or exercise too much power over the others. Yet during different 
historical periods, some of these institutions came to be more dominant, and therefore 
exercise greater power. For the most part, foreign policy remained a province of the 
executive branch, where most of the constitutional powers in the foreign policy realm are 
invested. Article two of the constitution highlights these powers, and over the years, 
particularly with the expansion of the federal government during the New Deal era, the power 
of the executive increased even more.659 
 Congress has also had its fair share of dominance. One prime example of congress 
dominating the executive branch was during the Reconstruction era that followed the 
American Civil War.660  During that period, the president became marginalized and was 
eventually impeached by the Radical Republicans, who reconstructed the new U.S. according 
to their views.661 In the 20th century, congress became heavily involved in foreign policy 
during the Vietnam era, when the president’s powers were contested amidst growing 
concerns with what Arthur Schlesinger labeled the “Imperial Presidency.”662 Congress passed 
the War Powers Resolution, over the veto of President Richard Nixon, which inhibited the 
president’s power as Commander in Chief and limited the latter’s role in deploying the armed 
forces.663 
In foreign aid, the power is divided between the two branches, though as chapter two 
demonstrated, though the initiative for usually came from the executive, congress still proved 
very influential. The constitution invests the power of collecting money and spending it in the 
legislative branch. Article one, section eight, clause one, the “Taxing and Spending Clause,” 
and section nine, clause seven in the same article, the “Appropriations Clause,” grant the 
legislative branch what is known as the “Power of the Purse.” Only Congress has the power 
to “lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provides for the 
common Defense and general, Welfare of the United States,” states section eight.664 As for 
spending, section nine states that “No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in 																																																								
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Consequences of Appropriations made by law.”665 The executive departments and agencies, 
including those institutions that make and implement policies that relate to foreign aid, 
submit their budgets to the President, who then requests the fund from congress. Therefore, it 
would be rather difficult to argue that the making of policies that relate to foreign aid is 
invested solely in one branch or the other, but rather that such policies are made by both 
branches and each checks and balances the other. 
In the previous chapters the research explored the foundations of foreign assistance 
and the role it plays in the conduct of international politics. The second chapter explored the 
use of this tool by the U.S. administrations and evaluated the effectiveness of its use in 
achieving U.S. foreign policy goals. This section of the research explores the contemporary 
American foreign assistance establishment, and the different categories and programs the 
various federal agencies and executive departments finance. It provides an account of the 
different government branches, executive agencies as well as the different political and 
economic institutions that play a role in formulating and implementing the different foreign 
aid programs, such as congress, interests groups, and public opinion, and the overall process 
of making foreign aid policy as a part of making the federal budget. The chapter also 
discusses the role American political parties, namely the Democratic and Republican parties, 
and how the parties’ ideals and platforms affect the making and shaping of American foreign 
assistance.  
3.1. Rationales, Objectives and Categories 
Broadly speaking, there are three general rationales behind American assistance. The first is 
that foreign aid serves the national security of the U.S. Historically, this rationale justified 
foreign aid during the Cold War years to contain communism. More contemporarily, 
communism as a threat to national security has been replaced by the so-called “Jihadist” 
groups, such as ISIL and Al-Qaeda. The second rationale is that foreign aid serves America’s 
economic interests. As chapter two demonstrated, this trend is as old as the aid regime itself. 
Fostering economic relations with other countries, and providing market for American goods 
and services are essential objectives of the foreign aid program. The final rationale is the 
humanitarian rationale, though it does not lack for political and economic motive and 
consequences, aid is justified under the rationale that the U.S. is a rich country and able to 
assist others in need. This rationale, by far the weakest, can be said to stem from America’s 
position as the leading power in the world, and from its ideals and principles. These broad 																																																								
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and general rationales entail within them a number of objectives, which include, advancing 
liberal democratic ideals, spreading democracy, strengthening allies in face of common 
security threats, advancing the principles of market economy, protecting American 
commercial interests and finally enforcing America’s leadership role in the world. 
The realist American political scientist, Samuel P. Huntington argued in two articles 
published in 1970 and 1971 that American foreign assistance has generally taken three forms. 
It is important to keep in mind that when Huntington published his article, he was writing 
from the perspective of an American political scientist, and a realist one at that, during the 
Cold War. 666  During this time, the foreign aid regime was ruled by Realpolitik, the 
hardheaded realism that ruled the Cold War years. At the very heart of this regime lay the 
belief that foreign assistance was an essential tool for protecting national security above all 
other rationales and considerations, to ensure that the Soviet Union had as few allies as 
possible, and that the U.S. had as many as possible, despite the contradiction of ideological 
principles between the U.S.’s and some of these friends and allies. 
Accordingly, Huntington’s forms are based on the level of “friendliness” of a given 
country to the U.S. The first form includes economic assistance provided to help a friendly 
foreign government in consolidating its position after coming to power, as was the case in 
Brazil in 1964 when the U.S. supported the military in the overthrow of the democratically 
elected Joao Goulart. Goulart had the support of the labor unions and was said to have had 
plans to improve Brazil’s relations with the communist block, which would consequently 
affect both the national security of the U.S. as well as the economic interests of large 
American corporations.667 Second, economic assistance was also provided to help a friendly 
country survive a financial crisis, as was the case with Iran in 1961.668 And third to help win 
elections against someone who the U.S. would rather not see in power, as was the case in 
Chile in 1964, through covert CIA activities that included funding the campaign, or rather 
running the campaign on behalf of Eduardo Montalva of the Christian Democratic Party who 
had a more liberal orientation than his socialist opponent Salvador Allende.669  
																																																								
666 Huntington, "Foreign Aid for What and for Whom."; "Foreign Aid for What and for Whom (II)." 
667 See Carlos Gustavo Poggio Teixeira, Brazil, the United States, and the South American Subsystem: Regional 
Politics and the Absent Empire (Plymouth: Lexington Books), 87-89. 
668 See Marvin Zonis, The Political Elite of Iran, Princeton Studies on the Near East (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1971), 107. 
669 United States Senate, Covert Action in Chile 1963-1973: Staff Report of the Select Committee to Study 
Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, 94 Cong., 1 sess. (Washington D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1975), 26 (31-34 digital version); Kristian Gustafson, Hostile Intent : U.S. Covert 
Operations in Chile, 1964-1974, 1st ed. (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2007), see chapter 7. 
3. The American Foreign Aid Establishment  138 
Huntington’s second form includes economic assistance to countries that may or may 
not be wholly friendly to the U.S. in return for something the U.S. wants, such as military 
basis, UN voting, or the rejection of aid from another country, namely communist countries. 
Huntington argued that in such cases, there is reciprocity of interest between the U.S. 
government and that of the recipient country’s based on each government’s feelings that it 
has achieved its desired goals from this bargain.670 
Huntington’s last form includes denying economic assistance to governments that are 
not friendly to the U.S. Governments that “do things we do not like, or refuse to do things 
which we want done.”671  Huntington used Brazil in 1964 as an example of suspending 
“assistance to governments which have come to power through coups d’état until such 
governments have scheduled elections.”672 In Huntington’s view, the first two forms are 
effective, while the third is less so. It is easier for foreign governments to accept carrying out 
policy adjustments or “perform some service” than it is for that government “to allow itself to 
be coerced into doing something by the threat that the U.S. will take away aid.”673 In the 
second article, Huntington articulated on the goals of American foreign assistance program. 
The first of these goals, argued Huntington, is enhancing the military security of selected 
countries.674 Second, to encourage the economic development of the Third World in general. 
Third, promote economic development of selected countries, and finally encourage the 
emergence of pluralistic societies.675  
Modernization theory takes a different approach in providing rationales and objectives 
of American aid. It is a more comprehensive theory that proved influential in American 
policy circles, particularly during the decade of development in the 1960s. The basic premise 
of Modernization Theory is that all human societies are destined to move from backwardness 
to modernity. According to Nils Gilman, a historian of the theory, the central thread that ran 
through all of modernization theory was a “particular rendition of the dichotomy of the ‘the 
traditional’ and ‘the modern.’”676 Modern societies were cosmopolitan, mobile, secular, open 
to change and had complex division of labor. The traditional society on the other hand was 
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“inward looking, inert, passive toward nature, superstitious, fearful of change and 
economically simple.”677  
President John F. Kennedy was greatly influenced by the ideas of the theory. A group 
of academics known as the Charles River group at Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s 
(MIT) Center for International Studies (CENIS) were the minds behind the theory and the 
minds behind influencing JFK, especially Walt Rostow and Max Millikan.678 According to 
Rostow, “Kennedy sought out and found in CENIS a group whose ardent commitment was to 
enlarge development aid rather than to party or political personality. He understood this 
clearly and used us well…”679 The group published A Proposal: Key to an Effective Foreign 
Policy in which they argued that the U.S. should use its aid program “as a tool to promote 
positive change.” According to A Proposal,  
“One of the highest priority tasks is to our influence to 
promote the evolution of societies that are stable in the sense 
that they are capable of rapid change without violence, 
effective in the senses that they can make progress in 
meeting the aspirations of their citizens, and democratic in 
the sense that ultimate power is widely shared through 
society.”680 
 
 Millikan and Rostow argued that there were two priorities for U.S. foreign policy; the 
first is to meet the communist challenge by using economic assistance to countries with 
important industrial potential; and the second is to “promote the evolution of a world in 
which threats to our security and, more broadly, our way of life are less likely to arise.”681 
The influential Rostow would later join the ranks of the Kennedy administration, and he 
proved instrumental in the development approach of American foreign aid in the 1960s, 
especially the Alliance for Progress in Latin America, the important developmental program 
initiated during Kennedy’s time in office.682 Some scholars during this period argued that 
democratization followed modernization. An important contribution in this regard came from 
Seymour M. Lipset who argued that economic development lead to better social and political 
wellbeing of society. Lipset’s ideas were first published as a paper in 1959, and his Political 
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Man was published four years later. Lipset argued that “the more well-to-do a nation, the 
greater the chance that it will sustain democracy.”683 
 Modernization Theory and the democratization frameworks that originated during this 
period, late 1950s- 1960s, explain the rationales and objectives of American aid quite 
accurately. In the case of aid to the Palestinians, 30 years after Rostow, fits within this 
framework. Developed Palestinian Territories through American and international economic 
assistance would lead to abandoning violence and terrorism, and the eventual emergence of a 
viable, stable, peaceful and democratic Palestinian state friendly to the U.S. and its ally, 
Israel. 
The institutional explanation for aid rationale and objectives was provided in 2006, 
during the 2007 Fiscal Year budget hearing. The Director of Foreign Assistance (DFA), who 
serves simultaneously as Director of USAID, Randall Tobias, summarized the strategic 
objectives of U.S. foreign assistance in a five-point framework.684 The DFA’s framework 
would serve for both the State Department and USAID’s programs, the latter’s amounting to 
roughly 90% of total U.S. foreign assistance.685 These five objectives; peace and security, 
investing in people, governing justly and democratically, promoting economic growth and 
prosperity, and finally humanitarian assistance, according to Tobias, “help transform 
countries into better, more effective partners to create a safer and more just international 
system.”686 Each of these objectives is composed of program areas that can be justified under 
three rationales; national security, commercial interests and humanitarian concerns.687 
The first of the aid objectives, Peace and Security, is composed of six program areas; 
Counter-Terrorism, Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs), Security Sector 
Reform, Counter- Narcotics, Transnational Crime, and Conflict mitigation. 
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							Figure	3:1,	summary	table	of	FY	2006	and	2016	“Peace	and	Security”	Objective	and	Program	Areas.	688	
With few exceptions, together these six areas usually receive most funds in aid 
appropriation, and of these areas “security sector reform” receives by far the highest amount 
a total of $6.8 billion of a total $8.7 billion for the Peace and Security program area in FY 
2016. 689  Protecting national security has been the main rationale of American foreign 
assistance since the early days of the republic, but as chapter two demonstrated, it became 
more prominent after the Marshall Plan. More recently, the peace and security rationale 
became the dominant feature once again during the Bush administration’s War on Terror. 
Countries that receive funds under this objective include, but are not limited to, Israel, Egypt, 
Pakistan and Jordan.690 
 The second aid objective is Governing Justly and Democratically and it represents a 
small portion of the aid budget; $ 2.8 billion for FY 2016, as can be seen in the table above. 
This area includes four objectives; Rule of Law and Human rights, Good governance, 
Political Competition and Civil Society. The third objective is Investing in People and has 
three program areas; health, education and social services and protection with a little over 
$10 billion. Most of the funds in this objective fall under the health sector, which contains 
funds to combat diseases such as HIV/AIDS, and Malaria. The fourth objective is Economic 
Growth and has eight areas, Macroeconomic growth, trade and investment, financial sector, 
infrastructure, agriculture, private sector competitiveness, economic opportunity, and 
environment. For FY 2016, the State Department requested $4.7 billion for this program area, 
an increase of over $1 billion from FY 2014. Humanitarian Assistance objective comes last 
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Aid Objective/Program Area FY 2006 
 
FY 2016 (Request) 
 
Peace and Security 7,318 8,772  
        Counter Terrorism 157 244 
        Combating WMD 223 298 
        Security Sector Reform 5,652 6,838 
        Counter Narcotics 1,020 569 
        Transnational Crime 60 89 
        Conflict Mitigation 199 342 
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with the smallest amount, $1,7 billion, and includes three program areas; protection, 
assistance and solutions, disaster readiness, migration management.691  		
Figure	3:2,	State	Department’s	FY	2016	budget	request	according	to	program	area.692	
3.2. Domestic Politics and Foreign Aid 
There is an escapable link between foreign and domestic policies. As	 Robert Putnam 
suggests, decision makers engage in negotiations at the inter-state, and intra state levels 
simultaneously. According to Putnam’s 1988 Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the Logic of 
the Two-Level Games,  
“The politics of many international negotiations can 
usefully be conceived as a two-level game. At the national 
level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring 
the government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians 
seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups. 
At the international level, national governments seek to 
maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, 
while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign 
developments.”693  
 
The approach further recognizes that decision makers “strive to reconcile domestic 																																																								
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and international imperatives simultaneously.”694 Putnam’s analysis earns much credit when it 
comes to foreign aid; considering for example the tied aspect of American foreign assistance, 
and the opposition of domestic groups to reforms that might reduce the aid establishment’s 
purchase of American commodities, as discussed in chapter one. A more comprehensive 
framework for understanding the relationship between domestic and foreign policies with 
respect to foreign aid was developed by Carol Lancaster. 695 
3.2.1. The	Lancaster	Model	
Lancaster identified four categories of domestic factors that shape foreign aid: ideas, political 
institutions, interests, and the aid organization.696   
Ideas  
Lancaster argues that the most important ideas shaping foreign aid are “worldviews,” 
which are shared values based on religion, culture, and ideology. These worldviews are about 
what is right and what is wrong, about what is appropriate and inappropriate. Lancaster states 
that these worldviews give rise to “principled beliefs.” For example, there is a principled 
belief that rich countries should provide aid to poor countries. There is no shortage of 
presidential rhetoric that makes such claims. But as the previous chapter demonstrated, there 
is rhetoric and there is policy, and the two do not always go hand in hand. Ideas and 
principles undoubtedly play a role, but they tend to give way in the face of political and 
economic considerations. 
Institutions 
Political institutions shape the “rules of the political games.”697 Lancaster describes 
electoral rules, the legislatures, local government and semi-public groups, as well as the 
political system and the effects of these institutions have on shaping the purpose of foreign 
aid. According to Lancaster, the first aspect of the political institutions, voting rules, affects 
aid indirectly. In countries with proportional representation, there tends to be a large number 
of political parties, some of which enter coalitions to form governments. This system 
provides the smaller parties with foreign aid agenda the platform to produce this agenda on 
the national level. By applying Lancaster’s idea on voting rules in the U.S. with its pluralist, 
first-past-the-post system, it becomes much harder, if not impossible, for smaller parties in 
the U.S. to place their agenda on the national level.  																																																								
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The type of political system in place, whether it is a parliamentary system as is the 
case in Germany, and the United Kingdom, or a presidential/congressional system as in the 
U.S. also plays a role in shaping foreign aid. Lancaster elaborates that in parliamentary 
systems, the executive is drawn from the legislature. British Prime Minister David Cameron 
from the Conservative Party and Angela Merkel from the Christian Democratic Union, are 
members of the legislatures, and enjoy the support of this legislature when making their 
foreign aid policy since their parties or coalitions make up the majority. President Obama, on 
the other hand, is not as lucky as he has to contend with congress on policies that could be 
perceived as controversial with the legislatures as with their constituents. 
The role of the legislature and other organizations that enjoy access to policy-makers 
is also important in influencing aid. In the case of the U.S., congress holds the power of the 
purse solely, whether in collecting money or in spending it. While the federal budget is 
usually, though not always, proposes by the executive department, congress has its own 
bureaucratic office, the Congressional Budget Office, to assist and advice members of 
congress on budgetary issues.  
Political parties also play an important role in shaping foreign aid policy. Left wing 
parties are often associated with increasing aid and with directing aid towards economic 
development, while the political right is often associated with decreasing aid levels, and 
placing greater emphasis on security and commercial interests. The next part of this chapter is 
dedicated to answering this question by examining the two American parties, the Democratic 
and Republican, their ideological platforms, and the role they play in shaping American 
foreign aid programs. For the present, it suffices to say that for the most part, Lancaster’s 
argument also applies to the American parties, to an extent, as Republicans for example place 
more emphasis on national security as an aid objective than their Democratic counterparts. 
Interests  
Interest groups, argues Lancaster are “pervasive and dynamic force in politics, 
especially where public resources are involved.” 698  Various sources estimate the current 
number of federal lobbyists in Washington D.C. to be around 11,500, all of whom are 
involved in influencing congress to adopt policies, bills, and positions that support their 
respective representatives.699 There are fewer groups involved in foreign aid since foreign aid 
does not have a large domestic constituency in comparison to other issues such as gun 																																																								
698 Ibid., 21. 
699 The website opensecrets.org, base their calculations on data from the Center for Responsive Politics which is 
based on data from the Senate Office of Public Records. (www.opensecrets.org/lobby). [29.02.2016] 
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ownership, advocated by the American Rifle Association (NRA) leading the gun lobby, or 
retired persons whose interests are advocated by the American Association of Retired 
Persons, (AARP). Few interest groups focus entirely on promoting, foreign aid as their 
specific issue, but since foreign aid is of interest to non-aid specific groups, they become 
involved when foreign aid becomes an issue all the same.   
According to Lancaster, there are three main categories of interests. The first 
encompasses group that support the commercial aspects of aid, such as agriculture and 
manufacturing. The fact that the majority of American aid is tied has opened the gates to 
numerous interest groups to become involved in the politics of foreign aid. To use food aid as 
an example, the U.S. government purchases wheat and grains from American farmers, the 
products are then transported to manufacturing plants, and transported to American ports 
where the products are loaded on American ships and sent to their destinations across the 
world. This process involves farming, transport, manufacturing, and shipping, all of which 
have lobbies that advocate the interests of these groups in congress. These groups, argues 
Lancaster, see aid as a means to expand their export markets or acquire access to raw 
materials.  
The second category includes NGOs and public interest groups that support aid for 
relief and development. There is another category of interest groups that Lancaster does not 
include in this particular model, but does include in another of her works.700 Interests groups 
that promote foreign aid for a specific purpose or principles, such as family planning as with 
Population Action International, and Church World Service, which promotes aid for 
combating hunger and assisting refugees.  
The third and last category includes groups with affinity for foreign countries, 
ethnicities or religions. Interest groups lobbying on behalf of other countries, such as Israel, 
lobby congress to increase foreign aid to the country for which they lobby, or conversely, 
suspend or decrease aid to other countries that are less friendly to those countries whose 
interests they represent. A prominent example of such groups is the American Israel Public 
Affairs Committee (AIPAC), whose mission is to “is to strengthen, protect and promote the 
U.S.-Israel relationship in ways that enhance the security of the United States and Israel.”701  
 
 																																																								
700 Carol Lancaster, Tranforming Foreign Aid: United States Assistance in the 21st Century (Washington D.C.: 
Institute for International Economics, 2000), 50-51. 
701 AIPAC, “Our Mission,”  
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Organization  
Lancaster’s final determinant of foreign aid is the organization of aid itself. The 
organization in this case, as defined by Lancaster “is the location within government of the 
tasks related to a major function or program of government.”702  Lancaster distinguishes 
between “organization” as defined above rather than the organizational arrangement within 
government agencies. Drawing from her own extensive experience in working for the 
American foreign aid establishment, Lancaster argues that the organization of aid has an 
important influence on the purpose of aid. For example, the UK has unified their aid activities 
in one independent cabinet-level agency, while Denmark merged their aid activities within 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the case of the U.S. foreign aid is carried out primarily, 
though not exclusively, by the USAID and attempts to merge the agency within the State 
Department failed. The reasoning behind the resistance, writes Lancaster was the “fear that 
the often crisis-driven, diplomatic focus of the State Department would overwhelm the longer 
term development focus of USAID’s programs.”703 									 Figure	3:3	the	Lancaster	Model	for	domestic	determinants	of	foreign	aid.	
3.2.2. Public Opinion 
An addition to Lancaster’s model above, this study adds public opinion. There is a 
dearth of literature on the public perception of aid in the donor countries, and even fewer on 
perception of aid in recipient countries. Indeed, the relationship between public opinion and 
its impact on aid is arguably one of the least studies field in foreign aid scholarship. The main 
reason is that the public at large is perceived to know little about the conduct of foreign 
policy in general, particularly an “elite policy area” such as foreign aid.704 The classical 
theories of international relations have also contributed to this problem since they tend 																																																								
702 Lancaster, Foreign Aid: Diplomacy... 2007, 22. 
703 Ibid., 23. 
704 Mark Otter, "Domestic Public Support for Foreign Aid: Does It Matter?," Third World Quarterly 24, no. 1 
(2003). 
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disregard the role of the public. According to Milner and Tingley, “very few theoretical 
perspectives in international relations give any weight to public attitudes; neorealism, 
neoliberalism, and institutionalism provide very little space for the mass public to affect 
foreign policy.”705 
Donald Snow divides the American public in four groups; the uninformed public, it 
compromises 75-80 percent of Americans who “do not regularly seek out information about 
international affairs;” the informed public, or “attentive public” who seek out information and 
they represent 10-20 percent of the population; the effective public, less than five percent of 
the population who actively seek to influence foreign policy and it includes members of 
government and national leaders; and the last group is the core decision makers, who 
formulate and execute policy, they are the smallest group just few hundreds in number.706 
Even though the American public tends to be supportive of foreign assistance, they 
seemed to know little about it. According to opinion polls conducted in the last few years, as 
well as historical surveys, the amount of aid is usually believed to be much higher than it 
actually is, which is approximately one percent of the federal budget.707 However, when 
respondents are informed of the actual percentage aid represents in the federal budget, 
support increases significantly. In a 1995 poll for example, 49 percent of participants favored 
a decrease in aid.708 The respondents believed on average that aid amounted to 18 percent of 
the federal budget, and when informed of the actual figure, support for increasing aid 
increased to 79 percent.709 A 2011 poll provided similar results; 61 percent of respondents 
said that the U.S. spent too much on foreign, when they were asked to “imagine that you 
found out that the US spends 1 percent of the federal budget on foreign aid,” only 13 percent 
said it was too much, as opposed to 61 before being informed of the actual percentage.710 
More recently, a November 2013 opinion poll conducted by the Kaiser Family Foundation 
found that only 4 percent of Americans could rightly guess the percentage, while 15 percent 
of people surveyed guessed it to be 11-20 percent, and 12 percent believed that the 
government spent more than 51 percent of the federal budget on foreign assistance 
programs.711 																																																								
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So how important is American public opinion, as misinformed and ignorant as it is, in 
foreign aid? According to Lancaster, even though “public opinion tends to be passive and 
permissive, it can influence the general terms of debate on foreign aid and erect broad 
limitations on the amount and direction of aid.”712 However, public opining does not dictate 
aid purposes, except when there is a major humanitarian crisis, or a major scandal involving 
aid.713 In his comparative study to find out whether domestic public support for foreign aid 
matters, Mark Otter compares trends in public support for aid programs in five donor 
countries; Australia, Canada, Denmark, Japan and the U.S. Otter finds mixed results, in some 
cases aid performance increased or decreased in accordance with public opinion; in other 
cases performance went against public opinion.714 In the U.S. aid decreased in accordance 
with decline in public support for aid.715 Otter attributes these results to faulty techniques and 
to governments “paying little attention to public opinion, at least in so-called elite policy 
areas” such as foreign aid.716 
Cox and Duffin disagree; they find that the end of the Cold War represented an 
opportunity to reduce aid, contrary to the wishes of institutions, which were to increase aid. 
Since aid was increased in the 1990s, it seems that public opinion had no effect on aid 
proposals. The authors conclude that geopolitical considerations, particularly the presence or 
absence of the Cold War, determine aid proposals, rather than domestic considerations.717 
There is no way to prove or to measure the exact role of the American public in 
foreign policy, or aid related policies. The Snow typology of the American public must be 
kept in mind. Making American foreign assistance is carried out by few hundreds, but their 
choice affects practically everyone in all tiers; from New York bankers who provide loans, to 
farmers in the Midwest who supply USAID with grain for emergency food relief. The banker 
and the farmer may not have enough power or leverage to change policy, but they do have 
representatives who lobby congress on their behalf when there is a need. Therefore, though 
public opinion can be said to have minimal effect on foreign aid, it does dictate aid at times, 
and its views are generally influential in congress.718 
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3.3. Between Republicans and Democrats		 Generally speaking, the two major American parties are in favor of the foreign aid 
program, though some, particularly on the Republican side tend to view foreign assistance 
with less favorability. One extreme example is former 2008 and 2012 Libertarian presidential 
candidate Ron Paul who wished to end the foreign aid program altogether. According to Paul 
“foreign aid is taking money from the poor people of a rich country and giving it to the rich 
people of a poor country.”719 Rand Paul, Ron’s son and current Republican senator from 
Kentucky, and former presidential candidate for the 2016 Republican nomination, shares 
similar views on foreign aid. In his proposed 2012 budget, Rand Paul proposed cutting off 
foreign aid to Israel entirely, as rare a proposition by an American politician as one could 
find. His justification was centered on the opinion that foreign aid is harmful to Israel’s 
economy.720  
 Democrats are in general more supportive of foreign aid, particularly economic 
assistance, and view military assistance with less favorability. 721  Their Republican 
counterparts hold opposite views, they view economic assistance with less favorability than 
their Democratic counterparts, and view military assistance with more favorability.722 But 
does the majority or ruling party in congress affect congressional behavior with respect to 
foreign aid appropriation? The short answer is no. The longer answer is, “not much, 
especially after the Cold War.”723 Despite the general agreement, and approval, of foreign 
aid, and the disagreements between the parties regarding the goals and objectives of the 
American aid program, the parties have a major disagreement when it comes to contested 
issues on the domestic front, such as abortion. 
In no case is the contrast between the two parties’ platforms so apparent than in 
abortion and family planning funding. The “Global Gag Rule,” which is also known as the 
“Mexico City Policy,” forbids NGOs that receive American foreign aid from spending these 
funds on abortion or advocating abortion rights.724 The two parties differ largely on abortion 
on home soil, and naturally, it has reflected in the foreign policy realm. In general, 
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Republicans are pro-life and are opposed to abortion; Democrats on the other hand, are pro-
choice.  
This debate originated with the passing of the Helms Amendment to the Foreign 
Assistance Act in 1973.725 The amendment came in the midst of an ongoing debate following 
the Supreme Court’s landmark ruling in Roe v. Wade, in which the court upheld the women’s 
right to abort pregnancy.726 The amendment added as a new section in the FAA stating that, 
“no foreign assistance funds may be used to pay for the performance of abortion as a method 
of family planning or to motivate or coerce any person to practice abortions.”727 
The Global Gag Rule, or the Mexico City Policy was devised during the proceedings 
of the International Conference on Population in Mexico City in 1984 during the tenure of 
President Ronald Reagan. The U.S. announced restrictions and eligibility conditions on 
health institutions worldwide that performed, or advocated abortion, whether or not they use 
U.S. funding for such operations.728 Therefore, the Mexico City Policy is an expansion of the 
Helms amendment to include any fund, even by other donors. Another major difference 
between the Helms Amendment and the Mexico City Gag Rule is that the first can only be 
repealed only by congress, while the executive can overturn the second, since it originated 
with president Reagan, rather than congress. This difference resulted in “Ping Pong” politics 
with the Global Gag Rule by the successive presidents. 
The “Ping Pong” began when Republican president Ronald Reagan approved the 
policy in 1984, then Democrat president Bill Clinton rescinded it in 1993, making it 
ineffective between 1993 and 2001. Republican president George W. Bush re-instituted the 
policy within few days of coming into office, making it effective once again from 2001-2009, 
and finally Democrat President Barack Obama rescinded it again in January 2009, three days 
after coming into office, ruling it ineffective for the time being.729  Doubtless, were the 
Republicans to win this year’s election, the policy will be reinstated once again.  
Another major issue on which the parties have differed is in the use of American 
foreign assistance during the Obama administration to tie, or condition receiving such 																																																								
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assistance with the treatment of sexual minorities in countries that receive American aid. In a 
2011 Presidential Memorandum, Obama directed “all agencies engaged abroad to ensure that 
U.S. diplomacy and foreign assistance promote and protect the human rights of LGBT 
persons.”730 Much like abortion, and to a lesser degree gun-laws, the issue of gay rights in the 
U.S. is a matter of deep divide in American society.  
The president’s memorandum was issued in December 2011, less than a year before 
the 2012 elections that saw President Obama defeat Republican opponent Mitt Romney who 
disapproved of the memorandum, arguing that he “will be looking at foreign aid, whether it 
meets our national security interests and, number two, whether these nations are friends of 
ours and are willing to be friendly with us in ways when it matters the most.”731 Rick Perry, 
another Republican presidential hopeful at the time said that spending money on advancing 
gay rights is not worth a dime of taxpayers’ money.732  
It is not unusual for domestic social issues to become entangled with the use of 
foreign aid, or when foreign aid is used to advance certain ideological stances on these very 
issues.  
3.4. Makers and Implementers 
3.4.1. The Legislative Branch 
As already mentioned, the power of the purse is invested in the legislative branch. 
Any money collected or spent by the federal government must therefore be approved by 
congress. The executive departments and Agencies, including those institutions that play a 
role in the running of the foreign aid establishment, submit their budgets to the President, 
who then requests the fund from congress. The appropriation process is rather complicated, 
and it is less straightforward than the following lines summarize.  
 The process begins within each department and agency by submitting budget requests 
to the president. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB), is the largest office within 
the Executive Branch and its main function is to formulate the president’s budget and 
evaluate the requests of other departments and agencies’ policies and programs to ensure that 
they are in line with the president’s policies.733 If president Obama feels that the situation 																																																								
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between Ukraine and Russia for example represents a threat to American interests, he would 
tell the State Department to increase economic and military assistance to Ukraine. This part 
of the process takes place before the first Monday in January and first Monday in February, 
the period in which the president is required to submit the budget proposal as the 1974 
Budget Act mandates.734 Though in recent years, there have been some delays, for example, 
in 2013 President Obama submitted his 2014 budget proposal in April, following the U.S. 
Fiscal Cliff crisis and the negotiations between the two branches.735  
 Once the president submits the budget to congress, it is referred to the House 
Committee on the Budget, the Senate Committee on the Budget, and the Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO).736 The CBO was created in 1974 as a non-partisan federal agency that 
answers to the legislative branch. According to Phillip G. Joyce, Professor of Public Policy at 
the University of Maryland, who had extensive work experience at the CBO states that the 
CBO was born out of “congress’ frustration with what it perceived as its domination by the 
executive branch in the budget-making process.”737 As distrust between congress and the 
executive department under Nixon grew, particularly when it came to fiscal and budget 
policies, the CBO was established to end the legislature’s dependence on the president and 
their aides’ assessment of the economy, and to establish, as the Senate report stated at the 
time a “highly competent staff to guide it [congress], in fiscal policy and budgetary 
considerations, similar to the President’s Office of Management and Budget”.738 The CBO’s 
main function is to advise congress regarding the budget by compiling reports, and studies, 
but it also serves as a check on the executive’s power. 
 The office’s evaluation of the president’s budget can affect the budgetary process, and 
has proved instrumental in affecting legislative decisions on previous occasions. The most 
recent example was when President Obama proposed the healthcare reform in 2009, which 
proved rather controversial. CBO director Douglas Elmendorf, whose appointment was made 
by Democratic congressional leadership, argued that the current bill in congress would do 
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little to reduce the long-term cost of health care.739 The CBO’s statement played a role in 
postponing the decision. 740  Charles Krauthammer wrote in a Washington Post column, 
“reforming the health-care system is dead. Cause of death? Blunt trauma administered not by 
Republicans, not even by Blue Dog Democrats, but by the green eyeshades at the 
Congressional Budget Office.”741 
With the assistance of the CBO, the house and senate budget committees propose a 
budget resolution in their respective houses, once passed in each house, the bills are 
reconciled in a budget conference. The resulting resolution is a concurrent resolution, 
meaning that it does not require presidential approval, and its task is to set the total amount of 
funds the Appropriation Committees can spend.742 For fiscal year 2016, the limit was agreed 
to be in the $1 trillion region. Once the limit is set, the appropriation committees begin their 
work in allocating the funds to different subcommittees. There are currently 12 
subcommittees; each committee deals with a different appropriation bill. The final step in 
congress is for both houses to vote and pass the 12 appropriation bills prepared by the 12 
subcommittees.  Finally, all 12 bills are sent to the executive for approval, or veto. Once 
signed, the appropriation bills, which make up the federal budget, become law.743  
The federal budget is divided into 20 categories, better known as funding accounts, or 
functions.744 Each function provides the funding for a specific purpose, or topic. For example, 
Function 270, and Function 570 fund Energy and Medicare respectively, while Function 050 
provides funds to the different federal agencies and departments under the topic or category 
of National Defense.745 The International-Affairs budget, also known as the Function 150 
account of the federal budget is the major source of funding for American foreign aid 
programs within the American foreign policy establishment. 746  In FY 2016, The F150 
account receives the money from the Department of State, Foreign Operation, and Related 
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Programs appropriations bill.747 The bill is divided into nine titles that provide funds for 
different purposes in foreign operations. For example, title I, provides funds for Department 
of State and related Agency; title II provides funds for USAID, title III for bilateral economic 
assistance, and title V provides funds for multilateral assistance.748 
The analysis of the history of American in the previous chapter discussed a number of 
instances when congress used foreign aid to apply pressure on the executive, particularly 
during the Vietnam era during the Johnson and Nixon presidencies. Furthermore, during 
periods of economic stagnation, congress tends to reduce foreign aid appropriations to limit 
budget deficit, as was the case in the mid-1990s. Whether the same party is in control of both 
the executive and legislative branches or just one of the two also makes little difference. 
During Clinton’s early years in office, a Democratic controlled congress slashed the 
president’s foreign aid budget proposals, even though they belonged to the same party. 
3.4.2. The Executive Departments and Agencies 
		Figure	 3:4,	 U.S.	 Foreign	 Assistance	 by	 Implementing	 Agency/Department	 for	 fiscal	 year	 2013	(disbursements).749	 	
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State	Department	
The State Department serves as America’s principle institution in charge of foreign 
affairs. Consequently, the department is the most powerful of the executive departments 
when it comes to foreign aid.	
  Figure	3:5	U.S.	Department	of	State	Summary	of	Appropriations,	FY	2016.750	
It is the principal institution in charge of preparing contributions to organizations and 
sub-organizations of the United Nations. The department is also responsible for making 
decisions regarding the size and allocation of U.S. foreign assistance. Indeed, the State 
Department is the one institution that holds most power in the foreign aid establishment, 
more than all others combined. In a demonstration of the significance of American aid, and 
the paramount role of the State Department in the process, U.S. Central Command General 
James Mattis and another 20 retired three and four star generals and admirals went to 
congress to petition for an increase in the International Affairs Budget. In answering Senator 
Roger Wicker’s (R-Mississippi) question regarding the effectiveness of the International 
Development budget in providing national defense for the U.S. Mattis answered, “if you 
don’t fund the State Department fully, then I need to buy more ammunition.”751 																																																								
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USAID  
USAID is the main agency in the American foreign assistance establishment. USAID 
is responsible for three key bilateral aid programs; Development Assistance, P.L.480 (food 
for peace), and the Economic Support Fund (ESF).752 According to Lancaster, “the best way 
to think about USAID’s political role is as an advocate within the Executive Branch, with 
Congress, private groups, and the public, for maximum levels of aid for development and for 
maximum flexibility to manage that aid.”753 According to Lancaster, since USAID does not 
enjoy a cabinet level status, the agency seeks allies where possible, playing one agency 
against another, or one house against another. During the Bush and Clinton administrations, 
USAID found support from the second and first ladies respectively who “acted as quiet 
supporters of those programs and of the survival of USAID as an organization.”754 
Food assistance through P.L.480 Food Aid Program is provided in three components 
or, titles; Title I, under this title recipient governments purchase American grain on credit at 
rate of three percent interest to be paid back over a period of 20-40 years in local currency.755 
Until the early 2000s, this category was the largest. 756  Title II is currently the largest 
category, under this title, food aid is provided as a “gift,” for economic development and 
emergency relief. Food cost and transportation is paid for by the U.S. government and is 
distributed by aid agencies such as CARE. This component of the U.S. food aid program 
accounts for 85 percent of total U.S. food aid.757 Finally, Title III provides food aid in 
government-to-government programs for economic development purposes. This category has 
not received any funding since 2001.758 
As has already been discussed in chapter one, most of American food assistance is 
tied. There are sourcing, packaging, and shipping requirements that have to be met.759 The 
Food for Peace Act has also been criticized for the legislative requirements that govern 
foreign aid in Title II which include, U.S. sourcing of all food aid, a 15 percent minimum 
monetization requirement, and a 50 percent of gross tonnage of agricultural commodities 																																																								
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must be shipped with privately owned, registered U.S.-flag commercial vessels, among other 
requirements.760  
Department	of	Defense	
The DoD began to occupy a more prominent role in the foreign aid establishment 
during the presidency of George W. Bush, during the War on Terror. To elaborate further, in 
2001, DoD’s share of total foreign aid budget was 5.2 percent, in 2005, and in 2007, it was 18 
percent.761 The DoD provides military training and expertise to friends and allies of the U.S. 
The majority of its aid funding in previous years was spent in Iraq and Afghanistan, but has 
recently expanded into development and stabilization, which was an important lesson learnt 
from these wars, according to former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates who said that “one 
of the most important lessons from our experience in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere has 
been the decisive role reconstruction, development, and governance plays in meaningful, 
long-term success.”762 The DoD’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency is in charge of 
programs such as Foreign Military Financing, and International Military Education and 
Training.763  
Furthermore, the DoD is responsible for implementing three programs administered 
by the State Department; Foreign Military Financing (FMF), which is a grant program 
provided to foreign governments to receive equipment from the U.S., most of FMF grants are 
provided to Egypt and Israel.764 The International Military Education and Training Program 
(IMET) provides military training for foreign officers and personnel; and finally 
Peacekeeping funds that support voluntary non-UN operations and training for an African 
crisis response force.765 
Treasury	Department	
  The Department of the Treasury represents the U.S. in multilateral development 
institutions such as the World Bank and it is usually the sole responsible institution for 
dictating the amount of aid to these institutions. The department proposes the U.S.’s annual 
contributions to these organizations, and is also in charge of foreign debt relief and 
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reduction.766 According to Lancaster, there are occasional conflicts between the Treasury and 
USAID because the latter seeks to extend its power to include such tasks carried out by the 
Treasury. USAID’s argument evolves from the fact that since USAID deals more and has 
better knowledge of development aid in general, therefore responsibility of such programs 
should fall within USAID’s tasks. Finally, the Treasury Department provides economic and 
financial advisors to countries undergoing economic reforms. The department also provides 
aid to countries combating terror finance.767  
Millennium	Challenge	Corporation	
During president Bush’s first term in office, the Millennium Challenge Corporation 
was established as the latest U.S. foreign aid agency. Unlike USAID, which is “subject to the 
foreign policy guidance of the President, the Secretary of State, and the National Security 
Council,” the MCC is an independent federal agency with its own board of directors and 
Chief Executive Officer.768 The board of directors is chaired by the Secretary of State, and 
includes USAID Administrator, Secretary of the Treasury, the U.S. Trade Representative, 
and four individuals from the private sector appointed by the president from a list nominated 
by congressional leaders.769 
Receiving its appropriations through the Millennium Challenge Account, MCC 
provides aid on competitive basis to countries that are “committed to good governance, 
economic freedom and investments in their citizens.”770 The board reviews the applications 
and eligibility of countries based on their performance in these areas, and if successful 
approves aid for projects the recipients themselves requested. 
There are also other agencies involved in providing foreign assistance, but their aid 
budgets are minimal in comparison to the agencies listed above. The list also includes, the 
United States Institute of Peace, the Peace Corps, Export- Import Bank, the International 
Trade Commission, the African Development Foundation, the North-South Center and the 
East-West center, to name a few. 
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3.5. 2016 Budget and Foreign Aid 
For the 2016 fiscal year, American foreign aid program’s share of the $4 trillion 
federal budget will amount to approximately one percent of the federal budget. Secretary of 
State John Kerry highlighted some of the major areas in the forward to the 2016 Budget 
Justification report by the Department of State. The major areas  
- Increase of foreign aid to Central America 
The purpose of the $1.1 billion budget request is to “address the root causes of illegal 
migration… and to bolster Mexico’s enforcement capacity on its southern borders.”771 The 
funds would be used for repatriation of these refugees as well as enhancing security and 
economic development.772 	
	 Figure:3:6,	Foreign	assistance	programs’	share	of	FY	2016.773	
- The fight against ISIL 
The administration has requested $3.5 billion to strengthen regional partners in the 
fight against ISIS. The funds also include humanitarian assistance for Syria as well as $1.1 to 
support “diplomatic engagement with Iran.”774 																																																								
771 John F. Kerry, Congressional Budget Justification: Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related 
Programs Fiscal Year 2016 (Online: U.S. Department of State, 2015), 4. 
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Office of Management and Budget,  (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2015). And 
calculations from the White House Interactive Budget website https://www.whitehouse.gov/interactive-budget 
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- Countering Russia 
With the situation in Ukraine remaining unresolved, the administration is continuing 
its support for Ukraine and other neighbors to “counter Russia’s pressure and aggressive 
action.”775 The new budget contains funds to support loan guarantees for Ukraine as well as 
$640 million in assistance.776	
3.6. The Recipients 	 It is now common knowledge that Israel has been the highest recipient of U.S. foreign 
assistance since its founding. The focus and study of U.S. foreign assistance to Israel and the 
nature of the American- Israeli alliance became a much contested topic in American political 
and academic circles after the publication of John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt’s The 
Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy in 2008, which was based on their 2006 paper 
published in the London Review of Books. In their work, the authors claim that the “Israeli 
lobby,” led by the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), plays an 
instrumental role in the conduct of American foreign policy, particularly in influencing the 
administration into invading Iraq in 2003.777 
Interestingly, the second highest recipient of American assistance is Israel’s neighbor, 
and once most dangerous enemy, Egypt. Since the signing of the first ceasefire agreement, 
the U.S. has supplied both countries with billions of dollars in economic and military 
assistance. The case of Israeli- Egyptian peace is a prime case of paying for peace. The case 
of aid to Egypt and Israel is discussed more thoroughly in the next chapter. 
Other major recipients of American aid are Afghanistan, which began receiving 
American aid in earnest after the American invasion in 2001. The same can be said of 
Pakistan. In FY 2000, neither Afghanistan nor Pakistan were among the top ten recipients.778 
Aid to Pakistan’s government is provided to counter terror threats originating from that 
country. The list of top recipients, as figure 3.8 demonstrates, includes four African countries 
the majority of aid in these cases is devoted to combating HIV/AIDS. This pattern began to 																																																																																																																																																																												
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emerge in FY 2010 as a result of President George W. Bush’s initiative to aid African 
countries with their struggle against HIV/AIDS.779 															Figure	3:7	U.S.	assistance	in	2016	by	different	regions	in	the	world.	(Source:	State	Department	and	USAID).780	 
 
		Figure	3:8,	Fiscal	Year	2016	Top	10	Recipients	in	USD	millions,	the	Palestinian	Authority	ranked	11th	with	$449	million.781		
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781 Author's calculations based on ibid. 
3100
1485
1185
1000
804
630
608
591
514
491
449
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500
Israel
Egypt
Afghanistan
Jordan
Pakistan
Kenya
Nigeria
Tanzania
Ukraine
Uganda
Palestinian	Territories
Top	Recipients	of	U.S.	Foreign	Aid,	FY	2016
Near	East35%
Africa33%
South	Central	Asia14%
Western	Hemisphere9%
Europe	and	Eurasia5%
East	and	and	Pacific4% 2016	aid	by	Region
4. The U.S. and the Question of Palestine  162 
4. The U.S. and the Question of Palestine 
“There is no such thing as American-Palestinian relations, there is American-Israeli 
relations, and the Palestinians are an agenda item.”782 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	      - Khalid Elgindy, 2014		
The significance of the Middle East as a region began to occupy a more prominent in the 
corridors of the American foreign policy establishment at the end of World War II. That is 
not to say that the U.S. and the various countries that existed in the Middle East and North 
Africa did not have any relations. After all, Morocco was the first country to recognize the 
newly established United States of America in 1777, and signed the Treaty of Friendship and 
Cooperation “which stands as the basis for the longest unbroken treaty relationship between 
the United States and a foreign country in the history of the Republic.”783 Furthermore, 
America’s first war after its independence was against the four Barbary States that existed in 
modern day Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, and Morocco over the kidnapping and seizure of 
American sailors and ships for ransoms.784 
However, as the research already discussed in chapter two, for the first two centuries 
after its founding, the U.S. had limited commercial and political interests in the region, 
preferring to keep its primary focus on the Western hemisphere and the far east during the 
expansion in the late 19th century. America’s early isolationism, and its later pre-occupation 
with political and economic developments in neighboring countries, left the Middle East as a 
geopolitical unit within the sphere of influence, and later under the control of the major 
colonial European powers; namely France and Great Britain.785 It was not until after the 
discovery of oil in Saudi Arabia in the 1930s by the Standard Oil of California that “the 
American romance began in earnest.”786  
 The following chapter provides a historical account of U.S. involvement in the 
Middle East, and the development of Palestinian- American relations. During the Cold War 
years, the location and resources of the Middle East ensured it would be a land of battle and 
debate between the United States and its allies on the one side, and the Soviet Union and its 
allies on the other as the two major powers strove to keep the other out. The analysis begins 																																																								
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with the origins of Palestinian nationalism and the Middle East conflict, however the primary 
focus is the historical period from the founding of Israel in 1948 during the administration of 
president Truman, until the signing of the Declaration of Principles in 1993, which marked 
the birth of the peace process between the PLO and Israel, and subsequently the beginnings 
of official American assistance to the newly established Palestinian Authority. The research 
also elaborates on the Camp David peace agreement between Israel and Egypt and the role 
foreign assistance played in achieving and maintaining the agreement.  
The historical analysis makes three main arguments that relate to the greater narrative 
of this research; the first is that American interest in the region during this era focused on 
containing the Soviet Union and, on protecting Israel’s security amidst the hostile 
environment of the Middle East, and at the same time ensuring the flow of Middle Eastern 
oil. The second is that until 1974, the perception of American policy makers of the Question 
of Palestine was a mere humanitarian problem concerned with the displacement of refugees 
as a result of the establishment of Israel. The oil crisis that followed the 1973 War, brought 
the Palestinian issue to the forefront of American foreign policy agenda, and gave it a more 
political and therefore a more paramount status in the American foreign policy agenda. Still, 
it took more than a decade later, until the Presidency of Ronald Reagan, that first direct 
diplomatic contact took place in December 1988.787 
The third and final argument is that the establishment of the Palestinian National 
Liberation Movement (Fatah) was done primarily to avoid entanglement with Arab regimes 
that established, financed, and eventually controlled the PLO and other Palestinian factions 
that were involved in armed conflict against Israel. The chapter elaborates on how the Arab 
regimes in Egypt, Iraq, and Syria used their financial and military support to the Palestinian 
factions to strengthen their own position and advance their own foreign policy agenda. 
Furthermore, when Fatah and Arafat controlled the PLO, their primary aim was to secure the 
independence of the organization’s finances to lift the PLO from the yoke of the Arab 
regimes, but this policy came to an end in the 1980s, which left Arafat and the PLO little 
choice but to accept the U.S.’s demands for dialogue. 
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4.1. The Great War 
By the time World War I began, the aging Ottoman Empire was not able to defend its 
territories against the Allies during the Great War. The Arab revolutions that took place 
against Ottoman rule, with the support of Great Britain, also contributed to further expansion 
of European influence, and proved detrimental to Ottoman rule.788 Among the most known of 
the stories is that of British military officer and diplomat Thomas E. Lawrence, or “Lawrence 
of Arabia” as he is better known. Lawrence played an important role in the Sinai and 
Palestine Campaign and more importantly in aiding the rebelling Arabs against the Ottomans 
between 1916 and 1918.789 The Arabs aided the British for the promise of a national Arab 
state as agreed in the famous McMahon- Hussein agreement which came as a result of 
correspondence between British High Commissioner in Cairo Sir Henry McMahon and 
Hussein Bin Ali, the Sharif of Mecca.790 McMahon promised British aid against the Turks 
and aid in establishing an Arab state. Though there was no formal treaty, Hussein took the 
correspondence and promises as binding agreement. But the promised Arab state never 
materialized, despite Hussein and his Arab legions’ aid against the Ottomans.791  
By the end of the Great War, the Ottoman Empire had shrunk to include modern day 
Turkey only. The former Ottoman territories proved extremely attractive for European 
colonial powers due mostly to the region’s richness of oil, the strategic location of the Middle 
East as the gateway of three continents, and the paramount importance of its waterways such 
as Hormuz, the Turkish Straits, not to mention the Suez Canal. Therefore, the Middle East 
was divided according to a secret agreement between Britain and France, with the consent of 
Russian Empire. The secretly negotiated agreement between British diplomat Mark Sykes 
and his French counterpart Francois Georges-Picot came to light after the Bolsheviks 
released the details in late 1917, though it was agreed more than a year earlier.792  The 
agreement divided the Middle East pie between France and Britain, leaving modern day 																																																								
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Syria, Lebanon, northern Iraq, and parts of Turkey under French control while Palestine, 
Jordan, most of Iraq and parts of the eastern coast of the Arabian Peninsula under Britain’s 
control.793 
Not only did the British “fraud,” as Lawrence called his action, simply deny the Arabs 
the promised state, more to their dismay, on November 2, 1917, British Foreign Secretary 
Arthur Balfour, issued a declaration in which he stated that, “His Majesty’s government view 
with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will 
use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object….” 794  Despite the 
declaration stating “nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights 
of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by 
Jews in any other country,” the declaration did little to appease the Arabs.795 On the other 
hand, it was heartily welcomed by most Jews across the world, from Britain to Russia, and 
helped alleviate the status of the already influential Zionist organization.796 
Across the Atlantic, President Wilson was consulted by the British approximately two 
months prior to issuing the declaration, his response was that the time was nor ripe for such a 
declaration. One month later, he agreed that the British should issue such declaration.797 
According to Martin Sicker, Wilson was urged not to publicly approve the declaration on 
three grounds. First, the U.S. though was at war with Germany, it was not at war with 
Ottoman Empire, even though diplomatic ties between the two countries had been severed. 
Therefore, approving the giving away of Ottoman territories would not be taken lightly by 
Turkey, and would prove detrimental to American-Turkish relations. Second, a quick and 
public approval of the declaration would have also gone against at least two of the principles 
advocated by Wilson in his famous Fourteen Points Speech in which he advocated the 
principle of self-determination and opposed annexation of territories acquired after the 
war.798 Though it must be mentioned that the speech Sicker refers to was delivered almost 
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three months after the promise. Finally, not all American Jews approved of Zionism and the 
ideals it advanced, which was no doubt a concern for Wilson.799 
Richard Lebow discusses Wilson’s dilemma and provides a review of the different 
reasons that historians have attributed to Wilson’s change of mind.800 There are at least three 
views on the issue. The first to be put forward was Selig Adler’s in which he credited the 
Zionist leaders in the U.S., particularly Louis Brandeis, who spoke to Wilson during these 
two months, with the chief role for changing Wilson’s mind between September and October 
1917.801 Brandeis would later become the first Jew to serve on the U.S. Supreme Court, 
nominated by Wilson.802 Leonard Stein provides a different explanation. Stein argues that 
while the Zionist leaders did in fact play an important role, the reason for the change was 
Brandeis convincing Wilson’s advisor and influential diplomat Edward House, or Colonel 
House as he was better known, though he had no military experience or rank.803 Rabbi 
Herbert Parzen presents the third view. Parzen, believed that House was not in fact an anti-
Semite as Adler argued, and that House did favor Zionism. Therefore, Parzen gives the credit 
to Colonel House rather than Brandeis and the Zionists leaders, whose role according to 
Parzen was overestimated.804 
There is no doubt that House and Brandeis both played a role, but all three views 
seem to emphasize the role of these individuals, with less regard to the state of the 
international system at the time, and to the idealist, visionary, and religious Wilson himself, 
who did indeed favor Zionism. Wilson’s reluctance was probably a result of Realpolitik 
considerations rather than recommendations and pressure by counselors and advisors. Indeed 
as Lebow points out “Wilson, of course, might have approved the Declaration even without 
the prodding of American Zionists.”805  The major powers, argues Lebow, were motivated 
not so much by sympathy for Zionists, but “by considerations of grand strategy.”806 
Palestinian nationalism emerged in response to these developments. It evolved and 
developed in much the same way many nationalisms did in the earlier decades of the 20th 
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century.807 Much of the early Zionists’ argument regarding the Holy Land was that it was “a 
land without people, for a people without a land,” The slogan became prominent during the 
late 19th and early 20th century among Zionists.808 It was an attempt to generate sympathy for 
the Zionist cause and provide justification for Jewish migration and the establishment of a 
Jewish homeland. Some scholars trace the origins of Palestinian nationalism back to 1834, 
when the threat was not Jewish migration or Zionism, but a growing discontent among the 
Palestinian population with their Egyptian occupiers.809 The 1834 peasant revolt, according to 
the view advocated by Kimmerling and Migdal, was the first step in developing the modern 
Palestinian identity810  
Historian Rashid Khalidi among others; Yeohoshua Porath in his two volumes; The 
Emergence of the Palestinian Arab- National Movement, 1918-1921, and From Riots to 
Rebellion, the Palestinian Arab-National Movement 1929-1939, and Muhammed Muslih’s 
The Origins of Palestinian Nationalism (1988), disagree with Kimmerling and Migdal’s 
analysis, and subscribe to the view that the Palestinians thought of themselves as a part of the 
Levant, or Greater Syria, rather than their own independent people until the end of the Great 
War.811 Only after the British occupation of Palestine in 1917-1918 did the modern day 
Palestinian nationalism and Palestinian national identity as it is today emerge.  
The major cause for this development was the threat to this identity, followed by the 
politicizing and the organization of the general public by the few elite who use symbols, 
figures, history, language, culture and traditions as means to create a new identity or re-affirm 
an already existing one, thereby providing the people with a sense of community and also a 
sense of common duty to resist whatever endangers the people’s identity and their sense of 
belonging. These are broad outlines to creating any nationalist movement and they have been 
apparent in numerous examples across the world from Mao’s China, Washington’s America, 
Hertzel’s Israel to the Basque Country and Kurdish nationalism. All of these nationalisms 
exhibit more or less the same features, and are developed along similar lines.812 Palestinian 																																																								
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nationalism emerged as a socio-political movement with the goal of limiting Jewish 
immigration to Palestine, if not stopping it completely. According to historian James Gelvin 
states, 
“The fact that Palestinian nationalism developed later than 
Zionism and indeed in response to it, does not in any way 
diminish the legitimacy of Palestinian nationalism or make it 
less valid than Zionism. All nationalisms arise in opposition 
to some ‘other.’ Why else would there be the need to specify 
who you are? And all nationalisms are defined by what they 
oppose.”813 
 
By 1925, on the historic land of Palestine, or the land of ancient Israel, two nationalist 
movements existed that were at odds in many ways, and each struggled against the other to 
establish a national home for its citizens. It was during the 1920s that the first major clashes 
between the two nations occurred over access to the holy sites in Jerusalem. The 1929 riots 
lasted for one week during August and resulted in the deaths of 133 Jews and 110 Arabs.814  
During the 1930s, Jewish migration to Palestine peaked, in the five years between 
1931 and 1936, the Jewish population more than doubled, which increased their total in the 
population from 17 to 27 percent.815 Jewish migration to Palestine, or Aliyah, took place in 
five waves since the 1880s. The first Aliyah took place between 1882 and 1903 consisted 
mostly of 35,000 Russian Jews fleeing extermination. The second Aliyah (1903-1914) was 
Jews escaping Tsarist Russia, 40,000 immigrants with socialist ideas who had the idea to 
build “collective” agricultural settlements Kibbutzim. The third wave 1919-1923, 40,000 
from Eastern Europe escaping pogroms. The fourth Aliyah 1924-1929m anti Semitic policies 
in Poland, economic hardship in eastern Europe with tough migration laws in U.S., 75,000-
82,000, middle class Jews. The fifth Aliyah, lasted until 1940, German Jews, highly skilled. 
Between 1933 and 1936, 174,000 Jews immigrated. By 1940, nearly 250,000 Jews had 
arrived, making population 450,000.816  After deadly clashes occurred again in 1936, the 
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British released the MacDonald White Paper in 1939 “proposed new restrictions on Zionist 
immigration and on land purchases by Jews.”817 
The Second World War left Britain in an exhausted state. As the research discussed in 
the second chapter with American aid to Greece, the British were unable to maintain their 
mandate following WWII. The British were targeted by attacks carried out by Arabs and 
Jews alike. 818  Therefore, the British government informed the UN that the government 
decided to “bring to an end their mandate and to prepare for the earliest possible withdrawal 
from Palestine of all British forces.”819 According to the British representative, the decision 
to end the mandate was “welcomed by all, Arabs and Jews alike, as well as by the United 
Nations.”820   
On May 14 1948, Israel declared its independence, and the White House issued a 
statement of recognition at 6:11 pm; 11 minutes after Israel officially came into being with 
the expiration of British Mandate at midnight Jerusalem time.821 The statement states that the 
Truman government “has been informed that a Jewish state has been proclaimed in Palestine, 
and recognition has been requested by the provisional government thereof. The United States 
recognizes the provisional government as the de facto authority of the State of Israel.”822 The 
Israelis call this day their Independence Day, and Palestinians refer to it as Nakba, meaning 
catastrophe. Following the declaration the armies of the Arab countries attacked the Israel but 
they failed in their attempt to regain control and were quickly, and astoundingly defeated.823 
The U.S. had imposed an embargo on arms sales to the belligerents, but the Soviet Union, 
anxious for the British to leave the Middle East, provided Israel with weapons, even few 
airplanes.824 
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4.2. Truman and the Birth of Israel, 1948 
In the United States, much of the debate surrounding the establishment of an 
independent Jewish state was focusing on two major issues; the Soviet Union and Arab oil. 
The U.S. was concerned that a conflict in the Middle East may increase Soviet influence as 
early as 1946. A Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum in June 1946 to the State-War-Navy 
Coordinating Committee warned in response to the report of the Anglo-American Committee 
on Palestine, which recommended allowing 100,000 Jewish immigrants to settle, that “the 
U.S.S.R might replace the United States and Britain in influence and power in the Middle 
East.”825 The oil rich Middle East was also a buffer zone between the British Mediterranean 
and the Soviet Union. The strategic importance of the Middle East was elevated to a much 
higher degree in the Cold War. 
No doubt that the humanitarian rationale played a part in the U.S. swift recognition 
and early aid to Israel, but the political considerations and calculations at the time showed 
serious advantages to having a strong ally in the region. For the U.S., Israel represented a 
strategic interest in its struggle with the Soviet Union. 826  Many of Truman’s advisers, 
particularly at the State Department urged him not to recognize the Jewish state on the 
grounds that it would fuel anti-American sentiment among the Arabs, and that would threaten 
America’s access to oil, and result in expansion of Soviet influence.827 In a meeting at the 
White House on May 12, two days before the declaration of the founding of Israel, tensions 
were high between Secretary of State George Marshall, who opposed recognition, and the 
president’s advisor on domestic affairs, Clark Clifford who urged recognition. Marshall and 
Clifford were not on the best of terms, to put it mildly.828  
Clifford, the president’s counsel, argued that the Arab nations were dependent on oil 
revenues, and therefore they would not be quick to use the oil weapon if the U.S. recognized 
Israel.829 Furthermore, Clifford argued that failure to support Israel, would make the U.S. 
look as if it were “trembling before threats of a few nomadic desert tribes.”830 Clifford recalls 
the meeting in the first chapter of his book, Counsel to the President: a Memoir, Clifford told 																																																								
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the president “in an area as unstable as the Middle East, where there is not now and never has 
been any tradition of democratic government, it is important for the long-range security of 
our country, and indeed the world, that a nation committed to the democratic system be 
established there, one on which we can rely. The new Jewish state can be such a place. We 
should strengthen it in its infancy by prompt recognition.”831 Clifford’s assistant George 
Elsey summarized their position in four points; recognition is consistent with U.S. policy, a 
separate Jewish state is inevitable, other nations will recognize it anyway, and finally the U.S. 
ought to recognize it before the Soviet Union.832 
In his record of the meeting, available in FRUS, Marshall questioned the presence of 
Clifford at the meeting in the first place. Since the meeting was discussing foreign policy 
issues, what purpose did Clifford’s presence serve? On Clifford’s advice, Marshall said 
plainly that it was a “transparent dodge to win a few votes,” warning that the dignity of the 
office would be seriously diminished.833 Furthermore, Marshall said, “the counsel offered by 
Mr. Clifford’s advice was based on domestic political considerations, while the problem 
confronting us was international. I stated bluntly that if the president were to follow Mr. 
Clifford’s advice, and if I were to vote in the next election, I would vote against the 
president.”834 Clifford’s domestic concerns were centered on the elections in November to 
ensure that Truman would gain the American-Jewish vote. Loy Henderson, head of the State 
Department’s Near Eastern Division wrote to Dean Rusk in 1977, “if Truman had taken 
positions that would have resulted in a failure to establish the Jewish state, he would almost 
certainly have been defeated in the November elections since the Zionists had almost the full 
support of the Congress, the United States media, and most of the American people.”835  
According Geselbracht, between 1947 and 1948, the White House received 48,600 
telegrams, nearly 800,000 cards and over 80,000 letters on the issue of Palestine.836 In the 
November elections, Truman won 75 percent of the total Jewish vote in the U.S.837 Even 
though the Jewish vote was small in number; the Democratic Party was receiving large 																																																								
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contributions from Jewish donors.838 Furthermore, The Jewish voters compromised three 
percent of total population, and cast 4 percent of the vote in elections, this one percent 
difference, explains Miglietta, translated into 750,000 votes, most of which was concentrated 
in states with large electoral votes.839  The New York vote was “the major prize in the 
election.”840 The Jewish population of New York State was estimated at 14 percent, and in 
New York City at 20 percent.841 Representing 94 electoral votes out of 266 needed to win.842  
There were electoral, political, and humanitarian considerations that played a role in 
shaping America’s recognition of Israel. The political one stemmed from having a strategic 
ally, a democratic friend in an area of such geopolitical importance as the Middle East at a 
time when competition with the Soviet Union was becoming more intense. There was also an 
electoral justification, which was important, and did indeed take part in Clifford and 
Truman’s calculations. But there is also the humanitarian doctrine, which should not be 
forgotten. Israel was a refuge to prosecuted Jews worldwide, including Holocaust survivors, 
therefore aiding the new state was a moral, and to Truman, even religious obligation. He was 
a devout Baptist and was greatly influenced by biblical teachings concerning Israel. 843 
Truman called himself Cyrus in reference to the ancient king whose actions are recorded in 
four biblical books. Cyrus liberated the Jews from the Babylonian captivity, and facilitated 
their return to Jerusalem.844 
With the resounding defeat of the Arab armies in 1948, and the declaration of 
Israel’s independence, all was lost to the Palestinians. Their fate in the might and strength of 
their Arab neighbors to overcome the much smaller Israeli army all but seized to exist. Yet, 
hope did endure among the Palestine refugees that they would some day, in the not so distant 
future, be allowed to return to their homes, which they were forced to abandon. Om Fadil, a 
Palestine refugee born in the early 1930s told me a story when she took her infant son Fadil 
to a clinic in 1949 that the doctor had informed her that they had best take good care of Fadil 
since his generation would be the one to “liberate Palestine.” She had responded by telling 
the doctor that surely the liberation will come well before Fadil is grown. Om Fadil still live, 
awaiting liberation, and Fadil passed away at the age of 60 few years ago.  																																																								
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The Palestinian nationalist movement’s hope revived four years later when the Free 
Officers of Egypt staged a coup d'état and overthrew King Farouk.845 Jamal Abd Al-Nasser, 
rose to prominence among these officers, and eventually became Egypt’s second president.846 
Nasser and his officers were socialist oriented, and quickly gained the support of the Soviet 
Union in their conflict with Israel while the latter continued to receive American backing.847 
Nasser was considered as the father of Pan-Arabism; an ideology that promoted the 
unification of Arab people and states under one banner, “which was so badly desired by the 
Arabs.”848 
4.3. The Eagle and the Bear 
According to Zionist historian Melvin Urofsky, “the first five years of the Eisenhower 
administration marked the low point in relations between the Israeli and American 
government.”849 In the anti-Zionist camp, Alfred Lilienthal, an American Jew who was most 
critical of Israel and Zionism, argues that Eisenhower’s approach moved away from 
Truman’s “blatant bias toward Israel,” into a “neutral course.”850 Steven Siegel describes the 
Eisenhower period as “not the pro-Israel camp’s finest hour.”851 Regardless of Eisenhower’s 
personal feelings towards Israel, the Cold War required that the Soviet Union be contained, 
and Israel could play an important role in this process. It was, as John Dulles, Eisenhower’s 
Secretary of State said, “high time that the United States government paid more attention to 
the Near East and South Asia.”852  
The U.S. wanted to keep the Middle East away from Soviet influence, due in large 
part to the paramount importance of the Arab petroleum to European market and the 
significance of the Suez Canal for international shipping. In a personal diary entry on March 
13, 1956, Eisenhower stated, “The oil of the Arab world has grown increasing important to 
all of Europe. The economy of Europe would collapse if those oil supplies were cut off. If the 
																																																								
845 Joel Gordon, Nasser's Blessed Movement: Egypt's Free Officers and The July Revolution (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1992), 4. 
846 Priscilla Mary Roberts, Arab-Israeli Conflict: The Essential Reference Guide (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 
2014), 137-38. 
847 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 193-95. 
848 Tawfig Y. Hasou, The Struggle for the Arab World: Egypt's Nasser and the Arab League (Boston: KPI; 
Distributed by Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985), 54. 
849 Melvin I. Urofsky, We Are One!: American Jewry and Israel, 1st ed. (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press, 
1978), 305. 
850 Alfred M. Lilienthal, The Zionist Connection: What Price Peace? (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1978), 535. 
851 Steven L. Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America's Middle East Policy from Truman to 
Reagan, Middle Eastern Studies (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 51. 
852 As quoted in ibid. 
4. The U.S. and the Question of Palestine  174 
economy of Europe would collapse, the United States would be in a situation of which the 
difficulty could scarcely be exaggerated.”853  
Following the example of NATO in Europe, the Eisenhower administration sought to 
create a Middle East Treaty Organization, METO, for the purpose of opposing the Soviet 
Union.854 During a visit to Egypt where the Free Officers now governed, Nasser told Dulles 
that Egypt’s problem was the British, not the Russians. Nasser had no interest in joining 
METO, which eventually materialized into the Baghdad Pact. 855  The alliance included 
countries in the northern part of the Middle East; Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and the United 
Kingdom. Though promises of military and economic aid by the U.S. played a part of 
negotiating the members’ entry, the U.S. did not join pact but did support it.856 
Egypt was a non-aligned country in the U.S.-Soviet struggle, however, Nasser 
“played both superpowers off against each other in order to achieve maximum political and 
economic benefits.”857  The construction of the High Dam in Aswan was a monumental 
project in Nasser’s presidency. Nasser had already agreed an arms deal with the Soviet Union 
through Czechoslovakia in September 1955, which was alarming for Israel, and did little to 
improve his relations with the Eisenhower administration.858 Nasser had requested aid from 
the U.S. in June 1955, only to be rejected because he refused to provide assurances as 
required by the Mutual Security Act, that such weapons would be used only for defensive 
purposes.859 Even after the arms deal, Eisenhower and Dulles felt that there was still a chance 
to keep Nasser on the Western side, and persuade him to back out of the arms deal by aiding 
the dam project.860 In December 1955, Dulles announced that the U.S. would provide $56 
million in grants, with $14 million from the British, to help with the dam construction.861 
Total Western aid, with subsequent grants and loans, and support from the World Bank, 
would have totaled $400 million, out of a total cost estimated to be $1.3 billion.862 Despite 
initial agreement with Nasser’s negotiators on U.S. aid package, Nasser rejected the 																																																								
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American offer. He feared that such aid would come bundled with restrictions that could 
restrain his purchase of arms, and come loaded with conditions that would affect his control 
over Egypt’s economy.863 
The western aid package deal never materialized as the Eisenhower administration 
began to perceive Nasser differently after becoming too communist friendly with the arms 
deal with the Soviets through Czechoslovakia, his recognition of communist China, and the 
establishment of cultural exchange programs with communist countries.864 He was left with 
two options; to either seek Soviet aid to build the dam, or simply abandon the project. 
Instead, Nasser took a third course. He nationalized the Suez Canal. As a result of the 
nationalizing, Britain and France, the stakeholders in the canal, allied with Israel attacked 
Egypt in a coordinated war. The war began with an Israeli attack on October 29, followed by 
landing of British and French troops in the canal area, resulting in a quick defeat of the 
Egyptian army and the occupation of the Sinai by Israel.865 
The Eisenhower was left in a difficult position due to the attack. They could not 
simply declare their support for their NATO allies and Israel, and therefore be perceived to 
be imperialist in their own right while they were criticizing the Soviet actions in Hungary, 
which was undergoing a revolution at the same time.866 According to Eisenhower’s Vice 
President Richard Nixon, “we couldn’t on one hand complain about the Soviets intervening 
in Hungary and, on the other hand, approve of the British and French picking that particular 
time to intervene against Nasser.”867 The U.S. called for a Security Council meeting in which 
the U.S. submitted a draft resolution calling for immediate Israeli withdrawal.868 French and 
British vetoes ensured that no resolution condemning them or stopping the war would be 
issued from the Security Council.869 An emergency General Assembly session was called 
instead and a U.S. sponsored resolution was passed. There is little doubt that the “even-
handed” Eisenhower feared a stronger reaction from the Arab countries, which on its part 
																																																								
863 Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America's Middle East Policy from Truman to Reagan, 68. 
864 Muhammad Abd el-Wahab Sayed-Ahmed, Nasser and American Foreign Policy, 1952-1956 (Cairo: The 
American University Press, 1989), 191. 
865  Moshe Shemesh, "Egypt: From Military Defeat to Political Victory," in The Suez-Sinai Crisis 1956: 
Retrospective and Reappraisal, ed. Selwyn Ilan Toren and Moshe Shemesh (London: Taylor and Francis e-
Library 2005, 1990), 115-16. 
866 Ibid. 
867 See László Borhi, "Containment, Rollback, Liberation or Inaction? The United States and Hungary in the 
1950s," Journal of Cold War Studies 1, no. 3 (1999). 
868 Edward Johnson, "The Suez Crisis at the United Nations: The Effects of the Foreign Office and British 
Foreign Policy," in Reassessing Suez 1956: New Perspectives on the Crisis and its Aftermath, ed. Simon C. 
Smith (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), 171. 
869 Ibid. 
4. The U.S. and the Question of Palestine  176 
would have disturbed the flow of oil, and increase anti-American sentiment.870 His actions in 
January the following year open a window for the Arab states to join with the U.S. 
 On January 5, 1957 Eisenhower addressed a joint session of congress on the situation 
in the Middle East. Eisenhower pledged economic and military aid, and protection to any 
nation in the region willing to acknowledge the threat of communism.871 The speech became 
the “Eisenhower Doctrine.” According to Salim Yaqub, the British failure to regain control of 
the Suez Canal marked the end of the British influence in the region and saw the U.S. fill this 
vacuum for fear that it might be filled by the Soviet Union.872 Egypt and Syria had become 
too friendly with the USSR, and it was feared that other Arab countries would follow suit. 
According to Eisenhower, Nasser “is a puppet [of the Soviets], even though he probably 
doesn’t think so.”873 
Puppet or independent, Nasser achieved a major victory for himself after the Suez 
Crisis. Despite the fact that Egypt was defeated militarily, the results of the war enforced 
Nasser’s position as the leader of the Arab World, and portrayed him as a champion of the 
free developing world in its struggle again European imperialism. As Salah Khalaf, who 
would later help establish Fatah and rise to prominence in the PLO, stated, “Nasser has now 
become the leader of the struggle against imperialism. The daring of the act and the challenge 
it posed to England and France made a strong and deep impression on all the Arab.” Nasser 
restored the Arabs and the third world their confidence and honor continues Khalaf, 
“everything is now possible, even the liberation of Palestine.”874 
The Palestinian issue did not feature during Eisenhower’s time in office. It was still 
largely an ignored issue, and when it did come up, it was a question of refugees and displaced 
person. Few months after Eisenhower took office, the National Security Council stated the 
foreign policy objectives in the Middle East. The refugee problem’s solution was a 
resettlement in the Arab countries, repatriation to Israel “‘to the extent feasible,’” as well as 
providing economic development programs.875 Eisenhower was indeed more even handed 
than his predecessor, and also than his successor, and one may even argue that he was the 
most even-handed American president to deal with Middle East issues relating to Israel. 																																																								
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During his time in office, Eisenhower employed foreign aid in various forms; economic 
development, political reform, and military assistance to contain the Soviet Union. The 
attempts failed at keeping the Soviets away from Egypt. The costs of Aswan dam were 
eventually loaned by the Soviet Union, $100 million at the official exchange rate.876 The 
Soviet Union also sent material, equipment and experts to aid with the dam construction.877  
For all of Eisenhower’s efforts, Nasser and Egypt moved into the eastern bloc, which 
did little to enhance the prospects of a solution to the Palestinians, and did much to keep 
Israel anxious. Between 1956 and 1967, the Soviet Union provided $2 billion of military aid 
to the Arab countries, 43 percent of the total went to Nasser, receiving over 530 tanks 
between 1961 and 1965 alone.878 
As Nasser and his colleagues were securing their regime in Egypt in the 1950s, and 
playing games of power with the Americans and Soviets, a young Palestinian Engineering 
student was mobilizing his fellow Palestinian students at Cairo University. He was 
Mohammed Abd al-Rauf al-Qudwa, better known as Yasser Arafat with the nom du guerre; 
Abu-Ammar. For the next 50 years, Arafat would lead the Palestinian cause through many 
perils and opportunities. He rose to become, arguably, the most popular Palestinian and Arab 
leader in the 20th century. In October 1959, Arafat and some prominent Palestinians including 
Khalil Al-Wazir, and Salah Khalaf (Abu-Iyyad), among others met in Kuwait and established 
the Palestinian National Liberation Movement, Fatah.879 The newly formed organization was 
committed to liberating Palestine by armed struggle. But the lack of financial means and the 
prosecution its members suffered on the hand of intelligence services of the different Arab 
regimes put their plans for armed struggle on hold until the mid-1960s.880  
Eisenhower’s successor, president Kennedy, was more supportive of Israel. Indeed, 
Kennedy was the first president to use the now widely used term “special relationship,” to 
describe U.S.- Israeli relations. According to Christison, Kennedy tried to fix U.S.- Egyptian 
relations, but had no more success than his predecessor.881 Shortly after becoming president, 
Kennedy wrote to the leaders of the prominent Arab countries “pledging help in resolving the 
Arab-Israeli conflict and the refugee problem.”882 Kennedy’s refugee plan was repatriation to 																																																								
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Israel. The U.S. was to assume 60 percent of the costs associated with the process, which 
would have been in the region of $1 billion.883 Yet Kennedy was not willing to go against the 
will of Israel’s leaders, and the plan for repatriation never materialized.884 Kennedy also 
pledged support to “all states determined to control their own destiny and to enhance the 
prosperity of their people.”885 He was also the first to make it special by being the first 
president to allow arms sale to Israel in 1962 when he authorized the delivery of Hawk 
missiles.886  
After the assassination of president Kennedy on November 22, 1963, his vice-
president Lyndon B. Johnson was sworn in aboard Air Force One two hours later. President 
Johnson was an avid supporter of Israel, perceiving the Jewish state as a crucial Cold War 
ally.887 During his time in the senate, Johnson was a defender of Israel a lobbied on its behalf 
to be granted multi-million dollar aid package as a part of the Mutual Security program.888 
Johnson was also critical of Egypt’s Nasser calling him “an instrument of the Kremlin.”889 
Johnson’s time in office would mark one of the most turbulent eras in the history of the 
Middle East conflict. 
4.3.1. Birth of the PLO (1964) 
In January 1964, Nasser called for an Arab summit to meet in Cairo to discuss the 
state of Arab affairs and gather support for his plans in the water dispute between Jordan and 
Israel. The Cairo summit was followed by another summit in Alexandria in September to 
follow up on their plans. Between January and September, the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization was founded. Iraqi leader Abd al-Karim al-Qasem challenged the Egyptian and 
Jordanian regimes to allow Palestinians to establish a government in the then Egyptian 
controlled Gaza Strip and Jordanian controlled West Bank.890 Feeling the pressure, Nasser 
responded by proposing to establish the Palestinian Liberation Organization, and he himself 
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“handpicked” Ahmad al-Shukeiri, who had been a Saudi diplomat to be the organization’s 
first chairman.891  
The organization was officially formed when 400 Palestinian delegates met at the 
Intercontinental Hotel in Jerusalem on May 28, 1964.892 Shukeiri delivered a speech in which 
he declared, “on this historic day and in the city of Jerusalem, the people of Palestine meet 
for the first time after the catastrophe… our conference declares to the entire world that we 
are here. The people of Palestine… we met and agreed to liberate Palestine.”893 King Hussein 
agreed that the congress could meet in Jerusalem, so long as his authority over the West Bank 
was not challenged. One of the invitees to the conference was Yasser Arafat but he did not 
attend the conference.894 
4.3.2. The 1967 War 
 The third major military confrontation in the Arab-Israel conflict began on June 5, 
1967 when the Israeli Air Force launched a surprise attack against Egypt’s airfields to destroy 
both planes and runways, rendering the Egyptian air force ineffective. During the six days of 
battle, the IDF gave the vastly superior in number Arab armies another bloody nose on three 
fronts; Jordan, Syria and Egypt. Estimates put the number of Egyptian casualties between 
10,000-15,000 between dead and missing, Jordan had 6000 dead or missing, Syria was left 
with 2500 dead and hundreds of tanks and aircrafts destroyed. Israel lost less than 1000 
soldiers in comparison. It was a major victory for Israel by all military standards.895 
 On June 19, 1967, Johnson delivered a speech at the State Department in which he 
outlined his vision for the Middle East. According to Charles Smith, the Johnson speech 
became “the bible of American policy” and “the foundation of UN Security Council 
resolution 242…”896 During the speech, Johnson made five important points, or lessons to be 
learned from the past month; 
1. Every nation in the area has a right to live, and have this right respected by its 
neighbors. 
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2. A human requirement for settlement, justice for the refugees… “there will be no 
peace for any part in the Middle East unless this problem is attacked with ne 
energy…”  
3. Respect for maritime, and right of passage through international waterways should 
be respected by all nations. 
4. Opposition to arms race. 
5. Respect for the territorial integrity of all states.897  
The most obvious consequence of the 1967 War was the significant increase of land 
under Israeli control, or occupation. Israel added the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Golan 
Heights and the Sinai Peninsula. Consequently, the war resulted in the passing of UNSC 
Resolution 242, which would later become the basis for peace negotiations between the 
Israelis and the Palestinians. Resolution 242 was sponsored by the British delegation and was 
adopted unanimously by the Security Council on November 22, 1967. It emphasized in its 
preamble the “inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need just and 
lasting peace in the Middle East in which every State in the are can live in security.”898 It 
advocated two principles; Israeli withdrawal from territories it occupied in recent conflict; 
and the “termination of all claims or states of belligerence and respect and acknowledgment 
of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every states…”899 
 Another major consequence of the 1967 War was the devastation it brought to Arab 
morale in general and Palestinian morale in particular. The swift heavy defeat inflicted by the 
Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) on Egypt’s Nasser, which was accounted as the strongest of the 
Arab countries and the leader of the Arab world, demoralized the Palestinian populace and 
the Palestinian leadership. In a meeting in a Damascus restaurant following the war, Khalid 
al-Hassan recalled how George Habash, a Palestinian Christian Marxist and the leader of the 
PFLP, was crying openly and saying how everything was lost. Arafat reportedly said to him, 
“George, you are wrong, this is not the end, it’s the beginning.”900 Arafat saw an opportunity 
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in the Arab defeat to unite the Palestinians and see them take the lead in their own cause 
rather being an instrument of the Arab regimes, or a problem for refugees.901  
It was the War of 1967 that gave Arafat the support his organization needed. After the 
Arabs’ second defeat and Israel’s occupation of Jerusalem, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, 
the Golan Heights and the Sinai Peninsula, the PLO was devastated and its strength was all 
but spent. Nasser wished to distant himself from the PLO and avoid becoming entangled in 
its failures. He probably saw Fatah as the better alternative since its approach through armed 
struggle proved more popular. Disregarding the advice of his intelligence chiefs, Nasser met 
Arafat, an armed Arafat, for the first time in November 1967.902  
One event in March 1968 is worth considering due to its significance in Fatah’s 
development. Fatah and other Palestinian groups’ attacks against Israel, and into the recently 
occupied West Bank, increased significantly after the 1967 War.903 On March 18, 1968, a 
mine exploded under a school bus, killing two and wounding 10 more.904 The Israeli cabinet 
decided to cross into Jordan to eliminate the Fedayeen threat originating from the town of 
Karameh, which they had been using as a base, with Yasser Arafat himself making the town 
his headquarters.905 Israel’s attack was defeated, and the operation failed to achieve its goals, 
leaving Israel with 28 killed and 90 wounded among its forces.906 In his biography of Arafat, 
British historian Alan Hart provides a detailed account of the fighting and the doings of 
Arafat and his aides during the battle. The Fedayeen won with the aid of Jordanian and Iraqi 
forces, but sustained heavy casualties in comparison with Israel, yet it was a major victory for 
Arafat when considering the consequences of the Battle of Karameh. 
Following the Battle, thousands of Palestinians flocked to join Fatah. Within 48 hours 
of the battle, 5000 Palestinians registered to become Fedayeen, and Time Magazine carried a 
full account of the battle in its December 1968 issue.907 The Palestinians saw a cause for 
celebration and optimism.908 The battle elevated Arafat and Fatah’s position to a great extent 																																																								
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in Palestinian and Arab circles. “The Arafat who rose from what should have been his grave 
was much more powerful than the pre-Karameh man,” says Hart.909 Arafat strengthened his 
hold on Fatah, which until then had tried to remain a secret organization, hiding the names 
and faces of its leader until Karameh when Arafat was chosen to be the organization’s official 
spokesperson.910 
Bassam abu-Sharrif, a former leader in the PFLP and a close advisor of Arafat, argues 
that the Nasser-Fatah relationship in 1969 was more than an alliance, it was an “adoption,” so 
much so that Nasser asked Arafat to accompany him on a trip to Moscow.911 Furthermore, 
Nasser publicly endorsed Arafat and gave him a radio station as a gift.912 According to abu-
Sharrif, Nasser promised Arafat the support he needed, and also promised him that he would 
be the next chairman of the PLO.913 On February 1969, Arafat was elected Chairman of the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization during a Palestinian National Council meeting, with 
Arafat becoming chairman, Fatah also became a part of the PLO. 914 
According to Quandt, U.S. policy towards the Palestinians from 1950 until the 1967 
War, was to try and freeze the situation in post 1949 status quo. Jordan would annex the West 
Bank and the Jordanians would become the interlocutors on issues involving the Palestinians, 
and this was the beginning of the Jordan option. The Jordanian government was perceived 
much more positively than its Egyptian counterpart since it was influenced by British, and 
had an under table relationship with Israel. Jordan became the choice to absorb the 
Palestinian problem. There was a notion, says Quandt, that we could not solve the problem, 
but we could contain the conflict and hope that the passage of time would allow this issue to 
be absorbed. Palestinians would become Jordanians, Syrians and Lebanese with some 
compensation for their losses. This notion prevailed during the Eisenhower, Kennedy and 
into Johnson until the 1967 War.915 
4.4. Nixon, Kissinger, War and Oil 
By 1968-1969 there was a feeling in American foreign policy circles that maybe they 
needed to look at the Palestine issue in a different way. 916  If the Johnson and Nixon 																																																								
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administrations wished to ignore the Palestinian problem any longer, the PLO did not give 
them that option. If president Johnson had picked up a Time Magazine’s December 1969 
issue during his final month in the White House, he would have found a photo of Arafat on 
the front cover under the heading The Arab Commandos: Defiant New Force in the Middle 
East.917 The Arab Commandos, or Fedayeen led by Arafat had become a new player, and an 
important one at that, in a game that was becoming more complicated in the Middle East. 
They had become, according to a British journalist in 1969, “a real and aggressive component 
in the Israeli nightmare.”918 
This was the situation faced by president Nixon when he arrived at the Oval Office, 
with Secretary of State William Rogers, and Henry Kissinger as his National Security 
Advisor. The Nixon administration’s policy towards the Middle East “was sorely lacking in 
direction and woefully uninterested in the Palestinian question.”919 Having had served for 
eight years as Eisenhower’s vice-president, Nixon did not lack foreign policy experience, nor 
did he lack understanding of the ongoing events in the Middle East. Nixon was “a tough 
minded anticommunist and an advocate of a strong international role for the United 
States.”920 His administration’s view of Arafat was that he was a radical terrorist, anti-West, 
anti-Israel, Soviet- friendly or a puppet of one or the other of Arab regimes.921 Events in the 
early 1970s did little to change this view, if not actually enforce it. 
The first was the 1970 crisis in Jordan, which elevated the significance of the 
Palestinian question greatly. Since its victory in the Battle of Karameh, Fatah and the various 
PLO factions began to exercise the power of policing Jordan, particularly within the capital 
Amman. Slowly, King Hussein was losing control of his own capital as the Palestinian 
factions roamed freely creating a state within a state.922 The PLO was grown in power in all 
respect; they had multiplied their numbers, improved their training, received better 
equipment, and were becoming battle hardened combatants from their frays with Israel, and 
each other. Recalling a visit to Jordan in the spring of 1970, Quandt said that it was not 
possible to travel around Amman without a PLO escort.923 U.S. ambassador to Jordan was 
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sending messages to Washington along the lines of King Hussein is finished, he had lost 
control over his capital city.924 
 The Palestinian militants did as they pleased. Between September 6, and September 
9, 1970, the PFLP hijacked four airplanes, and an attempt to hijack a fifth was foiled, three of 
the planes were taken to a small airstrip called Dawson’s field, or as the PFLP labeled it 
“Revolution Airport,” to bargain for the release of Palestinian prisoners.925 The Palestinian 
militants perceived the Jordanian regime as weak, and that somehow gave them the right to 
call for dismantling it, and establishing a “Hanoi” in Amman. 
Al-Jazeera’s Hikayat Thawra (The Tale of a Revolution), is a 13 episode 
documentary series following the evolution of Palestinian Nationalism. The title of the fourth 
episode was “The Arab’s Hanoi,” and it focused primarily on the 1970 crisis in Jordan. It was 
the desire of these factions to create a Hanoi in Jordan, from which they could attack Saigon 
in Israel. The fact that Hanoi and Saigon were used as example is enough to know that the 
source of this problem was the Marxist factions within the PLO, as Nayef Hawatma of the 
DFLP himself confirmed.926 According to him, “Amman must be turned into the Arab’s 
Hanoi… there was idea among the PFLP, DFLP, Saiqa and General Command… all factions 
except Fatah, declared publicly wanting to bring down the regime.”927  
Since its founding, Fatah adopted a policy of Palestinian non-intervention in the 
internal affairs of Arab states, and did maintain this policy in Jordan in late 1969 and 1970.928 
Other Palestinian factions, however, earned their bread and salt from the regimes in Syria and 
Iraq and the Baathist Party that emphasized pan-Arabism and collective Arab nationalism in 
these two countries.929 Unlike Fatah, these factions received assistance from Iraq and Syria, 
and were ever ready to do these regimes’ bidding. The PFLP, the DFLP, Saiqa and Arab 
Liberation Front were at odds with Hussein, or rather, their donors Syria and Iraq and their 
Baathist Party did not like Hussein and his close ties to the “imperialist west.” To them, 
Hussein was a “reactionary,” a “puppet of Western Imperialism,” or a “Zionist tool.”930 There 
is no doubt that they wished to dispose of Hussein. Unfortunately for them, neither Israel nor 
the U.S. were ever willing to let Hussein fall and leave Jordan to the Palestinians.  																																																								
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Kissinger assembled the Washington Special Actions Group, (WSAG), whose 
purpose was to develop plans for the unfolding events in Jordan. According to Kissinger’s 
memoirs, WSAG developed two plans for international intervention in Jordan.931 The first 
involved the use of American forces to evacuate American citizens from Jordan, leaving 
Israel to handle any Syrian or Iraqi forces that chose to support the Palestinian militants.932 
The second plan, which was simpler, left Israel out of the equation and laid the burden of 
saving Hussein’s regime on the American military itself.933 In the end, neither was required 
as the process of solving the problems caused by militants was done by “the tough little 
king’s” own army, and quite effectively.934  
The hostilities came to an end on October 27, when Arafat and Hussein signed a 
ceasefire agreement under Nasser’s guidance by which the PLO withdrew from major 
Jordanian cities.935 The U.S. made a series of moves with the intent of letting the Soviet 
Union and its allies in the region, particularly Iraq and Syria, know that the U.S. would 
intervene if the need pressed, and if these states rushed to help the Fedayeen. There were over 
17,000 Iraqi soldiers in Jordan, but they did not intervene.936 Syria sent some tanks in an 
apparent message to Hussein, but their advance did not last long under the threat of Israeli 
intervention on Hussein’s behalf.937 
Of all the terrible consequences the defeat of the PLO in Jordan created, the 
emergence of the notorious Black September Organization (BSO) was the worst. The 
organization emerged following the Jordanian- Palestinian clashes with the goal of punishing 
King Hussein and Jordan, but soon their operations expanded to include Israel and Israelis 
wherever they could be found. Bin Bella, one of the first Black September militants recalls 
the founding and a meeting with Salah Khalaf in which he informed Ben Bella and other 
fighters that they would soon be dismissed from Fatah ranks for a greater purpose, a task as 
hard and vital as the founding of Fatah itself. In November 1971, the organization struck its 
first blow, assassinating Jordan’s Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tal in Cairo, killing him with 14 
bullets, according to Jawad Abu-Aziza, one of the attackers.938 																																																								
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Two major attacks by BSO had resounding global impact. The first of the most 
infamous operations of BSO was the kidnapping of Israeli athletes participating in the 
September 1972 during the Summer Olympic in Munich in what was called by BSO as 
Operation Iqrit and Biram, two Christian villages in Palestine whose inhabitants were forced 
to migrate after attacks by the Jewish terrorist group Haganah in 1948. The better, and far 
fitter description of the operation would be the Munich Massacre. 11 members of the Israeli 
Olympic team were taken hostage, to demand the release of Palestinian prisoners, as well as 
the release of Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhof, the founders of the German Red Army 
Faction, a leftist terror group in Germany. The attackers demanded transportation to Cairo, 
which was not thrilled to be involved in the crisis to say the least.939 In the airport, where the 
hostages and attackers were to be transported, the German rescue attempt failed, realizing 
this, the attackers turned on the hostages, firing their machine guns and throwing hand-
grenades, killing all of the hostages. BSO’s account, provided by Abu-Dawoud, argued that 
the hostages were killed in the crossfire, rather than executed by the BSO terrorists.940 
It was an outrageous operation by all standards, worse than anything the PFLP had 
done with its earlier plane hijackings. King Hussein, whose authorities were at war with 
BSO, described the action as “a savage crimes against civilization… perpetrated by sick 
minds.” 941  Three of the attackers were actually taken alive by German authorities. On 
October 29, BSO kidnapped a Lufthansa airline flight, and demanded the release of the three 
attackers. Bonn agreed to the demands and released the prisoners. In response, Israeli Mossad 
launched Operation Mivtza Za’am Hael, or Wrath of God, in which Israeli Mossad targeted 
and killed members of the BSO, which were believed to have played a role in the 
kidnapping.942 
Few months later, this time in Africa, Black September attackers broke into the Saudi 
Embassy in the Sudanese capital Khartoum on March 1, 1973. The goal of the operation was 
to take hostages to trade for Palestinian prisoners in Israeli prisons; Sirhan Sirhan, Robert 
Kennedy’s assassin; and members of the Baader-Meinhof Gruppe, the German Red Army 
Faction.943 Later, Black September changed its demands to the release of Black September 
prisoners in Jordan. Among the hostages were two Americans; Cleo A. Noel, U.S. 																																																								
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Ambassador to Sudan; George Curtis Moore, U.S. Deputy Chief of Mission to Sudan; and 
Guy Eid, a Belgian diplomat, Adli al Nasser, Jordanian diplomat; and Sheikh Abdullah al 
Malhouk, Saudi Arabia’s Ambassador to Sudan, his wife and four children.944 
The next day, President Nixon said that the U.S. would not “pay blackmail,” which 
many considered to be a “blunder and shocking display of indifference to the fate of two 
American diplomats held at gunpoint by fanatical killers.”945 Few days later, the American 
ambassador, his deputy and Guy Eid, the Belgian diplomat, were executed. A secret State 
Department report assigned the blame on Arafat himself. According to the report “the 
Khartoum operation was planned and carried out with the full knowledge and personal 
approval of Yasir (sic) Arafat.” 946  The report stated, “one of the primary goals of the 
operation was to strike at the United States because of its effort to achieve a Middle East 
peace settlement which many Arabs believe would be inimical to Palestinian interests.” The 
report concluded “the Khartoum operation again demonstrated the ability of the BSO to strike 
where least expected.”947 
On the role of Arafat with the BSO, it would be unfair and simply false to hold him 
blameless, or to argue that the attack took place without his knowledge and most likely, 
approval as well. As Abu-Dawoud, one of BSO’s most prominent leaders, commented during 
an Aljazeera interview, “Arafat was the leader of a revolution; nothing took place without his 
knowledge.”948 Following the BSO attacks, Fatah declared an end to all external operations, 
and that any outside the military struggle against Israel would have reverse consequences.949 
4.4.1. 1973 Crisis 
In October 1973, the Middle East was to live through yet another war between Israel 
on one side and Egypt and Syria on the other in their bid to restore territories lost in the 1967 
war.950 Egypt had rearmed its army with Soviet support and launched its war in order to 
regain the territory it lost in the 1967 War.951 A day before the start of the war, recalls Farouq 
al-Qaddoumi, President Anwar Al-Sadat of Egypt met with Qaddoumi, Salah Khalaf and a 																																																								
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number of high-ranking Fatah officials. During the meeting, Sadat informed the leaders of his 
plans to attack Israel and urged them to ready the PLO forces. Sadat had planned to advance 
10 km after crossing the Suez Canal as he expected the “big countries” to intervene.952 Sadat 
had already chosen the diplomatic option to resolve Egypt’s differences with Israel, and he 
had no intention of carrying out a long war to retake the Palestinian territories, instead, he 
saw the short war of 1973 as a way to bring attention to the region and force a peace 
compromise.953 
The war lasted for 19 days and left thousands of Egyptians, Syrians, and Israelis dead, 
injured, or captured. Israel was taken by surprise, allowing Egypt and Syria to score some 
major victories in the beginning of the hostilities. Soon after, the tables turned. Israel 
countered on both fronts, and was able to absorb the attacks before retaliating, nearly 
reaching Damascus on the Syrian front. On the Sinai front, Ariel Sharon outmaneuvered the 
Egyptians, and managed to cross to the Western side of the canal and surround Egypt’s Third 
Army.954  
During the War, President Richard Nixon authorized the largest airlift in United 
States’ military history. Ammunition and various supplies were sent to aid Israel in its war 
with the Arab states with the total cost mounting to an impressive $2.2 billion.955 The Soviet 
Union responded by doing the same with Egypt. The Cold War tensions were rising 
threatening to drag more nations into the zone. Henry Kissinger was on the move to avoid a 
disaster, he went to Moscow to discuss a ceasefire but his visit was not successful to the 
extent that 5 days later, U.S. forces around the world were put on Red Alert, a nuclear alert, 
claims Hard.956 Though in his memoirs and in Crisis, Kissinger says that the forces were put 
on DefCon (Defense Condition) Three, the highest level of alert, particularly when 
information reached D.C. that the Soviet Union was planning a rescue operation of Egypt’s 
besieged third army.957   
Furthermore, and perhaps the most important aspect of this particular conflict was 
when in response to America’s support for Israel, the Arab controlled Organization of 																																																								
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Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), embargoed the sale of oil to any state it believed 
supported Israel, even Saudi Arabia, a traditional U.S. ally joined this embargo. 958  In 
December of the same year, OPEC announced a vast increase in the price of oil. Though 
Arab petroleum accounted only to 37 percent of western market, the results were 
devastating.959 According to a Department of Energy report released in 1974, the five-month 
embargo cost 500,000 jobs, and almost $20 billion loss in gross domestic product (GDP).960 
If any official had any doubt about the importance of the Middle East and, further, the dire 
need to resolve the ongoing conflict, this devastating effect on the economy was surely 
enough to abolish it.  
The 1973 War and the OPEC’s oil embargo brought the Palestinian issue to a whole 
new level of importance. And the PLO attempted to capitalize on it. It was clear to Arafat and 
leaders of the Palestinian factions within the PLO that sooner or later they ought to submit to 
the diplomatic option. That is to say that their focus until then had been on military 
operations and terror attacks against Israel and its interests abroad, they realized that they 
needed to have a clear political program on which they could pursue the establishment of a 
Palestinian state. However, Arafat faced the challenge of the hardliners who did not believe 
in such step.961 
Beginning in November 1973, Henry Kissinger embarked on a journey of “shuttle 
diplomacy” between Israel, Egypt and Syria in order to stop hostilities and negotiate an 
agreement.962 Naturally, the issue of Palestine rose at many of these meetings. Kissinger was 
aware of the importance of the Palestinian Question, but he chose to ignore it, probably due 
to the complexity of the issue and the burden it would have added to his efforts. Or another 
possible explanation is that he did not want to deal with Arafat, his concern was preventing 
another war, and not necessarily achieving a long-term peace settlement. The last thing the 
U.S. wanted was another war that would certainly disrupt the flow of oil, increase its price 
and give the Soviet Union more influence in the region. 
Kissinger urged Israel to surrender land to Jordan in order to “lock Hussein in 
negotiations.”963 Indeed, as Kissinger told Rabin in Washington when the latter came to 																																																								
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attend President Ford’s inauguration in 1974, the choices were either; a total settlement or a 
series of partial settlements.”964 The total settlement would include all issues and its failure 
would result in great pressures. Furthermore, total settlement would have raised the issue of 
the 1967 borders prematurely. And finally, total settlement would raise questions on 
Jerusalem and the Palestinians. For these reasons, “there must be some alternative framework 
to prevent the Palestinian issue from overwhelming all else.”965 
With Nixon distracted with the Watergate Scandal, which eventually led to his 
resignation on August 9, 1974, the running of foreign policy was left to Kissinger. Sadat 
urged Kissinger to open communication with the PLO, the two had developed a serious 
relationship, according to Quandt.966 Nixon authorized Vernon Walters, Deputy CIA director, 
to meet with Khalid al Hassan, “number two to Arafat” in Morocco in March 1974. Khalid 
was an acceptable face of PLO leadership to the Americans since he did not occupy an 
official position within the PLO. The Foreign Relations Series includes messages on the 
meetings from Walters to Kissinger. 967  The talks came to nothing in the end. Walters 
reiterated the U.S.’s position that King Hussein was a friend of the U.S. and cautioned against 
overthrowing his regime. The U.S., according to Walters, was not an expert in the history of 
intra-Arab politics and culture that it could invent solution.968  
In their critical biography of Arafat, Rubin and Rubin argue that another factor played 
a role in America’s wish to talk with the PLO. The motive was “to avoid more attacks on its 
own officials.” 969  According to Rubin, there were “credible reports” that the PLO was 
planning to target Secretary Rogers during his 1973 visit to the Gulf. “To defuse such a 
potential terrorist campaign against the United States,” Nixon sent Walters to meet with PLO 
officials in Morocco in March 1974.970  
Kissinger’s diplomacy between Egypt and Israel culminated in the Second Sinai 
Agreement on September 1, 1975.971 The two parties agreed that the conflict between them 
would not be resolved by military force, but through peaceful means. Egypt agreed to allow 
non-military ships destined for Israel, or leaving from Israel, to pass peacefully through the 
Suez Canal. Israel would withdraw from occupied territories in the Sinai in 14 stages, 																																																								
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beginning on November 1975 and ending in February the following year. 972  A month 
following the agreement, Sadat visited Washington to mark the first visit of an Egyptian 
president to the American capital. During his trip, Sadat requested military aid, and received 
positive response from the Ford administration regarding his request.973 The signing of the 
Second Sinai Agreement marked a new era in American-Egyptian relations. Egypt and Sadat 
abandoned the Soviet camp, in exchange for American friendship and American foreign 
assistance. 
In September 1975, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin managed to acquire U.S. 
commitment not to recognize the PLO and not negotiate with it until the PLO renounced 
terror and accepted UN resolution 242.974  In a press conference in November 1975, in 
response to the following question, “…State Department officials suggested that the 
Palestinian issue was at the core of the problem in the Middle East. Do you agree with that?” 
President Ford responded, “it certainly is a very important part of the problem, because the 
Palestinians do not recognize the State of Israel. And under those circumstances, it is 
impossible to bring the Palestinians and the Israelis together to negotiate. So, unless there is 
some change in their attitude, I think you can see a very serious roadblock exists.”975  
According to Kissinger, in order to facilitate Arab-Israeli negotiations, the U.S. 
attached a memorandum of understanding with Israel following each disengagement 
agreement between the belligerents. To the U.S., the memorandum “outlined American 
attitudes toward various contingencies.”976 After the Syrian disengagement, U.S. had agreed 
to “sympathetically” study Israel’s security needs, writes Kissinger. The Israeli government 
saw this memorandum as “a legal commitment to a gigantic request for a ten-year 
authorization of $40 billion…” to be requested by the administration from congress on behalf 
of Israel.977 It was to be the largest request ever made by any administration on behalf of a 
foreign country, according to Kissinger. The request was made during Nixon’s last days in 
office, when Nixon hesitated; Israel made the request a precondition for continuing the peace 
process. Nixon was very annoyed and refused. The matter was one of the first issues 
president Ford had to deal with. During Ford’s first NSC meeting, Defense Secretary James 																																																								
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Schlesinger informed Ford that the request would essentially take the equipment from the 
U.S. own forces, which they needed. When Ford asked if the Israelis were aware of that, 
Schlesinger said that they did, and that they felt that they should be the priority, to which 
Ford responded, “that certainly is an unselfish attitude.”978 
The Egyptian and Israeli aid requests were a mere a drop of what was to come. Since 
the signing of the Sinai agreement, Egypt and Israel have been the main recipients of U.S. 
foreign assistance, with both countries receiving in the region of $2.5 to $3 billion dollars 
annually. The Camp David Accords expanded on the aid provided to these two countries and 
soon it set the precedence of Paying for Peace in the use of the American aid program.  
4.5. Roots of Moderation (1974) 
At the Palestinian National Council meeting in 1974, the PLO showed the first signs 
of moderation and signaled the possibility of accepting a two state solution. The 
organization’s new policy, as outlined in the “Ten Point” program, created three new policy 
features; first acceptance of a Palestinian state on parts of Palestine, a major change from the 
previous view of one state and total liberation; second the language indicated a desire to 
accept diplomatic activities; and finally the program demonstrated a tendency to “formulate a 
strategy of stages; a strategy that seeks to realize the dream of a secular democratic state over 
a protracted period of time,” instead of all goals at once.979 The 1974 PNC meeting marks a 
historic moment in PLO history as the organization was preparing to join the diplomatic 
struggle. 
Unfortunately for Kissinger, Arafat managed to secure a historic recognition of the 
PLO from the Arab summit in Rabat in October 1974 confirming “the right of the Palestinian 
people to establish independent, national government under the leadership of the PLO as the 
sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people…”980 This took whatever power King 
Hussein had over the West Bank and Jerusalem, much to his disappointment, and handed it 
over to the PLO thereby forcing Kissinger, and the United States in general, to deal with 
Arafat and the PLO in any future peace arrangements.  
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In October of the same year, the PLO won another major diplomatic victory. This 
time it was a worldwide recognition of the organization as the representative of the 
Palestinian people, not just the Arab league. On October 14, 1974, the United Nations 
General Assembly (UNGA), passed resolution 3210 that was sponsored by 72 member states. 
The resolution passed by a massive margin, 105 members vote yes and four opposed it; 
Dominican Republic, Israel, Bolivia and the United States; while 20 countries, mostly 
Western European states abstained from voting altogether.981 The resolution was a victory for 
the PLO because it invited the PLO “the representative of the Palestinian people, to 
participate in the deliberations of the General Assembly on the question of Palestine in 
plenary meetings.” 982 
U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations (UN), John A. Scali, explained the U.S. 
opposition to the resolution on two bases; first, such resolution could be harmful to 
America’s peace efforts in the region, in reference to Henry Kissinger’s post- 1973 efforts; 
second, the resolution was breaking away from “the longstanding precedent that only 
representatives of governments should be allowed to participate in plenary deliberations,” 
according to Scali.983 The scheduled deliberations were postponed for a month, awaiting the 
decisions of the Arab head of states summit in Rabat, which recognized the PLO as the 
representative of the Palestinian people. 
The historic November deliberations lasted for a week, between November 14 and 
November 22. The first session opened with Arafat’s historic speech; the “Olive Branch” 
speech. Arafat spoke of what he said were the injustices the Palestinians had faced and called 
for the creation of a secular and an independent Palestinian state in which Muslims, 
Christians, and Jews could live together side by side in an equal society. 984  The most 
memorable moment of Arafat’s speech was his closing statement when he said, 
“I appeal to you to enable our people to establish national 
independent sovereignty over its own land. Today I have come 
bearing an olive branch and a freedom fighter’s gun. Do not let 
the olive branch fall from my hand. Do not let the olive branch 
fall from my hand.”985 
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Furthermore, Arafat spoke directly to the American people during his speech asking 
the American people, “what, I ask you plainly, is the crime of the people of Palestine against 
the American people? Why do you fight us so?”986 At the conclusion of the deliberations, the 
UNGA adopted two more resolutions, 3236 and 3237 which all but recognized Palestine as a 
state. Resolution 3236 affirmed the Palestinians’ right to self-determination, national 
independence and sovereignty, return of refugees and most importantly, recognized the 
“Palestinian people as a principle party in the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the 
Middle East.”987 The second resolution invited the PLO to participate in the general assembly 
and “international conferences convened under the auspices of the General Assembly in the 
capacity of observer.”988 The passing of the two resolutions left the United States with no 
option but to deal with the PLO, if the Palestinian dimension of the Middle East conflict was 
to be resolved.  
Then, after the events in Rabat unfolded, Ford made a statement that rang alarm bells 
in Israel. “There must be a movement toward settlement of the problems between Israel and 
Egypt on the one hand, between Israel and Jordan or the PLO on the other…”989 President 
Ford’s statement was surprising since it could be interpreted as an implicit recognition of the 
PLO as the representative of the Palestinians. Furthermore, it was the first time a U.S. 
president spoke openly about the possibility of Israel-PLO negotiations, which Israel rejected 
entirely. It would appear that Ford’s statement came from Kissinger. According to Spiegel, 
Kissinger was becoming frustrated with Israeli Prime Minister Rabin, and had encouraged 
Ford to make the statement “in a way calculated to disturb Israel,” to serve as a warning to 
Rabin who had proven “stubborn, and shortsighted…”990 
The events in Rabat and Geneva played an important role in transforming the 
Question of Palestine in American foreign policy circles. Previously, it was a humanitarian 
problem of refugees and displaced persons who lacked the basic necessities of life to a more 
complex political question of a nation without a state. In 1975, the questions of refugee and 
representation were brought up before congress. The 94th congress which began in January 
1975, with both chambers of congress in the hands of the Democrats, organized hearings 																																																								
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before the Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on International 
Relations. The forum marked the State Department’s release of what became known as the 
Saunders Document.991 
 Harold Saunders was one of Kissinger’s top aides on Middle East affairs as his 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs. Saunders was “laconic, 
cautious, bland of aspect, Saunders was very competent and shrewd. He was renowned in the 
department for the tightness and lucidity of his prose, for his cogency of analysis in strategic 
papers.”992 Saunders was the first American official to argue that the Question of Palestine 
was “the heart” of the Arab-Israeli conflict. He states, 
“In many ways, the Palestinian dimension of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict is the heart of that conflict. Final resolution of the 
problems arising from the partition of Palestine, the establishment 
of the State of Israel, and Arab opposition to those events will not 
be possible until agreement is reached defining a just and 
permanent status for the Arab peoples who consider themselves 
Palestinians…”993 
 
It took 25 years after the official founding of the State of Israel, and the expulsion and 
displacement of Palestine refugees, for the U.S. to acknowledge the political dimension of the 
Palestinian problem. The Americans’ focus was primarily on ensuring the flow of oil from 
the Middle East and into the world market. Another important, and related objective was 
limiting the Soviet influence in the Middle East through regimes such as Nasser’. Finally, the 
domestic politics of the United States, and the leverage Israel and its allies enjoy within the 
chambers of congress ensured that the Palestinian question remained in the background.994  
A Palestinian homeland would have required the U.S. to mount pressure on Israel to 
withdraw from territories the latter was never willing to withdraw from for security, and 
religious reasons and Johnson, Kennedy, Nixon and Ford were never willing to do that. It 
would be hard to argue that U.S. policy makers simply did not know or did not understand 
the Palestinian dimension of the conflict. The likelier explanation is that it was a deliberate 																																																								
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ignorance. The U.S. administrations had hoped the Palestinian question would resolve itself 
through the Jordan Option, that with time the problem would simply disappear when the 
refugees are integrated in whatever Arab country they escaped to.  
By the mid-1970s, it became apparent that the U.S. had to involve the PLO in 
negotiations if the Arab-Israeli conflict is to be resolved. For American policy makers, the 
PLO was a powerful terrorist organization that until then still had not recognized Israel’s 
right to exist, and had spent the better time since its founding in alliance with the Soviets and 
their clients in the Arab nationalist regimes. However, the PLO had won international 
recognition as the representative of the Palestinian people. The Ford administration handed 
the unresolved problem to President Jimmy Carter, who would achieve more in Middle East 
peace than any other president to date. Carter was the first president, or presidential 
candidate, to openly acknowledge that the solution to the Palestine question lay in the 
establishment of a homeland for Palestine refugees during the campaign for the 1976 general 
elections.995 
4.6. Peace at Last 
A significant contribution was made in this period by American academics in the 
Brookings Institution’s 1975 policy paper Toward Peace in the Middle East, more commonly 
referred to as the “Brookings Report.”996 The study was carried out by a number of scholars 
and diplomats, many of whom would later be affiliated with the Carter administration, and 
two of them became key members of Carter’s foreign policy team; Zbigniew Brzezinski, 
Carter’s National Security Advisor; and William Quandt, who served on Nixon and Carter’s 
NSC.997 The report, which was endorsed by Presidential candidate Jimmy Carter, reached 
five main conclusions;  
1. The U.S. has a strong moral, political, and economic interest in a stable 
peace in the Middle East.  
2. The Sinai interim agreement leaves “the basic elements of the Arab-Israeli 
dispute substantially untouched…the best way to address these issues is by 
the pursuit of a comprehensive settlement.”  
3. The time was ripe for the U.S. to begin a process of negotiating a 
settlement through multilateral meetings or a general peace conference.  																																																								
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4. A fair and enduring settlement that includes Palestinian self-determination, 
respect for the territorial integrity of all states, normalization of Arab-Israeli 
relations, Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders, and access to the holy 
places in Jerusalem. 
5. The report advocated an active role for the U.S. in reaching an agreement 
since it has the means to assist the parties economically and militarily, by 
submitting concrete peace proposals.998 
Carter himself had little foreign policy experience when he came into office in 1977. 
Born to a cotton and peanuts farmer and trained as an engineer, neither his background, nor 
his professional career qualified him as an expert on foreign affairs.999 In order to make up 
for this lack of experience, Carter assembled a diverse and experienced foreign policy team 
who proved vital to his success in securing the Egyptian- Israeli peace agreement. The most 
influential foreign policy position, the Secretary of State, was delegated to Cyrus R. Vance, 
who was an international lawyer and a Deputy Secretary of Defense during the 1967 Arab-
Israeli War.1000 Another crucial appointment was Zbigniew Brzezinski’s as National Security 
Advisor. Brzezinski’s publications as an academic tended to be more leftist, and advocated 
the establishment of a Palestinian state.1001 Vice President Walter Mondale who had close ties 
with the Jewish community, and was an adamant supporter of Israel balanced Brzezinski.1002 
According Quandt, while others moved in and out of the inner-circles of the foreign policy 
decision-making, Carter, Vance and Brzezinski remained at the very heart of it.1003  
Following Jimmy Carter’s inauguration, Arafat and the PLO prepared to re-issue their 
struggle for America’s recognition. Arafat had sent a number of messages to the U.S. through 
the Egyptians, the Saudis and the Syrians, to no avail.1004 The U.S. was determined that the 
PLO should accept resolutions 242 and 338 and acknowledge Israel’s right to exist and 
abandon all forms of violence and terrorism against Israel. As has been discussed, the first of 
these resolutions was issued in 1967 and called for the withdrawal of Israel armed forces 
from territories occupied in recent conflict.1005 The resolution implies recognition of Israel, 																																																								
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and respect for its territory and sovereignty. Resolution 338 was issued in 1973 and called for 
an immediate ceasefire and the implementation of resolution 242.1006 Such demands were too 
high for Arafat to meet, if not to him personally, then to the other parties in the PLO, and 
other voices within Fatah. Historians Walker and Gowers argue that Arafat reaching out to 
the U.S. and attempting to bring the PLO in international peace conferences was “taking a 
mile where his colleagues had given a few inches.”1007 
But with Carter, Arafat had reason to be more optimistic. On March 17, 1977, in a 
small town meeting in Massachusetts, Jimmy Carter said “there has to be a homeland 
provided for the Palestinian refugees who had suffered for many, many years…”1008 Carter 
and Secretary Cyrus Vance differed greatly from their predecessors. Three months after 
taking office, Carter reiterated his support for a “homeland for the Palestinians,” and two 
months later, the State Department also confirmed this new aspect in U.S. policy.1009 
By then Carter realize that neither the Egyptians nor the Saudis were effective 
channels of communication between the U.S. and the PLO. So in September Carter sent his 
Quaker friend, Landrum Bolling to speak directly with Arafat.1010 Arafat met with Bolling in 
Beirut and informed him that he had received contradictory messages from Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia.1011 In one message from Egypt, Carter said he would recognize the PLO and invite 
Arafat to the scheduled Geneva peace conference if the organization accepted resolution 242, 
but later Arafat received another message from the Saudis taking back these promises.1012 
These two regimes, for one reason or the other distorted the messages between the Carter 
administration and Arafat. Carter’s statement two years later probably clarifies some of this 
confusion. In a question-and-answer session with Florida newspaper editors in August 1979, 
Carter revealed that he had “never met an Arab leader that in private professed a desire for an 
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independent Palestinian state. Publicly, they all espouse an independent Palestinian state, 
almost all of them…”1013  
Arafat said to Bolling that he felt “blackmailed” by the Arab regimes and that he 
would reconsider the PLO’s position on 242, and report back the PLO’s acceptance with 
reservation.1014 What Arafat really wanted were American guarantees that there would be a 
Palestinian state under the leadership of the PLO.1015 This was much to ask from Carter who 
was already facing immense domestic pressure for his leniency with the PLO.1016 When 
Bolling informed Brzezinski of Arafat’s demands, Brzezinski suggested that Arafat was 
either too weak, or too out of touch with reality.1017 
On 1 October, Vance and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko announced the 
reconvening the Geneva Conference. The cleverly drafted declaration made no mention of 
the PLO, to make it easier for Israel to accept, nor did it mention 242, to make it easier for the 
PLO to accept. Arafat was thrilled. Asked by Hart if he had believed that the Americans and 
Soviets were working for peace, Arafat responded, “yes, yes, yes. I was very happy, very 
excited. It was an historic movement. For the first time the two superpowers were committed 
to doing something for us Palestinians. Truly, I believe there would be peace with some 
justice for my people. I was more optimistic than at any point in my life.”1018 Vance soon 
discovered that for all his promises, Arafat could not deliver. 1019  He had faced stern 
opposition within Fatah and within the PLO.1020  
What made matters more difficult for the peace efforts was the election in May 1977 
of Menachem Begin and the right wing Likud Party in Israel.  Begin had no interest in talking 
with the PLO, or Syria, or Jordan, or anyone else for that matter on the Palestinian issue.1021 
Begin was of the belief that Israel must remain in control of the land it acquired by war. His 
ideology “envisioned a vastly expanded Israel,” that even included Jordan.1022 Many Israelis, 
according to Wright considered him a “crank, a fascist or just an embarrassing reminder of 																																																								
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the terrorist underground that stained the legend of the country’s glorious struggle for 
independence.”1023 Ben-Gurion, labeled Begin “a racist who is willing to kill all the Arabs in 
order to gain control of the entire land of Israel.” 1024  He rejected the declaration and 
dispatched his Foreign Minister, Moshe Dayan to D.C. to persuade Carter to back down from 
the declaration, which according to Hart, Dayan succeeded in achieving.1025  
On November 8, 1977, Sadat invited Arafat to attend a meeting of the Egyptian 
assembly. In his speech, Sadat indicated his willingness to go to “the end of the world” to 
pursue peace.1026 He then shortened the trip significantly and invited himself to Israel to 
address the Knesset, the Israeli parliament. Sadat said, “in fact I know that Israel will be 
astounded when I say that I am ready to go to their very home, to the Knesset, to debate with 
them.” 1027  Israel was astounded indeed, the U.S. was astounded, the world was also 
astounded, but none was more astounded than Arafat who sat there, realizing that Sadat was 
using him. Arafat’s presence during the speech meant that he approved of Sadat’s visit, 
which he plainly did not, as he picked himself up and stormed off as soon as Sadat sat 
down.1028 Prior to his departure from Cairo, Arafat told his aides, “a long time will pass 
before I come again to Egypt.” Besides his other skills, Arafat added prophecy. Six years 
would pass before he sets foot in the city of his birth again.1029  
Egyptian-PLO relations deteriorated to reach their lowest point in history after Sadat’s 
speech and visit. Allying with Assad in Syria now, Arafat openly called for the overthrow of 
the “treasonous” Egyptian leader.1030 On December 15, 1977, President Carter declared that 
“by its completely negative attitude, the PLO has excluded itself from any immediate 
prospect of participating in the peace negotiations,” while Brzezinski put it more bluntly in an 
interview with Paris Match, saying “Bye Bye PLO.” 1031  Arafat would later respond to 
Brzezinski’s statement saying that “the Palestinians are here, will be around for a long time, 
and anything the U.S. may say will not affect this.”1032 
Despite what seemed to be an opportunity to include the PLO in the ongoing peace 
talk, the Carter administration left office without ever succeeding. Fingers may be pointed at 																																																								
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anyone. The PLO blamed the U.S. and the U.S. blamed the PLO. However, neither party was 
particularly guilty. Arafat was willing to take what seemed to him at the time as drastic 
measures to gain American recognition and initiate diplomatic contact, and Carter was also 
willing to do so. The trouble was the messengers, the timing, and Menachem Begin. Arafat 
did not just face heavy pressures from other political parties within the PLO, but also serious 
Syrian opposition to the diplomatic contact with the U.S. at a time when he lost Egypt, Syria 
was his only friend left.1033 
The Carter years slipped by without the PLO taking advantage of President Carter’s 
willingness to talk with the PLO, the most important reason being Arafat’s inability to 
moderate voices within his own organization who were still suspicious of Carter and the U.S. 
in General. Yet the worst blow for the PLO was Sadat’s decision to sign a peace treaty with 
Israel. The PLO felt betrayed by Sadat whose choice to enter negotiations for a peace treaty 
with Israel, marginalized the organization. What Sadat did was put the other issues on the 
shelf and focus on retrieving the Sinai, the Egyptian territory occupied by Israel in 1967 and 
the Egyptians failed to retrieve in 1973. According to Rabie, “no headway could be made 
until issues related to the Egyptian-Israeli dispute were isolated from the larger Arab-Israeli 
conflict.”1034 Sadat critics like Edward Said believe that Sadat “[promised] Arab countries 
things which he could never deliver, and of working outside Arab history, society, and 
actuality… towards the end of his time in office, Sadat abused the Arabs mercilessly.”1035 
Sadat, fully realizing the paramount importance of the Palestinian issue as an obstacle 
to peace with Israel intentionally invited Arafat to attend his “invitation to Jerusalem speech,” 
knowing Arafat would react the way he did. Sadat intentionally worked on killing Carter’s 
Geneva conference plan because bringing Palestinian representation, or even raising the 
Palestinian question would doubtless result in the conference’s failure, driving the region to 
the brink of war yet again. Sadat intentionally marginalized the PLO, knowing that keeping 
the PLO out of the peace process meant leaving the Palestinian issue out of the negotiations, 
and therefore giving the negotiations a chance to succeed. Sadat gave up on a comprehensive 
settlement, and he simply put recovering Sinai and the Egyptian territories, which he had 
failed to regain by means of war, as a priority above Palestinian considerations, even if it 
meant isolating Egypt in the Arab World, as it did. Furthermore, an agreement with Israel, 
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under the auspice of the U.S. would certainly guarantee Egypt economic and military 
assistance, for which Egypt was in desperate need. 
As for Arafat and the PLO, they had made a serious mistake, an error of ill judgment. 
There was a deep mistrust of the U.S. within the ranks of the PLO, particularly among groups 
affiliated with Syria and the Soviet Union like the PFLP. Their pressure on Arafat cost the 
Palestinian cause much. There has hardly been a U.S. president with a foreign policy team 
that was as sympathetic to the Palestinian cause as was Carter and his team. It would take 
another 15 years for the PLO to have another chance to have a dialogue with the U.S.  
4.6.1. Camp David 
	 President Carter’s greatest achievement, and arguably the greatest achievement of any 
U.S. president in the Middle East conflict to date, was securing the Egyptian Israeli peace 
agreement at Camp David resort in Maryland in 1978. According to the Wall Street Journal, 
the success at Camp David raised the president’s approval ratings by almost 10 percent.1036 
Yet, despite this rise, Carter and his foreign policy team were sentenced to leave office when 
the American people felt that the administration failed to handle the Iranian Hostage Crisis in 
1979 well enough. By the time Carter left office, his ratings were below 35 percent, the 2nd 
lowest after George W. Bush.1037  
It took the Carter team more than a year of strenuous diplomatic activity to bring the 
Egyptians and Israelis to the negotiations table. With the death of the Geneva conference, and 
Syria and the PLO’s intense opposition to Sadat, only an Egyptian-Israeli agreement was 
remotely possible. With this conviction, president Carter sent hand-written notes to Sadat and 
Begin inviting them to the Camp David resort in Maryland.1038 The leaders and their teams 
arrived the U.S. on September 5, 1978 to embark on historic for 13 days under the guidance 
of Carter and his foreign policy team. Carter chaired the American delegation and with him 
went; Vice-President Walter Mondale; Press Secretary Jody Powell; NSC member William 
Quandt; Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asian Affairs; 
and the U.S.’s ambassadors to Israel and Egypt, Samuel Lewis and Hermann Elits 
respectively.1039 Carter chose to keep the media out of the process, preferring to provide “a 
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relaxed and secluded atmosphere for serious discussions.”1040 Carter probably believed that 
the further away the leaders were from the media and their constituents, the more likely they 
are to reach a deal. 
By most accounts, the deliberations were far from easy, despite the absence of the 
PLO. Begin proved too hardheaded and stubborn for diplomacy and negotiations. According 
to Brzezinski, Begin always looked as if he was going to a funeral.1041 Sadat was quite the 
opposite; he was warm and relaxed, unlike his team. Indeed, the Israeli team, particularly 
Moshe Dayan, was far more flexible than their Egyptian counterparts, which suggests that it 
was all perhaps a part of a plan on both sides’ part; Sadat would be flexible, his team rigid; 
Begin would be rigid while his team would be flexible. Yet for all the flexibility of the Israeli 
team and Sadat, the negotiations stalled over the settlements Israel built in Sinai. Dayan said 
plainly that his remaining right eye would fall off before he “signs a scrap of paper permitting 
the dismantling of the Jewish settlements.”1042 Sadat, with packed suitcases ready to leave, 
was only made to wait by president Carter who went to Sadat’s cabin and asked for a second 
chance. Begin eventually agreed to put the matter to the Knesset. Were it not for the 
“extraordinary commitment of energy and ideas” from Carter, and his team, no agreement 
would have materialized.1043 
The resulting agreement was actually two agreements rather than a treaty; A 
Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel and A 
Framework for Peace in the Middle East. The peace treaty was signed by Sadat and Begin in 
D.C. on March 26, 1979, and entailed the following; the return of the Sinai to Egypt at the 
price of normalizing relations with Israel, which included ambassador exchange; 
demilitarization of Sinai, restrictions on Egyptian forces within 20-40 km of Israel’s borders; 
and guaranteed freedom of passage for Israeli ships in the Suez Canal and Straits of Tiran.1044 
Regarding the Palestinians, the agreement can be described as ambiguous at best. The 
Framework for Peace in the Middle East, seem to have been deliberately written to cover the 
big differences between the two sides. The preamble reiterated that the basis for a peaceful 
settlement was to be based on resolution 242, in all its parts.1045 The agreement included the 																																																								
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“legitimate rights of the Palestinian people,” to be negotiated between Egypt, Israel, Jordan 
and “the representatives of the Palestinian people,” which would result in full autonomy to 
the inhabitants and a self-governing authority in a period not exceeding five years.1046   
The ambiguities and vagueness of the agreement are apparent in its failure to define 
who the representatives of the Palestinians would be. Needless to say, the agreement did not 
include a word about the PLO being the representative of the Palestinians. The agreement did 
not indicate when the five-year period was to begin either. What the Palestinians call “the 
right of return,” was not mentioned and the refugee question was to be addressed by the 
parties. Finally, the report did not address Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza, 
nor did it address the question of Israeli settlements in these areas. The Hebrew version of the 
agreement does not even include the term “Palestinians.” Wherein the English version “Gaza 
Strip” and “West Bank” are used, in the Hebrew version they are referred to as “Judea, 
Samaria and the Gaza District.” In the English text, “the resolution of the Palestinian problem 
in all its aspects,” in the Hebrew version translates as “the resolution of the problem of the 
Eretz Israel Arabs….”, “legitimate rights,” in the English text, became “legal rights,” “self-
governing authority,” was “self-administration authority.”1047  
Arafat’s reaction to the treaty was “let them sign what they like. False peace will not 
last.”1048 Unfortunately for him, it has lasted, if only because the framework for peace was 
never actually implemented, nor was its implementation tied to the other agreement regarding 
Israeli-Egyptian peace. As Quandt remarked, it was obvious that what was achieved at Camp 
David was an Egyptian-Israeli bilateral agreement, with very loose links to anything else.1049  
 A part of Sadat’s motivation to reach an agreement with Israel was his desire to 
establish a relationship with the U.S. that would help resolve the internal economic problems 
with economic aid, investment, and American technology. According to Quandt, the idea was 
clearly on his mind, but it did not come up in the actual negotiations. Quandt recalled a 
conversation between Sadat and Carter in which the latter informed Sadat that if they manage 
to reach a peace agreement, the U.S. would have a relationship that is “comparable” to U.S.-
Israel’s relationship, without going in details about economic or military aid. The reason that 																																																								
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was not possible now, explained Carter, was that Egypt was in a state of war with Israel and 
congress would never agree to send significant aid to a country at war with Israel.1050 Sadat 
went to his team and told them, once we make peace with Israel, we will get the same amount 
of aid that Israel does. As the parties came close to reaching an agreement Egypt’s Prime 
Minister, started inquiring about economic and military aid through a list of questions that 
required U.S. promises on future assistance.1051 
 There was an expectation on both the American and Egyptians sides that once an 
agreement was reach, the U.S. would provide an economic and a military aid program. In a 
sign of what was to come, the U.S. agreed to sell helicopters and transport planes before the 
summit, and in the lead up to Camp David, the U.S. also offered to sell a small number of F5 
fighters to Egypt as a symbolic gesture.1052 
 
 Figure	4:1,	Total	U.S.	Aid	Obligations	to	Israel	and	Egypt	before	and	After	Camp	David	Accords	in	billion	of	Constant	USD,	(USAID).1053	
There is a maxim in American-Middle East relations that is attributed to Secretary 
Kissinger that states “there is no war in the Middle East without Egypt, and no peace without 
Syria.” What Camp David did was neutralize the Egyptian militarily as a threat. The 
American incentive, as Khalid Elgindy put it, was removing Egypt “from the equation 
strategically and militarily.”1054 Meaning that, if Egypt no longer wars against Israel, who 
would? Even the combined strength of all of Israel’s neighbor was never able to defeat Israel, 
a single state alone, like Syria or Jordan, did not stand a chance against Israel. According to 																																																								
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Elgindy, Camp David made the Egyptian military a client, removing the military from the 
Soviet camp, which Sadat was already doing, and now the U.S. and Egypt had developed a 
military-military relationship, which allowed the U.S. to influence these officers 
themselves.1055 The Egyptian military had a stake in maintaining the relationship with the 
U.S., and going to war with Israel would surely upset it. 
 Through the Camp David agreement, the U.S. paid for both peace and for the peace 
dividend. The promises of future assistance helped persuade the Egyptians and Israelis to 
accept coming to Camp David, and also in reaching the agreement itself. As for the dividend, 
the U.S. saw its assistance as an investment; spending money in support of certain institutions 
and mechanisms to support the political process. The dividend would bring peace, economic 
stability, more investment, and above all, improvements in people’s lives, particularly in 
Egypt.1056 
 President Carter was awarded the Noble Peace Prize in 2002 for “his decades of 
untiring effort to find peaceful solutions to international conflicts, to advance democracy and 
human rights, and to promote economic and social development.”1057 Until today, he is still 
active in the field of diplomacy and conflict resolution. In 1994, he succeeded in preventing a 
crisis that threatened to erupt in a bloody conflict in Haiti by convincing the military to 
surrender power.1058 In August 2010, Carter secured the release of an American citizen who 
was taken in North Korea.1059 Carter has also met with leaders of organizations listed as 
foreign terrorist organizations by the State Department, including Hamas’ Khaled Meshal.1060 
Carter’s diplomacy seems to be limitless as he continues to be an (un)official link between 
the U.S. government and the leaders of countries and organizations that the United States has 
little to no diplomatic contact with. 
4.7. The Reagan Years 
According to Quandt, Ronald Reagan was “puzzle;” he did not understand the middle 
east issues, and therefore had to rely on his advisors such as Secretary of State Alexander 
Haig (January-July 1982) and Shultz (July 1982- 1989).1061 The reason for Reagan’s reliance 
on his close circle was not his lack of knowledge and understanding of the Middle East 																																																								
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conflict and politics only, but also in foreign policy affairs in general. Indeed, the former 
television and radio entertainer arrived at the Oval Office with absolutely no foreign policy 
experience but he “did not lack opinions about America’s proper role in the world,” 
according to Melanson.1062 Reagan embarked on a process of strengthening the armed forces 
to “reestablish the American military superiority over the Soviet Union...”1063  
The presidency of Ronald Reagan marked arguably the worst era of U.S-PLO 
relations, despite the fact that Reagan’s administration was the first administration to 
establish official diplomatic contact with the PLO. Reagan’s first term with respect to the 
Palestinian question is remembered for giving Israel the green light invade Lebanon in 1982, 
to remove the threat of the PLO from Israel’s northern borders. It was a strong signal that if 
Israel could destroy the PLO, it was fine with the U.S. The green light for the invasion 
reflected and Reagan and Haig’s Cold War view that PLO was aligned with the Soviet 
Union. The Cold War fears were revived due to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Secretary 
Haig even suggested a “warning nuclear shot” in Europe to deter the Soviet Union.1064 Even 
with allies, Reagan was quite strict when it came to the “total quarantine of the Soviet 
Union,” “those who do not go along with us will be boycotted, too, and will be considered 
against us,” he said in an NSC in 1981.1065 Arafat and the PLO were in the “against us” camp.  
After its defeat and dismissal from Jordan in 1971, the PLO moved to Lebanon, and 
carried on exactly from where it left off in Jordan in terms of attacks on Israel, and also in 
terms of destabilizing the host country.1066 Lebanon was housing hundreds of thousands of 
Palestinian refugees already, and was suffering from a plethora of its own internal problems 
as Muslims, Christians and Druze were contesting for power. The Maronite Christians led the 
country, though they did not represent the majority of the population.1067 The arrival of 
Palestinian refugees added to the number of Muslims in the tiny country, fueling the 
instability further. The Cold War contributed to deepening the divisions as Muslims; Pan-
Arabist and left wing parties allied themselves with the Arab countries being supported by 
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the USSR; and the Christians sided with and were supported by the West.1068 The arrival of 
the defeated PLO tilted the balance of power favor of the Lebanese left. Despite many efforts 
to contain the situation, Lebanon erupted in a bloody civil between 1975 and 1990 that left 
130,000 civilians killed, nearly one quarter of the population approximately 1 million 
wounded, and mass migration out of the country.1069 
By 1981, PLO factions in Lebanon became a force to be reckoned with. Arafat had 
turned the PLO and Fatah’s forces into a semi-regular army. “We had a state called the PLO 
State within Lebanon, and within the PLO State we had a PFLP state, a DFLP state, a Fatah 
state… each faction had a state... We had an army and prisons,” says Mamdouh Noufal of the 
DFLP.1070  The PLO factions were still receiving financial and logistical assistance from 
Arab regimes. While this research was unable to verify these figures, Noufal who had been 
the DFLP Treasurer stated in an interview that, “the DFLP received a million dollars monthly 
from Libya, PFLP more than a million, General command, $1.5 in the period between 1978-
1980.” 1071  The factions continued their attacks on Israel on regular basis. Besides the 
incursions and kidnappings, PLO factions were now equipped with missiles that threatened 
Israeli residents in the north.1072 
In a meeting in Washington in May 1982 between Secretary Haig and Israel Minister 
of Defense Ariel Sharon, the latter informed the secretary that the invasion was imminent, 
citing Israel’s right to defend itself. According to Rubenberg, Haig’s only comment was that 
Israel would need a “clear breach of the case-fire to make the action acceptable in the 
international community.”1073 Rubenberg cited an unnamed high ranked American official 
saying, “Haig believed that Israel was doing our work for us in Lebanon.”1074 The meeting 
gave Sharon and Begin the green light to invade, all they needed was a serious Palestinian 
breach of the ceasefire that was arranged by Reagan’s special envoy Philip Habib. 
 According to Joe Stork and James Paul, the U.S. supplied Israel with $217.6 million 
worth of military equipment in the first quarter of 1982, nearly 10 times the amount delivered 
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in 1980, and 40 percent increase from the previous year.1075 The deliveries included, 10 F-15 
fighter jets, 14 tank recovery vehicles, 19 Howitzers, guided bombs, and $6 million worth of 
ammunition.1076  
Abu-Nidal Organization, a faction that split from Fatah earlier and had become 
Arafat’s most vicious enemy, provided Israel with the final excuse to invade after they 
attempted to assassinate Shlomo Argov, Israel’s ambassador to the United Kingdom. Event 
though the Abu-Nidal organization had been expelled from Lebanon and dismissed from the 
PLO, the attack was sufficient for Begin and Sharon to invade.1077 The bombing campaign 
and the invasion that followed was brutal by all standards. During the bombing of Beirut, 
Reagan spoke on the phone with Menachem Begin and declared angrily, “Menachem, this is 
a holocaust.”1078 
The organization was defeated in September 1982, and was forced to evacuate their 
fighters under American guarantees, provided by Reagan’s special envoy Habib, that the 
Palestinian refugees would be protected.1079 After the PLO evacuation, Christian Lebanese 
militia, Al-Kataeb, supported by the Israeli army, and some such as Abraham Weizefeld 
would argue with the knowledge and approval of the Israeli cabinet, invaded two Palestinian 
refugee camps and committed a horrifying massacre against Palestinian civilians.1080 The 
Sabra-Shatila Massacre did little to generate any trust between Reagan and Arafat.1081 
In an address to the American nation on September 1, 1982, following the PLO’s 
departure from Lebanon, Reagan spoke of a new opportunity for a just peace in the Middle 
East.1082 He certainly disliked the PLO but was mindful of the miseries inflicted on the 
Palestinian people. He said, “the question now is how to reconcile Israel’s legitimate security 
concerns with the legitimate rights of the Palestinians,” he then declares: “their cause is more 
than a question of refugees.”1083 “The military losses of the PLO have not diminished the 
yearning of the Palestinian people for a just solution of their claims,” “the departure of the 																																																								
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Palestinians from Beirut dramatizes more than ever the homelessness of the Palestinian 
people.”1084 Indeed, it is easy for one to imagine terrorists being loaded on ships, but seldom 
is one reminded of the fact that families were torn apart, yet again. However, Reagan’s 
proposed solution was an association, a full autonomy of the Palestinian territories with 
Jordan, an idea that PLO rejected entirely. 1085  The U.S. would oppose an independent 
Palestinian state; therefore the Palestinians should realize their legitimate political aspirations 
in a federal or confederate arrangement with Jordan. Reagan brought back the long held 
belief in American policy circles regarding the Jordan Option.  
After its departure from Lebanon, the PLO was weak and dispersed. Arafat ended up 
in Tunis. With no base of operations from which to attack Israel, and a host of Arab countries 
unwilling to host the organization after what happened in Jordan and Lebanon, the PLO was 
in a dire situation. The PLO’s rescue came from the least likely place, from the occupied 
territories, particularly from the Gaza Strip. 
On December 9, 1987, an IDF truck collided with a Palestinian civilian car, killing 
four passengers in Jabalia refugee camp in northern Gaza. The incident led to the first 
Palestinian uprising, or Intifada. The accident was merely the spark that started the fire since 
the uprising began to take roots since Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip in 1967. In his assessment of the causes, Benny Morris, an Israeli historian from the 
“New Historians” movement in Israel blames an “all-pervading element of humiliation,” that 
resulted from an occupation that was “always a brutal and mortifying experience for the 
occupied,” the occupation was “founded on brute force, repression and fear, collaboration 
and treachery, beatings and torture chambers, and daily intimidation, humiliation and 
manipulation.”1086  
According to Quandt, in the U.S. there was a brief period of  “what does this mean?” 
During the early period, the intifada was relatively peaceful, a civilian protest movement 
against a foreign occupier who had governed them for decades.1087 Palestinian youth, or 
“Children of the Stones,” took to the streets in protest against the Israeli occupation throwing 
stones at Israeli soldiers, hanging Palestinian flags from lampposts and electric wires, and 
drawing graffiti on practically every wall. Some of my own earliest memories as a child were 
of gathering stones in buckets with the neighborhood kids to supply the older youth. I recall 																																																								
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my older brother’s arrest one time when the IDF forced him to repaint the neighborhood 
walls and climb lampposts to bring down some flags. Soon after, Palestinians began going on 
strikes, paralyzing all aspects of life in the territories; shops and markets would shut down, 
civil servants stayed home without any planning or initial role of the PLO. The PLO began to 
regain a degree of supervision over all this. One man in the PLO leadership began to be 
perceived as the leader of the uprising. Khalil Al-Wazir, Abu Jihad, Arafat’s second in 
command, whose slogan “No Voice is louder than the Voice of the Intifada,” became the 
inspirational motto for the uprising. Wazir was soon directing strikes through Fatah affiliates 
in the territories. The strikes represented a vote of confidence in the indigenous leadership 
and the PLO. 
 The first uprising generated much more support for the Palestinian cause than any 
terrorist activity carried out by the PLO factions. The world was sympathizing with the young 
rock throwers and the weeping women facing Israeli soldiers.1088 The popular uprising was a 
spontaneous unplanned event, but the PLO soon harvested political victories that it had 
struggled for years to obtain. The uprising certainly helped pave the way for Arafat and the 
moderates to push the Reagan administration to recognize the PLO. 
Another important event that played a key role in bring U.S.-PLO dialogue closer was 
the disengagement declaration of King Hussein in July 1988. The West Bank was under 
Jordanian administration until its occupation by Israel in 1967, nonetheless, Jordan continued 
to manage educational and religious affairs in the West Bank, as well as pay for the salaries 
of Palestinian civil servants. In a televised address, King Hussein cited the decisions of the 
Rabat summit in 1974 in which the Arab leaders proclaimed the PLO as the “sole legitimate 
representative of the Palestinian people,” and the wishes of the PLO that disengagement “will 
contribute to the struggle of the Palestinian people and their glorious uprising.”1089 The king 
said “Jordan is not Palestine and the independent Palestinian state will be established on the 
occupied Palestinian territories after its liberation…”1090  
The Intifada convinced Hussein that he had no influence in the territories anymore. 
Consider the age of Palestinian youth in the West Bank, the youth were the real power behind 
the uprising in 1987-1988, most of them were born after 1967, they did not know Jordan, and 
Jordan did not know them. Hussein’s message to Washington was simply; if you wish to talk 
about the Palestinian issue, you have to negotiate with the PLO. The Jordan Option that the 																																																								
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successive U.S. administrations had clung to for years abandoned them. As for the PLO, for 
all its diplomatic and military efforts in the previous years, the uprising and Hussein’s 
disengagement provided serious enforcement of the PLO’s position as the only representative 
institution of the Palestinian people.  
The following section is derived for the most part from interviews with Mohammed 
Rabie and William Quandt. Across the Atlantic, after the king’s speech, Rabie and Quandt 
met in August 1988. Rabie had gone to school with many in the PLO’s leadership, including 
Khalid al-Hassan. Rabie told Quandt, “you know what is going on in Washington better than 
I do, and I know what is going on with the PLO better than you do. What if we tried to work 
out a formula whereby the U.S. and the PLO could deal directly with one another?”1091 They 
agreed that they would each try to find out what it would take for this dialogue to take place. 
Rabie went to Tunisia to speak with the PLO while Quandt spoke to State Department 
officials to find out their position on the issue of bringing about a U.S.-PLO dialogue. Quandt 
and Rabie’s aim was for things to move simultaneously on both sides with the prior 
understanding of “if you do this, I do that.” 
A week later, Quandt was informed that there was interest, but the PLO had to accept 
242, accept Israel’s right to exist, and it had to renounce terrorism. In return, the U.S. would 
accept self-determination for the Palestinian people, and recognize the PLO as their sole 
legitimate representative. Rabie returned from Tunisia with minor reservations, Quandt took 
the document to the State Department and Shultz was encouraged by the ongoing plans, but 
he said that he would not be in a position to give an authoritative answer until after the 
elections in November. There is a tendency in American politics that once an election has 
been held, and the new congress and/or president has won, politics enters a “lame duck 
session,” in which not much was done, but at the same time, the President is free of many 
constraints that would otherwise hinder them, particularly during election years. Vice-
President and Republican candidate George H.W. Bush was also interested in the plan, but 
said that he would rather not have it as the first thing to do if he became president, but 
promised to go along with it if Reagan approved it.  
Three months later, on November 15, 1988 at an emergency Palestinian National 
Council meeting in Algeria, Yasser Arafat declared the establishment of a Palestinian state. 
He read the Palestinian Declaration of Independence with nationalist fervor declaring, “the 
Palestine National Council, in the name of God, and in the name of the Palestinian Arab 																																																								
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people, hereby proclaims the establishment of the States of Palestine on our Palestinian 
territories with its capital holy Jerusalem.”1092 Arafat said that Palestine was a peace loving 
state, “committed to the settlement of regional and international disputes by peaceful means 
in accordance with the charter and resolutions of the United nations.”1093 The importance of 
the declaration is in the PLO’s acceptance of U.N. Resolutions 242, 338. The PLO accepted 
the division of Palestine, and called for multinational peace negotiations based on UN and 
UNSC resolutions. 1094 The U.S., however felt that the declaration fell short of the demands 
conveyed through Quandt.  
Arafat went to Sweden right after the American elections, which George H. W. Bush 
won. Shultz wanted to test Arafat to see if he was truly willing to meet U.S. conditions. He 
asked the Swedish Foreign Minister to present the deal to Arafat, in the same language as 
Rabie and Quandt’s. According to Quandt, Arafat recognized it and said that he had known it 
and that he would agree to it. Arafat signed the document in his personal capacity and 
promised to consult with rest of the PLO in Tunis. He agreed that once he had the PLO’s 
endorsement, he would go to the General Assembly and deliver a speech to say what was 
required. In late November, Arafat managed to persuade, or coerce, the PLO into accepting 
the agreement, all was left to do now was to visit New York to deliver the speech at the UN.  
In the speech Arafat was supposed to declare the PLO’s acceptance of 242, 338, and 
Israel’s right to exist. Shultz still did not trust Arafat fully, nor did he like the idea of dealing 
with the PLO, he probably wanted to test Arafat’s commitment to the understanding, 
therefore Shultz denied Arafat a visa to enter the U.S., he was less than fond Arafat and 
probably even held him in contempt.1095 While denying Arafat the visa, Shultz wrote the 
exact words and lines Arafat was supposed to say.1096 
Instead of New York, Arafat went to Geneva on December 13, and gave the speech at 
the UN headquarters. He said, “our Palestine National Council has reaffirmed its 
commitment to the UN resolutions…. It has also reaffirmed its rejection of terrorism, in all its 
forms.” He went on to condemn terrorism as well. While he did not recognize Israel’s right to 
exist in a clear manner, he hinted at peaceful coexistence, and acceptance of UN resolutions 
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and states’ right to live peacefully.1097 It was not enough. The State Department felt that 
Arafat was being devious, which he was to be sure. He was supposed to “renounce,” 
terrorism, instead of denouncing or condemning it. It seems that Arafat was as mistrustful of 
Shultz and Reagan as they were of him. 
Arafat called a press conference the next day and said exactly what was required of 
him by the U.S, all the while saying, “as I said yesterday” in reference to his speech on the 
previous day. During the press conference, Arafat said, “our statehood provides salvation to 
the Palestinians and peace to both Palestinians and Israelis. Self-determination means 
survival for the Palestinians. And our survival does not destroy the survival of the Israelis...” 
He also made a reference to the PLO’s acceptance of resolutions 242 and 338 as the basis for 
negotiations with Israel within the framework of an international conference, and finally he 
mentioned specifically the right of the “parties concerned in the Middle East conflict to exist 
in peace and security and as I have mentioned including the state of Palestine and Israel and 
other neighbors according to resolutions 242 and 338.” He also said “I repeat for the record 
that we totally and absolutely renounce all forms of terrorism.” 1098 In a final message to the 
American administration, he told journalists “enough is enough, enough is enough, enough is 
enough,” before adding “do you want me to striptease?” 1099  He said exactly what was 
required of him by Shultz, and was in no mood for further compromise. 
Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir saw the speech as “a monumental act of 
deception,” and urged the U.S. not to open dialogue with the PLO ever for the sake of peace 
and “advancing the struggle against terror and violence.”1100 If the speech was not sufficient 
for Shamir, it was for Regan, Shultz, and the State Department. On the same day, December, 
14, 1988, Reagan issued a statement in which he accepted the PLO’s statement and that the 
statement met the conditions for a “substantive dialogue.”1101 He then authorized the State 
Department to enter into a dialogue with PLO representatives and cautioned the organization 
that it “must live up to its statements. In particular, it must demonstrate that its renunciation 																																																								
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of terrorism is pervasive and permanent.”1102  Thus, after more than twenty years of its 
founding, the PLO managed to enter into a dialogue with the U.S. and Arafat’s obsession 
with securing a diplomatic dialogue with the U.S. was finally achieved. Arafat sincerely 
believed, as he put it in an interview with Time Magazine, that “the U.S. holds the key to 
Israel.”1103  
4.8. On the Road to Oslo 
President George H. W. Bush authorized the American ambassador in Tunisia Robert 
Pelletreau to hold secret dialogue with mid-level PLO official. By early 1990, the diplomatic 
representation was elevated as Pelletreau began holding meetings with Salah Khalaf, abu-
Iyyad, the man who by most accounts was behind the Black September Organization, that 
very organization that carried out the Khartoum attack and executed an American 
ambassador and his deputy, and took Israeli athletes hostage during the Munich Olympics.1104 
It was not a surprise that, once a Kuwaiti newspaper leaked news about the meetings, the 
U.S. took a step back, but did not put the dialogue completely on hold.1105 The dialogue 
eventually came to a standstill when a Palestinian organization called the Palestine Liberation 
Front (PLF) attempted to carry out a terrorist attack against Israel in 1990, the sole purpose of 
which was disrupting U.S.-PLO dialogue.1106 The administration saw the incident as violation 
of the PLO’s promises to abandon terrorism and put an end to the dialogue. When the Bush 
administration demanded of Arafat to renounce the attacks and punish the PLF, he seemed 
hesitant to do so, Bush “more in sorrow than in anger,” ended the dialogue.1107  
The cause Arafat’s hesitation sprung from the fact that the organization was an Iraqi 
sponsored organization. As discussed earlier, every Palestinian faction received aid and 
training from one Arab regime or the other, rendering their political will subject to the 
pleasure and displeasure of these regimes. Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein was preparing for 
something else, and having the Palestinians on his side seemed to be an important factor to 
sway the Arab public opinion. 
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Saddam had just finished his eight-year war with Iran in 1988, leaving his economy 
and military in a rather devastated state. The war had cost Iraq in excess of $500 billion, with 
the country being $130 billion owed to Arab and western countries that helped Iraq finance 
the war effort.1108 The disastrous economic situation led Iraq to invade the tiny neighboring 
country of Kuwait, which Saddam had accused of slant drilling and tempering with oil 
production and prices. After the war with Iran, Sadam sought to increase the price of oil by 
decreasing Iraq’s oil production, Kuwait stepped up its production. According to former Iraqi 
Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, “every $1 drop in the price of a barrel of oil caused $1 billion 
drop in Iraq’s annual revenue.”1109 
Neither the Bush administration not any of the major powers looked favorably on 
Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait. The USSR and China imposed arms embargo against Iraq and 
on January 15, 1991, the Bush administration issued an ultimatum to Iraq to withdraw from 
Kuwait or face war. After negotiations between Iraq and the major powers failed, the U.S. led 
an international coalition with UN approval to remove Saddam’s army from Kuwait.1110 The 
Gulf War ended with the defeat of the Iraqi army and its removal from Kuwait. The coalition 
did not press further into Iraq nor attempt to remove Saddam. Dick Cheney, who would later 
become the Vice President under George W. Bush, stated so sagely in April 1994 that the 
going far into Iraq, and overtaking Iraq would be a “quagmire.”1111  
When Iraq invaded Kuwait, the majority of the Arab countries, including the major 
players in the region, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria and the Gulf states supported Kuwait. 
Arafat saw fit to side with Saddam. Arafat has made some serious mistakes in his career, but 
his decision to support Saddam would surely count amongst the worst. In The Iron Cage, 
Khalidi described the decision as “disastrous,” which it was.1112  Saddam had begun his 
campaign to bring the Palestinian leadership into the fold prior to the war. And what is a 
better way to do that than financial assistance? According to Walker and Gowers, the PLO 
received $50 million payment from Baghdad during the first days of the uprising, the single 
largest sum the PLO had ever received from anybody.1113 Baghdad provided the PLO with $4 
million a month from the beginning of the uprising. In 1989, Saddam provided the families of 																																																								
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Palestinians killed in clashes with Israel with a sum equivalent to a pension paid to families 
of dead Iraqi soldiers.1114  
In their discussion of this episode of Arafat’s life, Walker and Gowers called their 
chapter “The Wrong Horse.”1115 Arafat had thrown his lot with Saddam who was exhausted 
politically, economically, militarily, and worst of all, he put Iraq at odds with its neighbors 
and left the devastated nation isolated. Arafat was in a similar position without recourse or 
help from the Arab countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States who terminated 
their financial aid to the Palestinians. 1116  Furthermore, Kuwait expelled thousands of 
Palestinians, most of whom had been wealthy and financially supportive of the PLO.1117 
Finally, Arafat’s decision to align with Kuwait ended any hope for a U.S.-PLO dialogue.1118 
With the Intifada raging in the territories, and the threat of other factions consolidating their 
powers there, Arafat was beginning to feel the pressure. It was at this time that he began 
using the slogan “Peace of the Brave,” when in fact it should have been Peace of the Lonely, 
or better yet, Peace of the Desperate, for such was his and the PLO’s situation after the Gulf 
War. 
 On March 6, 1991, President George address congress in which he outlined his 
policies regarding the Middle East. In his “New World Order” speech to a join session of 
congress, Bush said that the U.S. must do all it could to close the gap between Israel and the 
Arab States, and between Israelis and the Palestinians.1119 He reiterated the U.S. stance that 
“a comprehensive peace must be grounded in United Nations Security Council Resolutions 
242 and 338…” and added “the principle of territory for peace.”1120 The land for peace 
compromise, according to Bush the concept must guarantee Israel’s security and the 
recognition for “the legitimate Palestinian political rights.”1121 Bush and his Secretary of 
State James Baker felt that the time was ripe to attempt to move peace in the Middle East 
forward following the victory over Iraq. According to Lasensky, “coalition victory and 
increased U.S. prestige would itself induce a new Arab-Israeli dialogue… because their 
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initiative focused on process and procedure rather than on agreements and concessions.”1122 
Few days after the speech, Baker went to the Middle East to meet the parties and the 
meetings resulted in calls for an international peace conference.  
Whether because of this initiative, or because there was an actual need for it, Israel 
requested $10 billion from the U.S. in May 1991 to assist with arriving refugees from the 
Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Ethiopia.1123 According to Yitzhak Shamir, Israel’s Prime 
Minister, “it was a humanitarian issue, one that the United States had supported for many 
years.”1124 The request and the subsequent debate would mark one of the lowest points in 
American-Israeli relations up to that point. Israel had received $400 million loan guarantee in 
October 1990, and refused to disclose whether the amount was used for settlement expansion. 
A Bush advisor quoted by Lasensky stated “getting people into settlements was not a 
humanitarian issue.” 1125  Bush and Baker did not want U.S. aid money to be spent on 
settlement construction since such policy would outrage the Arab states and harden their 
opinion towards negotiations. Furthermore, they believed that settlement construction in the 
occupied territories to be an obstacle to any future agreement between Israel and the 
Palestinians.1126 
When president Bush requested 120-day delay before considering the Israeli 
requested, he faced stern opposition in congress. The president went to the American public 
instead, speaking strongly against Israeli settlements and against the Israeli lobby. “… we are 
up against a very strong and effective… groups that go up to the Hill. I heard today there was 
something like a thousand lobbyists on the Hill working the other side of the question. We’ve 
got one lonely little guy down here doing it,” Bush said in a press conference.1127  The 
president threatened to use veto if required to make sure that nothing interferes with the 
prospect of making peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors, according to Bush.1128 
With high approval ratings among the public, Bush eventually won congress’ 
approval for the delay. Two possible factors could have contributed to this success; either 
going public with the issue, or because Shamir was facing criticism within Israel for the 
deterioration in the relationship with the U.S., or a combination of both. The elections of 																																																								
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Yitzhak Rabin and the Labor Party in June 1992 did much to garner a feeling of optimism 
regarding future negotiations. Within a short while of becoming Prime Minister, Rabin met 
Baker in an attempt to push the talks further. Rabin visited Egypt and met with President 
Hosni Mubarak.1129 Two days later, Rabin announced the cancellation of more than 6000 
housing units that were to be built in the West Bank.1130 
 The issue that remained to be resolved was Palestinian representation at the peace 
conference. Shamir was adamant that the PLO would not be present. A unified Jordanian-
Palestinian was sent instead to attend the conference on October 30 in Madrid. The 
Palestinian delegation was made up of Palestinians from the occupied territories, though the 
PLO selected them all, “whose role would only barely be disguised.” 1131  According to 
Mamdouh Noufal, member of the PLO’s Supreme Revolutionary Forces Council, most of 
these teams were directly under the supervision of Arafat, and Arafat was in direct contact 
with every team, even if they were independent and had little loyalty to the PLO.1132 
The conference convened in Madrid under the joint chairmanship of president Bush 
and last Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev. The conference itself served as a first step to 
initiate future bilateral and multilateral negotiations between the parties.1133 It saw up two 
negotiating tracks; bilateral negotiations between Israel and its neighbors, and multilateral 
between all parties to discuss regional issues such as water, arms control and refugees.1134 
Despite the fact that no tangible agreement was reached at Madrid, the conference set the 
groundwork for future negotiations between the parties. Bilateral Israeli-Palestinian 
negotiations continued in Washington, without direct representation of the PLO, though few 
believed that the PLO was not involved at all as the teams were under the supervision of 
Arafat.1135 
By the time President Clinton assumed office in 1992, the basis for peace negotiations 
was in place. According to Quandt, “no president ever came to office with a more promising 																																																								
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set of circumstances for promoting peace between Israel and its neighbors than did Bill 
Clinton.”1136 The vital position of Secretary of State was assigned Warren Christopher who 
was a Carter administration veteran who played a major role in the release of American 
hostages during the 1979 Iranian hostage crisis.1137 
The Washington negotiations were faltering by spring 1993, due in large part to 
Arafat’s stubbornness. He was sending a message that only through him and through the PLO 
could negotiations move forward. During that spring, secret negotiations were held in Oslo, 
Norway, with a Palestinian team who “were clearly acting on Arafat’s behalf.” 1138  A 
framework agreement was eventually reached between the parties for mutual recognition, 
with the aid of Norwegian foreign minister. This agreement would become the Oslo I accord, 
or the Declaration of Principles. While the American administration was informed of the 
ongoing negotiations, the U.S. was not directly involved and played a small part in reaching 
the agreement.1139 
Finally, on September 13, 1993, after decades of war, occupation, and terrorism, the 
leaders of the two peoples of the Holy Land met on a sunny Autumn day in the American 
capital to sign the “Declaration of Principles,” in which the parties agreed that “it is time to 
put an end to decades of conformation and conflict, recognize their mutual legitimate and 
political rights, and strive to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and security to 
achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement.”1140 Annex I and II included 
protocols that established the Palestinian Authority to serve as a transitional government for 
the Palestinian territories in areas that Israel would soon be evacuating and handing over the 
administrative and security responsibilities to Arafat and the new PA, paving the way for 
Arafat’s return to the land he had spent his life trying to liberate by means of armed struggle, 
terrorism, and diplomacy.1141 The agreement included provisions for future negotiations on 
permanent status issues such as; Jerusalem, settlements, security arrangements, borders, and 
the refugee problem based on Security Council resolutions.1142 It is the omission of these 
issue that left observers wondering about the viability of the agreement, and whether the 
peace process would actually succeed.  																																																								
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On the first day of October 1993, donors gathered in Washington to help the peace 
process by pouring money into the accounts of the newly established PA, to “support the 
historic political breakthrough in the Middle East through a broad-based multilateral effort to 
mobilize resources to promote reconstruction and development in the West Bank and 
Gaza.”1143 The purpose of aid was, according to World Bank president at the time, “to open 
the door to development and to invest in peace.”1144 
The Oslo I agreement was followed by a number of agreements that sought to 
formalize the transfer of power from Israel to the newly established PA. The Gaza-Jericho 
agreement was signed in May 1994. The Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and 
Responsibilities between Israel and the PLO was signed in August 1994, the Protocol on 
Further Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities in August 1995, and finally the Oslo II 
agreement in September 1995. When the latter withdrew from most of the Gaza Strip and the 
major cities in the West Bank, as agreed in the Oslo II agreement which was signed in Taba, 
Egypt, the West Bank was divided as; area A, under the security and administrative control of 
the PA and included the major civilian centers; area B, rural areas under Israeli security and 
Palestinian administrative control; and area C included the Israeli settlements, the Jordan 
Valley region and bypass roads remained under complete Israeli control.1145 The table below 
provides a timeline and a summary of the major agreements between the two sides since the 
Madrid Conference. 
Agreement Title Date Signed Summary 
Madrid Peace Conference October 1991 Sat up two separate tracks for 
negotiations based on UN 
and UNSC resolutions 242 
and 338. 
Oslo Agreement (Declaration 
of Principles) 
September 1993 Mutual recognition and 
overall framework for 
interim period with 
Palestinian self-governance. 
Protocol on Economic 
Relations (Paris Protocol) 
April 1994 Codification of economic 
relations between the two 																																																								
1143 Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs- Historical Documents, 114- Summary of Co-Sponsors at the Conference 
to Support Middle East Peace- Washington, 1 October 1993, Vol. 13-14: 1992-1993 (Online: MFA, Israel. 
1144 Quoted in Brynen, A Very Political Economy: Peacebuilding and Foreign Aid in the West Bank and Gaza, 
4. 
1145 Mouin Rabbani, "Palestinian Authority, Israeli Rule," in The Struggle for Sovereignty: Palestine and Israel, 
1993-2005, ed. Joel Beinin and Rebecca L. Stein (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 79. 
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sides. 
Gaza-Jericho Agreement May 1994 Transfer of power to PA in 
Gaza and Jericho 
Early Empowerment 
Agreement 
August 1994 Transfer authority to PA in 
agriculture, energy, labor, 
local government and trade. 
Oslo II (Taba Agreement) September 1995 Composition of PA 
legislative council. 
Agreement on elections in 
1996, further Israel 
redeployment, expansion of 
PA control. Figure	4:2,	early	agreements	between	Israel	and	the	PA	1991-1995. 
The history of Palestinian- American relations until the signing of the Oslo accords 
was one in which the U.S. attempted to avoid contact with the PLO at whatever cost. Until 
the mid 1970s, the U.S. chose to deal with the question of Palestine as a humanitarian issue, a 
refugee crisis that ought to be resolved with the help of the neighboring Arab regimes, 
especially Jordan. According to Khalidi, “mention of Palestinian national rights in the context 
of American policy or of UN resolutions was actively opposed by the Johnson, Nixon and 
Ford administrations.”1146 Yet contact was inevitable when the Arab states declared the PLO 
to be the government of the Palestinian people in the refugee camps and in the occupied 
territories, and King Hussein’s disengagement from the West Bank contributed much in 
setting up the PLO as the authority to speak for the people in the territories and in Diaspora. 
What made matters worse for the United States was the PLO’s success in the international 
arena especially when it secured the recognition of the Arab states and other worldwide 
regimes.  
However, the U.S. succeeded in maintaining its stance that the PLO should first 
recognize Israel and accept UNSC resolutions 242 and 338, exactly as Henry Kissinger 
wanted more than a decade earlier. President Ronald Reagan was a determined support of 
Israel and he sincerely disliked the PLO. Yet, during Reagan’s second term, official contact 
was finally made and the road to Oslo was paved. It is important to keep in mind that until 
Oslo, the United States’ financial aid to the Palestinians was directed through the United 
Nations in order to help Palestinian refugees survive. The vast majority of the foreign aid the 																																																								
1146 Rashid Khalidi, Brokers of Deceit: How the US Has Undermined Peace in the Middle East, (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 2013). 61. 
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U.S. contributed to the region went to Israel and Egypt after the Camp David summit to 
peace for peace and for peace dividend.1147 
For most of the period between the end of WWII and the signing of the Oslo accords, 
U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East centered primarily on two factors; first America’s 
desire to ensure the flow of Middle East oil in world market; and second was the Cold War 
struggle to keep the USSR as far away from the region as possible. In order to secure 
American interest and presence in the region, the U.S. supported Israel in face of danger 
represented in the PLO and the neighboring Arab regimes. That is not to deny the moral and 
humanitarian obligation Americans felt towards the Jewish nation, nor undermine the role of 
interest groups within the U.S. that worked tirelessly to ensure that Israel enjoyed the aid and 
friendship of U.S. administrations. The only president to express a desire for a peace 
settlement by establishing a homeland for the Palestinians was Carter who attempted on more 
than one occasion to establish contact with the PLO. His attempts would have succeeded if it 
were not for the intervention of the Arab regimes that attempted to subdue Arafat and the 
PLO for their own political agenda. 
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5. The Road to Decline 
The return of Arafat to the Palestinian territories in July 1994 was a cause for 
celebrations among most Palestinians. The day of his return to the newly “liberated” Gaza 
Strip was marked with national music and dancing in the streets from the border city of Rafah 
along the Saladin road, the main road in the coastal strip, to the parliament square in central 
Gaza. The return marked, or at least was made to appear as a major victory for the PLO. 
Nabil Shaath, one of Arafat’s top aides joked at the time that the only way to assassinate 
Arafat was by “over-kissing him.”1148  
It was essential for Arafat to sell the peace process to his supporters and his opponents 
alike, and what better way to do that than to try and convince his followers that the process 
was a major victory for the PLO, and a step in the right direction to reclaiming Palestine. 
Arafat became the “Hero of War, Hero of Peace,” as a shirt I wore at the time proudly 
claimed under a photograph of Arafat. One could observe those who favored the peace 
agreement as they raised the Palestinian flag on their rooftops, and those who opposed it 
chose to fly a black flag instead, in mourning over what they perceived as the sacrifices made 
by Arafat and his colleagues in Washington, Cairo and Taba. 
The opposition however, represented primarily by the Islamist factions; Hamas and 
the Islamic Jihad; and the PLO’s leftist factions such as the PFLP, did not share my shirt’s 
view. Upon his arrival in Gaza City, Arafat delivered a historic speech in front of a crowd of 
10,000, or 200,000 people, in which he admitted that neither he nor many among the 
Palestinians approved the Oslo Accords fully.1149 He exclaimed that it was only a first step on 
a long road to struggle. The armed struggle had come to an end, and another major battle was 
commencing, Arafat said. The new battle was to be fought at the negotiations table, a battle 
to “rebuild our homeland, our institutions that the occupation has destroyed.”1150 Mindful of 
Hamas, Arafat addressed their then imprisoned leader Ahmad Yassin saying “we are here 
today to tell Ahmad Yassin that we will not rest or be silent until you are with us, by our side, 
here, here, here,” he repeated three times in the genuine Arafat manner.1151 
																																																								
1148 Michael Parks, "Arafat Returns in Triumph to Gaza, Pleads for Unity," LA Times, July 02, 1994.  
1149 Reports estimate the number between 10,000 (Moscow Times), to 200,000 (BBC), neither figure could be 
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The Islamist parties Hamas and Islamic Jihad rejected the agreement altogether as a 
betrayal of the Palestinian rights and principles. Oslo was “premature. The fruit was unripe, 
green, and bitter… we were made to swallow the bitterness,” says Khalid al-Batsh of the 
Islamic Jihad. 1152  The PFLP deemed the agreement unjust and disadvantageous to the 
Palestinians. 1153  Yet for all the promises that the new form of government would be 
democratic with free institutions, and all Arafat’s talk about national unity, it did not take 
Arafat’s forces long after their arrival to commit a massacre against Hamas’ supporters. On 
November 18, 1994 Arafat’s security forces opened fire outside Palestine Mosque in Gaza 
City killing at least 15 people and injuring 200 others.1154 It was the first major clash between 
Arafat’s forces and Hamas, and needless to say, it did little to ease the high tensions between 
opponents and proponents of the peace process.  
According to opinion polls conducted after the signing of the Oslo accords and 
subsequent autonomy agreements, Arafat and Fatah’s popularity were extremely high among 
Palestinians. For example, in a response to the question “if elections were to be held today, 
and you decide to participate, you would vote for candidates affiliated with…” 14 percent of 
the participants chose Hamas candidates, eight percent chose independents, 40 percent said 
that they would choose Fatah and 15 percent chose none.1155 Another survey conducted in the 
same period by the Jerusalem Media and Communication center also gave Fatah 40 percent 
to Hamas’ 10, and the approval of Yasser Arafat whose return had made 53 percent of 
participants “more confident and more optimistic,” about their future, increased to over 54 
percent.1156 There was also much hope that the occupied territories would flourish under a 
democratic system. According to polls, 73 percent of Palestinians in 1993 felt that the new 
PA Legislative Council should be elected, and 41 percent said that they would vote for a 
Fatah affiliated candidate.1157 The idea of democracy was warmly welcomed by a people 
whose aspirations rested throughout their history on a single political organization dominated 
by a single party led by a single man, from aboard. The optimism was justified as millions of 
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Palestinians found themselves ruled for the first time by their very own Palestinian Authority, 
rather than Israel.  
 This section of the research focuses on the period following the signing of the Oslo 
accords, the subsequent donor conference, and the two-decade reign of the Palestinian 
Authority under the leadership of Yasser Arafat and Mahmoud Abbas. The chapter examines 
the manifestations and causes of Fatah’s decline, while paying close attention to the role 
foreign aid played in the process on two fronts; first, the chapter examines the various forms 
of corruption within Fatah and the PA and the role foreign assistance played in this 
corruption. On the second front, the chapter examines the U.S.’s use of its foreign assistance 
program to influence the PA’s decisions as well as the effectiveness of this use in general and 
in three cases in particular; the Goldstone Report, the Palestinian bid for statehood and the 
role of the security cooperation between the PA and Israel and the impact of the use of 
foreign aid in these cases on the standing of Abbas and Fatah among the Palestinian public. 
5.1. Marshall Plan for Palestine 
The previous chapter concluded with the signing of major peace agreements between 
Israel and the Palestinians with aid from the Clinton administration. Despite the minimal role 
of the Clinton administration in reaching the Oslo agreement, Clinton seemed to be satisfied 
and smiling. Clinton had every reason to smile. He had achieved what no other president 
since Truman was able to achieve. He brought the Israelis and Palestinians to sign a peace 
treaty, not even President Carter was able to achieve that for all his attempts to bring the PLO 
into the peace process. What Clinton needed now was a way to ensure that the peace process 
would survive and thrive. As chapter two of the research demonstrated, the U.S. has been 
using foreign assistance in its various forms to achieve U.S. foreign policy goals and 
objectives. These goals and objectives, and the different historic rationales and narratives 
provided to justify this use have varied over the course of the country’s history. One 
persistent pattern that remained was paying for peace and its dividend; it proved its durability 
in the Egyptian- Israeli case, why not the Israeli-Palestinian case too? 
 Political Scientist Scott Lasensky, who has written intensively on U.S. foreign aid 
and the Middle East peace process, notes that the U.S. has provided more than $200 billion in 
aid to the Middle East since 1970, and that nearly half of the current foreign aid budget goes 
to the Middle East.1158 Lasensky argues that the obvious purpose of foreign aid is to influence 
policy through what he called “Positive Economic Inducements” (PEI). Lasensky defines PEI 																																																								
1158 Lasensky, "Paying for Peace... 2004," 211. 
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as country A provides country B with a certain amount of financial aid in exchange for policy 
adjustment on part of country B.1159  
One of the first instances in the use of PEI in Middle East peace efforts took place 
during the Nixon- Kissinger era when the U.S. and Israel signed the first strategic 
memorandum of understanding in 1971. The understanding saw the U.S. supply Israel with 
long-term military aid for the purpose of gaining concessions from Israel for peace initiatives. 
It was believed that “only a confident, reassured and secure Israel would be willing to make 
the necessary concessions for peace with its Arab neighbors.”1160 On the other hand, if Israel 
feels too strong and self-confident because of American backing, why would it make 
concessions, if it can maintain the status quo without having to relinquish territory to its Arab 
neighbors?1161 These two perspectives perhaps demonstrate the uncertainty of using foreign 
aid as a tool of influence. 
Positive Economic Inducements, as defined above, requires paying a certain country, 
or rather supplying a state with forms of aid, in exchange for policy change. It is important to 
realize that for PEI the aid can be in forms other than direct financial assistance, it could be 
military, and it could also be political, or economic. For example, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, American promises of economic and military aid played an important role in 
bringing Egypt and Israel to the Camp David negotiations, and an expansion of aid to these 
two countries ensured that the peace process would survive to the present day. 
5.1.1. Aid Pre-Oslo 
As mentioned earlier, despite the lack, or even absence, of diplomatic relations 
between the United States and the PLO, the U.S. had a long history of supporting Palestine 
refugees. The U.S. perceived the Palestinian question as a refugee crisis prior to the 1970s. 
Therefore, the foreign aid provided to the Palestinians until the signing of the Oslo accords 
was channeled through the United Nations Relief and Work Agency, UNRWA.  
UNRWA has been the caretaker of Palestinian refugees in the Palestinian territories 
and in refugee camps in neighboring Arab countries since its induction in December 1949, 
under United Nations General Assembly Resolution 302.1162 UNRWA continues to be the 
main provider of education, medical treatment for Palestine refugees to the present. 
Donations to UNRWA are voluntary by UN member states and it is possible in cash or in 																																																								
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material goods. According to UNRWA, the United States was the single largest donor in 
2009, providing $269 million followed by the European Commission $232 million. 1163 
Between 1950 and 1991, the United States contributed over $1.6 billion, and since 1991 the 
amount has been in a steady increase.1164 															Figure	5:1,	United	States	Contributions	to	UNRWA.1165 
UNRWA has been the caretaker of Palestinian refugees in the Palestinian territories 
and in refugee camps in neighboring Arab countries since its induction in December 1949, 
under United Nations General Assembly Resolution 302.1166 UNRWA continues to be the 
main provider of education, medical treatment for Palestine refugees to the present. 
Donations to UNRWA are voluntary by UN member states and it is possible in cash or in 
material goods. According to UNRWA, the United States was the single largest donor in 
2009, providing $269 million followed by the European Commission $232 million. 1167 
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United	States	Contributions	to	UNRWA	(USD	Millions)	
1950-1989	 147,3.3	 2002	 111,9	
1990	 57	 2003	 134	
1991	 75,6	 2004	 127,4	
1992	 69	 2005	 108	
1993	 73,8	 2006	 137	
1994	 78,2	 2007	 154,2	
1995	 74,8	 2008	 187	
1996	 77	 2009	 268	
1997	 79,2	 2010	 237,8	
1998	 78,3	 2011	 249,4	
1999	 80,5	 2012	 233,3	
2000	 89	 2013	 294	
2001	 123	 2014	 400	
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Between 1950 and 1991, the United States contributed over $1.6 billion, and since 1991 the 
amount has been in a steady increase.1168 
As of December 2014, the U.S. was still ranked as UNRWA’s number one donor with 
over $400 million, followed by the EU with almost $140 million. 1169  Today UNRWA 
supports over five million registered Palestinian refugees in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip 
and neighboring Arab countries with a budget of over $740 million. 1170  Thanks to 
international assistance to UNRWA, particularly that of the U.S. as the single largest donor, 
the Palestinian Territories have one of the highest literacy rates in the Arab World, even 
higher than the oil rich Gulf States. According to UNESCO, the literacy rate in the West 
Bank and Gaza stands at 98 percent, in comparison to 94 percent in the United Arab Emirates 
and Saudi Arabia, and 93 percent in Oman.1171  
But as discussed in chapter one, humanitarian assistance in its various forms rarely 
ever lacks political implications. In hindsight, this claim might be surprising, humanitarian 
aid is a good in and by itself. Imagine the state of the Palestine refugees in these places if 
UNRWA had not been established, and if the donor countries had not provided it with 
billions of dollars to ensure its survival. A closer look at the political implications reveals that 
there is an inherent paradox in humanitarian action, as Feldman argues, “by providing aid, 
you can keep a conflict going, by simply getting in the way of forces that can compel a 
conflict to come to and end.”1172  Fiona Terry calls this “the paradoxes of humanitarian 
action,” and David Kennedy has labeled it “the dark side of virtue.”1173 
There are many different ways through which humanitarian assistance to the 
Palestinians has helped maintain the status quo in the Palestinian territories throughout 
history. For example, one can argue that humanitarian foreign aid helps Israel by relieving it 
of having to pay for its occupation, and the destruction inflicted on Palestinian infrastructure 
and houses as a result of the successive wars.1174 According to a senior UNRWA official, “it 
is only Israeli extremists who call for an end to UNRWA. Israeli security and government 																																																								
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understand that UNRWA is necessary because otherwise Israeli [sic] would have to provide 
for the camps in the occupied territories.”1175 Along these lines, British-Israeli Avi Shlaim 
writing about the 2009 Gaza War in The Guardian, argued that the “undeclared aim is to 
ensure that the Palestinians in Gaza are seen by the world as a humanitarian problem and thus 
derail their struggle for independence and statehood.”1176 In this case, humanitarian aid serves 
as a “cover up,” for the lack of a better term, for the larger political issues at hand. By the 
same token, U.S. aid to Palestine refugees since 1948 has been a cover up for the need to 
address the Palestinians’ political rights and concerns. 
The research has argued on more than one occasion that until the mid-1970s, the U.S. 
perceived the Palestinian problem as one of refugees displaced as a result of Israel’s 
founding. This support can be perceived as a result of America’s principles of helping others 
in need, but it can also be explained as a deliberate way to keep the Palestine issue 
humanitarian in nature. Furthermore, humanitarian assistance to Palestine refugees 
contributes to enforcing the refugee identity. Consider the example provided in chapter one 
of Palestinian refugees refusing aid during the 1967 war. Once the refugees consumed the 
rice, flour, and oil provided by UNRWA, they become refugees officially, destined to remain 
outside their homes forever, as was the case with those who left in 1948. Among aid workers, 
the “Palestinianization” of a refugee crisis has come to mean that the crisis will be 
“prolonged, when durable solutions seem unattainable.”1177 According to Peteet, UNRWA 
has played “a pivotal role in the production and reproduction of a Palestinian identity in 
Lebanon.”1178 
There is no way to prove that America’s aid to UNRWA, and U.S. humanitarian aid 
to the Palestinians in general is an official state policy of the U.S. without dancing too closely 
to the tunes of conspiracy theories. But there is enough evidence to suggest that dealing with 
the Palestinian question from a humanitarian standpoint leaves the larger political issues 
unresolved, and that humanitarian aid rendered to Palestine refugees, as well as organizing 
donor conferences for rebuilding the destruction caused by the recent wars has taken that 
responsibility off of Israel’s shoulders. Is it then a surprise that Abbas has used dismantling 
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the PA as leverage against Israel and the U.S.?1179 Without the PA, the responsibility of 
caring for the millions of Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank becomes Israel’s, as 
required by international law as set in the 1907 Hague Regulations’ articles 42-56, and the 
Fourth Geneva Convention’s articles 27-34 and 47-78.1180 
5.1.2. Fruit of Oslo 
The signing of the Oslo Accords triggered a significant increase in foreign aid to the 
Palestinians, especially from the U.S. The purpose of this increase is best explained by 
Shimon Peres, the Israeli Foreign Minister at the time of the signing the Oslo Accords. Peres 
proposed seeking aid for the PNA to strengthen the institution economically.1181 He sought to 
find funding from other sources as well, namely the Scandinavian countries and Western 
Europe. According to Peres “the aid itself didn’t radically change the way Palestinians 
negotiate, but we both knew it would be crucial to the implementation of the agreement.”1182 
It was assumed that economic stability in the Palestinian territories would guarantee the 
success of the peace process. In other words, Palestinians needed to taste the fruit of peace in 
order to abandon violence against Israel.1183 The logic behind the aid was that once the 
Palestinian Territories became economically developed, and social and politically stable, a 
democratic state would flourish. The purpose of the aid according to one official was “to 
build a peace constituency among the Palestinians.”1184  If this sounds like the logic of 
Modernization Theory and the related idea of Democratization, discussed in chapter one, it is 
because it is very much the same logic. 
According to Mahmoud Abbas’ account of the Oslo process in his 1995 Through 
Secret Channels, even before the signing ceremony Clinton “spoke in very clear terms about 
America’s commitment to provide economic support.”1185 And after the signing ceremony, 
Christopher assured the Palestinian delegation that the U.S. would provide aid to “make the 
[Palestinian] people feel the benefit of the accord.”1186 In an interview with Scott Lasensky, 																																																								
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Palestinian negotiator Nabil Shaath stated that, “the Palestinians expected several dividends 
of peace…including economic freedom, security, and economic prosperity...” According to 
Shaath, the aid component was “critical to this process.”1187  
Two weeks after the signing of the DoP, the U.S. organized the first of two 
international donor conferences. Some of the major players involved were; the U.S., Norway, 
Saudi Arabia, the World Bank, Japan and the European Union. The delegates pledged more 
than $2 billion over a period of five years.1188 In a later meeting, the sum rose to $3.6 
billion.1189 According to Warren Christopher, Secretary of State under Clinton, the purpose of 
the meeting was to gather resources needed to “make the agreement work.”1190 The PNA’s 
own estimate was that it required $11 billion over a seven-year period.1191 
Under this premise, the United States and its Western allies sought to strengthen the 
PA. If Palestinians began to feel the difference the peace process brought to their lives, 
whether it is in economic or social wellbeing, they are more likely to cling to the idea of 
peace and be more willing to compromise. Furthermore, one can argue that the United States 
fought the Cold War under the same principle; sustaining economies and building 
infrastructure in order for democracy to survive and thrive and the Middle East is no 
exception. The majority of the vast sums contributed by the U.S. administrations since Oslo 
were channeled through USAID programs.1192 According to a recent CRS report by Jim 
Zanotti published on March 18, 2016, since the signing of the Oslo accords, the U.S. 
government has provided over $5 billion in bilateral economic assistance to the PA.1193 This 
assistance targeted Palestinian economy, social service, and civil society sectors. The funds 
have also been used to strengthen the PA’s security forces by providing training, weapons, 
and improve governance of the different PA institutions.1194   
Due to the absence of a government structure in the West Bank and Gaza, the World 
Bank established the Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction, 
PECDAR. According to Graham Usher, PECDAR’s programs were politically targeted for 																																																								
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Palestinians “to see very clearly that their situation will improve because of peace.’”1195 In his 
account of PECDAR, Usher states the purpose of PECDAR was to establish “immediate 
impact projects” for the purpose of bringing fast improvements to Palestinians’ lives in terms 
of road construction, and improving electricity and water. As a World Bank institution, 
PECDAR was accountable to the World Bank, an idea that Arafat was not entirely 
comfortable with. He was a man used to running everything as he saw fit and PECDAR’s 
accountability issue, seemed to circumvent his authority. He issued a decree in November 
1993 that made PECDAR accountable to Arafat. PECDAR’s managing director Yusuf 
Sayigh resigned in protest. Palestinian leaders urged Arafat to “forgo ‘the revolutionary 
mentality,’” in favor of “state-building mentality,’” but he disregarded their request.1196 The 
donors wanted the aid money tied to infrastructure projects, while Arafat wanted the funds as 
“operational expenses.”1197 In other words, he wanted the funds to consolidate his position 
and power.  
In April 1994, an important agreement was negotiated between Israel and the PA. The 
Paris Protocol on Economic Relations established “the contractual agreement that will govern 
the economic relations between the two sides…”1198 Palestinians have heavily criticized the 
protocol as unbalanced and favorable to Israel.1199 The most important aspect of the protocol 
for the purpose of this study however is that the protocol gave Israel the power to collect 
taxes on goods imported into the territories under the control of the PA, and to provide the 
PA with 75 percent of the revenues collected from income tax on Palestinians working in 
Israel.1200 These tax revenues represent nearly two thirds of the PA’s budget, with foreign aid 
making up the final third.1201 Israel has regularly withheld these tax returns as punishment for 
the PA during turbulent periods in the relations between the two, most recently when the PA 
applied to join the Rome Statute and the International Criminal Court in 2015.1202 Chief 
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Palestinian Negotiator, Saeb Erekat described Israel’s policy as “robbery and an act more 
appropriate to pirates and not governments.”1203 
As agreed in the 1995 interim agreement, Oslo II, the PA structure included a 
legislative council and an executive to be selected by the Palestinian people.1204 On January 
21st 1996, the PA organized the first general elections, with a high voter turn out; almost 72 
percent of eligible Palestinians voters cast a vote.1205 Hamas, the Islamic Jihad boycotted the 
elections since this election was the product of Oslo and Washington, an idea Hamas chose to 
forget a decade years later.1206 The first general elections in the Palestinian territories were 
free and fair. According to the Central Elections Commission, there were over 519 
international observers from different countries and more than 2000 local officials ensuring 
the fair flow of the election process.1207 As expected, Arafat won with a landslide victory 
after securing 88.2 percent of the total votes in comparison to his opponent Ms. Samiha 
Khalil who won 11.5 percent of the votes. In the Legislative Council elections, Fatah won 62 
and independents won 15, out of total of 88 seats.1208 
According to Lamis Andoni, writing on February 1996 in Middle East International 
“election campaign has ended with a deepening feeling of an emerging ruling elite, whose 
economic interests are tied with Israel, and a widening social [and] economic gap in the West 
Bank and Gaza.”1209 Approximately 50 percent of the new cabinet members were from the 
landowning class.1210 The Palestinian leadership had hoped to use the results of the elections 
to provide some legitimacy for their leadership and to further enforce their position in 
negotiations with Israel and demonstrate their strong commitment to democratic 
principles.1211 From the perspective of Arafat and the leadership, the elections represented an 
important step towards realizing a Palestinian state.1212 For Israel, the elections represented a 
referendum of Palestinians’ approval of the peace process and a chance for the newly 
democratically elected council to replace the PLO’s more extreme Palestinian National 																																																								
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Council.1213 The elections marked a general Palestinian approval with the course of events. 
Indeed, the day of the elections was a day of celebrations as it was seen as an important step 
towards peace and stability.  
In May 1996, Israel held elections, this time the Israelis narrowly voted for Benjamin 
Netanyahu, a man known for being critical of the Oslo accords and the interim agreements 
that followed.1214 Netanyahu was opposed to an independent Palestinian, and with him came 
a hardline Likud led coalition. With Netanyahu’s arrival, the peace process looked to be 
entering a dark tunnel. He was recorded boasting to some settlers that he had “stopped the 
Oslo Accord,” “America is a thing you can move very easily, move it in the right direction... 
they won’t get in our way.”1215 The relationship between president Clinton and Benjamin 
Netanyahu was not a warm one. In a meeting with president Clinton, Netanyahu presumed to 
lecture the American president on the Middle East issues. Following the meeting Clinton 
asked his advisors who were present “who the [expletive deleted] does he think he is? Who’s 
the [expletive deleted] superpower here?”1216  
The first sign of disturbance came in September when the Israeli government opened 
a tunnel under the holy mosque in Jerusalem, provoking Palestinian riots.1217 Serious clashes 
occurred between stone throwers and the Israeli army occurred, much like the first uprising, 
though this time Palestinian police engaged in gun battles against the IDF.1218 The clashes left 
75 Palestinians and 15 Israelis dead.1219 In Hebron, Netanyahu supported a band of settlers, 
leading 450 of these settlers to determine the fate of a city of 140,000 Palestinians.1220 
Netanyahu also increased settlement activities in the West Bank, in violation of the signed 
agreements as well as international law. 1221  Countries across the world condemned 
Netanyahu’s settlements projects in a UN general assembly vote of 130 votes to two.1222 The 
following March, Palestinian suicide bombings in Tel Aviv were followed by more attacks in 
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Jerusalem in July, and again in September, leading to closure of the West Bank and 
suspension of transfer of Palestinian tax revenues.1223 
As the peace process stalled and the economic situation began to deteriorate rapidly in 
the Palestinian Territories, the PA’s position began to weaken as more Palestinians began to 
favor violence against Israel. In March 1996, 21 percent of Palestinians were supportive of 
attacks against Israel, by April 1997, the percentage increased to 40 percent and by October 
1998 to 51 percent.1224 During this period, Arafat suspended the security coordination with 
Israel, then started it, then suspended it again. 1225  He had cracked down on Islamist 
oppositions in March 1996 following terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians, but the 
crackdown seemed to ease as Netanyahu continued with closure, suspension of tax revenues, 
and settlement expansion.1226 With the situation deteriorating in this manner, Clinton invited 
Arafat and Netanyahu to Wye River for discussions in October 1998.1227  
The Wye River Memorandum included provisions for the resumption of the final 
status negotiations between the two sides, further security coordination and cooperation with 
Israel on security matters and further Israeli transfer of power to the PA in areas of the West 
Bank.1228  The major difference with the new security coordination was direct American 
involvement to provide “monitoring and actual participation in Israeli-Palestinian-U.S. 
security coordination committee...”1229  The two sides also agreed on “the importance of 
continued international donor assistance to facilitate implementation by both sides of 
arrangements reached.”1230 The parties also recognized “the need for enhanced donor support 
for economic development in the West Bank and Gaza. They agree to jointly approach the 
donor community to organize a Ministerial Conference before the end of 1998 to seek 
pledges for enhanced levels of assistance.”1231 
The implementation of the memorandum was put on hold as Netanyahu faced fierce 
opposition from the Israeli right that eventually led to the collapse of his coalition.1232 On 
May 17, the Israeli Labor Party was back in power with Ehud Barak, which was a hopeful 																																																								
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sign since soon after the two sides met again in September in Sharm el-Sheik in Egypt and 
agreed to resume the implementation of the arrangements in the Wye River 
Memorandum.1233 By then, donors had pumped approximately $3.8 billion of $4.2 billion 
pledged into the Palestinian territories.1234  
In a 1997 public opinion survey, 72 percent of Palestinians believed that services and 
infrastructure improved under the PA, while 76 percent felt that foreign aid was the reason 
for this improvement. Of the participants who did not feel that there was improvement, 26 
percent blamed the donor, and 47 percent blamed the Palestinian Authority. In another 1997 
survey, questions regarding the impact of the donor’s politics on aid yielded the following 
results, 
Figure	5:2,	Center	for	Palestine	Research	and	Study	(CPRS,	2007),	Prevailing	Perceptions	on	Aid	Management.1235		 As the table above demonstrates, there was a noticeable difference between the 
perceived impact of EU and US policies on aid, with EU policies receiving far more 
favorable views among local NGOs by a wide margin, 38 to 5 percent positive perception 
and 18 to 84 percent negative perception respectively. Among PA officials, the disparity is 
even more apparent with 92 percent of PA officials believing that U.S. policy to have had a 
negative impact on aid, as opposed to 25 percent who saw the impact of EU policy on aid to 																																																								
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 Positive (percentage) Neutral (percentage) Negative (percentage) 
Perceived Impact of Donor Politics on Aid: All Donors 
By Donor Officials 34 34 19 
By Local NGOs 12 21 60 
By PA Officials 6 19 75 
Perceived Impact of Donor Politics on Aid: U.S. Assistance 
By Donor Officials 18 9 43 
By Local NGOs 5 8 84 
By PA Officials 1 6 92 
Perceived Impact of Donor Politics on Aid: EU Assistance 
By Donor Officials 30 42 3 
By Local NGOs 38 42 18 
By PA Officials 33 43 25 
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be negative.  Only one percent of PA officials perceived the impact of U.S. policy to have 
had positive impact on aid to the Palestinians in 1997. 
Clinton’s	Final	Effort	 	
Before leaving office in January 2001, President Clinton attempted to cap the earlier 
peace achievement in his first term with a conclusion of a final peace agreement between 
Israel and the Palestinians. He invited Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak 
to attend a summit at Camp David resort, the same location in which the Egyptian-Israeli was 
achieved decades earlier. Perhaps the hope was that the significance of the location would 
help achieve a Palestinian-Israeli deal, similar to the one achieved by Carter. The negotiations 
remained secret for the most part. Prior to his arrival, Arafat was rather hesitant to go. He 
feared that if the negotiations failed, Clinton and Barak would blame him, which they did.1236 
The year 2000 was an election year the U.S. but Clinton had nothing to lose, since he was 
nearing the end of his second term as president, which made him free of the pressure usually 
present during election years. Clinton was also trying to fix his legacy, which had been badly 
damaged by the Monica Lewinski affair and his subsequent impeachment by the House of 
Representatives for lying about it.1237 A historic Israeli-Palestinian final settlement would 
have done much to repair the damage. Barak on the other hand was facing stern opposition in 
Israel and his government coalition was falling apart due to his failure in achieving peace 
with Syria in earlier negotiations and the stalemate with the Palestinian.  
What happened at Camp David has been a contentious issue, with both sides 
providing different narratives as to what was offered and what was demanded. Generally, 
Arafat’s fears proved true as both Barak and Clinton blamed him for the summit’s failure. 
The debate over what happened in Camp David is centered on a supposedly extremely 
generous offer made by Barak that Arafat had rejected. Thomas Friedman, a well-known 
American journalist and New York Times columnist wrote in July 2000,  
“Prime Minister Ehud Barak of Israel offered the 
Palestinians a real state in virtually all of the West Bank 
and Gaza; he put forward a credible solution for the 
Palestinian refugee issue; he offered Yasir Arafat a mosaic 
of Palestinian administrative control and sovereignty over 
the Arab areas of Jerusalem and Muslim holy sites.”1238 
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 According to Lasensky, the generosity at Camp David included a $35 billion offer 
made to both sides at the negotiations table. $10 billion would compensate Palestinian 
refugees, another $10 billion would be dedicated to Israel-Jordanian-Palestinian water 
desalinization project, and another $15 billion for Israel to upgrade the IDF, redeploy out of 
territories and moving settlers out of the West Bank.1239 Robert Malley and Dennis Ross, two 
American negotiators and aides to Clinton who were present at the negotiations both said that 
Arafat could not have accepted this unprecedented generous offer.1240 According Malley, 
Barak refused to meet Arafat alone. Apparently, Barak complained that Arafat had a notepad 
in which he scripted conversations and offers that he would later brandish out and remind 
Barak of things he had said.1241 Ross also confirmed Barak’s refusal to meet Arafat face to 
face. Barak’s offer was probably made, but it was never written. It was an oral offer with no 
validity whatsoever.1242  
Ross, who was quick to blame Arafat for the failure later, said in an interview Omar 
al-Issawy for Aljazeera’s Tale of a Revolution, “should he [Arafat] have taken the offer at 
Camp David? Probably not… I would say from his standpoint no, he should not have 
accepted it.” 1243  Malley echoes this opinion in the same documentary, “if you ask any 
American negotiator today… do we think Palestinians should, could, accept the ideas 
president Clinton put on the table… I think they would all have to say in hindsight, no, he 
couldn’t accept them.”1244 According to Malley, not even moderate Palestinian leaders like 
Mahmoud Abbas accepted it, they rejected it in terms harsher than Arafat’s. What Arafat was 
blamed for, and rightly so, was his failure to propose a counteroffer, even after the failure 
when Clinton attempted to revive the talks in December 2000. So why did Arafat not propose 
a counter offer?  
 According to Quandt, there was reason to believe that Arafat was ill advised about the 
new president. He was told by the Saudis that he should wait because the new president, 
meaning George W. Bush, would be more pro-Arab and more pro- Palestinian than Clinton 																																																								
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was. When asked about the source, Quandt cited Clinton administration officials, who 
believed that they knew who the individual was. Quandt did not mention any names, but said 
that his name started with a “B,” nobody can prove it, said Quandt, but he believed that it was 
probably true. The man whose name starts with a “B,” a Saudi with strong connections in the 
U.S. points very strongly at Bandar bin Sultan Al-Saud, Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to the 
United States. 1245  Bandar would later claim that Arafat’s refusal of Barak’s offer was 
“criminal.”1246 In their last conversation, Arafat said to Clinton, “you are a great man,” to 
which Clinton responded, “I am not a great man, I am a [colossal] failure, and you made 
one”1247 
 The failure of the Camp David Summit had dire consequences on the region and the 
peace process. Exactly what is responsible for the events that followed is also a subject for 
debates and discussions. The Palestinians territories erupted in a second uprising. Palestinians 
argue that it was Ariel Sharon’s provocative visit to the Wailing Wall, and his passing the 
venues of the holy mosque in Jerusalem that started the trouble. Sharon had by then become 
the Palestinians’ enemy number one. He was not even occupying a governmental position, 
but his actions in Lebanon in 1982 and his role in the Sabra and Shatila Massacre for which 
he was held personally responsible by an Israeli investigation that led to his resignation, put 
Sharon in the same category as Menachem Begin in the Palestinians’ perception.1248 To say 
he was one of the most despised figures in Israeli politics among Palestinians would be an 
understatement. 
 Israel blamed the violence on Arafat, rather than Sharon’s visit. The argument was 
that once the negotiations failed, Arafat resorted to violence in order to pressure Barak and 
the U.S. into gaining better offers, and that Sharon’s visit was used as a catalyst to ignite 
Palestinian violence. Whether it was Arafat’s desire to restart the Intifada or it was general 
frustration among the Palestinians at the deterioration of the peace process and their 
conditions, or it was an outrage at Sharon’s visit, what was hardly disputable by November 
2000 is that the region was quickly slipping into another cycle of violence and that the peace 
process was taking its last breaths. 
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5.2. Bush 	 When President Bush arrived at the Oval Office in January 2001, the second 
Palestinian uprising was only four months old. The situation in the territories was bad, and 
getting worse. During his first NSC meeting, Bush was critical of Clinton’s peace efforts, 
saying that Clinton had given Arafat too much, and doubted that “much can be done about 
the Palestinian issue.”1249 When Secretary of State Colin Powell said that things could get 
worse for the Palestinians, Bush shrugged off his concern saying maybe that would be for the 
best.1250 The “Arab-friend” George W. Bush did not prove all that friendly to the Palestinians. 
Arafat “never had much of a chance with [Bush],” to whom Arafat was an “incorrigible 
terrorist.”1251 The president was more often than not at odds with Powell, who felt that more 
can and should be done regarding the Israeli- Palestinian conflict. Time and again, the two 
men disagreed, so much so that in early 2002, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice 
became the handler of U.S. policy toward the conflict, rather than the Secretary of State.1252 
 The terror attacks on September 11, 2001 did little to help the Palestinian case. The 
Bush administration divided the world according to “with us or against us,” “Axis of Evil,” 
and “War on Terror” perceptions, and Arafat naturally fell into the “against us” category.  
 In June 2002, with the Post-9/11 democratization fever that swept the Bush 
administration, Bush declared his support for a Palestinian state on the condition that the 
Palestinians reform their political institutions. The speech would eventually materialize into 
the president’s Road Map for Peace. Early draft of the proposal was released in November 
2002, and the final text in April the following year.1253 In his June 2002 speech, the president 
declared that, 
“When the Palestinian people have new leaders, new 
institutions, and new security arrangements with their 
neighbors, the United States of America will support the 
creation of a Palestinian state whose borders and certain 
																																																								
1249 William B. Quandt, "Skewed Perceptions: Yasir Arafat in the Eyes of American Officials, 1969-2004," in 
Scripting Middle East Leaders: The Impact of Leadership Perceptions on US and UK Foreign Policy, ed. 
Lawrence Freedman and Jeffrey H. Michaels (New York; London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 112. 
1250 Ibid. 
1251 Michael Rubner, "Book Review: Tested by Zion: Th Bush Administration and the Israeli- Palestinian 
Conflict by Elliott Abrams," Middle East Policy XX, no. 2 (2013): 288; Quandt, "Skewed Perceptions: Yasir 
Arafat in the Eyes of American Officials, 1969-2004," 112-13; Marcus Mabry, Twice as Good: Condoleezza 
Rice and Her Path to Power (New York: Modern Times, 2007), 171. 
1252 Rubner, "Book Review: Tested by Zion: Th Bush Administration and the Israeli- Palestinian Conflict by 
Elliott Abrams." 
1253 "President Bush's Road Map to a Palestinian State," International New York Times, November, 14, 2002.  
5. The Road to Decline  242 
aspects of sovereignty will be provisional until resolved 
as part of a final settlement in the Middle East.”1254 
 
From here the trouble started. The “reforms” required by the Bush administration led 
to the eventual arrival of Hamas as a major political player in the arena, but that story must 
wait a little longer. During his speech, the president promised that the U.S., and international 
donors, including the World Bank “stand ready to work with Palestinians on a major project 
of economic reform and development… the United States, along with our partners in the 
developed world, will increase our humanitarian assistance to relieve Palestinian 
suffering.”1255 What is a better way to bring these concessions than by simply paying for 
them? Bush’s Roadmap for Peace, which was adopted by the Quartet, was another failed 
American attempt to resolve the conflict, by “reengineering Palestinian politics.”1256 The plan 
consisted of three phases; here are some of its requirements;  
Phase I, “Ending Terror and Violence, Normalizing Palestinian Life, and Building 
Palestinian Institutions.” The phase required that Palestinians to cease violence immediately, 
including undertaking “visible efforts on the ground to arrest, disrupt, and restrain individuals 
and groups conducting and planning violent attacks on Israelis anywhere.” The U.S. will 
rebuild the Palestinian security apparatus with aid from Egypt and Jordan, and all security 
organizations to be consolidated into three, reporting to an empowered Interior Minister, (not 
the executive: Arafat). To start a process of reform that includes the creation of a prime 
minister position, a new Palestinian constitution, based on strong parliamentary democracy, 
(again, not Arafat and his executive department). The donor coordination committee, the Ad 
Hoc Liaison Committee would review the humanitarian situation and to launch a major donor 
assistance effort. Israel will be required to freeze all settlement activity and both leaderships 
issue unequivocal statement affirming their commitment to the two-state solution. 
On March 19, 2003, Arafat appointed Mahmoud Abbas as the first Palestinian Prime 
Minister in history, Arafat’s hope was that since Abbas was perceived as a moderate, his 
appointment would meet the demand and help restart negotiations.1257 Unlike Arafat who was 
sympathetic, and even supportive of armed resistance against Israel, Abbas was not known 																																																								
1254 President George W. Bush, "Remarks on the Middle East," in The American Presidency Project (Online by 
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley: The American Presidency Project, University of California,  2002). 
1255 Ibid. 
1256 Elgindy, "Khalid Elgindy, Interview, November 2014, Washington D.C.." Full text of the plan available 
from United Nations website "A Performance-Based Roadmap: To a Permanent Two-State Soltuon to the 
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," United Nations News Center, 
http://www.un.org/News/dh/mideast/roadmap122002.pdf. 
1257 Tom Lansford, 9/11 and the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq: A Chronology and Reference Guide (Santa 
Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2012), 103. 
5. The Road to Decline  243 
for his love for militants. He complained, with justification, that his position was a hollow 
one, that Arafat remained in control of the entire security apparatus. Arafat, who had been the 
sole leader for much of his life, was not about to relinquish the power over the security forces 
to Abbas, or an “empowered Interior Minister” either. Abbas lasted until October of the same 
year before resigning his new position, citing “a lack of support from Israel and the United 
States as well as internal incitement against his government.”1258  
Phase II, “Transition; June 2003- December 2003.” During this phase, “efforts are 
focused on the option of creating an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders 
and attributes of sovereignty…” The phase includes plans for an international conference to 
be convened by the Quartet to support Palestinian economic recovery. The phase also 
included multilateral talks on regional issues such as “water resources, environment, 
economic development, refugees and arms control.” During this phase, Israel would be 
required to stop settlement activities by the end of 2003 and withdraw from all areas 
occupied, or reoccupied since September 2000. 
Phase III, “Permanent Status Agreement and End of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 
2004-2005.” Since the conflict is still raging in 2016, needless to say, the plan did not make it 
to this stage. At any rate, the objectives in this phase are “consolidation of reform and 
stabilization of Palestinian institutions… and Israeli-Palestinian negotiations aimed at a 
permanent status agreement in 2005.” And again, an international conference convened by 
the Quartet “to support progress toward a Middle East peace settlement…”1259 When all is 
achieved, the Arab states accept to full normalize relations with Israel in the context of a 
comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace.1260 
Indeed, the Bush administration has received much criticism and blame for its actions 
in Iraq and elsewhere, but has so far escaped the blame for turning Palestinian politics on its 
head by insisting on holding elections and carrying out reforms during a time when Hamas 
was on the rise. One is left to wonder if the Bush administration had done their calculations 
correctly, whether the Palestinian- Israeli conflict would be where it is today.  	 If the Bush administration’s pressure brought Hamas to the helm of Palestinian 
politics, it can hardly be blamed for Hamas’ rise since it occurred over 20 year period. Indeed 
Hamas did not come to power as a result of its excellent campaign strategies in 2006, nor the 
charismas and eloquence of its leaders alone. It was a long process that started in late 1980s, 																																																								
1258 Dan Cohn-Sherbok and Dawoud El-Alami, The Palestine- Israeli Conflict; Beginner's Guide, (London: One 
World PUblications, 2015). Renewed Aggression. 
1259 "A Performance-Based Roadmap: To a Permanent Two-State Soltuon to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict". 
1260 Ibid. 
5. The Road to Decline  244 
and culminated in the movement’s electoral victory in 2006. The process began with secret 
attacks, successful recruitment, and indoctrination with emphasis on loyalty to the movement, 
a well-established social support system, an effective media branch, and perhaps most 
importantly, an effective military wing in Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades. Al-Qassam is by 
far the best-equipped and trained Palestinian military faction at present. The military wing 
that began with Salah Shahada has grown to include, depending on various estimates between 
20,000-50,000 fighters today.1261 
 Hamas is a branch of the Society of Muslim Brothers, or the Muslim Brotherhood, as 
it is better known. It was born officially on December 14, 1988 when it issued its first 
communiqué threatening Israel, or the “criminal Zionists,” as referred to in the communiqué, 
to “keep their hands off of our people, our cities, our refugee camps, our villages.” Hamas’ 
battle with the Zionists was a battle of “faith, existence, and life,” according to the 
declaration.1262 While the movement has undergone a process of mild moderation since its 
founding, particularly after its official enrollment in the political process as the majority party 
in the Palestinian Legislative Council, it still holds to its longstanding policy of refusing to 
recognize Israel’s right to exist, and still carries out attacks against Israeli civilian. According 
to a Hamas military commander, this sort of action is justified on the “an eye for an eye” 
concept, and the fact that Israel has compulsory military service, meaning that its citizens 
could be called into action by their government when drafted.1263 
 The founder and spiritual leader of the movement was Sheik Ahmad Yassin of Gaza 
City. Yassin was a 1948 Palestine refugee who fled to the Gaza Strip following the 
occupation of his village near the city of Ashkelon in Israel.1264 After a wrestling accident at 
the age of 12, Yassin suffered from quadriplegia for the remainder of his life until his 
assassination by Israel after the fajr (morning) prayer outside a mosque in Gaza City in 
March 2004.1265 A public opinion poll two weeks after Yassin’s assassination found that 
Hamas had become the most popular party among Palestinians for the first time in history.1266   
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 Today the U.S. Department of State, and most European countries list Hamas as a 
terrorist organization.1267 Norway and Switzerland remain the only two western European 
countries not to list Hamas as a terrorist organization, joined by Brazil, China, Iran, Qatar, 
Turkey and Russia.1268 The Chinese government’s position regarding Hamas was clarified by 
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Liu Jianchao after the 2006 elections when he stated, 
“… we believe that the Palestinian government is legally elected by the people there and it 
should be respected.”1269  
 On October 25, 2004, news from Ramallah reported that Arafat was ill with the flu. 
As his condition worsened in the next few days, Arab doctors from Egypt, Jordan, and 
Tunisia arrived to help with the treatment.1270 After obtaining permission from Israel, Arafat 
was transported in a Jordanian helicopter to Amman and transported to Percy Military 
Hospital in Calmart, a suburb of Paris.1271 Few days later, on November 11, 24, Yasser Arafat 
passed away in France from what French called a massive hemorrhagic stroke, and that he 
had suffered from a blood condition called disseminated intravascular coagulation.1272  
The French Army Honor Guard accorded Arafat a funeral that included playing the 
French and Palestinian national anthems. Former French president Jacques Chirac stood 
beside Arafat’s coffin for about 10 minutes in a show of respect for the old man.1273 The 
following day, Arafat was transported to the city of his birth Cairo, where he was accorded a 
military funeral with the presence of many Arab kings, presidents, and other world heads of 
state, and high rank officials.1274 He had wished to be buried in Jerusalem, but Israel denied 
the request. He was therefore buried near headquarters in Ramallah in the presence of tens of 
thousands of Palestinians from all ages, and factions, who had come to say farewell to their 
leader. Needless to say, he died as he had lived, in controversial and mysterious 
circumstances, and fingers quickly pointed at Israel with accusations of poisoning him using 
																																																								
1267 Terrorism, "Foreign Terrorist Organization." 
1268 Joshua Davidovich, "The China Bank is Not the Issue Here, Dude," The Times of Israel, December 18, 
2013. Senussi Bsaikri, "Russia's Relations with Hamas: a Win-Win Situation," Middle East Monitor, February 
15, 2010. 
1269 As quoted in Chris Zambelis, "China's Palestine Policy," The Jamestown Foundation- China Brief  9, no. 5 
(2009): 10.(China Daily, June 2, 2006)  
1270 Amal Jamal, The Palestinian National Movement: Politics of Contention, 1967-2005 (Bloomington: Indiana 
State University, 2005). 
1271 Josef Federman and Karin Laub, "New Tests Revive Debate Over Arafat Death," Associated Press, July, 4, 
2012.  
1272 Ibid. 
1273 Brian Whitaker and John Aglionby, "Blair's Tribute to Arafat Breaks Ranks With Bush," The Guardian, 
November, 12, 2004.  
1274 "Leaders Gather in Egypt for Arafat's Funeral," CNN International, November, 12, 2004.  
5. The Road to Decline  246 
polonium. Since then, an investigation into his death has been carried out in France, 
Switzerland and Russia but investigators have reached inconclusive conclusions.1275 
Arafat’s political career began when Eisenhower and Dulles were in charge of the 
foreign policy establishment as president and secretary of state respectively. He became the 
de facto leader of the Palestinian people and revolution during the Johnson presidency, and 
ended with George W. Bush and Colin Powell. During his life, the U.S. changed presidents 
10 times, and over 17 people occupied the position of Secretary of State, while Arafat 
endured at the pinnacle of Palestinian politics. For the Palestinians’, Arafat’s death was a 
major blow to their cause. For he had long been the father figure and a symbol for their 
revolution, towards the end of his life, he was referred to in reverence and respect as 
Elkhitiar, meaning the “old man.” He had spent the better part of his revolutionary years 
trying to have somewhat of a normal relation within the U.S. for his belief that it held the key 
to Israel, but he never managed to gain the friendship or the trust of his American 
counterparts. Not a single official from the Bush administration attended the funerals in Paris, 
Egypt, or Ramallah. “After more than 30 years of interactions with the Americans,” says 
Quandt, “Arafat was still shunned and demonized by those whose support he had sought in 
vain.”1276 
After Arafat died, the authorities of the Chairman of the Palestinian Authority was 
given to Rawhi Fattouh, the Speaker of the PLC, to serve as interim president for 60 days, 
during this time, Fattouh arranged for elections.1277 The leadership of Fatah went to one of 
the last living of Fatah’s founders, Farouq al-Qaddoumi, until elections could be held. 
Fattouh scheduled elections for January 9, 2005, exactly 60 days after Arafat’s death, and 
legislative elections was to be held on July 17 of the same year, though that deadline was 
postponed to January 2006.1278 
The 2005 presidential elections took place on the day Fattouh had chosen. Prior to the 
elections, there was a debate within Fatah to choose a candidate. One of the candidates 
considered was Marwan al-Barghouti, an extremely popular figure among Palestinians and 
Fatah’s leader in the West Bank prior to his arrest and sentence for five life-sentences by 
Israel for establishing Al-Aqsa Martyr Brigades, a Fatah military wing established during the 
second uprising and responsible for attacks against Israel by Barghouti himself. In jail, 																																																								
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Barghouti could do little to campaign, or even influence the nomination of a candidate within 
Fatah. The only other serious candidate was Mustafa Barghouti an independent (a relative of 
Marwan). So unopposed from within Fatah, and hardly any opposition from outside since 
Hamas and the Islamic Jihad both boycotted the election, Abbas ran practically unopposed, 
with the exception of Mustafa Barghouti the independent who still managed to claim almost 
20 percent of the total vote.1279 There was little to no doubt that Abbas would win. He won 
with 62.5 percent of the total vote. Abbas’ campaign slogan was “The Best Successor for 
Best Predecessor.”  
But for all his victory, Abbas has never been a popular figure. He is falsely credited 
with being one of the founders of Fatah, which he was not. These claims have probably been 
advanced chiefly to add weight to his “revolutionary record.” He was recruited to join Fatah 
during its underground years in Kuwait.1280  Abbas was in Qatar working as Director of 
Personnel in the Emirate’s Civil Service in 1961 when he was recruited more for his wealth 
than for his political brilliance.1281 In 2012, Abu-Dawoud, the Black September architect of 
the Munich Massacre admitted in an interview that Abbas was actually the financial sponsor 
of the operation, though he did not know what his money was going to be spent on.1282 
Abu Mazen was born in Safad in March 1935, a city in British Mandate Palestine that 
is now in Israel, to which he has publicly announced giving up his right of return, proving 
that he really is a pragmatist.1283 In 1948, his family fled Safad to Damascus where Abbas 
graduated with a law degree from its university. He went to Moscow where earned a PhD in 
1982 for his thesis entitled The Secret Relations Between the Nazism and Zionism.1284 His 
views of the Holocaust would come into question, and he has repeatedly denied accusations 
that he was a Holocaust denier. In truth, he did not deny it. He said that it did take place, but 
that the number of casualties was greatly exaggerated by the Zionists to generate more 
international sympathy for their cause, and he further argued that there was cooperation 
between the Nazis and the Zionists to facilitate Jewish migration to Palestine.1285 
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Abbas has three sons, Mazen his eldest (hence the name Abu-Mazen) ran a 
construction company in Qatar where he died of a heart attack in 2002. His second son 
Yasser, is a multimillionaire Canadian citizen, and his third son, Tareq is a business 
executive. The doings, businesses, and wealth of his sons would come into question in 
Palestinian political and corruption debates on more than one occasion.1286 
5.3. 2006 Elections 
 With mounting pressure for reform from the Bush administration, the 2006 elections 
were scheduled for January 2006, few months after Abbas’ electoral victory.1287 According to 
prominent Fatah leader Mohammed Dahlan “it was Bush who had pushed legislative 
elections in the Palestinian territories in January 2006, despite warnings that Fatah was not 
ready.”1288  
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was at the World Economic Forum in Davos, 
Switzerland, when the preliminary election results were released. In a videoconference 
message, Secretary Rice congratulated president Abbas and the Palestinian people on 
peaceful elections, and restated the United States’ position on Hamas saying “you cannot 
have one foot in politics and the other in terror. Our position on Hamas has therefore not 
changed,” meaning that Hamas must abandon violence and recognize Israel.1289 These two 
conditions Hamas has never been willing to accept.  
Few days before the elections, the Washington Post reported that the Bush 
administration spent foreign aid money in an attempt to increase the popularity of Abbas 
prior to the elections. The $2 million program, which was double what Hamas spent on its 
election campaign, was run by a division of USAID, “but no U.S. government logos appeared 
with the projects or events being undertaken as part of the campaign, which bears no 
evidence of U.S. involvement…”1290 At least the administration kept the project quite, and so 
far as this research found, it was not reported in local Palestinian media, else it would have 
been a scandal that would have been counter productive to improving Abbas’ standing and 
image. American officials said that providing aid in this manner was to ensure that Abbas 
received the credit for them. The aid money was spent on this “temporary paradigm shift,” 																																																								
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would sponsor street-cleaning campaign, distribution of free food and water to Palestinians at 
border crossing, donating computers to community centers and sponsoring a youth soccer 
tournament.1291 
The most puzzling aspect of the 2006 elections is the supposedly “unexpected” 
Hamas victory. The puzzle is not why they won, but the fact that it was unexpected. Hamas’ 
victory should have come as no surprise to any scholar or politician who had kept a close eye 
on the developing events in the Palestinian territories following Arafat’s death. Why 
American policy makers failed to see Hamas’ coming victory, when everyone else saw it, 
remains inconceivable. During a visit to the Gaza Strip in 2005, I was truly dumbfounded by 
the large number of people who had switched their allegiance to Hamas, or those who 
became Hamas supporters. By January 2006, Hamas had won major municipal and local 
elections across the Palestinian territories.1292 It was “carrying the resistance banner,” leading 
the military operations against Israel and led a well-organized campaign on which the focus 
was Fatah’s corruption.1293 Its payroll and charity programs had expanded massively in the 
years of the Intifada. In 2005 municipal elections, Hamas won a total of 75 percent of total 
seats up for elections in Gaza’s districts.1294 
 A possible explanation for this misdirection was a series of public opinion polls 
conducted shortly before the elections, as well as exit polls on the day of the elections. In all 
honesty, Hamas fooled everyone, particularly Palestinian researchers. As numerous Hamas 
supporters, and some of its leaders confirmed, in the weeks before the elections, Hamas 
supporters were told to first ignore public opinion surveys, and if that was not possible, they 
were to provide the wrong answer with respect to their voting preference. This misled to 
faulty results in many of the opinion polls.1295 
 The second deficiency was misreading the actual results by the media and politicians 
alike. According to a poll conducted between 17-19th of January 2006, Fatah’s list was 
expected to win 42 percent of the total legislative seats, to Hamas’ 35 percent. The very same 
poll indicated that 7 percent were still “undecided.” Such high number of undecided voters 
was enough to swing the elections in Hamas’ favor. Unfortunately, in such cases the attention 
is usually focused on the larger digits, and little to know attention is focused on the undecided 
and the independents. 																																																								
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What followed was a disaster by any standard, for everyone involved. The major 
donors suspended their foreign aid to the PA until Hamas and the new government met three 
conditions; renunciation of violence, recognition of Israel, and acceptance of previous 
commitments and obligations made by the PA. If this sounds familiar, it is because these 
demands were more or less the same the Reagan administration made of the PLO in late 
1980s. What Hamas’ victory did was send the peace process 20 years into the past. 
 Within the Quartet, there was division regarding what to do with Hamas. The U.S. 
and the EU, the major donors, saw Hamas as a terrorist organization and were adamant that 
the movement had to change its position regarding Israel. Russia and the UN were more 
flexible. According to Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary General at the time, the quartet 
attempted to reach a “common but differentiated approach,” wherein the UN and Russia 
would deal with Hamas “as necessary,” while the U.S. and the EU would exercise pressure 
on the movement, but Condoleezza Rice “would have none of it.”1296 Annan’s advisors 
warned him against the risk early on saying that U.S.’s intention was now to bring down the 
Palestinian Authority, and that would result in chaos. The advisors also warned of “a large 
disgruntled security sector whose salaries were not paid.” According to Annan, “The work of 
more than a decade of building institutions, however imperfect, could be lost. The Americans 
did not seem to mind.”1297  
The U.S. and Israel did not mind because they believed Hamas’ new government 
would crumble under the financial pressure, and that somehow they would be overthrown by 
a popular uprising. As Dov Weisglass, an advisor of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, 
informed Annan, it would take “just few days” for popular protest to force Hamas to meet 
international demands or fall.1298 This was grievous misjudgment on part of Israel and the 
U.S. Twenty years since Hamas’ founding and the so-called policy experts on both side felt 
that this was the way to go forward, that such pressure would actually make Hamas succumb 
to pressure. Twenty years and it seems that they had learnt little to nothing about Hamas. 
Needless to say, it has taken more than “few days,” it has taken years and Hamas is as likely 
to change its position today, as it was when it won the elections. Instead, Bush and Israel’s 
blockade backfired, creating a “Rally Around the Flag Effect,” rather than bring down the 
flag effect.  
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In the months that followed the elections, PA employees were suffering as a result of 
not receiving their monthly wages. Worst of all, the economic boycott that followed the 2006 
elections undermined the PA reform efforts that were being carried out by Abbas. The 
Palestinians felt abandoned by the international community. How could they not feel this way 
when they cast their vote as required only to be told in no subtle manner, too bad, you have 
chosen wrongly? Reform, democracy, human rights, and sustainable development were all 
undermined by the blockade. In responding to the suspension of aid following the elections, 
Khalid Meshal, Head of Hamas’ Political Office rejected the U.S. and the EU’s demands, 
stating in an article published in The Guardian entitled We Will Not Sell Our people or 
Principles for Foreign Aid, 
“The day Hamas won the Palestinian democratic elections the 
world’s leading democracies failed the test of democracy. 
Rather than recognize the legitimacy of Hamas as a freely 
elected representative of the Palestinian people, seize the 
opportunity created by the result to support the development of 
good governance in Palestine, and search for a means of ending 
the bloodshed, the U.S. and EU threatened the Palestinian 
people with collective punishment.”1299 
 
Donors had spent millions of dollars in their attempt to build democratic institutions, 
and ensuring that the Palestinian Elections Commission was well equipped and its staff well 
trained, and that the Palestinians understood the benefits of such notions as democracy, 
transparency and good governance, only for all these notions to be thrown out of the window 
because the Palestinians voted for Hamas.1300 After the elections, Fatah also pursued a policy 
of limiting Hamas’ authority by urging donors to send aid to PA individuals and agencies 
under Abbas’ control rather than to the local municipalities controlled by Hamas.1301 A report 
by the British House of Commons published in early 2007 concluded that, “the situation… 
politically, economically and socially, is worse than it was in 2004. The International 
community is in danger of preventing the creation of a viable Palestinian state.”1302   
 The rising tension as a result of Hamas and Fatah’s struggle for power soon 
transferred itself into the Palestinian streets. Violence erupted between the supporters of the 
two movements, which culminated in military clashes between the armed wing of Hamas on 																																																								
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the one side, and the armed wing of Fatah and the PA’s security on the other. What and who 
exactly is or are responsible for the short intra-Palestinian civil war is a matter for 
speculation. Both Fatah and Hamas embarked on propaganda campaigns in both the local and 
international theaters, absolving themselves of responsibility and holding the other 
accountable for the deterioration in the security situation. According to Raji Sourani, the 
director of the Palestinian Center for Human Rights, “it took Hamas just few days to flush 
away 53,000 strong PA security apparatus which was a fourteen-year Western 
investment.”1303 
The day Hamas seized Gaza remains a day of controversy for Palestinians. Today, 
Fatah supporters call it “the coup,” and Hamas’ supporters call it the day of “decisiveness.”  
The next day, when the sun rose over Gaza, the entire coastal strip was under Hamas’ control. 
If Israel and the U.S. had not been worried, this was the time to start. What began with 
suspending foreign aid to moderate or even bring an end to Hamas after its electoral victory, 
culminated in a disaster. Suspending foreign aid did not work; in fact it made matters, much 
worse for the U.S., Abbas, the peace process, and Israel. Hamas became the de facto 
governor of Gaza, and Israel declared the coastal strip a “hostile territory.”1304 Over the next 
few years, the hostile territory would enter into three wars with Israel, resulting in the deaths 
of thousands of Palestinians, the destruction of thousands of homes, the destruction, 
reconstruction then re-destruction of Palestinian infrastructure that was built with foreign aid 
money. 
In the West Bank, after Hamas’ takeover of the Gaza Strip, Abbas worked on 
consolidating his and Fatah’s positions after the embarrassing defeat at Hamas’ hands. As the 
figure above demonstrates, U.S. bilateral aid to the Palestinians dropped significantly after 
Hamas’ electoral victory in 2006, before beginning to climb to the highest amount in history 
in 2008-2009, due in large part to aid provided to Abbas to secure the West Bank and avoid 
another disaster for the U.S. Salam Fayyad, a Palestinian technocrat, was appointed as prime 
Minister of the Palestinian Authority. According to Elgindy, Fayyad was the perfect model 
for the West because he provided them “with a sanitized depoliticized version of Palestinian 
politics that the West could embrace.”1305  Fayyad represented a new wave of non-militant 
leaders, he was not interested in the difficult political issues; refugees’ right of return, 																																																								
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Jerusalem, borders and armed struggle. Instead, Fayyad focused on good governance, and 
institutional reforms, a much-preferred approach by the Europeans and the U.S.  
 
 Figure	5:3,	Bilateral	American	aid	to	the	PA	in	USD	millions. 
5.4. Embargo and Blockade 
 Few days after the coup in June 2007, the Guardian UK published a secret End of 
Mission Report, by Alvaro De Soto, the United Nations Middle East Envoy. In the leaked 
report, which was written in May 2007, de Soto condemned the boycott of the Palestinian 
government following the elections describing the boycott “at best extremely short-
sighted.”1306 Gaza has become a “concentration camp” had become often used to demonstrate 
the level of suffering inflicted upon Gaza’s citizens as a result of the blockade.1307 People 
who use such expressions either do not have the slightest clue as to what a concentration 
camp was, or do not know what Gaza is like. Gaza is a camp, with very limited freedom of 
movement for its citizens, and people are concentrated there, but there is no extermination, no 
forced labor, no gas chambers, Gaza is not Auschwitz. Gaza is far from being a concentration 
camp in the sense that “concentration camp,” as a term entails. It is a big prison that 
occasionally opens its doors to let few prisoners out. Food and other necessities are available 
with occasional shortages every now and then. Petrol and cooking-gas and commodities of 																																																								
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this nature are imported from Israel, and Israel closes trade crossings and forbids such 
material to enter the strip as it sees fit. And this does not by any means give legitimacy and 
justification for Israel’s unjust, and counter-productive policy of blockading 1.8 million 
people. There is death and misery in Gaza, and plenty of both because of the blockade, and 
life can indeed be quite unbearable for its residents. 
 The collapse of Hamas that Israel and many others, including the PA in Ramallah, 
waited for never materialized, in large part due to the ingenious idea of digging tunnels under 
the Gaza- Egypt border. These tunnels provided a much-needed lifeline to Hamas, and to the 
people of Gaza. Gazans smuggled all sorts of goods through these tunnels, ruling Israel’s 
blockade of the strip virtually obsolete. Thanks to these tunnels, the Gaza Strip had a zoo, 
though the Zebras were actually painted donkeys.1308 Cars and machineries began to be 
smuggled through these tunnels as well. During a visit to the tunnel area, I was shocked by 
the sheer number of these tunnels. When I finally mastered the courage to go down into one, I 
saw a car that had been cut in three parts being rolled out to be re-attached together in Gaza, a 
flock of sheep followed the car, before carts of Egyptian cement concluded the day’s business 
for the tunnel owner. People on both sides of the border prospered as Egyptians in Sinai 
discovered a market of 1.8 million consumers who had been deprived of much due to Israel’s 
blockade. Some of the tunnels were 20 and 30 meters deep and 250 meters to 1 km long, 
according to the tunnel operators I spoke with. And if all that was not enough, a Gazan could 
pick up the phone and order Kentucky Fried Chicken from Al-Arish in Egypt to be delivered 
to their homes a couple of hours later cold and soggy.  
 But no Gazan benefitted half as much as from the tunnels as Gaza militants, as Hamas 
militants informed me in 2013, and 2014 prior to the start of the war. According to these 
militants, after the collapse of regimes in Arab countries during the so-called Arab Spring 
provided Hamas and other military groups managed to smuggle huge amounts of weaponry, 
ammunition, and military technologies that they had lacked, particularly from Libya. Hamas’ 
fighters no longer wore the standard military uniform alone, now their outlook included 
American night vision goggles. Hamas’ rocket arsenal expanded to include thousands of 
rockets in total, some of which was built with Syrian and Iranian training before Hamas 
started manufacturing them locally in Gaza. Some of these rockets include the Qassam 
rocket, which has a range of 17km, able to reach cities such as Sderot and Ashkelon in Israel; 
Fajr-5, an Iranian rocket with 75km range, Hamas developed the M-75 based on this rocket 																																																								
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which can reach major cities in Israel such as Beersheba, Dimona, Tel-Aviv and Jerusalem; 
and Khaibar-1 which has a range of 160 km, and can threaten the city and port of Haifa. 
While these rockets are still primitive and inaccurate, they still proved a major threat to Israel 
during the 2014 conflict since they limited the Israelis’ movement, spread fear and caused the 
shutdown of Ben-Gurion Airport for few hours, leaving thousands stranded, unable to leave 
Israel, nor come back to Israel, with major airliners either cancelling or delaying their flights 
to Tel- Aviv.1309 
Instead of a hostile political party equipped with basic military means, or a hostile 
bankrupt government, Israel’s fierce enemy became a quasi-state with its own independent 
territory. Hamas’ control of the strip helped Hamas grow in all aspects at a much faster rate, 
particularly during the year between June 2012 and June 2013 when the Muslim Brotherhood 
came to power in neighboring Egypt after the revolution in 2011.1310 
5.5. Manifestations of Disorder 	 For all Hamas’ success in the election campaign, and in its success in maintaining its 
control over Gaza despite the blockade, the current decline in Fatah is a product of its own 
failure, particularly the failures of its leadership presented chiefly by Mahmoud Abbas, who 
was described by Elgindy as “the man without a plan B.”1311 The optimism that surrounded 
the signing of the Oslo accords began to fade rather quickly as the new PA was unable to 
manage Palestinian political, social and economic affairs in an effective manner. The 
leadership seemed to stumble from one folly to the next, with total disregard to the needs and 
demands of their own people. Arafat and Abbas after him focused on maintaining and 
enforcing their positions of power by dictatorial means rather than by providing honest 
government and functioning economy, despite the various restrictions Israel imposed 
throughout the two decades since the signing of Oslo. 
“In Palestine, citizens have rights of free speech and free 
assembly. The most independent judiciary in the Arab world 
adjudicates their disputes. Palestinians select their leaders freely 
in competitive elections overseen by an independent electoral 
commission. A representative assembly monitors the executive, 
granting and withholding confidence from ministers and 
reviewing the state budget in detailed public discussions. 
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Elected councils manage local governments that are fiscally 
autonomous of the center.”1312  
 
Nathaniel Brown’s 2005 Evaluating Palestinian Reform describes Palestinian politics 
as it is “on paper.”1313 Brown continues his generous description by stating, “Palestine is, in 
short, a model liberal democracy.” After finishing this description of the PA, Brown exclaims 
that the PA remains “an authoritarian regime in a region rich with authoritarianism.”1314 
The deficiencies of the PLO manifested themselves in the PA. There was no tangible 
change between the leadership style of Yasser Arafat after he became president of the PA. 
The PLO was a revolutionary organization that was ill equipped to carry out the tasks of a 
full-scale government in the form of the PA following Oslo. The mismanagement of social 
and economic affairs that the PLO demonstrated in Jordan and Lebanon in the 1970s 
manifested itself in the Palestinian territories, they simply carried over into the PA. Neither 
Arafat nor Abbas were able to provide good governance that is based on democratic values, 
transparency, equal opportunity, and respect for their citizens’ rights.  
Their cronyism is one of the major causes of the corruption that eventually manifested 
itself in every layer of Palestinian politics and society. The Palestinians satirically referred to 
Vitamin “waw,” which stands for “wasta” in Arabic, meaning nepotism, or “who you know.” 
In other words, if someone wished to be appointed to any job position, all they needed was to 
know someone in whatever institution they wished to work for. Another way was to be 
counted among Fatah affiliates. Indeed, Fatah’s downfall while it took place simultaneously 
with Hamas’ rise, was a product of such policies rather than Hamas’ own successes, 
significant as they were. Hamas’ 2006 electoral list was called “change and reform.” Change 
from the leadership of Fatah that plagued the Palestinian society for two decades, and reform 
of the corrupt institutions that Fatah established and filled with incompetence and individuals 
who wasted public resources for their own benefits. 
The majority of the vast sums contributed by the U.S. administrations since Oslo were 
channeled through USAID programs.1315 According to a recent CRS report by Jim Zanotti 
published on March 18, 2016, since the signing of the Oslo accords, the U.S. government has 
provided over $5 billion in bilateral economic assistance to the PA.1316  This assistance 
targeted Palestinian economy, social service, and civil society sectors. The funds have also 																																																								
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been used to strengthen the PA’s security forces by providing training, weapons, and improve 
governance of the different PA institutions.1317  
According to a December 2014 public opinion poll, 81 percent of the Palestinians 
living in the territories believed that there was corruption in the PA, compared with 78 
percent in a poll conducted three months earlier. In the same poll, 29 percent of the 
Palestinian public believed that Israeli occupation and settlement construction to be “the most 
serious problem confronting Palestinian society today,” and 25 percent believed it was 
corruption.1318 Corruption under the PA, argues Haddad, “was not an anomaly inasmuch as it 
was systemic and a means of governance- a deliberate tool of garnering power and 
consolidating position.”1319 
Through an initiative by a number of Palestinian civil society organizations, The 
Coalition for Integrity and Accountability, AMAN, was established in 2000 with the mission 
of promoting transparency and accountability in Palestinian institutions.1320 AMAN publishes 
an annual report on corruption in the Palestinian territories, which is funded by the 
governments of Norway, Netherlands and Luxembourg. In its most recent report for 2014, 
AMAN found that the ministry of planning stopped public reporting on budget and data, and 
that some officials’ salaries reached $10,000, an outrageously highly salary at a time when 
Gaza employees have not been paid in years, while public sector employees in the West Bank 
have been on strike multiple times in the last year demanding improved salaries and 
retirement packages.1321 $10,000 a month is an outrageous salary even for the PA president, 
as the highest ranked official in the PA structure. 
Some of the major findings in AMAN’s 2014 report conclude that with a 
dysfunctional legislative branch, there has been a lack of supervision, and little transparency 
over budgetary issues. There has also been further growth in the politicization of 
appointments to public positions, which has led to “random and unnecessary appointments,” 
particularly in the civil and security sectors, imposing further constraints on the budget. Anti-
corruption courts received 50 cases in 2014 alone, some of which were director generals of 
ministerial positions, 20 cases were dismissed and the courts ruled in only three of them, 																																																								
1317 "U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians," 4. 
1318  Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, "Public Opinion Poll No (54): December 2014," 
(Ramallah: PCPSR,  2014). 
1319 Toufic Haddad, "From Arafat's Death to the Disengagement Spectacle," in Between the Lines: Readings on 
Israel, the Palestinians and the U.S. "War on Terror", ed. Taufic Haddad and Tikva Honig-Parnass (Chicago: 
Haymarket Books, 2007), 348. 
1320 AMAN, "Aman- Transparency Palestine, About Aman," (Online: Aman). 
1321 Nadim Baba, "Frustrated Palestinian Teachers Escalate Strike Action," Aljazeera, March, 11, 2016.  
5. The Road to Decline  258 
leaving 27 practically untouched. Economic crimes, according to AMAN’s findings are also 
on the rise.1322 
Corruption is not a new phenomenon in Palestinian politics. Indeed, it is embedded in 
the foundation and structures that govern the Palestinians. As Tariq Dana rightly points out, 
“the scandals that Palestinians hotly debate from time to time… are an outcome of 
longstanding corruption embedded in the underlying power structure that governs the 
Palestinian political system and that were rooted in the Palestinian Liberation Organization 
prior to the Oslo process.” 1323  Foreign aid simply helped bring these issues under the 
spotlight due to oversight and reporting mechanisms require by the donors on the bilateral 
and multilateral levels.    
Writing about the PA in his The Iron Cage, Rashid Khalidi states that, “the Para-state 
structure,” is  
“a patronage- laden and largely ineffective system rife with 
cronyism. This system conspicuously benefited PLO leaders and 
cadres who had staffed the Palestinian quasi state in Lebanon, and 
then had sat in enforced idleness in different sites of exile for over a 
decade after the expulsion of the PLO from Beirut in 1982. These 
individuals were chosen for most of the top positions in the PA 
essentially because of their loyalty and their revolutionary past 
rather than on the basis of merit. The senior figures among them 
enjoyed privileges and perquisites ranging from education abroad 
for their children to VIP status shrewdly granted by Israel that gave 
them relative freedom of movement and insulated them from the lot 
of the common people.”1324 
 
Thomas Friedman wrote along similar lines 16 years before Khalidi in From Beirut to 
Lebanon, Friedman writes that there is “well-known corruption in the PLO leadership, the 
misuse of funds, and the way in which the organization had become as much a corporation 
full of bureaucratic hacks and guerilla outfit.”1325  
The explanation for the spread of this phenomenon begins at the very top of the 
Palestinian pyramid, and also at the roots of Palestinian culture. The nature of the newly 
established PA; the fact that it stemmed from an quasi-state organization like the PLO and 
from a militarized political movement, such as Fatah, ensured that the vast majority of the 
new state employees were enrolled in the security apparatus. To accommodate such large 
number of military personnel, twelve different security apparatuses were established within 																																																								
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the new PA. Twelve security branches to serve less than four million people. Furthermore, 
this extraordinarily high number of security organizations can be attributed to Arafat’s way of 
rewarding those military commanders who had served long in Fatah’s ranks and were loyal to 
him. Giving them high ranked positions within the security organizations was Arafat’s way 
of rewarding them, and keeping them on his side. 
The protocol allowed the PA to import goods and set prices on them within the 
territories. According to Nigel Parsons, the system was manipulated to the advantage of 
“selected merchants in collusion with the PA.”1326 The PA did not make public auctions for 
importing cement, communications equipment and petroleum resulting in huge economic 
benefits and monopolies to “well-placed” Palestinians such as Mohammed Dahlan, head of 
Preventative Security in Gaza; Mohammed Rashid, Arafat’s financial advisor, and Nabil 
Shaath.1327 
Unaffiliated Palestinians tend to be the group that suffers the most. There is a sense of 
iron loyalty among Palestinians to their political affiliation. Part of this loyalty no doubt 
springs from the fact that each party takes care of its affiliates, supporters, and members, 
leaving the unaffiliated with much less care. An experience during the 2014 war is worth 
mentioning at this point. Being an educated Palestinian with knowledge of American politics 
and a good command of English has made me an attractive target for the political parties. 
During Israel’s air campaign against the Gaza Strip, prior to the ground invasion, a 
neighbor’s house was destroyed and our house sustained some damage. Within hours, my 
phone was ringing with calls from different people affiliated with different parties asking for 
my details so they can compensate me for the damage done to our house, and the unaffiliated 
neighbors whose houses were even more damaged received no such calls. Also during the 
war, Fatah, Hamas and other parties supported their supporters who were displaced because 
of the war with blankets, cooking supplies, and other basic necessities, and the unaffiliated 
had to wait for relief from international relief organizations, and some of them did receive 
aid, others did not. 
Even the health sector became corrupt. Due to the limited medical resources in the 
Gaza Strip, a large number of Gazans travel for surgeries, cancer treatments and other 
advanced medical procedures. Arafat himself would issue these transfer orders, without the 
knowledge and approval of the minister of health or the minister of finance for that matter. 																																																								
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“A letter from Arafat was all that was needed to implement such decisions; not even a 
medical examination was required.”1328 
The cultural aspect that reinforces corruption is the loyalty to families and places of 
origins. It is not unusual for a high-ranking government official to distribute jobs and 
positions among members of the family, or town, even if said members lack the merit and 
skills required for such positions. It is abnormal if they do not. As a hypothetical example, if 
the Minister of Energy were from Jabalya, one can expect Jabalies to fill the ranks in the 
Ministry of Energy. If the minister does not hire relatives and fellow Jabalies, he or she 
become subject to disapproval. This patron-clientelism, argues Dana, “contributes to the 
climate of corruption by favoring incompetent loyal political constituents and excluding 
skillful people on arbitrary basis.”1329 
Mohammed Rashid, a close aide of Arafat, who had been his financial advisor for 
many years, was sentenced to 15 yeas in jail in absentia by a court in Ramallah in May 2012 
after being found guilty of money laundering and misappropriation of public funds. 1330 
Rashid was fined $15 million and ordered to return more than $30 million, which he was 
accused of stealing.1331 Shortly after Rashid’s sentence, the House Subcommittee on Middle 
East and South Asia held hearings entitled Chronic Kleptocracy: Corruption within the 
Palestinian Political Establishment, in which former George W. Bush administration official 
Elliot Abraham stated that “corruption is an insidious destroyer not only of Palestinian public 
finance but of faith in the entire political system. And it has certainly had an impact on 
potential donors.”1332 Recalling from his own experience while seeking assistance for the PA 
from the Gulf States that he was told, “why should we give them money when their officials 
just steal it?”1333  
5.6. Carrots and Sticks  
Despite the initial success of the efforts of president Clinton, and the less frequent and 
less successful efforts carried out by his successors, the situation in the Middle East remains 																																																								
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too close to the abyss for anyone’s comfort. Until the time of writing these lines, President 
Obama has showed little to no interest in bringing together the two sides to the negotiations 
table fearing perhaps to tarnish the end of his legacy with a failure, particularly after his 
success with Iran’s nuclear deal and normalization of relations Cuba.1334 Secretary of State 
John Kerry has visited the region a number of times in vain attempt to bring the two sides 
closer. Although that is probably due for the most part to the Palestinian and Israeli 
leaderships’ unwillingness to come to the table without preconditions. Israel is demanding to 
be recognized as a Jewish State, and the Palestinians are refusing to come to the table so long 
as settlement expansion in the West Bank continues.1335 Hamas’ control of the Gaza Strip and 
the recent conflicts between the Islamist movement and Israel, have done little to ease the 
tensions between the two nations and their leaderships.  
 Presidents Clinton, Bush and Obama have all used the foreign assistance program to 
pressure Abbas and his bankrupt PA into making policy concessions and policy adjustments. 
None of these of leaders actually succeeded in achieving their goal. On the contrary, 
America’s peace partner is stuck in a corner, unable to juggle between Israel and the security 
commitments required of him, and the demands of the people who chose him to lead them 
more than a decade ago. The simple truth is that the PA cannot survive without foreign 
assistance and budget support. Aid has been the backbone of its economy, particularly when 
Israel withholds tax returns on imports destined for the territories. 
 In late September 2015, the Palestinian territories erupted once again in what German 
foreign Ministry Spokesperson Martin Schäfer called “possibly a third Intifada.”1336  The 
situation was reminiscent of the first two uprisings with Palestinian youth throwing stones 
and clashing with Israeli soldiers at checkpoints. Netanyahu accused the Palestinian leaders 
of inciting extermination against the Jews. At leas two IDF generals disagreed, stating 
publicly “that Palestinian violence is driven to a considerable degree by anger at Israeli 
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actions.” 1337  Israeli intelligence service the Shin Bet claimed it was a feeling of 
discrimination among Palestinian youth that was driving them to violence.1338  
The Department of State and congress have accused the Palestinian leadership of 
inciting violence and not doing enough to prevent Palestinian youth from carrying out attacks 
against Israelis. So in late September 2015, the State Department informed congress of their 
plans to reduce aid to the Palestinians by $80 million, approximately 20 percent of total aid 
destined for 2015.1339 The U.S. was sending a message to Abbas to stop alleged incitement 
against Israel. Though the cuts had already been planned before the clashes took place, in 
response to the PA’s application to join the International Criminal Court and the UN as well 
as the PA’s negotiations with Hamas to resolve the political rift between the two major 
Palestinian factions that has plagued the Palestinians since Hamas’ takeover of Gaza in 
2007.1340 
The final section of this research focuses on such historic and contemporary instances 
when the U.S. used foreign assistance to influence the policies and practices of the PA and its 
president Mahmoud Abbas, and how the adjustments made on part of the PA contributed to 
the decline of his, and his party’s popularity among the Palestinian public. As has already 
been discussed, a decline in Fatah and Abbas’ popularity will certainly lead to rise of 
Hamas’, which is an undesired consequence for both the U.S. and for Israel. This section 
discusses and analyses the failed attempts of the Bush and Obama administrations to 
influence the PA by using aid as a tool of statecraft, and how this use backfired and resulted 
in further decline of Abbas and Fatah. Three case studies suffice to demonstrate the extent of 
the shortcomings of using foreign assistance in this way; the Goldstone Report, the 
Palestinian bid for statehood, and finally and most significantly the American sponsored 
security cooperation between the PA and Israel. 
5.6.1. Goldstone Report 
 On December 27, 2008, a war erupted between the Palestinian factions in the Gaza 
Strip, Hamas chief among them, and Israel. The war ended just few days before the 
inauguration of president Obama on January 21 the following year.1341  It was the first of 																																																								
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three wars between the Gaza Strip and Israel between 2009 and 2014. The situation erupted 
when the Egyptian brokered ceasefire between the two sides came to its conclusion and the 
parties failed to extend it. The war left approximately 1400 Palestinians and 13 Israelis dead 
and over 5000 Palestinians and 518 Israelis injured.1342 Both Hamas and Israel came under 
criticism for their war tactics. The former for firing rockets and mortar shells indiscriminately 
towards Israeli civilian areas, and the latter for the airstrikes that left civilians and police 
officers dead, particularly on the first day of the war. 
 During the last week of the war, the Organization of the Islamic Conference requested 
from the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), sending a fact-finding mission to 
the Gaza Strip. The Council adopted a resolution to “dispatch an urgent, independent 
international fact-finding mission, to be appointed by the President of the Council, to 
investigate all violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law 
by the occupying power, Israel, against the Palestinian people…”1343 One needs not be an 
expert in the Palestinian- Israeli conflict to read the obvious bias in the resolution since it 
made no mention of possible crimes committed by Hamas and other Palestinian factions. 
Because of the bias in the language, former commissioner Mary Robinson refused to head the 
commission stating that the mandate was driven by politics rather than human rights.1344 
South African jurist Richard Goldstone also refused leading the commission for the same 
reason, until the mandate was changed to investigate “to investigate all violations of 
international human rights law and international humanitarian law…”1345 
The mission was headed by Goldstone who had been the chief prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and included; 
Christine Chinkin, International Law Professor at the London School of Economic and 
Political Science; Hina Jilani, Advocate of the Supreme Court of Pakistan; and Desmond 
Travers, a former colonel in the Irish Defense Forces. The mission traveled to the region to 
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conduct their investigation. The 574-page report of their findings accused both Israel and 
Hamas of committing war crimes and possibly crimes against humanity.1346  
The next step was to vote on the report and its recommendations at the UNHRC. The 
recommendations required both Hamas and Israel to conduct open investigations in their 
conduct during the war, should the parties fail to do so, the case would be transferred to the 
International Criminal Court. If the case reaches the ICC, Israeli leaders would be subject to 
arrest and trials for committing war crimes. What happened next was the real shock for 
Palestinians. In the last hours before the resolution was to be put to a vote by the UN council 
where it would have in all likelihood received 33 votes of the 47 members, Abbas decided to 
postpone the vote until March the following year.1347 Consequently, Palestinians took to the 
streets in protest against Abbas. Gazans threw shoes at Abbas’ portraits and called him a 
traitor, Ramallah’s main square filled up with protestors, and Syria cancelled Abbas’ planned 
visit.1348  
 In a vain attempt to salvage what he could, Abbas delivered a televised address in 
which he explained, “the decision to postpone was a result of a consensus among the 
different parties at the human rights council … in order to secure the largest number of 
supporters for any resolution in the future.”1349 Abbas changed his mind a few days later to 
preserve what he could after the wave of criticism his action created.1350 According to an 
opinion poll by an-Najah University, despite the fact that the report accused Hamas as well as 
Israel, 55.6 percent of Palestinians supported the implementation of the report’s 
recommendations.1351 	 The leaked documents from the Palestinian negotiating teams, the Palestine Papers, 
reveal that the postponement of the report had nothing to do with a consensus among the 
different parties or securing more votes. The reason for it was American promises of aid and 
a political settlement package. In a meeting between Senator George Mitchel, U.S. Special 
Envoy for Middle East Peace, and Saeb Erekat, Chief Palestinian Negotiator on September 
24, 2009 in New York City, Mitchel told Erekat that president Obama was “strongly 
committed to supporting AM [abu-mazen, Abbas] and his government. I’ve devoted half my 																																																								
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time over the last several months to things like getting you support (for example with 
Kuwait) not just financial. We will stay the course on this.”1352 Before Mitchell’s arrival at 
the meeting, David Hale informed Erekat that Mitchell was speaking with the Kuwaitis 
“about getting aid to be more cash assistant,” according to the meeting minutes.1353 
 The chaos that surrounded the Goldstone Report saga left Abbas on bad terms with 
everyone involved. The Palestinian people resented his action in postponing the report 
because they believed he had given Israel a free pass, and Israel and the U.S. were not happy 
about his U-turn. Abbas then launched an investigation in a vain attempt to calm the 
Palestinian protestors; an investigation in his own action.1354 In fairness, the Palestine Papers 
reveal that the postponement of the report, while it did bring aid benefits, seemed to have 
been done for the most part due to American promises to re-launch the peace negotiations. 
The Palestine Papers also recorded a discussion regarding a $200 million aid package from 
Saudi Arabia that the PA needed but would not have received had the U.S. not interfered with 
Saudi Arabia.1355 
5.6.2. Bid for Statehood 	 By summer 2008, a sense of frustration was growing among both Palestinians and 
Palestinian leadership at the lack of progress in the political process. Neither Hamas, with its 
supposed military prowess, nor Abbas with his experienced negotiators, had produced any 
tangible achievement on the ground. The staggering peace process, and the failed attempts to 
reignite it, only added to the frustration, forcing Abbas to think of alternative ways to deliver. 
As Khalid Elgindy noted in a Foreign Affairs in September 2011, the Palestinian leadership 
was not “seeking to revive the moribund peace process: they are seeking to bypass it 
altogether.” 1356  Meaning that to progress towards establishing a Palestinian state, the 
Palestinian leadership bypassed the peace process by going to the UN to seek recognition 
from its institutions. Needless to say, neither Israel nor the U.S. welcomed this new approach, 
and both used financial pressure to force the PA to back down. 
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Saeb Erekat, summarized the Palestinian negotiation position bluntly and succinctly 
in an NPR interview in March 2015 when he said,  “since Eve negotiated with Adam, I am 
the most disadvantaged negotiator in history. I have no army, no navy, no air force, no 
economy… my people are fragmented.”1357 The bid for statehood provided the Palestinian 
leadership with a much-needed leverage, not just to secure some diplomatic success on the 
home front, but to pile pressure on the Israeli and American governments. They were in a 
desperate need of a carrot, or anything that could be used to improve their standing. With 
this, “Palestine 194” campaign was launched. 194 refers to Palestine becoming the 194th 
member of the United Nations. 
 The bid for statehood provided just the Palestinian leadership with an opportunity to 
improve their standing among Palestinians and also at any future negotiations, at the very 
least, they could use their UN bid as leverage against Israel and the U.S. The responsibility 
fell to Salam Fayyad. The PLO had served as a quasi-state organization that ran refugee 
camps, invested globally, maintained law and order, and fought bloody wars and skirmishes 
with Israel for 50 years. The PA took over in the last decade of the 20th century, and was 
supposed to be doing an improved job in building Palestinian institutions, with the aid of 
international donors to help sustain the Palestinian people in their state building process.  
 Echoing the action of the senate a month earlier, in July 2011 the U.S. House passed 
Resolution 268, in which the house opposed “any attempt to establish or seek recognition of a 
Palestinian state outside of an agreement negotiated between Israel and the Palestinians.”1358 
Furthermore, the resolution urged Palestinian leaders to “cease efforts at circumventing the 
negotiation process, including through unilateral declaration of statehood or by seeking 
recognition…. from other nations or the United Nations.” The act further affirmed that such 
efforts would “harm U.S.- Palestinian relations and will have implications for U.S. assistance 
programs for the Palestinians and the Palestinian Authority.”1359 The house’s resolution was 
very similar to the resolution passed by the senate a month earlier, affirming, urging and 
threatening the same principles in a similarly worded resolution.1360 
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Two months before the UN General Assembly were to vote on the resolution, 
congress suspended over $200 million in aid money to the PA that was to be used for 
humanitarian and development projects.1361 In response, Ghassan Khatib, a PA spokesperson, 
labeled congress’ action as “another kind of collective punishment which is going to harm the 
needs of the public without making any positive contribution.”1362 In September 2011, in a 
desperate attempt to prevent the PA from seeking state recognition at the UN, David Hale, 
who had replaced Senator Mitchell as U.S. Middle East peace envoy, and Dennis Ross 
embarked on shuttle diplomacy visit to Israel and the West Bank in an attempt to persuade 
the PA to withdraw their bid, to no avail.1363 Despite American threats to veto any resolution, 
the Palestinian leadership was confident that they would receive the nine votes required, if 
the U.S. vetoed it, then the U.S. would be the one standing in the path of establishing a 
Palestinian state.1364 
On December 30, 2014, the UN Security Council rejected a resolution that called for 
an end to occupation within three years, and the establishment of a Palestinian state within 
1967 borders, receiving eight “yes” votes, and two “no” votes from the U.S. and Australia, 
with five abstentions.1365 In explaining the American vote, U.S. Ambassador to the United 
Nations Samantha Power said, “we voted against this resolution not because we are 
comfortable with the status quo. We voted against it because… peace must come from hard 
compromises that occur at the negotiating table.”1366 The resolution required nine “Yes” 
votes. Nigeria surprised the council with their abstention. It is not yet clear what promises or 
threats were made to sway the Nigerian vote. What is known however is that the Palestinian 
and Jordanian delegations received assurance from the Nigerian delegation that they would 
back the resolution.1367 Even if Nigeria had voted in favor, or abstained, the U.S. would have 
had to use its veto power to prevent the resolution from passing anyway.  
Secretary of State John Kerry made a phone call to the Nigerian president before the 
vote; what threats or promises were made during that conversation remains unknown, but one 
cannot help but wonder how big a role U.S. assistance to Nigeria played a role in helping the 																																																								
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African nation decide.1368 Nigeria is one of the largest African recipients of American foreign 
assistance, both economic and military.1369  In 2013, the most populous African country 
received over $300 million, in 2014 the amount increased to over $350 million, and in May 
2015, the Obama administration promised further increase in military assistance.1370 
The United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization, UNESCO, was 
the first organization to lose U.S. funding. During a UNESCO meeting in September 2011, a 
resolution sponsored by 24 states was put forward to consider the Palestinian application for 
full membership in the organization. On October 5th, UNESCO voted in favor of the 
admission 107 to 14 with 52 abstentions.1371 Shortly after the vote, the Obama administration, 
citing a 1990 congressional law, withheld $60 million from UNESCO, leaving the 
organization’s budget in a terrible position. The Congressional law states that “no funds 
authorized to be appropriated by this Act or any other Act shall be available for the United 
Nations or any specialized agency thereof which accords the Palestine Liberation 
Organization the same standing as member states.”1372 
The 2011 suspension of aid to UNESCO was not the first time the U.S. used foreign 
aid to influence, or punish international organizations the U.S. perceived to be critical of 
Israel, or supportive of the Palestinians. During the Ford administration in November 1974, 
the General Conference of UNESCO rejected Israel’s request to join the organization’s 
European regional group, leaving Israel as the only member of the organization without a 
regional group.1373 Earlier still, a resolution by the general conference condemned Israel for 
“its persistence in altering the historical features of the City of Jerusalem and by undertaking 
excavations which constitutes a danger to its monuments.”1374 A month later, congress voted 
to suspend U.S. assistance to UNESCO budget.1375 The embargo was lifted two years later 
once the general conference admitted Israel to the European regional group.1376 																																																								
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The International Labor Organization (ILO) also had a taste of American sanctions. In 
1975, while the UNESCO suspension was still in effect, Kissinger handed the ILO director 
general a notice in November stating four grievances against the ILO, the last two of which 
were the organization’s disregard for due process. According to Kissinger “the most blatant 
example was the 1973 conference’s treatment of Israel,” and what he perceived as the 
increasing politicization of the organization.1377 The politicization in all certainty referred to 
the PLO’s participation in the General Conference, and the General Conference’s 1974 
condemnation of Israel for “racist” practices in the West Bank. On November 1, 1977, 
President Carter suspended America’s membership in the ILO, and it would not resume until 
February 1980.1378 
Suspending aid to UNESCO in 2011 was devastating to the organization to say the 
least. American aid to the UN amounts for a little over 20 percent of the organization’s 
budget, and 22 percent of UNESCO’s, totaling over $140 million.1379 As a result of losing 
American aid, the organization embarked on a series of budgetary cuts, which according to 
its director, affected every platform of the organization.1380  
In March 2012, the satirical American Daily Show with Jon Stewart criticized the 
Obama administration’s action.1381  In the report, John Oliver, the show’s Chief Foreign 
Correspondent investigated the issue, interviewing Congressman Robert Wexler who 
admitted that “many of the things [UNESCO] does are life saving,” but blaming the 
organization for the situation in which it found itself.1382 Gabon, the poor African country 
was the first country to “step up and pledge $2 million,” to assist with the organization’s 
budget deficit. The report highlighted the efforts of UNESCO on global scale, particularly its 
efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, including teaching over 80 percent of the Afghan police force 
how to read and write. 1383  The Obama administration is yet to resume funding the 
organization, The Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs 
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Congressional Budget Justification for fiscal year 2016 includes no funding requests for 
UNESCO.1384 
The Palestinian Authority went ahead with the bid for statehood, despite American 
and Israeli pressure and loss of crucial financial assistance. UNESCO went ahead and 
recognized Palestine, leaving the U.S. without voting rights in one of the most important UN 
organizations having lost it for failing to pay its dues.1385 While neither UNESCO, nor the 
UN for that matter, determines crucial political issues, the U.S. has lost “influence in culture, 
science and education around the world.”1386 The use of foreign assistance in this particular 
scenario failed to achieve its policy objective, worse still for the U.S., considering the 
plethora of projects UNESCO had to slash in areas of significant geopolitical importance for 
the U.S. The U.S.’s standing in the world as its leader, an indeed an example to other 
supposedly, was damaged by such needless action that has not, nor is it likely to, yield any 
results in the future. 
5.6.3. Security Coordination 
 The final case study, and arguably the most important focuses on the U.S. donations 
to the security apparatus of the PA, and the security coordination between Israel and the PA. 
The security coordination, sometimes referred to as security cooperation or security 
collaboration, between the Palestinian Authority and Israel originated with the signing of the 
Oslo accords. The purpose was to facilitate the cooperation between the two sides on security 
matters and exchange of intelligence.1387 Unlike Abbas, Arafat’s commitment to the program 
can best be described as half-hearted at best, and the coordination seized to exist during 
Arafat’s last years in office following the start of the second uprising in 2000.1388  The 
program was revived under his predecessor Mahmoud Abbas, who views the coordination as 
sacred as he described it to Israeli journalists and business people during their visit to his 
headquarter in Ramallah in 2014.1389  
The sacredness of the coordination to Abbas springs from three reasons. The first is 
the fact that most foreign aid provided by the U.S., particularly after Hamas’ takeover of the 																																																								
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Gaza Strip has been dictated to the security sector. The PA’s security apparatus is the single 
largest employer within the PA structure, representing approximately half of the employees 
on the PA’s payroll. The authority’s spending on security, particularly salaries, represents 30 
percent of the PA’s budget. In 2014 for example, PA expenditure for security sector totaled 
$1.1 trillion of the PA’s $3.5 trillion dollar budget, equaling what the PA spent on education 
and health combined.1390 The second reason is the protection provided to Abbas’ rule in the 
West Bank since most of the employees are Fatah affiliates whose loyalty belongs to Abbas. 
This reason was elevated to higher levels after Hamas’ coup in Gaza. And finally, for any 
future peace agreement with Israel to work, Abbas needs to prove his ability to maintain 
peace, law, and order in the West Bank, or else Israel will never give him the state he desires. 
This coordination was capped by the creation of the office of the United States 
Security Coordinators (USSC) by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in 2005. The USSC is 
one of the most controversial policies ever adopted by the PA. The USSC is a multinational 
team made up of security experts from the United States, Turkey, Britain and Canada. 
Lieutenant General Keith Dayton,  
“It was to mobilize additional resources and to allay Israeli fears 
about the nature and capabilities of the Palestinian Security 
forces. The USSC was to help the Palestinian Authority to right 
size its force and advise them on the restructuring and training 
necessary to improve their ability, to enforce the rule of law, and 
make them accountable to the leadership of the Palestinian 
people whom they serve.”1391 
 
 According to General Dayton, his office focused on improving the Palestinian 
Authority and government system in four different ways; first is training and equipping new 
security forces; second is capacity building and improving the institutional capabilities of the 
Ministry of Interior; the third way is infrastructure; the fourth and final was the senior leader 
training programs. 1392  According Thomas Friedman, this new policing has done much 
positive to stabilize the West Bank and create a safe environment for investment.1393  
 Since Hamas’ takeover of the Gaza Strip in 2007, the U.S. has spent more than $1 
billion in security assistance to the PA. Most of this aid has been provided under the 
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement program (INCLE). The aid has helped 																																																								
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train approximately half of the 45,000 PA security personnel in the West Bank and provide 
non-lethal assistance, advise, housing, training, and equipment such as uniforms, vehicles.1394 
For FY 2016, the State Department requested $70 million in INCLE funds for the West Bank 
to “continue to build the capacity of the Palestinian Authority security sector and sustain the 
capabilities of the PA security forces.”1395 
In 2009 alone, Palestinian and Israeli forces took part in 1297 coordinated activities 
against militant groups, a 72 percent increase over the year before.1396  Fatah’s Al-Aqsa 
Martyrs Brigades, established by the imprisoned Barghouti that led the armed attacks against 
Israeli civilians and IDF in the beginning of the second uprising, was dismantled by this joint 
Palestinian-Israeli security coordination.1397 The result was a reduction of Palestinian attacks 
against Israel to their lowest levels since the start of the intifada on September 28, 2000. “It is 
better than before the second intifada even- it’s excellent,” commented Mike Herzog, former 
Chief of Staff to the Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak.1398 The Palestine Papers, the 
leaked documents by Aljazeera from the PA’s negotiations department, have revealed the PA 
security forces complacency in Israel’s assassination of a top tier Fatah military commander, 
Hassan Al-Madhoun in Gaza.1399 Furthermore, another document cites Saeb Erekat, Chief 
Palestinian Negotiator, speaking of “killing our own people,” in reference to the PA security 
forces’ killing of Hamas militants in Qalqilya in the West Bank.1400  
Amid growing pressure on Abbas, he supported a PLO Central Committee decision to 
suspend security coordination with Israel in March 2015.1401 The committee explained its 
decision based on “Israel’s systematic and ongoing non-compliance with its obligations under 
signed agreements, including its daily military raids throughout the State of Palestine, attacks 
against our civilians and properties,” according to a statement by the committee.1402 Until the 
writing of these lines, a year after the decision was taken, and Abbas is yet to carry it out. 
Security coordination is proving to be too useful and too beneficial to abandon, even amidst 
ever growing disapproval of the Abbas and his policies with respect to this cooperation. 																																																								
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Public opinion surveys conducted between 2014 and late 2015 indicate a strong 
disapproval among Palestinians for security coordination. There was general approval of the 
PLO’s Central Committee’s decision to suspend the coordination in March 2015. In a survey 
conducted by An-Najah National University in Nablus between 20-22, November 201, 72 
percent of respondents in the West Bank supported the decision, as opposed to 64 percent in 
the Gaza Strip where Hamas rules and there is no security coordination.1403  A possible 
explanation for the eight percentage point difference is that respondents in the West Bank are 
more aware of the consequences of this coordination since they are subject to it, unlike their 
Gazan counterparts. When the respondents were asked whether the PA would eventually 
implement the committee’s decision, 27 percent said yes and 62 said no.1404 Another opinion 
poll conducted more than a year earlier, showed similar results with 67 percent of participants 
opposing the security coordination.1405 
When the Head of Palestinian Intelligence in the West Bank Majid Faraj announced in 
January 2016 that the security forces had thwarted more than 200 planned attacks against 
Israel, there was a wide outrage against him in local news as well as social media network, 
amid calls demanding his resignation. A tweet by an outraged Palestinian called for Faraj’s 
expulsion dubbing him as “Dayton’s puppy.” Faraj’s statement was published in an article, 
Keeping ISIS Out of Palestine, by Barbara Opall-Rome published in New York based 
Defense News website.1406  
The attacks Faraj referred to were mostly lone-wolf stabbings planned by Palestinian 
youth. All the same, Faraj came under heavy criticism, particularly from Hamas. Talal abu-
Tarifa, a member of the DFLP’s political office, labeled Faraj’s statement “a political scandal 
and a political cover to the daily policy of execution and murder and a stab for the 
intifada.” 1407  Hamas PLC representative, Marwan abu-Ras said that Faraj’s declaration 
revealed that these leader, in reference to the security apparatus leadership, are “a part of the 
Zionist project,” who hide their shame under the cloak of working in accordance with 
Palestinian national interest.1408 He added that these leaders have contributed nothing to the 
Palestinian people and condemned Faraj and Abbas for protecting “the occupation army and 																																																								
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their settlers.”1409 If that was not enough, Hamas’ Attorney General in Gaza opened a case 
against Faraj in a military court for his confession in “preventing ‘resistance operations’ and 
‘coordinating with the occupation.’”1410 Nothing will come since Hamas’ Attorney General 
has no jurisdiction over Faraj or the West Bank at any rate; it is just Hamas’ way of making 
sure Faraj stays under the spotlight. 
An opinion poll conducted between March 17 and March 19, 2016, asked respondents 
about Faraj’s statement regarding stopping 200 attacks against Israel, only 30 percent of 
Palestinian public supported the PA security’s action in stopping these attacks, and 65 
percent opposed it.1411 In Gaza, a traditionally a Hamas stronghold, the support percentage 
dropped to 22 percent, as opposed to the West Bank’s 34, while opposition in Gaza stood at 
74 percent, in comparison to the West Bank’s 59 percent. The poll indicates a general 
disapproval of Faraj’s statement, and further disapproval of the security coordination between 
the PA and Israel.1412 
Yet for all the training of these Palestinian policemen, they remain very much affected 
by the conditions in which they live and what they experience. In the most recent escalation 
in late 2015 and early 2016, Amjad al-Sukkari, an off-duty policy officer opened fire on 
Israeli soldiers at a checkpoint near Ramallah, wounding three. The attack rang alarm bells in 
Israel and drew heavy criticism of Abbas by Netanyahu who accused the PA of standing 
“behind the incitement that stokes the terrorist attacks.”1413 Few hours before the attack, 
Sukkari posted a poem by late Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish on his Facebook page. 
“We have on this earth what makes life worth living,” wrote Amjad before adding, 
“unfortunately, I do not see anything worth living for as long as the occupation is suppressing 
us and killing our brothers and sisters.” Sukkari’s attack was the first to be carried out by a 
Palestinian police officer. After hesitation, the PA accorded Sukkari a military funeral with 
thousands of Palestinians attending, hailing him as a hero.  
Sukkari’s attack was glorified by Palestinian media and praised by Hamas, which did 
not miss the chance to mention security coordination on the occasion of an attack by an 
officer from the so-called Dayton Army. Ismail Haniya told local news website Alwatan 																																																								
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Voice that agreements with Israel were useless and demanded a national strategy to bring the 
Palestinians out of what he described as a “dark tunnel,” in reference to security coordination, 
and demanded a cancellation of agreements “that damage our shared Palestinian… we praise 
the great Mujahid Amjad al-Sukkari who works in the West Banks security apparatus who 
sought a free Palestinian future.”1414 
With his adamant refusal to carry out the wishes of the Palestinian population to end 
security coordination with Israel, and general agreement among Palestinians of what they 
perceive as his failure to deliver any substantial improvements in their lives as well as general 
dissatisfaction with his policies, public opinion surveys since summer 2015 have generally 
showed Abbas’ approval ratings to be dropping, at the cost of rising approval for Hamas, and 
military oriented leaders such as Marwan al-Barghouti, the Fatah leader currently serving 
multiple life sentences for terrorist charges in Israeli jails. 1415  For the last six months, 
approximately two thirds of Palestinians believe that the time has come for Abbas, to borrow 
a football expression, to hang his boots, with 60-67 percent demanding his immediate 
resignation.1416  
Doubtless, the escalating violence in the territories, particularly the stabbings and riots 
in the West Bank, with the number of dead Palestinians soon to exceed 200 since September 
2015, there is a general shift among Palestinians to more hardline, more right oriented groups 
and leaders than Abbas. 
It is hard for any Palestinian living in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, to witness 
and experience their very own Palestinian police cracking down on militants as well as youth 
stone throwers and remain supportive of Abbas. For the sake of the argument, place yourself 
in the neighborhood in the city of Qalqilya where Abbas’ police marched in and engaged 
Hamas militants and killed them. Whether one agrees with Hamas’ tactics and strategies or 
not, this is a different question, 
5.6.4. The Palestinians’ Perception of Aid 	 As mentioned in the literature review as well as chapter three’s discussion of the role 
of public opinion in foreign aid, there is a general lack of literature on the role of public 
opinion on aid, particularly on the perception of aid in the recipient countries. Unfortunately, 
the Palestinian case is not an exception. There are few opinion polls that include questions on 																																																								
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the Palestinians’ perception of donor assistance, and fewer dedicated to the question of aid 
motives and functions specifically. The Development Studies Program at Birzeit University 
in Ramallah conducted one of those surveys 2004. 1417  Beata Paragi of the Institute of 
International Studies from the Corvinus University of Budapest conducted another survey in 
2010. Paragi’s survey was based on a series of individual and focus group interviews, and 
reached similar conclusions to Birzeit University’s survey.1418 The results of both surveys 
demonstrate a general distrust of foreign assistance among Palestinians, as well as questions 
regarding the political motives of donors.1419 
 According to the 2004 survey by Birzeit University, 62 percent of respondents 
believed that donors had hidden political agenda, while only 14 percent believed that the 
donors acted out of concern for the needs of the Palestinians, and 24 percent believed it was a 
combination of both.1420 In the same survey, 55 percent of respondents believed that aid had 
helped Israel consolidate its control over the territories, and only one third believed that aid 
had served the long-term interests of the Palestinian people.1421 The most interesting of the 
survey’s results was the fact that only 24 percent of Palestinians surveyed believed that donor 
assistance should be provided to the PA, a clear indication of mistrust among Palestinians of 
the PA’s ability to manage international assistance, as opposed to 20 percent who believed it 
should be provided to private sector, while the majority 56 percent believed that it should be 
provided to NGOs. Finally, 77.5 percent of respondents believed that neither they, nor their 
families had benefited directly from foreign aid.1422 The issue of corruption in the PA ranks is 
the most accurate explanation for this mistrust. The survey was conducted a decade after the 
PA took charge of their lives, two years after the start of the second uprising, and by then PA 
corruption was common knowledge among Palestinians. 
 The Norwegian research foundation Fafo, also conducted an opinion poll in both the 
West Bank and Gaza in February and March 2008, shortly after the 2008/2009 Gaza War.1423 
A small part of the survey was devoted to perception of foreign assistance. The poll reached 
similar results to the 2004 Birzeit survey, with the majority of respondents believing that 																																																								
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“Western financial assistance to the PA is doing more harm than good.”1424 63 percent of 
Palestinians believed that aid to the PA promoted corruption, and a similar percentage 
believed that it had very little to no effect on eliminating poverty in the territories. Nearly 70 
percent of those polled said that foreign aid contributed to the rift between Fatah and Hamas, 
and only a third felt that aid had a positive impact on services provided by the PA.1425 
 The 2010 survey conducted by Paragi also reached similar conclusions. One of the 
survey questions asked the respondents about their “impressions and feelings” regarding 
foreign aid, and whether they agreed with specific statements regarding foreign assistance. 53 
percent said that their feelings towards aid were “positive feeling, it is always good to help,” 
42 percent said that aid “makes me feel more secure,” 65 percent saw it as “only 
compensation from those responsible for the situation,” 65 percent saw it as 
“humiliation.”1426 Regarding the roles and functions of aid, 68 percent felt that, “aid helped 
donor countries impose their aims,” and 62 percent agreed with the statement that the role of 
aid was to “help Israel continue the occupation.”1427 Based on these results, Paragi concludes 
that, “donors are perceived as active players being able to influence not just political or 
institutional processes, but hurting the collective and individual self-esteem of the recipient as 
well.”1428 
 Despite the general shortcomings associated with public opinion surveys, all three 
polls indicate that there is a general dissatisfaction with foreign assistance among 
Palestinians. Two notions from these surveys are worth keeping in mind; Palestinians do not 
trust their government to spend aid donations fairly without reinforcing the existing 
corruption, and the second is that the Palestinian populace perceive aid as a political tool 
rather than a humanitarian tool designed to ease their suffering.  
 This section of the research focused on the road to decline with the establishment of 
the PA after the signing of the peace process between the PLO and Israel. The chapter argued 
that the causes of Fatah’s decline date back to the years before the signing of the peace 
process, but that the process peace and subsequent aid have played a role in accelerating this 
decline by feeding the corruption within Fatah and the PA’s ranks, and by pressuring the 
Palestinian leadership to meet political demands that were not in line with the view of the 
Palestinian people. Indeed, as the case studies discussed in this section have demonstrated, 																																																								
1424 Ibid. 
1425 Ibid. 
1426 Paragi, "First Impressions and Perceived Roles: Palestinian Perceptions on Foreign Aid," 11. 
1427 Ibid., 14. 
1428 Ibid., 20. 
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using foreign aid has put the PA leadership, and president Abbas at odds with the Palestinian 
public on multiple occasions.  
First, the Goldstone Report scandal resulted in a backlash against Abbas’ decision to 
postpone it, and the research has revealed that it was for the promise of further American aid 
and aid from Kuwait and other gulf states the U.S. promised the Palestinians would work 
tirelessly to obtain. Second, the attempt to dissuade the PA from seeking a recognition of a 
Palestinian state at the UN ended with UNESCO, a well respected international organization 
that was carrying out humanitarian projects across the world, including Afghanistan, to lose 
its U.S. funding, throwing its budget in disarray and forcing program cuts. And finally, and 
arguably worst of all, aid has turned the Palestinian security apparatus against their own 
citizens, even if such citizens are designated as terrorists by Israel, they remain Palestinian 
and fighters for a noble cause, as the Palestinians see them. Abbas is therefore perceived to 
be cooperation with the enemy against his own citizens. 
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Conclusion 
The purpose of this study was to examine the political impact of American foreign aid 
on Palestinian politics, particularly since the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 to the 
present. It examined the role American assistance played in shaping the bilateral American-
Palestinian relationship, and more specifically the role this impact played in feeding the 
discontent with the peace camp represented by President Mahmoud Abbas and the 
Palestinian Liberation Movement, Fatah. The study also evaluated the use of aid as a tool of 
foreign policy in achieving the objectives the U.S. has spent billions trying to achieve, 
namely protecting Israel’s security as its most important ally in the Middle East, and 
advancing the cause of peace in an unstable part of the world that has paramount geopolitical 
significance to U.S. interests. 
The study demonstrated that American foreign aid has had a profound impact on 
shaping the American-Palestinian relationship, not only since the signing of the Oslo 
agreement, but rather since the U.S. began providing millions of dollars to UNRWA’s budget 
when the organization was created in 1949. The impact of American aid to the Palestinians 
can be summarized in three periods, or phases, each marking a paradigm shift in the use of 
aid in dealing with the Palestinian question; the pre-Oslo Humanitarian Phase, the post-Oslo 
Development Phase, and finally the Security Phase.  
This study argued that during the first phase U.S. aid to Palestine refugees had a 
strong political component that dominated American foreign policy circles until the mid-
1970s. The political component of what in this case qualifies as “humanitarian aid” was 
keeping the Question of Palestine as a humanitarian one rather than a political one, a problem 
of refugees and displaced persons, rather than a problem of a nation without a state. It was 
hoped that with time, the question would simply answer itself in one of two ways; by either 
simply being buried in the pages of history which meant that the refugees would eventually 
settle in whatever Arab country they escaped to, or the Jordan Option would resolve the 
refugee crisis by hosting the Palestinians, providing for their needs with international 
assistance, integrating them in Jordan, and eventually also by speaking for them in any future 
negotiations. In this paradigm, American humanitarian aid took the politics out of the 
question of Palestine, and with it any questions regarding the Palestinians’ political rights to 
self-determination and statehood. With this solution, Israel would not have to relinquish 
territory to accommodate any future Palestinian state. 
This paradox of what may be perceived as humanitarian action, has indeed helped 
prolong the conflict in other ways than simply covering up the political issues, particularly of 
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the Palestinians’ right to self-determination. An example of the role of aid in prolonging the 
conflict through this paradox was by absolving Israel of its supposed responsibilities under 
international law to care and pay for the needs of five million Palestinians in the Gaza Strip 
and the West Bank, who were otherwise being aided by the U.S. and UN agencies. If Israel 
felt the pressure to provide for another five million individuals, one could argue that this 
pressure would have made Israel flexible on territorial issues. 
However, the use of humanitarian aid as a means to keep the politics out of the 
refugee problem, though it can be said to continue today, was beginning to prove insufficient 
as three factors that evolved simultaneously during the 1970s put the politics back in the 
question of Palestine, and ruled the original intent of American aid obsolete. The first was the 
emergence and growth of the PLO as a major player in the Middle East political scene, 
particularly when the organization threatened to topple the regime of King Hussein in the 
early 1970s and make a Hanoi in Amman. There are also the infamous plane hijackings by 
the PFLP, and the even more infamous activities of the Black September Organization, which 
played a role in enforcing the PLO’s position and also in bringing the Palestinian question to 
the forefront of international agenda. Terror does have its purpose, and it seemed to have 
work in the 1970s as not only the Arab League recognized the power and influence of the 
PLO, but also most of the world as the General Assembly invited the PLO to speak for the 
Palestinian people at the world’s highest international forum. “The world only ever listened 
to [the Palestinians] when [they] blew things up,” I was told by Elgindy during the 2014 
interview in Washington D.C. 
The two other interrelated reasons for the change in the U.S. perception of the 
Palestinian issue was the 1973 Oil Crisis, which forced the U.S. to look at the deeper roots of 
the conflict, with the Question of Palestine at the heart of it, and finally the change brought 
by the election of president Carter with whom came individuals who believed that the 
solution to the Middle East conflict lay in resolving the Question of Palestine by creating a 
homeland for Palestine refugees, Brzezinski and Quandt and the minds behind the Brookings 
Report chief among them. 
This idea of a homeland, though it did not feature a state in the contemporary sense of 
the word, continued into the Reagan administration, even though Reagan had little love for 
the PLO, and its general alignment with the Soviet Union, he held to the homeland solution, 
perhaps in a confederate arrangement with Jordan. But when King Hussein decided to 
disengage from the West Bank, and hand it over to the PLO, the Jordan Option the U.S. had 
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clung to for years was all but dead, and there was no other way for the Palestinian issue to be 
resolved except by talking with the PLO, an idea that U.S. was not willing to embrace easily.  
The Reagan administration made demands of Arafat and the PLO that were very 
similar of those made of Hamas by the George W. Bush following the 2006 elections; 
recognition of Israel, renouncing terrorism, and accepting UN resolutions 242 and 338. 
Arafat accepted these demands, though he had refused them during Carter’s time in office, or 
could not accept them then due to serious opposition from other PLO factions. The reason for 
Arafat’s acceptance to become involved in the diplomatic efforts towards the end of Reagan’s 
time in office and George Bush’s term, was his loneliness, and loss of support of financial 
and political aid provided by the Arab States, particularly in the Gulf, after his miscalculation 
when he sided with Saddam, who had lured Arafat to his cause by providing handsome 
financial packages to begin with. 
The second phase was the Development Phase that followed the start of the peace 
process. During this phase, the Clinton administration paid for peace and for peace dividend. 
This phase is best understood within the framework of Modernization Theory and 
democratization as advocated by the 1950s and 1960s works of the CENIS group and 
Seymour Lipset. The purpose of aid during this phase was to create a developed, stable, and 
peaceful Palestinian regime and society under the leadership of the Palestinian Authority. 
This aid was supposed to set the course for the eventual creation of a Palestinian state that 
would in turn be stable, viable, developed, democratic, and therefore peaceful. The dominant 
belief during the second phase was that economic stability and social prosperity lead to a 
democratic form of government that resorts to peaceful negotiations to resolve longstanding 
issues between the Palestinians and the Israelis, thereby removing the threat of Palestinian 
militarism. 
Within this rationale, there was the idea that aid would help move the peace process 
forward. The Oslo agreement, a considerable achievement on its own, was supposed to be a 
mere first step towards reaching a lasting peace. There is an undeniable link between foreign 
aid spending and peace agreements. A review of U.S. aid spending in the Middle East 
revealed an increase of aid to any country that country signed a peace agreement, including 
Syria in the 1970s, though the aid stopped as soon as the promise for peace failed to 
materialize. This case is apparent since the 1975 Sinai II and the 1978 Camp David 
agreements between Egypt and Israel, among many others. Such aid can be attributed as a 
reward for concessions, and as a means to support the leaders in implementing the agreement. 
In the case of Egypt, supporting Sadat was essential since his involvement in negotiations on 
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final settlement issues without the Palestinians, and without providing a serious plan to 
resolve the Israeli-Palestinian dispute alienated him and Egypt in the Arab World. By 
providing aid, the U.S. bound Egypt, and kept it well away from the Soviet Camp, and also 
gave Sadat the means to begin socioeconomic development of Egypt. Aid in this case serve a 
twofold purpose; neutralizing Egypt as a threat to Israel, since it was actually the only Arab 
country able to present a threat and to help Sadat sell the agreement to the Egyptian people. 
The same could not be said of the PLO. The research argued that this approach failed 
for a number of reasons, chief of which was the failure of the peace negotiations during this 
period to deliver answers to the larger political questions, particularly the final status between 
Israel and the Palestinians. The economic and social stability the U.S. paid for did not 
materialize due to extremist elements in both Israel and the Palestinian territories, which 
stagnated the peace negotiations and stood in the way of Palestinian economic and social 
development including the Palestinian economy’s reliance, or even dependence on Israel’s 
economy, as well as Israel’s virtual control on most aspects of the Palestinian economy in the 
territories. Corruption and mismanagement of donor assistance during this period contributed 
significantly to the failure of the development phase, and indeed foreign aid played a role in 
fueling this corruption as well. Finally, the last reason was the rise of a stubborn and capable 
opponent to Fatah in all aspects of Palestinian life, from social assistance and charity to 
armed struggle against Israel, Hamas virtually overtook Fatah in practically every aspect. 
The final phase, Security Phase, began with the Hamas’ electoral victory in 2006 and 
its takeover of the Gaza Strip a year later and it continues to the present. The objective in this 
phase is to ensure the survival of Mahmoud Abbas, and the peace camp by providing aid for 
security purposes, even though it was officially rendered under the umbrella of economic aid. 
During the third phase, the Israeli-Palestinian security coordination was elevated to higher 
levels, particularly after the creation of the Office of United States Security Coordinator for 
Israel and the Palestinian Authority (USSC). The objective of aid provided to the Palestinian 
Authority’s so-called “Dayton Army,” was to foster the security cooperation between the PA 
and Israel to prevent Palestinian militants from attacking Israel, and to ensure that what 
happened in Gaza in 2007 with Hamas’ takeover of the strip does not repeat itself in the West 
Bank. 
Of all the unpopular policies Abbas has adopted since coming to power in 2005, his 
unwillingness to compromise on this particular policy has been more detrimental to his 
standing than any other policy he has adapted or any statement he has made. Indeed, a year 
has passed since the PLO’s highest executive authority officially suspended this coordination, 
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it remains in effect to this day for Abbas’ refusal to stopping it or at least bringing it to 
minimum. Palestinians may forgive corruption, they might even forgive and forget the 
Goldstone scandal, but few are likely forget the fact that Palestinian blood was shed by 
Palestinians, for the protection of Israel. This is not to argue that Palestinians have not shed 
Palestinian previously. Far be it from anyone to deny that Palestinian factions have over the 
years killed other Palestinians for political reasons with equal fervor as they have killed 
Israelis, Lebanese, and Jordanians during the years of their revolution. But so far as the 
history of the Palestinian nationalist movement can reveal, no faction sided with Israel 
against other factions so openly and so proudly as Abbas, and by association Fatah, have 
done in recent years. 
The seriousness of Hamas’ threat to the West Bank’s regime is a matter of 
speculation, but neither Israel nor the U.S. were willing to take any chance in this regard. 
Hamas’ takeover of the Gaza Strip, and the subsequent expansion of its military capabilities 
has arguably represented the most serious threat to Israel since the 1973 War as the Islamist 
organization has developed its overall abilities and capabilities significantly since its electoral 
victory in 2006. Just as I write the words of this conclusion, Hamas’ television channel is 
broadcasting images and nationalist songs in an attempt to fuel this ongoing wave, or “Third 
Intifada,” and only few moments ago the movement revealed that they have four Israeli 
soldiers in custody after the 2014 War, although in the beginning they claimed to have had 
one only. Their “military media,” as they call it, have also become increasingly effective with 
radio and television stations and even a website with an excellent archive, surpassing the best 
of the PA’s websites in terms of quality and search results. 
The second of this study’s objectives was examining the impact of aid on the standing 
of the Palestinian peace camp under president Abbas. The U.S. has had a tendency not only 
to tie its aid program, but also to condition it upon the recipient meeting certain conditions 
and demands, or carrying out policy adjustments, or providing concessions, even the 
Marshall Plan aid, America’s greatest humanitarian endeavor, was tied and conditioned, 
though this fact is sometimes omitted from literature on the plan. The study found that not 
only does aid conditionality in this regard fail to achieve its objectives, but that it has had 
undesirable outcomes and consequences, the most important of which was undermining the 
popularity, and therefore the already weakened position of the peace camp in general, and 
president Abbas in particular. Fatah, which had dominated the Palestinian political scene 
since its official founding in the 1960s, finds itself divided, corrupt and second to Hamas in 
terms of popularity and support among Palestinians. According to most opinion polls 
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conducted in the last few months, Hamas’ candidates are the most likely winners of any 
presidential or legislative elections. The U.S. ought to be thankful that there is no prospect for 
elections in the near future at least. 
In order to explain these unintended consequences, from the U.S. perspective, the 
research studied a number of instances in which the U.S. used its foreign assistance to 
influence the course of events in the Palestinian territories. There are two ways in which the 
U.S. has done that; providing aid packages as incentives, or inducements; and the second is 
withholding aid until the Palestinian leadership came to its senses, and did what was required 
of it. The study has found that neither policy has achieved any tangible results. 
Using economic inducements to either gain policy adjustments or to gain concessions 
at the negotiations table has not been successful. The $34 billion aid package that was 
promised to Arafat did not succeed in tempting Arafat in accepting the offer that was 
supposedly made at Camp David. It was by far the most generous financial aid package ever 
promised to the Palestinians. However, while the promises of a negotiations package and 
financial support did succeed in convincing Abbas to postpone the vote on the Goldstone 
Report, the postponement enraged Abbas’ supporters and opponents alike, thereby 
reinforcing the image of his weakness and his willingness to accept American demands easily 
as he appeared complicit in protecting whom the Palestinians perceive as Israeli war 
criminals from being prosecuted in international criminal courts, despite how unlikely such 
prosecution is to take place. 
The second method to influence Palestinian politics is withholding foreign aid as 
punishment until the Palestinian leadership changed course. This study found that this 
method has been just as unsuccessful, if not indeed more so, but has yielded a positive 
outcome with respect to Abbas and Fatah’s position. The method entails threatening to 
suspend, and in some cases suspending foreign assistance to the Palestinian Authority. There 
are numerous examples of this particular use. The most prominent example of using foreign 
aid to gain policy concession was the Bush administration’s demands made of the PA after 
Hamas’s electoral victory in 2006. The administration suspended its entire foreign assistance 
until Hamas met the Quartet’s conditions, which included recognition of Israel, abandoning 
terrorism and a declaration that the new government would respect previously agreed 
agreements between Israel and the PA. 
Hamas met the third condition only, and the Bush administration, together with the 
EU, suspended all forms of assistance to the PA, creating a rather disastrous situation for the 
Palestinian economy and Palestinian people in the territories. Needless to say, the suspension 
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and subsequent blockade proved counterproductive, from American and Israeli point of view 
as it created a Rally Around the Flag effect, and saw Hamas’ popularity increase.  
Another instance of punishing the PA was threatening to suspend foreign aid when 
the latter sought to win diplomatic recognition for a Palestinian state at the United Nations 
and its organizations. The result was catastrophic for UNESCO, rather than the Palestinian 
Authority. The organization was forced to suspend many of its programs and perform budget 
cuts across the board. Abbas’ position and popularity in this period were actually 
strengthened as he appeared to be able resist American pressure and stand for what the 
Palestinians perceive as their principles and rights. But the bid for statehood went ahead all 
the same, and the PA has since made plans to join the International Criminal Court and other 
international organizations, which could, theoretically at least, threaten Israeli military and 
political leadership with war crimes charges for their actions in recent military confrontations 
in the Gaza Strip. 
As discussed in chapter five, the most recent use of withholding was reducing the aid 
intended for FY2016 by $80 million in response to what the U.S. perceives to be Abbas’ 
failure to stop the current wave of violence. Abbas and the “Dayton Army,” have actually 
done much in this regard. As the case of Faraj’s statement regarding stopping over 200 
planned attacks against Israelis in the last few months demonstrated. This has of course 
enraged the Palestinians further. At a time when they believe that their president should be 
supporting this “third uprising,” Abbas has come out time and again recently and praised the 
security coordination and vowing not to permit any protest against Israel. To most 
Palestinians, this wave of violence is a result of settlers’ actions in the West Bank and of the 
Israeli government’s unwillingness to make life easier for them, and Abbas simply seemed to 
be doing what they want him to do. This study does not advocate attacks against Israel or the 
Israelis, it simply argues that Abbas and his security apparatus have become alienated from 
the people who chose him to lead them. 
The Ugly American, the book that Kennedy was fond of and played a role in 
influencing him to reform the foreign assistance program when he came into office, has come 
to my mind more often than any other work used in this research. It is high time a new novel 
is published, though perhaps the new title should be the Blatantly Ignorant American. It 
seems that the Bush administration did not read the book, nor understand the principles it 
emphasized. Ignorance of local political and socioeconomic circumstances in the recipient 
country is essential to the success of any foreign aid program. Indeed, if the U.S. wished to 
provide development aid to country X, they should be aware of the economic situation in that 
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country, and how providing aid or withholding it would affect the political situation. It is not 
sufficient to just pour dollars into a society and hope that it would miraculously develop, not 
when the local leadership is so corrupt that money results in no tangible improvements in 
people’s lives. The simple truth regarding Abbas is that he has too far gone for the 
Palestinians to trust him again. His failure to handle American pressure is only part of the 
reason why Palestinians have come to place little faith in him. He seemed to jump from one 
folly to the next without even realizing it, or simply not caring. Few rational beings actually 
believe that the Palestine refugees would be allowed to return to their homes which they 
abandoned, or were forced to abandon, during the 1948 and the 1967 Wars, but there was no 
need for the Palestinian leader to blatantly say that he himself had given up the right to return 
as Abbas had done. Maybe he is just too realist for his own good. 
The aim of the study was to contribute to existing literature on foreign aid to the 
Palestinians by focusing on the political, rather than the economic impact of foreign aid, and 
to shed some light on the average Palestinians’ perspective on the consequences of aid, and 
their reaction and perception of their leadership’s ability or inability to resist the U.S.’s use of 
this tool. The hope is that this study will serve to inspire other scholars to explore these 
seriously understudied aspects of American foreign aid; recipient’s public opinion, and the 
political impact and consequences of aid. 
In conclusion, United States’ foreign aid program, and the use of this tool in the realm 
of foreign policy, though at times proves to have inconsistent policies, methods, and purpose, 
the fact that denial, or worse, ignorance more often than not proved detrimental to the goals 
and purpose of providing such large sums of tax money to Middle Eastern countries in 
general and the Palestinian Authority in particular. U.S. aid to the Palestinians is filled with 
problems and paradoxes and using it to advance American foreign policy objectives makes 
for an uncertain tool of statecraft at best. The research concludes that using aid in American 
foreign policy with respect to the Palestinians, is hardly fully thought-out, and its 
consequences, particularly the unintended, have proved to be more costly than beneficial.  
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